Comment: Europe's Balkan Travesty - and How to Fix It

EU indecision over Kosovo and Bosnia threatens to revive the experience of the 1990s not as tragedy, but as farce.

By Edward P. Joseph in Washington

The Balkan crisis of a decade ago was tragedy. Unless diplomats meet
today’s twin crises in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina with real
determination, the stage is now set for travesty – with the potential
for yet more tragedy. The plot stands like this:

Act 1: Kosovo.
Because of European indecision, Moscow and Belgrade have managed to
string out the charade of “negotiations” over Kosovo, sanctimoniously
invoking the “principle” that any solution to Kosovo must be based on
agreement. (The farce works because we, the audience, understand that
no agreement is possible.)

A December 10 “deadline” for the
talks to end now appears once again to be merely one more opportunity
to further postpone the inevitable day of reckoning when Kosovo’s
status must be settled. The fact that delay only prolongs stagnation in
both Kosovo and Serbia is lost on many actors.

Act 2: Bosnia.
Emboldened by the Kosovo fiasco and ever more energetic Russian
support, Belgrade has gone to neighbouring Bosnia and called in a
supporting player: Bosnia’s Serb entity, RS. Its government in Banja
Luka under Premier Milorad Dodik now seems inclined to defy the
international community’s top official in Bosnia, High Representative
Miroslav Lajcak, and challenge his decision to impose important changes
designed to cut through Bosnia’s gridlock.

The farce here
involves Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica shouting to the
world that Lajcak’s reasonable measures “threaten the vital interests
of the Serb people.” The fact that a dozen years of frustration have
proven that Bosnia’s structure locks its Serbs, Croats and Muslims into
a zero-sum relationship is lost on many actors.

Act 3 is about
to be written. In the 1990s, the play was scripted, after some initial
reluctance, by the US. Now, the pen is shared fully with Europe. If
European diplomats do not find the current performance funny, here is
what they need to do – urgently – with their American colleagues:

1.
Recognize the true nature of the Russo-Serbian challenge. Make no
mistake; the stakes now are quite high – in a strategic sense, larger
than in the Milosevic-Tudjman era when the Serbian and Croatian
strongmen dominated former Yugoslavia. Effectively, Moscow is mounting
a challenge through Belgrade to Europe’s ability to decide the nature
and pace of South-East Europe’s integration.

For the moment,
Kostunica has snubbed NATO alone. But the Serbian Premier’s talk of a
“third way” between Europe and Russia is really a nod to a
fundamentally new Eastern orientation. Delay on Kosovo strengthens the
Russo-Serb position. Delay also keeps Kosovo’s Serbs and Albanians in
an unproductive state of limbo. Whether or not Kosovo “explodes”, no
one can predict. But what no one can deny is that Kosovo’s structures
cannot develop properly until its status is decided. Nor can the
Balkans fully integrate into Europe.

2. Forget about EU “unity”
over Kosovo. The truth is that there is not even Scandinavian unity on
Kosovo. Former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari’s Swedish neighbours
have not shown much enthusiasm for his plan for supervised independence
for Kosovo.

EU unity is a chimera. The endless search for it
only renders Brussels child’s play for a game of divide-and-delay
tactics by Russia. Instead of unity, jittery EU diplomats should keep
in mind the bed-rock interests of those European capitals that have so
far resisted moving forward on Kosovo’s final status.

Athens,
in particular, can ill afford a permanently languishing, unstable
Kosovo on its doorstep. Would Greece (and, for that matter, Cyprus)
really subvert the development of an independent Kosovo? And if the
answer is no, then why should any other EU state, with even less of a
direct stake in a stable South-Eastern Europe? Instead of unity, the EU
needs leadership.

3. Don’t be bamboozled into “saving the
moderates” in Serbia. On his recent trip to Washington, Serbian Deputy
Premier Bozidar Djelic invoked the standard warning: “if you push us
too far on Kosovo, you will undermine President Tadic, and you might
get the Radicals.”

The truth is that as well-intentioned as
Tadic and Djelic may be, what they can achieve is strictly limited by
the realities of Serbian political dynamics. So far, the “deliverables”
from the moderates are rather modest. Pushing forward with independence
for Kosovo may indeed produce substantial turbulence in Serbia. But
outsiders cannot refrain from long-overdue decisions because of the
fear of holding back political reform there.

The evidence from
both Croatia and Macedonia is that true political reform comes when the
main nationalist party undergoes a thorough transformation, purging its
ranks of extreme nationalists and embracing fully the EU and NATO
accession agendas. While Europe trembles about the political
consequences in Serbia, nobody worries about Croatia’s elections next
month.

This is because the governing HDZ, under Prime Minister
Ivo Sanader, has taken on the colour of many European center-right
parties. When Kostunica’s DSS undergoes the same transformation,
jettisoning its retrograde nationalism, then Serbia’s moderates like
Tadic will be able to realize their vision for the country.

4.
Stop thinking that EU accession is a panacea. EU accession is a crucial
step for every state in the Balkans -- a catalyst for reform, a conduit
for aid, a signal for investment, and a point of strategic orientation.
But it is time to recognize its limitations.

The sad truth is
that EU accession does not make states forget about borders. Banja Luka
has made it painfully clear that when it comes to a choice between the
RS and the EU, the Serbs choose the RS. Likewise, Serbia has made it
clear that when it comes to fulfilling EU conditions, Brussels can
wait. EU accession, vital as it is, cannot substitute for tackling
over-arching political questions, nor can it achieve its goals if
Brussels gives waivers on core principles.

5. Stand by Lajcak –
to the end. Some EU capitals worry that the High Representative will
not be able to stand up to Banja Luka’s challenge to his use of the
"Bonn Powers" to impose legislation on Bosnia. They may demand a
“compromise”, i.e. an embarrassing climb-down by Lajcak.

Such a
step would render not only the High Representative, but the wider
international community, mostly impotent. Those European diplomats with
both experience and wisdom will remember the sad case of Hans Koschnik,
the EU Administrator in Mostar who was emasculated when the EU failed
to back him in 1996, following a violent challenge from hard-line
Croats. There is no need for Koschnik’s tragedy to be repeated as farce
in Lajcak’s case.

The truth is that power is about the
perception of power. As long as the EU and Washington stand together
for their principles – and not allow Moscow and Belgrade to divide them
with cynical pseudo-principles – these twin crises can be weathered.
The alternative is tragicomedy.

Edward P. Joseph is Visiting
Scholar at the Johns Hopkins School of International Studies,
Washington DC. He spent over a decade in the Balkans from 1992-2003,
serving in Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Kosovo, during which he
served as UN Deputy Administrator in Mitrovica, Kosovo. Balkan Insight
is BIRN`s online publication

http://www.birn.eu.com/en/109/10/5398/?tpl=30&ST1=Text&ST_T1=Article&ST_AS1=1&ST_max=1

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