December 29, 2011

Kosovo Serbs: The Right To A Homeland

 

http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/12/29/63118604.html

Voice of Russia
December 29, 2011

Kosovo Serbs: the right to a Motherland
Alexander Vatutin

The outgoing year was a challenging one for Serbs living in densely populated areas of Kosovo and Metohija as they fought for their ethnic identity and the right to live in the land of their ancestors. The authorities in the Republic of Kosovo with the capital Pristina have been doing whatever they can to establish control over Kosovo and Metohija and continue the policy of "shadow" genocide irrespective of international agreements. The Voice of Russia's Alexander Vatutin reports.

Pristina makes no secret of its intention of gaining complete sovereignty over the whole of Kosovo. Given that the West is turning a blind eye to that, it is using the situation to its maximum advantage and most of the efforts in the direction of this goal were taken this year. Kosovo's Prime Minister Hashim Thaci said earlier that the Albanian authorities had no intention of granting Serb enclaves the right to self-determination.

Ethnic conflict expert Pavel Kandel has this to say.

"The Albanians will slowly press Kosovo Serbs out of the province. The birthrate among Albanians is fairly high. Given the current social tensions when half of young Albanians in the province are jobless, the easiest way to deal with the crisis is to put the blame on foreign neighbors."

Pristina attempted to get the administrative border of Kosovo and Serbia under its control. Pristina's authorities backed by the EU-led international police force used force against Kosovo Serbs who refuse to accept Pristina's sovereignty over their territories. The clashes that started this summer reached a culmination point at the end of November when KFOR international forces deployed in the province under the UN mandate readily supported the Albanians.

On February 15th 2012 Kosovo Serbs will take part in a referendum in which they will be asked whether they were willing to recognize Kosovo-Albanian authorities in the north of Kosovo. The positive outcome of the vote could lead to further actions of disobedience and the declaration of independence of Kosovo and Metohija. Belgrade might be unprepared for such a turn.

Driven to despair, Kosovo Serbs turned to Russia for Russian citizenship. Russia has to reject their request because Russian legislation doesn't stipulate this. However, Russian diplomacy has other means of influencing the events.

Balkan expert Pyotr Iskenderov comments.

"Russian diplomats could insist on restructuring the entire peacekeeping presence in the Balkans."

Eager to enter the EU, Belgrade de facto left Kosovo Serbs to their own devices. All throughout the year, Serbia made it a point to convince Brussels that it wouldn't meddle in the conflict between the Albanian majority and the Serb minority in Kosovo. However, in accordance with Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council which was adopted in 1999 and is still in effect, Serbia has the right to deploy troops in the Serb-populated areas of Kosovo. Apparently, Belgrade finds the mere thought of this appalling.

December 20, 2011

Kim Jong-il, by S. Trifkovic (Chronicles)

Kim Jong-il, the Leader from Hell

by Srdja Trifkovic • December 19, 2011

 

Kim Jong-il, the North Korean "Dear Leader" (as well as Secretary-General of the Workers' Party of Korea, Chairman of the National Defense Commission, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, etc, etc.) is dead at 69. The news that the diminutive leader of the most unpleasant despotism in the world is no longer going to regale us with his elevator shoes, oversize glasses and bouffant hairdo would be unworthy of attention, were it not for the existence of North Korea's nuclear arsenal and the anachronistic presence of U.S. troops in South Korea.

 

Kim was the son and heir of North Korea's long-term Communist dictator Kim Il-sung. He was born in late 1941 in the Soviet Far East, where his father commanded a Red Army brigade composed of Korean and Chinese exiles. His official biography was doctored, however, to claim that he was born on Korean soil in 1942, in an area controlled by the Communist resistance forces led by his father. Everything else that is officially known about him is also a lie, including the miraculous signs that supposedly attended his birth (according to the official North Korean News Agency it was accompanied by the appearance of a bright star in the sky and a double-rainbow that touched the earth), the details of his education, and the intricacies of his complex family life. What we do know is that he was a film buff with a collection of 20,000 foreign movies and a connoisseur of fine French cognacs, neither of which appears to have softened his propensity to cruelty and capricious eccentricity.

 

By 1982 Kim Sr. had bestowed on him several senior Party, legislative, and military posts. As heir-apparent he took the designation of "Dear Leader" and was hailed as "the worthy successor to the cause of the revolution." A grotesque personality cult was swiftly built around him, similar to the one enjoyed by his father, whom he succeeded on Kim Il-sung's death in 1994. Hymns were composed in his honor, his images were hewn into rocky mountainsides, and his pictures added to those of his father in every office, classroom, and home.

 

In the late 1990s Kim Jong-il invested heavily into the already bloated military (songun, "army first"), with an emphasis on the nuclear program which was crowned with an A-bomb test in 2006, and a second shortly after President Obama's inauguration. He pursued his father's ruinous economic policy of strict autarky ("self-reliance," juche) with fanatical zeal, effectively ending foreign trade even with North Korea's only foreign friend, China. Economic mismanagement eventually resulted in a catastrophic famine which is conservatively estimated to have claimed over two million lives, or ten percent of the population, by 1997.

 

In late spring 2009 Kim Jong-il started grooming his youngest son, Kim Jong-un (b., 1983), as his successor. The youngster was duly designated "The Brilliant Comrade," but since the rules of succession had not been formally announced prior to Kim Jong-il's death it is uncertain whether it will proceed uncontested. His ability to establish himself in power will depend primarily on the loyalty of the army top brass and the willingness of the narrow ruling elite—which includes several relatives from his grandfather's extended family—to respect Kim Jong-il's wishes. The first signs are encouraging for the youngster: the ruling party has called on the nation to unite "under the leadership of our comrade Kim Jong-un," and he was also named head of the committee that will oversee his father's funeral on December 28.

 

On the foreign front the successors will inherit a position fairly stable in the short term. Kim Jong-il proved a capable negotiator, extracting a series of American concessions in return for a halt to his nuclear weapons buildup. The U.S. put North Korea on its list of state sponsors of terrorism after North Korean agents planted a bomb that blew up a South Korean passenger jet in 1987, on Kim Jong-il's direct orders, according to one of the agents who was caught alive. In October 2008 the Bush Administration agreed to remove Pyongyang from its terrorism blacklist in return for the North's commitment to dismantle its nuclear program. The deal was reached within the framework of the six-party talks (China, Japan, Russia, the United States, North and South Korea), whereby Pyongyang agreed to allow teams of international inspectors to visit its Yongbyon plutonium-processing facility in return for much needed foreign aid.

 

Playing the nuclear card—the only one he had amidst economic ruin and political isolation—had paid handsome diplomatic and economic dividends to Kim Jong-il over the years. "When the history of this era is written," Graham Allison, a Harvard professor and expert on proliferation, was quoted in The New York Times as saying, "the scorecard will be Kim 8, Bush 0." But if "he was the greatest master of survival, against all odds," added Andrei Lankov, a North Korea expert at Kookmin University in Seoul, "it was his own people who paid the price, and the price was pretty high."

 

Whoever succeeds Kim, the United States should plan on withdrawing the remaining American troops from the Korean peninsula. It should be left to the countries immediately concerned—South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia—to deal with his successors to the best of their abilities. The U.S. response to Communist aggression in Korea in the summer of 1950 was fully justified. In the ensuing decades it was necessary to maintain U.S. forces in South Korea, as neither China nor the USSR could be relied upon to keep Kim Il-sung in check. Over the past three decades, however, the picture has been altered beyond recognition. China and Russia owe no favors to Pyongyang and are loath to underwrite its ruinous economic policies at home, let alone to condone any adventurism abroad. More importantly, South Korea is now one of the most powerful economies in the world. It has the financial and scientific wherewithal to become a first-class military power. It is more than capable of checking threats from North Korea, which remains mired in an Oriental brand of Stalinism—the most oppressive police state in the world, and one of the poorest in terms of per capita consumption.

 

As I noted in this column over three years ago, removing the American umbrella from South Korea would be beneficial to both sides because the U.S. would be disengaged from a spot where the dangers of continued military presence exceed benefits, while South Korea would be forced to end its dependence on Washington for its defense:

American withdrawal would prompt South Korea finally to become a mature, self-reliant regional power fully responsible for its self-protection, as befits one of the most highly developed industrial economies in the world. It would also force it to diversify its portfolio of foreign contacts, possibly leading to a Russian-South Korean or a Chinese-South Korean alliance, either of which is preferable to an open-ended American guarantee… America has no national interest in retaining troops in Korea or in continuing to protect Seoul. Old habits may die hard, but the 55-year habit of garrisoning South Korea has to be kicked because it is dangerous, expensive, and unnecessary. To the argument that South Korea's military is not strong enough to withstand the threat from the North, the answer is clear: only by removing our tripwire can America finally force South Korea to upgrade its military and to make its people assume the full economic and political burden of defending their own country. For exactly the same reason American troops should be removed from Japan and Germany. A strategic anachronism five decades old would thus be finally ended.

The above conclusions from October 2008 still stand, word for word. It is to be feared that the Obama Administration will not contemplate an American withdrawal from Korea because of its newly-fangled policy of encircling China, which is manifest in the decision to station U.S. Marines in Darwin, in northern Australia. In view of President Obama's sudden outburst of bellicose oratory at the sixth East Asian Summit in Bali last month (China must "play by the rules" and stop her "military advances," he declared, and the United States "will send a clear message to [the Chinese] that we think that they need to be on track in terms of accepting the rules and responsibilities that come with being a world power") the GIs will stay put along the 38th parallel for many years to come.

 

December 17, 2011

US Ambasador, what is bad in Kosovo

 

THE BELGRADE FORUM FOR A WORLD OF EQUALS

Belgrade, December 16th, 2011.

 

WHAT, REALY, IS VERY BAD IN KOSOVO?

 

WASHINGTON -- U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade Mary Warlick stated for Voice of America that progress has been made in the dialogue, but that Kosovo's participation in regional forums has not been resolved yet, as well as that it is very bad that there are barricades in Kosovo…

First of all, it is very bad to take way 15% of the Serbian state territory by force and hand it over to the former terrorist leader Hashim Tachi and co;

Second, it is very bad that the US government violated sovereignty and territorial integrity of FRY (Serbia), guarantied by UN SC resolution 1244 (1244) and Serbia's Constitution, by recognizing unilateral illegal secession of Prishtina and lobbying world-wide recognition of such an illegal act;

Third, it is very bad that the US established military base Bondstil in Kosovo, said to be the biggest US base in the world, immediately following the NATO aggression in 1999, without asking permission neither from Serbia to which the territory belongs, nor from UN SC which still has mandate over the Province;

Fourth, it is very bad that US government, having decisive role in KFOR and UNMIK, has done little if anything, to help uncover perpetrators of thousands of crimes against Serbs in Kosovo including abductions, disappearance and deaths of over 1.000 Serbs since KFOR/UNMIK took over full responsibility in the Province 1999;

Fifth, it is very bad, that the US obstructs return of contingents of Serbian Army and Police to Kosovo explicitly provided for by UN SC resolution 1244(1999);

Sixth, it is very bad that US government obstructs that investigation about human organs harvesting and trafficking, demanded by the Resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, as well as by the Government of Serbia, be conducted under UN SC and not EULEX mandate;

Seventh, it is very bad, that US Government, has done little if anything, to help free and safe return of about 230.000 of displaced Serbs and other non-Albanians to their native homes in Kosovo, as provided for in the UN SC resolution 1244 (1999);

Eighth, it is very bad that US State Secretary Hillary Clinton has just signed the document with Edita Tahiri about cultural monuments in Kosovo and Metohija, omitting to note that those monuments in over 90% of cases are monuments of Serbian culture, including Serbian medieval churches and monasteries some of which have been registered part of the world cultural heritage by UNESCO;

Ninth, it is very bad that illegal police and customs officers of illegal Prishtina entities have been transported by NATO military helicopters to the administrative line in Northern part of the Province, to establish state border within Serbia's state territory, using military force against civilian peaceful protesters and violating the will of the Serbian majority to remain free within Serbia.

Overall development following US sponsored NATO aggression against Serbia (and Montenegro ) 1999, is very bad, indeed. In Kosovo, but not only.

THE BELGRADE FORUM FOR A WORLD OF EQUALS

 

December 16, 2011

Russian convoy with aid for Kosovo resumes its way

Russian convoy with aid for Kosovo resumes its way

Topic: Kosovo problem

The humanitarian cargo weighing a total of 284 metric tons is to be taken to the Red Cross department in Kosovska Mitrovica

© RIA Novosti. Nikolay Sokolov

05:11 16/12/2011

MOSCOW, December 16 (RIA Novosti)

A Russian Emergencies Ministry convoy carrying humanitarian aid, blocked earlier on the border between Serbia and Kosovo, has resumed its way, a spokesman for the ministry said on Friday.

A total of 25 trucks carrying electric generators, blankets, clothes, food and cooking gear were blocked by the European Union Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) after rejecting an escort. The proposed escort included customs and police officers representing Kosovo, whose independence is not recognized by Russia.

"The convoy resumed its way on the territory of Kosovo at 4:00 Moscow time [0:00 GMT]," the spokesman said.

An agreement to unblock the situation around the convoy was reached last night at the Russia-EU summit.

The humanitarian cargo weighing a total of 284 metric tons is to be taken to the Red Cross department in Kosovska Mitrovica, the largest city in the predominantly Serb-populated northern Kosovo.

Kosovo, a landlocked region with a population of mainly ethnic Albanians, declared its independence from Serbia in February 2008. Ethnic Serbs account as much as 10 percent of Kosovo's two-million population.

Both Serbia and Russia do not recognize Kosovo's independence.

http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111216/170292067.html

December 14, 2011

Kremlin accuses EU of blocking humanitarian aid to Kosovo Serbs

Kremlin accuses EU of blocking humanitarian aid to Kosovo Serbs

Dec 14, 2011, 15:52 GMT

Moscow - Russia's Foreign Ministry on Wednesday accused the European Union of blocking 50 Russian lorries carrying badly-needed shipments of humanitarian aid to ethnic Serbs in Kosovo.

In a statement, the ministry said EU officials were 'using a variety of pretexts' to prevent the convoy from reaching its destination.

Seemingly artificial delays allegedly imposed by EU officials include their insistence on the convoy being escorted, as well as starting but not completing border crossing formalities for individual lorries, said Aleksandr Kanuzin, Russia's ambassador to Serbia, in comments to the news agency Interfax.

EU officials working on Kosovo's border are taking sides in the conflict between ethnic Serbs and Albanians in the region and 'playing political games,' Kanuzin said.

Russia in recent days has sent two groups of lorries loaded with 284 tons of power generation equipment, stoves, blankets and food for ethnic Serbs in Kosovo.

The first convoy, dispatched on December 7, has been blocked at Kosovo's northern border, the Interfax reported.

The lorry shipments followed a Russian airborne aid delivery on November 17.

 

http://www.monstersandcritics.com/news/europe/news/article_1680800.php/Kremlin-accuses-EU-of-blocking-humanitarian-aid-to-Kosovo-Serbs

December 13, 2011

Serbia Vice-PM: Sneaky EU Wants Us to Recognize Kosovo

Serbia Vice-PM: Sneaky EU Wants Us to Recognize Kosovo

Bulgaria in EU | December 13, 2011, Tuesday| 426 views


Serbian vice-PM Ivica Dacic has criticized the EU of not been committed in earnest to the membership of his country. Photo by EPA/BGNES

Serbian citizens and government should face the reality that the EU's requirement for membership is Serbia's recognition of the Kosovo's independence, said vice-PM and Interior Minister Ivica Dacic.

"Let us stop fooling ourselves. Recognizing Kosovo's independence is EU's requirement," said Dacic Tuesday at a conference on security in Belgrade, reports Serbian agency Blic.

The Serbian Minister's words come after Serbia failed to get a much-expected official EU candidate status at the European Council end of last week.

Tuesday Dacic criticized the EU of "betraying the expectations of Serbia's citizens" and of changing its radically switching its requirements in the process of EU integration.

"In 2000, when talks started, no one put on the table the question of Kosovo's independence, while 11 years later we cannot even get a candidate status," remarked the Serbian Minister of Interior.

Dacic recalled that Serbia removed Slobodan Milosevic from power, installed key internal reforms, fully cooperated with the Hague International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, and adopted a number of declarations relating to misdeeds during the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s - all requirements for the EU integration process.

"If the European Union is no longer looking for enlargement, it better say so," quipped the Serbian Interior Minister, adding that he is fully supportive of the EU integration of his country, given it will not breach key national interests.

This is the first statement so far by a senior Serbian official admitting that recognizing the independence of breakaway province of Kosovo is a de facto requirement by the European Union.

http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=134818

December 07, 2011

Violation of Human rights of Serbs in the Province of Kosovo and Metohija


Zivadin Jovanovic,

President of the Belgrade Forum for a World of Equals, Serbia

 

 

 Violation of Human rights of Serbs in the Province of Kosovo and Metohija

 

- Theses for a case study -

 

(Paper presented at the International Conference "Human Rights with the view to building a Culture of Peace", held in Sao Paolo, Brazil, on 2nd and 3rd of December 2011)

 

It is true that the struggle for peace and the struggle for full respect of universal human rights, as defined by UN Declaration on protection of human rights, are interdependent and non-separable. Threats to peace, violations of sovereignty and territorial integrity, military interventions, aggressions and occupations go hand in hand with massive violations of the basic human rights.

It is clear that there are no humanitarian military interventions. 

NATO military aggression against Yugoslavia (Serbia) in the spring 1999 was launched to allegedly protect human rights of Kosovo Albanians. It was the first of that sort and without approval of UN Security Council. The precedent was used later in various other parts of the world whenever it suited the interests of USA and NATO: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. There are threats that it may be used against Syria, Iran or any other country.

NATO aggression against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1999 left close to 4000 dead and more tan 10.000 wounded,  two thirds of whom where civilians including close to 1 hundred children. NATO forces were using missiles with depleted uranium, causing massive cancer disease, deformation of newly-born babies unknown before polluting of soil, water and food production for unbelievable period of four billion years. Economic damage caused by aggression was estimated to an amount over one hundred billion dollars.

 

Immediately after the end of the aggression, USA constructed on Serbian soil in Kosovo and Metohija the biggest American base in the world known as Bondstill. This was the beginning of mushrooming of USA and NATO military basis all over the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

 

Today there are more USA and NATO military basis in Europe than any time during the Cold War Era.

 

Why now?

 

Warsaw military block has been disbanded. There are no adversary social-political systems, all apparently are democratic. Who to defend and where from by long range ballistic rockets carrying nuclear heads?

 

The overall economic, financial, political and moral crises of the leading countries of the West may lead to further spreading interventionism and total disregard of the basic principles of international relations. The crises have already caused the most massive violation of human rights such as the right to employment, education, health, information.


Shortly after NATO "humanitarian" aggression on Yugoslavia (Serbia), it became clear that intervention actually resulted in an unprecedented scale of violation of human rights of Serbs and non-Albanians of Kosovo and Metohija Province. Alliance between NATO and the Albanian terrorists and separatists during the military aggression (KLA), continued ever since and reached its peak in February 2008 by unilateral proclamation of illegal secession of the Province from Serbia. This act would never be possible without NATO aggression and support. It violated the basic principles of the national and international laws, UN Charter and UN Security Council's resolution 1244 (1999) which guaranties sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia.

The consequences are that Kosovo and Metohija after 12 years of being under UN mandate continues to be the source of instability, organized international crime and spring board of extremism and terrorism toward the rest of Europe.

 

The Province of Kosovo and Metohija is birth place of Serbian nation, culture, religion and the state. Thousands of Serbian medieval monuments witness to this. There are two large communities living in the Province - Kosovo Serbs, who are Orthodox Christians, and Kosovo Albanians, great majority of whom are Moslems. Before the beginning of the Second World War Serbian population in the Province were majority. Today, Serbs make less than 10 percent of the total population of the Province.  The drastic change in national structure was due to the policy of ethnic cleansing of Serbs over decades if not centuries - first by Turkish Empire which occupied the Province for about 500 years, then by Tito's anti-Serbian policy, by fascist-Nazi occupation forces (1941 – 1945) of Mussolini and Hitler and finally by NATO aggression and occupation which continues up to these days.

UN Security Council Resolution 1244, of June 10, 1999 put the end of the NATO aggression but introduced military occupation of the Province, formally by international UN mandated forces (KFOR), in reality by NATO forces. Ever since June 1999, we have been witnessing large scale of individual and even institutionally-sponsored violation of basic human rights and freedoms of Kosovo Serbs. This continued in spite of any new adopted legislation which endorsed and made applicable in Kosovo all international human rights instruments.

 

Here are examples of major human rights violations.

 

No free and safe return for 250,000 displaced Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija

After June 1999, International Red Cross noted some 250,000 Serbs and other non-Albanians who had been expelled by terror, intimidation and ethnic cleansing leave their birth places and homes in Kosovo and Metohija. Current UNHCR data show return of some 18,000 Serbs, but in reality this number is some 6,000, or 2.1%. UN Mission and other international stakeholders organized the process of the return, but no results. Therefore, Serbia remains the country with the highest number of refugees and displaced persons in the whole of Europe.

No justice for the victims

After June 1999, close to 1,000 Serbian and other non-Albanian civilians have been abducted and eventually killed. Many of them were abducted in their working places. In July 1999, 14 people, including children, in the village of Staro Gracko were killed while harvesting in the field. In the winter 2002, a bomb was planted and set-off under a passenger bus killing many Serb passengers. In August 2003 a group of Serbian children playing by the river in village of Gorazdevac, were killed. Thousands of other crimes against Serbs in the Province have been committed and non of the culprits brought to justice although justice and police are directly managed by UN and EU missions (UNMIK, EULEX).

Human organs trafficking

In December 2010, Special Rapporteur of the Parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe, Swiss MP Dick Marty, published Report on trafficking of human organ of abducted Serbs in 1999. The Parliamentary Assembly adopted the Report and passed Resolution demanding independent international investigation. So far no results because the people involved in this organized crime are Kosovo Albanian top politicians, former leaders of the terrorist KLA (UCK). They enjoy support and protection from Washington, London and Berlin.

There is great need to for public preasure that the investigation in the human organs trafficking in Kosovo and Metohija be conducted under auspices of UN Security Council without further delay.

Illegal occupation of Serbian-owned property

After June 1999, Kosovo Albanians simply occupied all immovable and movable possession of 250,000 Serbs who left Kosovo, but also of Serbs who remained. Often, owners were either killed or expelled by force from their properties. In September 1999, the UN founded a body that was supposed to facilitate return property to legal owners, the Housing and Property Directorate, but there are no results.

 

General insecurity

Since June 1999, there was almost no freedom of movement outside the so-called enclaves in which Serbs found their safety in numbers, except in military-guarded convoys. Today Serbs still cannot access their businesses and land without risk of being attacked end even killed. They still cannot go churches and cemeteries without KFOR military escort.

 

Rewriting history

Ever since NATO aggression in 1999, there has been systematic distraction of any traces of Serbian monuments and Christianity in Kosovo. Some 150 Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries have been destroyed, originating from as early as 13th and 14th centuries, including some from the UNESCO List of World Heritage. In addition, there has been a wide-spread exercise to rename remaining churches and monasteries as "Byzantine" or "Albanian", or "Albanian castles and towers". There is a current diplomatic battle going on in UNESCO, where Kosovo Albanians try to present this cultural heritage as heritage of Kosovo what is absurd. 

 

 

Violation of right to health

Kosovo Albanian authorities have been stopping and seizing shipments of medical equipment and medical drugs intended for medical facilities in Serbian enclaves. In addition, they have been willfully and intentionally trying to worsen situation for Serbian populated areas, by cutting the electric power supply. For three years in the row, in winters of 2005, 2006 and 2007, they have been cutting power supply to Serbian enclaves on the pretext of payment etc. They have been rejecting offers of Serbian government for humanitarian and free-of-charge electric power supply, thus exposing population to health hazards. In 2009, they have stopped power supply to the Serbian enclave of Strpce in the southernmost part of Kosovo for three months, pressing local population to sign new contracts. Unfortunately, none of international stakeholders voiced any concerns over this act.

 

Violation of right to education

Since June 1999, all cities and towns in Kosovo except Mitrovica in the north were ethnically cleansed and became mono-ethnically Albanian. Serbs and other ethnic groups were driven to villages. School facilities were inaccessible for Serbian schoolchildren. They had to resort to inadequate premises for schools. However, most drastic situation is in Gorani community. The Goranis are local Serbian speaking ethnic group of Muslim belief, who have been exposed to incessant assimilation attempts and forced to accept Albanian language and Albanian curriculum. This pressure still goes on.

 

Let me sum up what has been said:

 

Struggle for peace and struggle for social, economic, political and cultural human rights are invisible tasks of peace movements and all peace loving forces.

Freedom, equality in rights and opportunities and independence of states and nations are preconditions for full respect of human rights as provided for in the UN GS Declaration on human rights.

Liberal corporate capitalism in its imperialistic stage is the chief source of massive violation of the basic human rights of the mankind.

Global economic, financial, political and moral crisis of the western societies is accompanied by the most massive violation of the basic human rights after the end of the Second World War.

Global interventionism, wars and violations of human rights, disrespect of the international law and abuse of United Nations are immanent features of corporate capitalism.

There are no humanitarian military interventions whatsoever.

NATO has become the most dangerous tool for massive violation of human rights in the second half of XX and first decade of XXI centuries. Therefore NATO as remnant of the cold war area should be dismantled, including all its military bases all over the world.

Abuse of human rights for spreading domination of imperialism is impermissible and should be stopped.

Territorial integrity and sovereignty of each country should be fully respected in the interest of peace and stability. Natural and economic resources are subject to the sovereign rights and sole control of concrete countries and can not be excuse for any intervention into internal affairs.

The role of the UN, respect of the UN Charter and UN GS Declaration on protection human rights should be reaffirmed and reinforced.

The sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia should be respected and UN SC resolution 1244 (1999) fully implemented.

Unilateral secession of Serbian Province of Kosovo and Metohija is not acceptable and should not be recognized. We call for peaceful solution of the issue of the status respecting UN SC resolution 1244 and equal human rights of all inhabitants of the Province.

All Serbs and other non-Albanians expelled from the Province after NATO aggression should be given all necessary conditions for free and safe return to their homes in the Province.

The use of the missiles with depleted uranium should be formally banned by international convention.

 

 

December 04, 2011

There will be no stability in the Balkans without Serbia

http://www.euinside.eu/en/faces/there-will-be-no-stability-in-the-balkans-without-serbia#ixzz1fbfRtVU3

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=7TUHOmEgnS0

There will be no stability in the Balkans without Serbia

An interview with Konstanty Gebert, Head of the Warsaw office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, who was in Bulgaria for a few days. We met at the Polish embassy to talk about the Western Balkans, because Mr Gebert was a correspondent to the region for many years and is still very interested in the developments there. The reason why the Western Balkans was the topic was that at the European Council on December 9th, it is expected the EU to give or deny green light for starting accession talks with Serbia and Montenegro. There are growing fears that Serbia might get a "no", judging from the speech of German Chancellor Angela Merkel on Friday. In the meantime, there was another interesting development that we discussed with Konstanty Gebert - Bosnia has decided to file an application for EU membership. And while we were discussing the woes of the EU, of Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia, we several times spoke about Russia and Turkey too.

euinside: We're here with Konstanty Gebert, Head of the Warsaw office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, a former journalist ...

Konstanty Gebert: Well, a current journalist still, please, I still have a column.

euinside: Yes, you do, well a journalist is always a journalist actually ... who was a correspondent to the Western Balkans for quite a lot of time. So, he obviously knows our region very well. And there is a very important summit coming up for the Western Balkans. A lot of countries wait for some very important decisions to be taken at the European Council on December 9 and this is what we are going to talk with Mr Gebert right now about. So, you've been to the Western Balkans in many countries in the region for a long time, during the war too, how do you find the region right now?

Konstanty Gebert: Well, it's almost to have you wonder that there is still "a region", the countries are moving at different speeds and different directions. I've returned from Pristina 2 weeks ago. Pristina was unexpectedly, strikingly optimistic in terms of activity and dynamism and, if you travel from Pristina to Sarajevo, you can see just how badly things can go - Sarajevo is still a depressed city. Sarajevo is still a city that has lost the war. So, the Western Balkans are travelling in different directions and obviously from the perspectives from over here the European summit will be about the Western Balkans, except that in Brussels nobody knows that. The European summit will be about the future of the euro, the Western Balkans are an afterthought, they are an item on the agenda. And this is characteristic I think of the very disparate visions of the Western Balkans, depending on where from you look at them.

euinside: Do you think that from this perspective, because since you mentioned the crisis and this is an issue we cannot avoid talking about, this could in some way overshadow and change the perspective the EU leaders have on the Balkans?

Konstanty Gebert: Well, it already has. The Western Balkans, as I said, are an afterthought. And in a way, if they matter at all right now, they matter within the context of the crisis. That is one argument for continuing involvement with the Western Balkans is the reflection that if people still want to join, maybe we're not in as bigger mess as we think we are, right? But basically the discussion will be about the crisis and it frankly should, and also we have to realise that enlargement fever has gone quite some time ago.

euinside: Maybe it went away with Bulgaria's and Romania's accession?

Konstanty Gebert: Yes, there is a consensus that this happened too quickly and we don't want to repeat a mistake, if a mistake there was, so what you have is a breakdown of the previous European consensus, which essentially said that enlargement was good for everybody. And you've got enlargement sceptical countries, like Finland, Netherlands but also Germany probably. Pro-enlargement countries, like Poland and Britain, which are pro-enlargement because of their own national interest agenda, and the enlargement in different majority that really cannot be bothered with that local Western Balkans issues when their entire house is in flames.

euinside: And from the Western Balkans' perspective, because during the war and the years after that they were in a way under the spotlight of European and international community attention, do you think that it's possible that they now feel abandoned?

Konstanty Gebert: Certainly they do. And it's a legitimate feeling but feelings don't change much in politics. That is safe if Serbia were to say "well, look we were kind" and they did, so where's our reward, and after all Serbia is obviously a part of the European mainstream, whatever it is Serbia is part of it, right? And the answer is tough luck, really.

euinside: Bad moment, bad timing ...

Konstanty Gebert: Bad moment, bad timing. Also the Kosovo issue, which is still a hot issue. It is a problem and a legitimate problem but it doesn't bother Kosovo alone.

euinside: Yes, but if you remember the EU was cautious and even denied that Serbia has to recognise Kosovo's independence but now they're quite directly saying that this is a precondition.

Konstanty Gebert: Well, maybe it's said officially it's a precondition and I don't really think it's about recognising Kosovo but preventing Kosovo from being an issue. After all not all the EU members have recognised Kosovo. Recognising Kosovo is not a precondition but disarming Kosovo, stopping Kosovo from being an issue is. And there is an analogy one of the reasons why Transylvania didn't blow up was that both Hungary and Romania were extremely aware that if there is any problem whatsoever with Transylvania the EU, at the time just the EC, isn't even going to think who's responsible what the problem is. Brussels would just say - go away and come back once this is no longer an issue. This is what the EU now wants from Serbia in terms of Kosovo.

euinside: The same approach. Because they said quite directly with their October progress report that Serbia is OK to start negotiations but it needs to solve its issues with Kosovo. So, you think that this doesn't necessarily mean recognising Kosovo's independence?

Konstanty Gebert: No. There is no legal basis for the EU to demand that a candidate country diplomatically recognise some other country. However, the EU says "we've got enough problems the way it is. If brining Serbia in means bringing in an unresolved Kosovo problem, then we don't want it". However, this doesn't mean that Belgrade needs to recognise Pristina but what it does mean is that Belgrade cannot be seen as part of the problem regarding Kosovo. Right now it still is, even if Tadic finally made that declaration calling on the Serbs to abandon the roadblocks. This came in very late and, well, the Serb state is still involved.

euinside: When saying that this came very late, could we consider this as last ditch effort to gain approval at the Council and can we say that actually they're doing this because of that and then, once they get the green light again return to this practise?

Konstanty Gebert: They're obviously doing it because of that, but they're also doing it because part of the Serb political elites and elite part of Serbia's population recognise that Kosovo is lost. Serbia will not be the first country in Europe to have suffered territorial losses. Speaking of the Hungarians or even the Poles for that matter, right?

euinside: Bulgarians too.

Konstanty Gebert: Bulgarians too, absolutely. The question really is where does Serbia want to be. If Serbia wants to be part of Europe, then regardless of the rights and wrongs it cannot enter Europe with that territorial issue still open. Full stop. This simply doesn't add up, right? If Serbia does not want to be part of the EU, that's perfectly understandable - the EU isn't exactly looking like the sexiest joint in town right now but if not in the EU where? There doesn't seem to be an alternative geopolitical space in Europe ...

euinside: The Eurasian Union? No, just joking.

Konstanty Gebert: It is a funny joke out east, you know but does anybody want to join the Eurasian Union out of their own?

euinside: I don't thinks so.

Konstanty Gebert: ... with the possible exception of the population of Mitrovica, where 30,000 people have already made applications for Russian citizenship, as you know. The idea is that if we have enough Russian citizens the Russian army will protect us.

euinside: Well, it was a joke actually but if you remember it was not that long ago when Serbia used to say 'well, we have good relations with Russia, why do we need the EU?'

Konstanty Gebert: Well, this is I think one of the curses of Serbian history because Serbia occasionally likes to think it has good relations with Russia but I'm not terribly sure if Russia is that concerned of having good relations with Serbia. It has been largely a one-way street. And of course it's fun to say - how many are you - well, together with the Russians we are 200 million, right. It doesn't work that way. Look at the Russian citizenship issue. Russia has encouraged, in fact, the Serbs of Kosovo to apply, while they often said they were examining those applications very closely which is nonsense. Under the Russian law those applications cannot be considered. By Russian law you can have Russian citizenship if you have been resident on Russian territory for 5 years, or if you're entitled to Soviet citizenship. None of these conditions apply in Mitrovica. Those applications simply cannot be considered and this should be the honest response that Moscow should give to the extremely unfortunate people living in Mitrovica, but they are toying with their hopes, which I find extremely indecent thing to do. But this is a good metaphor for the way that Russia has relations with Serbia, while Serbia might genuinely think they are a friend and a partner, but certainly this is a one way street. So, I don't really see much whittle room for Serbia. We'll see what the spring elections will bring and this will be the ultimate test, regardless of what happens in Brussels.

euinside: This obviously is a very difficult test, given our own, in Bulgaria, relations with Russia - 20 years on we are still, as a society, quite divided to russiaphiles and russiaphobes, which actually is not an actual debate, because as far as we see the political and geopolitical evolution in the EU a lot of former socialist countries actually start looking at Russia quite pragmatically. But to leave Russia aside, do you think there is a risk, while focusing on the Serbia-Kosovo issue that the attention might be distracted from other issues Serbia has, with, you know, the judicial system, other reforms? Do you think there is a risk of that?

Konstanty Gebert: I don't think there is a risk of Brussels overlooking all the other issues.

euinside: That's an important point.

Konstanty Gebert: This is the salient issue in public opinion and indeed in the political sphere right now because, as long as Kosovo remains a hot potato, this is going to be a no-go. However, assuming that some kind of pragmatic solution can be found, and with some good will it can be found, but the Kosovars are not making totally unrealistic demands either, then everything else still remains on the table - judiciary, internal affairs, economy - and Serbia is not in better shape or even as good shape as Romania and Bulgaria were.

euinside: Well, this is worth arguing, because if you travel by car through Serbia you will see the pace with which they build highways, for example, unlike Bulgaria which never had war and had 22 years of quietness to do a lot things, while Serbia had war but still they're trying to build that infrastructure bridge to the EU.

Konstanty Gebert: Infrastructure is looking better. I believe that systematic corruption in Serbia is actually worse than in Bulgaria. That's an open discussion.

euinside: It is.

Konstanty Gebert: And none of the two would be a great compliment. But they actually think that unfortunately for everybody on this point Serbia is in a worse situation than Bulgaria and these issues that will go away even if a compromise over Kosovo is found. But this is a different debate because until, or unless, the Kosovo hurdle is cleared then discussing corruption or even highways is simply not relative. But once the Kosovo hurdle is cleared, then, yes, all those petty details will be on the table and the Montenegro precedent - where the idea is now to revise all those negotiations and have the most difficult dossiers at first - well, if this is implemented and I think it will be and should be implemented it will also be implemented in respect to Serbia. So, all those issues are still on.

euinside: OK, to conclude with Serbia, what do you think will be the implications for Serbia itself if the European Council would decide "OK, you're not ready yet"?

Konstanty Gebert: My fear is that this would mean a massive nationalist victory in the spring elections and something that I had called at the time Weimar Serbia. Let's face it - there will be no stability, no peace and no genuine cooperation on the Balkans without the Serbs. Full stop. You cannot pretend they're not there, you cannot ignore also the legitimate grievances they have, it's an issue. But this needs Serbia that is willing to engage in genuine deadlock and also make compromises and also acknowledge its own evils.

euinside: So, it could be a kind of carrot if ...

Konstanty Gebert: ... If ...

euinside: ... because we're talking about negotiations not full membership, right?

Konstanty Gebert: Right, but negotiations themselves have preconditions and if Serbia turns inwards. If it reacts with a kind of classical Serb reactions "they don't understand us and, in fact, they don't deserve us". "They should be glad we want to be part of the club". That will be bad for Serbia, it will be bad for the Balkans and I believe it will be bad for Europe. Serbia is part of Europe, the European project is not only economic and not even only political. It is also a cultural sphere that Serbia is a full member of. So, a soaking Serbia, inwards looking Serbia and a Serbia that is excluded, and therefore left to rot, could become eventually again a destabilising factor on the Balkans.

euinside: That's quite dangerous.

Konstanty Gebert: That's very dangerous both for the Serbs and for the Balkans and for Europe at large.

euinside: This is quite logical that we go for the next country, I think it is very important that we discuss, and that's Bosnia and Herzegovina because, although the European Commission report from October said actually no progress at all in any field almost, now Bosnia said it wanted to file an application for EU membership. How do you see these two things combined?

Konstanty Gebert: I don't and I think that in Bosnia a great deal of responsibility is of our side, that is of the side of the EU. Dayton was a quick fix. Dayton was about stopping a war and nobody really thought in the long term what saddling Bosnia, with such an improbable constitution, will entail. What Dayton did was in fact to perpetuate the status quo. That is cove up Bosnia into ethnic statelets, most of them run by criminal mobs. And to make sure that the situation will remain permanent. I think it is extremely indicative that, while there was no problem at all in integrating the Bosnian army, which today is integrated, professional and actually has a contingent in Iraq. This army, that's made up of two armies that fought a very bitter civil war. Integrating the police forces is a non-go because the police forces in each of the entities and are the major stabilising factor for whoever is locally in power, and the local power elites hate each other, as they may for political reasons, cooperate very closely on the basis of groups of interest, right. You won't touch my mob and I won't touch your mob.

euinside: Do you think that the EU is actually realising that mistake?

Konstanty Gebert: Oh yes, we are very conscious of it, nobody has a bright idea ...

euinside: But there is no signal for a change of approach.

Konstanty Gebert: But nobody has a bright idea how to change approach. The hope was that such an impulse would come from within Bosnia and would be stronger, so that the EU could support it. But this didn't happen and not because there were not impulse, there were but the EU was too distracted and not politically courageous enough to take the risks that it takes and support a movement from within, which was aimed at changing the status quo. By now the status quo is quite old, it's very entrenched and many Bosnians have decided that they have to cooperate with it, even if it's absurd, because obviously nothing better will be around. So we have a permanently dysfunctional state, which is stabilised mainly by the fact that the international community, which essentially means the EU, accepts its dysfunctionality, this is done at the expense of its citizens and at the expense of chances for long-term stability. I think this is a pretty shameful situation.

euinside: So we are now in a crossroads because with Bosnia filing an application the EU actually has two options - whether to come up with a new proposal, a new approach or to accept Bosnia's application and start negotiations, which will actually stamp Bosnia forever in this.

Konstanty Gebert: There is always an optimistic perspective and the optimistic perspective, which wasn't totally ludicrous, was that once Bosnia eventually was in all the way it is would become an EU member. Then all this would become irrelevant within a broader European context. This might have been the case with an activist and rich and stable EU. This certainly is not the case today. The EU would simply not have the resources or indeed the political will or interest to nurse Bosnia back to political health if and whether it joins the EU. So, in a way it almost doesn't matter whether Bosnia's application will be accepted or rejected because Bosnia, as it is, cannot join the EU. Full stop.

euinside: Then why do you think is this decision of Mr Izetbegovich to file this application?

Konstanty Gebert: I think he is sending us the bill. This is entirely legitimate. He says "you, guys, have been the co-creators of this mess or not. We are the Bosnia that have fought up. So, that's the Bosnia you get".

euinside: It's your problem now, you solve it.

Konstanty Gebert: It's also your problem. It will be extremely foolish of Bosnian leaders to say "it's your problem" because ultimately a country is never anybody's problem before being a problem for its own citizens, right? Whoever is responsible for the mess the citizens are those who ultimately have to solve it. But the EU cannot pretend it's not co-responsible and that said Izetbegovich said - he said 'OK guys, own up'.

euinside: So, it's difficult to predict what the EU's move would be?

Konstanty Gebert: It's difficult to predict. I'd rather think it will be a rejection for procedural matters and also because the EU today is a much more brutal place than it was, say, five years ago. 5 years ago we were all politically correct and fluffy and nice.

euinside: And that obviously is set aside.

Konstanty Gebert: Well look, when it comes to the money nicety is set aside, so right now it's cutting to the bone and I don't think the EU is going for political correctness anymore.

euinside: And no patience at all with the current crisis?

Konstanty Gebert: No, for obvious reasons.

euinside: And Montenegro - it's a very strange case in all this jigsaw puzzle.

Konstanty Gebert: In a way Montenegro is too small to matter one way or the other. Given the fact that it actually has made a substantial progress, and given the fact that it's probably the only country where there is no unavoidability tray. There are great fears in Brussels when opening yet another chapter and lightning another green light, is that there will be a dynamism that would become unstoppable. But Montenegro can be stopped at any stage precisely because it's small. Therefore, the decision abut Montenegro will be not really so much about Montenegro itself but about keeping the European project going. And I think it will cheer everybody up in Brussels that somebody still wants to join. So, why not give Montenegro the go ahead. It's not dangerous and if Brussels changes it mind then it changes its mind - there will be no big price to pay.

euinside: Do you share the vision that with Croatia joining, because you know the background of all these grim events will be a celebration on the 9th of December with the ceremony on the signing of Croatia's treaty, but do you share that vision that Croatia would be a kind of stimulus for all the countries in the region?

Konstanty Gebert: In a normal world, yes. In a way, if it was still a very open game, that is you play by the rules, you meet the conditions, you're automatically in - then, yes, Croatia should add this kind of impulse effect on everybody else. But it's no longer the case. The rules are shifting, the EU is in a process of profound transformation. If it emerges victorious from this present situation, this will mean that the sovereignty shift to Brussels for any new members will be much bigger than originally imagined. If we do not solve our crisis, I think we'll become much less attractive. Incidentally, if we don't solve our crisis, if the EU breaks up into what is called a two-speed Europe, I think the terms are not normal because there wouldn't be a two-speed Europe there will be a multi-speed Europe, which will mean that there will be a core Europe around the euro, much more integrated economically, which means politically, than it is today and then there will be the periphery, which ...

euinside: ... which is obviously not that attractive for the countries in the Western Balkans.

Konstanty Gebert: Yes, and now because the periphery will not be moving at a uniform speed, which will mean that in fact we will have a reduced core Europe - the euro and - and then a kind of grey zone in which being formally a EU member or not will not make such a huge difference as it makes today, because what will really matter if you're part of the euro or not. And this might reduce the attractiveness of joining the EU because the real issue will be joining the eurozone. Then Montenegro and Kosovo will say 'we're there already'. Well, it's not serious - they have simply adopted the euro as a national currency but that doesn't mean they have influence over the eurozone but this will change the political geography of Europe so profoundly that the Croatian impulse will just get lost amongst the rising cacophony.

euinside: Because it seems like a notion to the actually good competition between different countries, like it was with Bulgaria and Romania - look, how the Romanians are going and we have to catch up and they - vice versa. But the countries in the region are so much different, so it's very difficult to make such a competitions fruitful.

Konstanty Gebert: Right. Especially as the price is no longer that clear.

euinside: Yes, precisely because no longer ... and they have this kind of sense 'what kind of a Union are we joining?'. And for the Croatians it's a little bit 'maybe we've managed to catch the last train' but what about the others?

Konstanty Gebert: It's not so much a question of catching trains but do we really want to go where the trains are going.

euinside: Indeed, because for us it was the last train but for them it is - is this the right train.

Konstanty Gebert: What it might simply mean is that there will be a cooling off period for everybody, a wait-and-see period. There is a great deal of integrating structures operating in the Western Balkans already. If you think of the classical intermediary vision of Europe of totally southern nation states those totally southern nation states don't exist anywhere in the continent even if you're not part of Europe, of the political Europe, of the EU, you're still connected with it - with the different treaties you've ratified, different procedures you've adopted. So, the kind of completely southern world is simply no longer there. So what it might mean is that this intermediary phase might last a couple of years longer until the EU sorts out its own mess one way or the other. The urgency is no longer really there in the sense that the Western Balkans are in fact already today an EU enclave - they are surrounded by the EU. It might turn out a kind of piecemeal arrangement that will be made will provide satisfactory enough for both sides to survive that period of transition and once the new EU architecture is clear, it will be much clearer for everybody - do we want to join and what is the price of joining.

euinside: I really, not that I wanted that our conversation to be optimistic, but with these developments in the EU we did not sound optimistic at all.

Konstanty Gebert: No, but usually the idea was - well you, guys, in the West, in the EU, you've got it made and you're simply denying us our slice of the pie. This is no longer the conversation. The pie is disappearing as we speak, the EU is not that golden standard of success that it was.

euinside: What is actually worrying me is that so far the European integration and the so called European perspective was the main driver of reforms. Now these countries need another driver of reforms and it is still not on the horizon.

Konstanty Gebert: I was always kind of sceptical of selling public opinions the idea that we don't really want to do this but big bad Brussels is forcing us. The idea is so, say, freedom of expression is not really what we wanted to have but we have to have it to show it to Brussels or free trade, or gender equality, or lack of corruption. I mean Brussels doesn't impose anything that could honestly be objected to from an internal perspective. I think Turkey is interesting because, while Turkey has officially shifted course from Brussels and now it says 'we're not really sure if we're interested' but they continue with the internal reform progress ...

euinside: ... for their own sake.

Konstanty Gebert: Those things are good. It also happens that Brussels wants them.

euinside: Yes, but Turkey has the economic driver, it has the economic power now, maybe that's one of the reasons why.

Konstanty Gebert: But it's also one of the consequences. Turkey wasn't that brilliant shape a dozen years ago. One of the reasons why Turkey has become a local economic power house is that it has not only endorsed but actually implemented so much of the economic and structural reforms that Brussels demanded. So, if Turkey were to become a role model, those things actually work. It's not just some fancy window dressing that is an unreasonable demand from Brussels, it makes sense, even if we don't join the Union still makes sense. And Turkey apparently is more than happy to play the role of a mentor, so maybe Turkey in the interim could assume this role.

euinside: Well Turkey is still a topic taboo for this region actually, where we are still not quite evolved to accept the realities.

Konstanty Gebert: But we have to. Russia is a taboo, was a taboo topic for Poland, say. Because the psychological relationship was similar. Actually I would prefer to have Turkey as a taboo topic than Russia. Turkey is behaving in a slightly more rational way than Russia is but we also have to realise that, OK, basically everybody has had a hard childhood, right? Our sub story is very real and very true and nobody's interested. So, we cannot change our past. What we can do is own up to our present and hope to influence the future. And we were able to have that reasonably fresh start with Russia. No illusions there, I mean - nobody fell in love with anybody but we can have pragmatic dealings with Russia. Russia realised that it cannot really have good relations with the EU, while being destructive on Poland. Poland has realised that the EU is not going to add up the Polish perspective on Russia, so both sides had to realise, for pragmatic reasons, that we need to have our policies. OK, there was the symbolic movement with the Smolensk crash, which helped because there was a genuine moral shock for both sides, but we are capable of engaging in pragmatic policy cooperation with Russia.

euinside: The approach is - small steps but constant walking.

Konstanty Gebert: Absolutely. And don't expect miracles and don't pretend it's a love story. It's not. If this kind of relationship would be possible with Turkey and would demand a great deal on both sides, of course, I think it would be extremely beneficial for both sides. Turkey is still looking for the regional context it can become a permanent guiding element.

euinside: I think it already found it, or at least it seems so, with the developments in the Middle East.

Konstanty Gebert: I think this is going to be very short lived. I don't really see Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt endorsing Turkey's vision of a secular state and it's not only the Balkans that have a difficult historical relationship with Turkey, so does the Arab world.

euinside: So, there are a lot of question marks where is Turkey headed to.

Konstanty Gebert: All this essentially is joggling concepts, no decisions have been made anywhere but I do think that Turkey's interests will be best served by having a leadership role in the Balkans, whether a relationship that can be stable. The Arab world will be sorting itself out for another 10 to 20 years and Turkey's stateous secularism is not a model that will be enforceable in the Arab world.

euinside: And it's changing obviously.

Konstanty Gebert: It is changing but fear is, of course, that in the long run it will be the Arab world that will change Turkey and not the other way round. And this really is that the fundamental issue, you see, when Sarkozy asked his rhetorical question 'do we want the EU to have a common border with Iran, Iraq and Syria'. OK, the answer is, of course we don't. If we had a choice we would say 'we don't want these common borders'. We don't have this choice. The only choice we have is whether these common borders will be Turkey's Eastern borders or Western borders.

euinside: And how would they would be protected.

Konstanty Gebert: Exactly. Will Turkey be part of the European project or will Turkey be a part of the European problem?

euinside: But Turkey looks like it is riping for the idea of a Norway scenario for itself. Do you think that's a kind of compromise? Inbetween these extreme visions about Turkey in Turkey and in the EU.

Konstanty Gebert: To replicate the Norway scenario it helps if you're Norway. Norway does not have a historical past in Europe.

euinside: And no cultural differences, we have to admit that.

Konstanty Gebert: Well, the Norwegians are weird but that's another story - everybody's weird. I'm sure that if, say, Sweden would have liked to play the Norwegian scenario somebody would remind of the Swedish invasions in the 17th century. Europe is a place with long historical past. Part of the Norway scenario is that Norway is only an extremely rich country, which is still too sovereign to do what it wants with its money. If you wish a Qatar.

euinside: And they have their oil, which is very important these days.

Konstanty Gebert: This is where the money comes from. So, Norway's influence or Norway the intermediary is not a political threat to anybody. Turkey simply doesn't have this past. It cannot be, even if it wants, to be an impartial negotiator it will never be seen that way, this is an illusion, this is a fantasy. Having said that Turkey's impact does work both ways. I remember speaking to a Turkish colonel in Bosnia, in Zenica when the Turkish army entered as part of the UNPROFOR, he told me that they had been trained for months in advance about how to behave, I mean this is the Turkish army returning to Europe for the first time since World War I, and that extensive human rights training whatever, and then we come in, he said, and we realise we have to teach the natives about separation of church and state and these kind of things, so it must have come as a shock. But that was the problem. So, Turkey does have a role to play and it also can be a very positive role but Turkey cannot be under the illusion that people will accept the face value. It comes with the past. And this is why Norway scenarios seem to fanciful to have.

euinside: I've alway been impressed how talking about this very small region of the Western Balkans it's inevitable to start talking about Russia, Turkey, even Norway. Well, thank you so much, it's been very interesting for me.

Konstanty Gebert: Thank you.