March 27, 2008

NATO's Balkan Destiny

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120658092416867333.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

WALL STREET JOURNAL (USA)

OPINION

NATO's Balkan Destiny

By ANTONIO MILOSOSKI

March 27, 2008

SKOPJE, Macedonia

The NATO summit in Bucharest is less than a week away. Yet Macedonia's bid
to join the trans-Atlantic alliance hangs in the balance. Strangely, the
problem is the name of my country, which Greece doesn't recognize, and not
our record on civil and military reforms, which Macedonia has been
diligently pursuing.

Seven years ago, Macedonia was a net security consumer. We're now a net
provider with 3.5% of our troops engaged in security missions abroad --
mainly in Afghanistan. Ninety percent of our citizens support NATO
membership, a rarity in this region. Support for the alliance unites the
multiethnic Macedonian society and cuts across ethnic, party and social
lines.

Our close cooperation with NATO goes back to its 1999 intervention against
the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia. Macedonia was the key country in
the region in assisting the alliance, providing infrastructure and logistics
for NATO combat operations. We also opened our doors to 380,000 Kosovo
refugees who found a shelter in Macedonia. Some stayed on to make their
lives in Macedonia.

Kosovo remains a pressing security issue today, and Macedonia is honoring
its end of the bargain. We are the host country of the logistics
headquarters for KFOR, the Kosovo stabilization force. It is operated by the
Macedonian army and financed through our budget.

Kosovo's independence last month changed the security and political outlook
for the Balkans. We still don't know what the end game will look like. Much
progress was made in the recent years in the Western Balkans in terms of
keeping stability and expanding our economies. This has been achieved in no
small part thanks to the positive roles played by the EU and the U.S. in our
region in the last decade.

But there are numerous potential sources of instability. Political
structures in Kosovo are underdeveloped. Political cohesion in the region is
weak. From a security perspective, NATO is still needed, particularly in and
around Kosovo to help administer borders and keep a close watch on
trafficking and organized crime.

Positive messages from the EU and the U.S. on integration into NATO and the
EU are vitally important. NATO membership is a staple of progress in our
region. To this extent, progress, stability and prosperity will be enhanced
in the Balkans if Albania, Croatia and Macedonia are invited to join NATO
next week in Bucharest.

The more states from the Balkans we have joining NATO, the less NATO we will
need in the Balkans. The alliance would then be freed up to cope with
challenges further a field

Considering what's at stake, Macedonia's NATO membership shouldn't be held
hostage to a bilateral dispute with Greece over my country's name. But
that's just what has happened in recent months.

Our soldiers are fighting in Afghanistan shoulder to shoulder with the
Greek, Americans, the Dutch, and others. No one minds the label "Macedonia"
on their uniforms. Macedonia was asked to fulfill the Membership Action Plan
(or MAP) criteria to be considered for NATO membership. This we did.

Our issue with Greece is a bilateral one. We are prepared to settle it
together with our Greek friends. We are ready to compromise. But we won't be
pushed into accepting a solution concerning our name as a condition of
getting into NATO.

My country remains committed to the 1995 Interim Accord where we agreed --
with the UN serving as the guarantor -- that neither Macedonia nor Greece
will block the other's membership in international organizations.

NATO membership and the start of the accession talks with the EU are the two
bottom-line priorities for Macedonia -- no matter who's in power. But
Macedonia will not yield to pressure.

NATO isn't where the name issue should be decided. Let's keep the alliance
focused on security. With that in mind, it should be clear that excluding
Macedonia from the club will do nothing to boost security in the Balkan
region. It may even bring about the opposite result.

Mr. Milososki is foreign minister of Macedonia.

wsj.ltrs@wsj.com