International Crisis Group: Constant pressure drove the Serbs away from Kosovo; tensions increased since Kurti came to power - Kosovo Online
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Due to constant pressure, more than 10% of the Serbs left Kosovo last year, and their departure only accelerates the existing trend, warns the International Crisis Group (ICG), noting that one-third of the Serbian population has left Kosovo in the last eight years.
"Emigration of Kosovo Serbs is worrying because it speaks to their level of frustration and because it undermines the most likely path to normalization, in which Kosovo should give them significant governance in exchange for de facto, if not de jure, recognition of Serbia", the report "Toward Normal Relations between Kosovo and Serbia" states.
The report notes that tensions between Kosovo and Serbia increased since 2021, following the arrival of Albin Kurti to power, who escalated tensions in northern Kosovo.
"Kosovo's refusal to grant greater autonomy to the Serbian population is one of the two main reasons for tensions in relations with neighboring Serbia, and the other is Serbia's refusal to recognize Kosovo's status as an independent state, which is crucial for opening the path to membership in international organizations such as the European Union and the UN," ICG points out.
The analysis states that, as disputes persist without resolution, Serbia and Kosovo on the north have achieved some form of overlapping sovereignty – Serbia provides education and healthcare to citizens, while Kosovo is responsible for law enforcement and the judiciary.
"However, Albin Kurti has obviously lost patience with this. Among other things, he sent heavily armed police to the north, imposed an embargo on Serbian goods, suppressed Serbian institutions, and banned the use of the Serbian currency. His government has partially justified these steps with security threats, in the form of Serbian paramilitary formations, which he claims brought military weapons from Serbia in September 2023," the Crisis Group adds.
To facilitate the dynamics of relations between Kosovo and the Serbian population, the EU should encourage Pristina to redirect the work of the police in the northern municipalities to meet the needs of the community.
"The deployment of special forces should not be in the function of everyday police work but should focus on border security and the search for weapons depots. Pristina should send more officers who speak Serbian to the north (as opposed to those who only speak Albanian) and engage on the ground to improve relations with citizens," the analysis suggests.
It is also pointed out that Pristina should work to meet the needs of the Serbian minority in northern Kosovo, especially regarding employment, healthcare, and education.
"If this cannot be done within the framework of the partial autonomy discussed for Serb-majority municipalities, then the EU and member states should press Pristina to develop alternative ways to achieve the same goal," the Crisis Group emphasizes.
It is highlighted that the EU should encourage Pristina to soften its strict security measures in the north, including withdrawing special police, promising sanctions relief, and fewer measures in return.
Pressure should also be exerted on Serbia to fully cooperate in efforts, including KFOR's efforts, to close borders to weapons smuggling and find heavy weapons delivered to paramilitary units of Kosovo Serbs.
"Since the 1999 conflict that separated Kosovo from Serbia, the question of how the government in Pristina (representing the majority Albanian population) will govern the four Serb-majority municipalities in northern Kosovo has remained unresolved. Although Kosovo and Serbia developed a 'modus vivendi' for administering and providing services to these communities, this has been significantly exposed since President Kurti took office in 2021. In line with the governance methods that emerged in the years before Kurti's election, both Kosovo and Serbia could exercise certain sovereign powers over the four Serb-majority municipalities in the north," the report states.
Changes began with Kurti's rise to power, and Pristina started imposing its authority on northern Kosovo with measures that sparked a boycott and mass resignations of the Serbs from positions.
"Kosovo's pressure tactics in the north could generate further violent rejection and also expose another risk: it could undermine the most promising path to resolving the longstanding disputes between Belgrade and Pristina. The Crisis Group has argued that the best path to good relations between Kosovo and Serbia is a compromise where Serbia accepts Kosovo's independence in exchange for Kosovo granting significant self-governance to the Serbian minority. However, demographic changes caused by political tensions risk gradually sliding that agreement off the table as the population of Kosovo Serbs decreases to the point where autonomy may become impractical," the Crisis Group warns.
The report recalls that in 2015, the number of Kosovo Serbs was estimated at 145,000, and by 2023, it had dropped to below 100,000.
"Although the exact numbers are unknown due to the Serbian boycott of the last census held in 2011, Serbian authorities say an additional 13% of Serbs left Kosovo during the past year. Many of these departures are from central and southern Kosovo, where Serbs live alongside the Albanian majority and are well integrated, and the population is rural and older, but some are from the four northern municipalities. It is not difficult to imagine that the trend is accelerating in the north as Pristina increasingly asserts its sovereignty," the ICG underscores.
"The population of Kosovo Serbs is likely to decline both in absolute and relative terms, regardless of what happens in the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, but the rate of change will almost certainly depend on the level of tensions, the perception of security, and politics," the report states.
"Pristina may welcome this demographic change, but it should acknowledge that it comes at a cost: it is in Kosovo's best interest for the Serbian minority to stay in the country and have the opportunity for self-governance because that is the easiest way to build goodwill in Serbia and secure the concession that Pristina most desires – recognition," the ICG emphasizes.
