Kosovo in limbo

Kosovo in limbo

SCOTT TAYLOR | ON TARGET
Mon. Jun 22 - 4:46 AM

THIS WEEK marks the 10th anniversary of NATO's entry into the war-torn Balkan province of Kosovo.

I can still vividly recall those violent and terror-filled days as I packed up my gear and fled north amidst the Serbian refugees and the withdrawing Yugoslav security forces.

For 78 days the allied NATO air force — including Canadian aircraft — had pounded infrastructure targets throughout Kosovo and Serbia in a failed attempt to force the Serbs to capitulate and accept the terms U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had proposed at the 1999 Rambouillet peace talks.

What the nearly $13 billion worth of explosive ordnance dropped in that campaign failed to achieve was any substantial downgrading of the Serbian military forces; more importantly, it did not diminish the will of the Serbian people to resist.

Knowing the futility of their air defences, the Serbs I interviewed had been anxiously awaiting the start of a ground invasion so they could engage NATO soldiers on more even terms in the narrow mountain passes of Kosovo. That contested entry scenario was something NATO leaders were definitely anxious to avoid and they were forced to the bargaining table in Kumanovo, Macedonia.

After days of protracted negotiations, UN Resolution 1244 was ratified by both parties on June 10, 1999. Two days later the ceasefire went into effect.

Despite NATO's proclamations of a decisive victory, the terms of 1244 conceded to all the demands which had been put forward by the Serbs at Rambouillet. During the interim, Serbia would still control the checkpoints of Kosovo and a small number of Serb security forces would remain to protect the centuries-old orthodox churches and monasteries.

The most important element of 1244 was the formal recognition that Kosovo was the sovereign territory of Serbia. When drafted and signed, Resolution 1244 rendered all the death and destruction inflicted during the 78-day bombardment absolutely unnecessary. The Serbian will to resist had forced the mightiest military alliance in history to concede to their demands.

But NATO had no intention of abiding by the terms of Resolution 1244. The signing was just a ruse to get Serbian air defences out of Kosovo and NATO ground troops in without a fight.

NATO planners had no intention of letting any Serbian troops remain in Kosovo, no intention to ever let them return and no intention of disarming the Kosovo Liberation Army.

Incumbent in the ceasefire agreement, NATO was to provide a secure environment for both ethnic Serbs and ethnic Kosovar Albanians in the province when they assumed responsibility for security.

Instead, as expected, NATO troops did little to curtail the wave of violence inflicted on Serbs by the emboldened Kosovar Albanians. Unable to protect themselves, some 200,000 Serbs fled Kosovo. Crammed aboard a Belgrade-bound bus, I witnessed first-hand the Albanian mobs assaulting our convoy with rocks and bats.

Not surprisingly, over the past decade the continued presence of NATO troops in Kosovo has not prevented inter-ethnic violence. Rather than clarifying its future, the February 2008 unilateral declaration of independence by the Albanian Kosovars only complicated things further.

Following America's lead, Canada and 50 other countries recognized that independence. Serbia refused to acknowledge that declaration and is supported by Russia, China and another 138 nations.

For now, Kosovo remains in a diplomatic limbo, unable to join the United Nations, economically dependant on foreign aid and occupied by foreign troops for the foreseeable future.

The irony is that the U.S. State Department considers the Kosovo intervention a "success" when compared to their subsequent fiascos in Iraq and Afghanistan.

( staylor@herald.ca)

http://thechronicleherald.ca/Opinion/1128592.html

UN Papers and the Gross Reality

Pyotr ISKENDEROV

UN Papers and the Gross Reality

(On the Tenth Anniversary of the UN Security Council Resolution on Kosovo)

June 10 is a sad date in the history of the UN, the institution originally meant to play the key role in ensuring peace, security, and the primacy of law in the world. The decade since the passing of the June 10, 1999 UN Security Council Resolution 1244 addressing the Kosovo problem – the document totally ignored throughout the period - has shown that the UN is no longer playing the role prescribed to it by the post-World War II system of the international law.

The Resolution the tenth anniversary of which nobody seems willing to celebrate in the UN headquarters, Belgrade, or Pristina is usually attributed to an intricate compromise. Ten years ago the Russian leadership managed to incorporate into it several fundamental principles concerning the Kosovo settlement. Most importantly, it was stressed in the document's preamble that the Kosovo problem had to be solved on the basis "of the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region". Correspondingly, the Resolution called for "substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo". Besides, the UN Security Council reached consensus that international discussions of specific parameters of Kosovo's future status would begin only after the implementation in the province of the democratic standards guaranteeing the political, economic, cultural, and national rights of the province's non-Albanian population.

Nothing of the above materialized. From the outset, the West pushed for Kosovo independence, and only the requirements of Resolution 1244 which could be interpreted so as to broaden the rights and authority of Albanian separatists were actually met. As for Russia, its only accomplishments throughout the period since the passing of the resolution till the opening of the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina on the status of Kosovo in February, 2006 were the snap offensive which led to the seizure of the Slatina airport by Russian peacekeepers and their quiet withdrawal in 2003 under the pretext that "it was impossible to change anything".

The subsequent talks under the auspices of the UN in which Russia took a somewhat bigger role ended with a predictable failure which made it possible for the Albanian separatists to declare the independence of Kosovo unilaterally in February, 2008. The independence was momentarily recognized by the Albanians' Western donors and ideological patrons.

The available information makes it possible to claim that both the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and the diplomatic maneuvers around Kosovo that ensued – those in which the Russian Foreign and Defense Ministries took part in particular – were nothing but a show originally planned by the West. In the process Moscow's role to which the Russian leadership somehow agreed was that of a "good policeman".

Obviously, Resolution 1244 was stillborn. The key problems were not the poor compliance with its requirements and Russia's inability to make its partners view the UN document with proper respect but the fact that the West had made all the decisions on the status of Kosovo already in the late 1998. The subsequent negotiation between Serbs and Albanians in Rambouillet, NATO airstrikes, discussions in the UN Security Council, and the deployment of the UN mission and NATO peacekeepers in the province were just steps in the realization of the already existing plan.

The build-up of the NATO presence in Kosovo also commenced in the late 1998. In the US the point of no return was reached when Michael Polt who coordinated the military policy in the Clinton Administration and later became the US Ambassador to Serbia convinced Secretary of State C. Powell to consent to the intervention in the region. Polt argued that by intervening in Kosovo NATO would send a clear message to all Eurasian countries, of course including Russia.

Yugoslavian Vice President Momir Bulatovic said: "It already became clear in October, 1998 that the decision on our future had been made. They started talking about the "humanitarian disaster" in Kosovo and the so-called NATO credibility. The latter meant that if NATO was unable to put an end to the "humanitarian disaster", then it simply had no right to exist. To avoid a military strike we were ready to make concessions to the extent of retaining only the minimal amount of state dignity and territorial integrity. They were interested in Kosovo's natural resources - we offered US and British companies to develop them at the token price of $1. They responded that the offer was attractive but unacceptable. Then NATO wanted a base in Kosovo. We offered them to have it for the same $1 token price. They were surprised but turned down the offer nevertheless. Trying to avoid conflict we eventually suggested that Yugoslavia should join NATO and thus automatically generate a solution to the Kosovo problem. Again the answer was No. Admitting us to NATO could resolve the dispute over Kosovo but could not solve any of the problems due to which NATO decided to attack our small country. NATO decided to move into Kosovo by forceavoiding any cooperation with us. The point is that if NATO does not reckon with us it would also be free of any obligations to other countries. They branded this the New World Order".

The US still had to secure Europe's consent to launching the offensive. Washington proposed "to give Serbs another chance" and to hold an international conference on Kosovo in Rambouillet in February, 1999. Belgrade faced totally unprecedented requirements deliberately formulated to make the aggression against Yugoslavia inevitable. Momir Bulatovic recalled: "In Rambouillet we were asked to agree to the deployment of NATO forces in Kosovo and to allow them access to all of the Yugoslavian territory. According to a document which looked like an ultimatum, all our expressways, railroads, air space, and installations were to be used by NATO free of charge and without any limitations. All NATO servicemen were to be exempt from our laws and or any criminal responsibilities. All the decision-making was to be left to the commander of the NATO contingent. The document was formulated so that no sane individual could ever sign it". As expected, Yugoslavia' representatives did not agree to the de facto occupation of their country.

Russia actively took part in the Rambouillet "negotiations" though the Russian leadership had to be aware that the West had already laid the finishing touches on the scenario for Kosovo. Russia's involvement only helped to make the enforced separation of Kosovo – the cradle of the Serbian national statehood – from Serbia appear more peaceful and take somewhat longer to complete...

Viewing the situation now in 2009 one can only hope that Russia has learned the lessons. Russian diplomats admit in private conversations that Moscow should start cooperating more actively with the Balkan political forces which can be regarded as its potential allies in future conflicts over Eurasian political arrangements and energy security. Kosovo has been torn out of Serbia - this is the gross reality, not a passage from some UN papers. Bringing it back would take something other than voting in the UN Security Council, an institution which has become nothing else than a decoration used by the global forces acting behind the curtain.

 

http://en.fondsk.ru/article.php?id=2214

Treaties and Dreams

http://original.antiwar.com/malic/2009/06/09/treaties-and-dreams/
 

Treaties and Dreams

by Nebojsa Malic, June 10, 2009

Kosovo Armistice, a Decade Later

 

On June 10, 1999, the military-technical agreement (MTA) between NATO and the Yugoslav Army went into effect, along with UN Security Council Resolution 1244. Between them, they provided a somewhat graceful ending to NATO's first war. Conceived as a three-day demonstration of force, predicated on a disgraceful ultimatum, justified by an onslaught of vicious propaganda, the assault on then-Yugoslavia nearly tore the alliance apart on its 50th birthday. Just four years later, the invasion of Iraq saw it tossed aside in favor of a "coalition of the willing."

 

NATO never honored its obligations from the MTA or UNSCR 1244. Kosovo was turned over to the KLA, whose campaign of murder, pillage, and arson drove out hundreds of thousands of non-Albanians from the province. Over the next 10 years, Serb religious and cultural heritage has been systematically destroyed, and most of the surviving Serbs have been driven out or killed. Meanwhile, the UN and NATO authorities gradually created institutions of statehood and eventually sponsored a declaration of "independence" by the KLA regime.

Armistice, Not Surrender

In the face of such overwhelming evidence, one would be tempted to conclude that the treaty signed by NATO and Yugoslav officers in a tent near Kumanovo on June 9 was an unconditional surrender. Or, as Alliance spokesman Jamie Shea put it at a June 7 press conference, a "complete acceptance of our non-negotiable conditions." Yet it was nothing of the kind.

The MTA was an armistice, painstakingly negotiated over five days. The government in Belgrade accepted the proposal put forth by NATO emissary Martti Ahtisaari (accompanied by Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin) on June 3. Yet Yugoslav and NATO officers negotiated till June 9 before settling on a text. During that week, NATO continued to bomb – as evidenced by the briefing given by Luftwaffe Maj. Gen. Walter Jertz at the aforementioned press conference.

On the anniversary of the armistice, the Belgrade daily Politika published an interview with one of the participants in the talks, Maj. Gen. Obrad Stevanovic of the Serbian police. Stevanovic said that the final text of the agreement only mentioned NATO in the context of its obligation to halt the bombing, and that KFOR was supposed to be a UN force. Likewise, there was no mention of the Rambouillet ultimatum.

In the end, none of that mattered much. Once NATO and the KLA came into possession of Kosovo, the MTA and 1244 were dead letters. Stevanovic maintains that none of the officers involved could have known NATO would not honor the deal, or that KFOR would fail to protect the civilians from the KLA. Yet that is precisely what happened.

A Strange Coincidence

With the benefit of hindsight, NATO turning over Kosovo to the KLA may seem like an obvious and foregone conclusion. After all, did the Alliance not just launch an illegal war of aggression on behalf of this terrorist organization hastily re-branded as "freedom fighters"? At the time, however, things seemed less clear-cut.

The war had not gone well for the Alliance. There were too many "mistakes," too much "collateral damage," and too little proof for tall tales of massacred Albanian civilians. That didn't stop the media from repeating them ad nauseam, but every day that Belgrade held out, the Alliance got weaker. On the other hand, the Yeltsin regime sold Belgrade down the river in early June, most likely at Washington's insistence. The proposal offered to Milosevic on June 3 was sufficiently watered down that he could accept it and claim a diplomatic victory.

Granted, that meant nothing once NATO got actual possession of the territory and the KLA could do as it pleased. Neither Milosevic nor the Russians were in any position to challenge that, however. Milosevic was ousted in a black-op "popular revolution" in 2000 and replaced with a client regime. Yeltsin was pressured to resign at the end of 1999, with his betrayal of Belgrade probably playing at least a partial role.

In the tragedy of Kosovo that ensued, few noticed that the war officially ended on a very symbolic date. Perhaps it was a coincidence, but there aren't many of those when it comes to the Balkans. Namely, June 10 was the date on which the first Albanian national movement was established in distant 1878, a crucial year in Balkans history.

1878 and the Congress of Berlin

By the mid-15th century, all of the Balkans had been conquered by the Ottoman Turks. The tide of Ottoman conquest, once seemingly unstoppable, began to recede after the failed siege of Vienna in 1683. The 18th century was marked by fierce wars with Austria and Russia, pushing the Turks back. Starting in 1804, uprisings by the Serbs and the Greeks further weakened the Ottoman hold over the Balkans.

As part of an administrative reform in 1864, the Ottoman Empire broke up its old provinces into smaller units called vilayets. In one of those provinces, Herzegovina, the excesses of Ottoman taxation provoked a rebellion in 1875. Using the distraction, Bulgarians rose up in the spring of 1876 but were cruelly suppressed. At this point, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on the Ottoman Empire. Despite Russian military aid, they were soon forced on the defensive. In April 1877, Russia entered the war; by March 1878, the Ottomans were defeated, and Russian forces were within reach of Istanbul.

With Austria-Hungary and Britain alarmed at the extent of Russian gains in the proposed Treaty of San Stefano, Germany's chancellor Bismarck called the Congress of Berlin. Intended to be a reprise of the 1815 Congress of Vienna, which had created four decades of peace in post-Napoleonic Europe, the Berlin affair merely sowed the seeds of future Balkans conflicts and ultimately the Great War.

For example, the San Stefano treaty outlined a sizable, independent Bulgarian state. At the Congress of Berlin, only a third of the outlined territory was recognized as Bulgaria; another third was set apart as "East Rumelia," and the rest (Macedonia) was restored to Ottoman rule. Though East Rumelia was peacefully integrated into Bulgaria in 1885, the issue of Macedonia proved a major bone of contention between Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, marring the victory over the Ottomans in 1912 and resulting in Bulgaria joining the Central Powers in 1915 (and the Axis in World War II).

The Congress of Berlin is also where Austria-Hungary received a mandate to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, which put Vienna on a collision course with Belgrade and resulted in the Sarajevo assassination of 1914.

The League of Prizren

On June 10, 1878, Albanian religious and tribal leaders founded the League of Prizren, demanding greater recognition of Albanians within the Ottoman Empire and the consolidation of four vilayets – Shkoder, Kosovo, Ioannina, and Monastir (see a rough map here) – into an Albanian province. Though ultimately unsuccessful and disbanded after just three years, the League marked the beginning of an Albanian national movement. Just as Bulgarians saw the borders set out in Berlin as a grave injustice and considered the San Stefano borders their birthright, the Albanians claimed the four provinces as "ethnic Albanian lands" and have fought to acquire them ever since.

The independent Albania that was established in 1912 included the province of Shkoder and a part of Ioannina. Kosovo became a part of Serbia, and the vilayet of Monastir – i.e., Macedonia – was divided between Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece. The part that went to Serbia is today the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Following the Nazi-led invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941, parts of Kosovo and today's Macedonia were given to Italian-occupied Albania. Upon Italy's surrender in 1943, Albanian leaders formed the "Second League of Prizren" and sought Nazi patronage in establishing an "ethnic Albania."

Living the Dream

It is unclear whether Imperial leaders and generals knew the symbolism of June 10 when they chose that date for the Kumanovo agreement to go into force. It is, however, clear that NATO's occupation resulted in the establishment of the "independent state of Kosovo" in February 2008, as well as the 2001 insurrections in Macedonia and southern Serbia. Thus the "Albanian lands" claimed by the League of Prizren have been put under de facto Albanian control – thanks to the American Empire.

The latest example came just two weeks ago, on May 31, when the prime ministers of Albania and Kosovo ceremoniously opened a tunnel on the Pristina-Durres highway (built with Turkish funding). The Albanian prime minister, Sali Berisha, was quoted as saying:

"Today, one of the Albanians' most beautiful dreams has become reality. This is a tunnel of the unification of the nation. Today we decided that there are no obstacles, that there is nothing that can divide us, not only spiritually, but also physically." (Emphasis added.)

However, the one constant in this "beautiful dream" since 1878 has been that it could only be realized with the help of outside powers, and by force. From the Ottoman Empire to the Axis, all the sponsors of Albanian aspirations ultimately failed, and their victory proved ephemeral.

In 1999, the American Empire was the "indispensable nation," and it looked as if its power would last forever. That is by no means a certainty any longer. The question now is whether history repeats itself or merely rhymes.

WILLIAM MONTGOMERY | The Balkan Mess Redux

The Balkan Mess Redux

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By WILLIAM MONTGOMERY

Published: June 4, 2009

President Obama recently said of Iraq, "What we will not do is permit the pursuit of the perfect stand in the way of achievable goals." It would be a major step forward if this same approach was applied to Bosnia and Kosovo.

In both those countries, we have become trapped in policy "boxes" that make it impossible to achieve stability or long-term solutions, despite enormous investments of personnel and resources for almost two decades.

This is because we continue to insist that it is possible, with enough pressure and encouragement, to establish fully functioning multiethnic societies in Bosnia and Kosovo with no change in borders. And we have consistently ignored all evidence to the contrary and branded as obstructionist anyone who speaks openly about alternative approaches.

The reality is that no amount of threats or inducements, including fast membership in the European Union or NATO, will persuade the Bosnian Serbs to cede a significant portion of the rights and privileges given them under the Dayton Agreement to the central government, as the Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) and the international community are determined to bring about. The Bosnian Serbs are determined to have full control over their own destiny, and fear that if they continue to transfer authority to a central government, the more numerous Bosniaks will end up in control.

The end result is continued tension between the two Bosnian entities, a dysfunctional country, and the prospect of many more years of efforts by Western politicians — like Vice President Joe Biden on his recent visit — to pound a square peg into a round hole.

I know of what I speak: For more than 15 years, I was one of these pounders. I finally came to understand that the historical experiences in this region have implanted a mind-set very different from our own. We keep expecting the people in the Balkans to think and react as we do: It is not going to happen.

In Kosovo, the reality is that most of the Serbs have already left and will not be coming back. Many of those still remaining do so only because they hope or believe that they can ignore the central government of independent Kosovo and continue to look to Serbia for political and financial support.

Those Serbs living north of the Ibar River in particular act as if they are in fact living in Serbia. President Boris Tadic and his moderate government are trapped into supporting the Kosovo Serbs to prevent a nationalist backlash while trying to move toward the E.U.

These contradictions are becoming ever more obvious. But that is not the major danger.

Up to now, Kosovo Albanians have been patient with the refusal of Kosovo Serbs to recognize the independence of the former Serbian province, deferring to the international community to sort this problem out. But already opposition Kosovo Albanian politicians are starting to criticize the Kosovo government for its passivity on the matter.

This frustration will grow, leading to further deterioration of relations among Kosovo, Serbia and the international community, and an increase in violence against Kosovo Serbs.

In both Kosovo and Bosnia, we need to consider different solutions — ones which we may not like and which will have complications of their own, but which will be really...achievable. This is the only way the international community can bring its involvement in the Balkans to an end.

In Kosovo, this probably means some form of partition between the Albanians and the Serbs combined with joint recognition, pledges of full rights for minorities and a variety of sweeteners from the EU.

Bosnia is more complicated. There, a solution probably involves shaping a different relationship within Bosnia and permitting the Republika Srpska, the Serbian portion of the divided country, to hold a referendum on independence. This would have to include a lot of guarantees about future relationships, and be done as a complete package led and implemented by the international community.

In both cases, there would need to be a demonstrated will and readiness to use military force to prevent violence along the way.

There is another reason to broaden our thinking. We in the West act as if we control what happens in the region. This is not the case, as the outbreak of violence in 1990-91 in the former Yugoslavia and the growth of the Kosovo Liberation Army in 1997-99 demonstrated.

The fact is that both in Bosnia and in Kosovo, independent local forces can take matters into their own hands and in a very short time bring about renewed violence that we will be hard-pressed to contain. And we simply cannot afford to become even more entangled in the Balkans.

Like an alcoholic whose first step is to recognize he has a problem, we need to accept that the current policies are not tenable. Only then can we start thinking constructively about solutions which can bring lasting stability to the region.

William Montgomery is a former U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria, Croatia and Serbia/Montenegro and a former special adviser to the president on Bosnia.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/05/opinion/05iht-edmontgomery.html?scp=2&sq=kosovo&st=cse

Kosovo's Minorities flee - The Guardian

Date: Friday, June 5, 2009, 6:09 AM The flight of Kosovo's minorities (The Guardian) The EU insists that Kosovo is a tolerant and multi-ethnic society. So why are its minorities leaving?   Ian Bancroft guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 3 June 2009 20.30   A highly critical report by Minority Rights Group International (MRG) maintains that members of minority communities are beginning to leave Kosovo over a year after its unilateral declaration of independence, due to persistent exclusion and discrimination. In contradicting the conclusions of the EU's general affairs and external relations council, the report once again demonstrates the emptiness and evasiveness of statements by members of the international community asserting Kosovo's supposedly multi-ethnic character. Without urgent measures to improve the position of minorities in Kosovo, such a discourse will increasingly serve only to parody, not portray, the reality on the ground.   The report, Filling the Vacuum: Ensuring Protection and Legal Remedies for Minorities in Kosovo, concludes that Kosovo "lacks effective international protection for minorities, which is worsening the situation for smaller minorities and forcing some to leave the country for good". These minorities include not only Kosovo's Serbs, but also Ashkali, Bosniaks, Croats, Egyptians, Gorani, Roma and Turks, who together make up around 5% of the population of Kosovo according to local estimates.   MRG's conclusions clearly contradict those of the recent meeting of the EU's general affairs and external relations council, which "noted with satisfaction the initial results achieved by EULEX in assisting the Kosovo authorities in consolidating the rule of law and in contributing to a safe and secure environment for all inhabitants, regardless of their ethnic origins". The divergence between such statements and the reports of human rights organisations such as MRG has become a distinctive feature of the international community's efforts to provide positive assessments of Kosovo's institutions. The result is policies that are insufficient to contend with the substantive problems faced by local communities. Though the government of Kosovo have often been commended for its stated commitment to upholding minority rights, MRG's report goes on to describe how "a lack of political will among majority Albanians and poor investment in protection mechanisms have resulted in minority rights being eroded or compromised in the post-independence period". According to MRG, Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence has left "a vacuum in effective international protection for minorities"; a vacuum that the Kosovo government seems both unwilling and unable to fill. Without tackling deficiencies in the area of the rule of law - reconfirmed by a newly released report by the Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), which describes Kosovo's courts as being "inefficient, opaque, and hampered by persistent institutional obstacles" - the plight of minorities will continue to be of secondary importance to the apparent need to proclaim Kosovo an example of a tolerant and multi-ethnic society. Indeed, Mark Lattimer, the executive director of MRG, also emphasised how "restrictions of movement and political, social and economic exclusion are particularly experienced by smaller minorities". Such conditions are only likely to be further aggravated by the worsening economic situation in Kosovo, especially for the Ashkali, Egyptian and Roma communities that suffer from deeply ingrained poverty and marginalisation. MRG has long drawn attention to the many failures to uphold the rights of minority communities in Kosovo, with a 2006 report, Minority Rights in Kosovo under International Rule, describing the situation of minorities as the worst in Europe and "little short of disastrous"; the international community having allowed "a segregated society to develop and become entrenched". Despite these and other warnings from human rights organisations, the international community has continued to not only ignore the difficulties faced by minority communities in Kosovo, but to regularly proclaim success with respect to minority rights protection. While both the international community and the Kosovo government insist that minority rights are guaranteed and conform to the highest international standards, MRG's report instead highlights how the segregation of Kosovo continues unabated. Indeed, it is increasingly clear that the litany of failures with respect to minority rights has been further exacerbated and entrenched by Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence. In sidelining the imperatives of re-integration, the international community's approach towards Kosovo is likely to have ramifications elsewhere in the Western Balkans. Without immediate and substantial steps to tackle minority rights issues, especially the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, Kosovo will remain the most segregated territory in Europe and a constant source of tension and instability for the entire region.

 

http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/03/kosovo-minorities-eu-government

Round table held on 29 May 2009 on Kosovo

Round table held on 29 May 2009 on Kosovo

Publication day: 3/6/2009

On 29 May 2009, IDC Paris organised a debate on the right of Kosovo to
secede from Serbia.  The main speaker was Slobodan Samardzic, the former
Serbian minister for Kosovo, who argued that the secession was illegal and a
violation of international law.  His paper is published under the section
"Research" on this web site.  Two neutral experts kindly agreed to come and
reply to his arguments, Dr Eric de Brabandere of the Grotius Centre for
International Legal Studies at the University of Leiden in the Netherlands
and Professor and Dr Cedric Ryngaert of the Universityof Leuven in Belgium.

Slobodan Samardzic served as adviser to and then minister under Vojislav
Kostunica, the man who overthrew Slobodan Milosevic after contested
electrions on 5 October 2000.  He therefore embodies a new spirit of
pro-Western orientation in Serbia.  Yet Mr Samardzic, who is Vice-President
of Kostunica's party and a professor of political science at the University
of Belgrade, bitterly contests the way in which Serbia has been let down by
her European and American allies.

His main argument focussed on United Nations Security Council Resolution
1244 of 10 June 1999, which fixed the status of Kosovo following the NATO
bombing campaign against Yugoslavia.  That resolution, he insisted, thrice
reaffirmed Kosovo's status as an integral part of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia of which today's Serbia is the successor state.  (Kosovo, indeed,
was always part of Serbia within the Yugoslav federation.)  The resolution
provided for negotiations about the future status of Kosovo and these
negotiations did indeed take place, from 2005 onwards.  However, they were
broken off when the Albanian authorities in the province declared
independence in February 2008, with the support of the European Union and
the United States.  He added that the period of UN administration of the
province (1999 – 2008) had been a period of systematic persecution against
the Serbs and other national minorities in Kosovo.

His two respondents were in considerable agreement with the former
minister.  Eric de Brabandere said that secession was a political issue on
which international law did not necessarily have the right to adjudicate. 
Not everything can be governed by international law, he argued.  Cedric
Ryngaert took a different view, saying that there was a body of
jurisprudence on the right of secession and that the essential point was
that it was illegal except in cases of massive violations of human rights.  

Natalia Narochnitskaya, the president of the Institute, asked what
confidence one could have in the new European Union administration of the
province when it was releasing from prison or refusing to prosecute people
convicted or suspected of war crimes.  She also emphasised the long list of
desecrations perpetrated against Serb Orthodox churches in the province.

There was a strong debate after the main speakers had finished.  A former
French ambassador to Croatia clearly disagreed with Mr Samardzic and Mrs
Narochnitskaya.  He claimed that the status of the new EU administration in
Kosovo, EULEX, was legal because confirmed by a report of the UN Secretary
General, and he countered the allegation about the desecration of churches
saying that hundreds of mosques had been destroyed in Kosovo prior to June
1999.  Mr Samardzic in turn countered both points, first by denying that the
Secretary General has the right to rescind a Security Council Resolution
(which created a UN administration) and second by claiming that the
destruction of mosques was due to NATO bombing not attacks by Serb forces.

Others who intervened included a former commander of French special forces
in Kosovo in 1999, who said that the NATO war had been based on a massive
campaign of disinformation.  The audience included senior army officers,
government officials, academics and students

http://www.idc-europe.org/actualites.asp

Risky business in the Balkans

 

http://www.torontosun.com/news/columnists/peter_worthington/2009/06/01/9634846-sun.html

Risky business in the Balkans

By PETER WORTHINGTON

Last Updated: 1st June 2009, 3:26am

 

Since Barack Obama became U.S. president, both Vice-President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have separately visited Europe and made disquieting observations about the Balkans.

In March, Clinton commented in Brussels that the Obama administration was "determined to listen, advise (European Union countries) and through agreement arrive at wise solution to common challenges."

Among the "common challenges" was that the "Balkans is in danger of becoming part of the forgotten past." She added the ominous view that "it will not be allowed for unfinished business to remain there."

What "unfinished business" is that, one wonders?

Well, it certainly isn't rapprochement with Serbia, where VP Joe Biden was last week. Many recall Biden's 1999 sponsoring of the bombing of Serbia and his remark on Larry King Live that Serbs were "a bunch of illiterate degenerates, baby killers, butchers and rapists."

The "unfinished business" mentioned by Clinton is formal recognition, of Kosovo as an independent state -- which violates the original terms of the U.S.-sponsored war against Serbia on behalf of Kosovo.

Since that 78-day air war (which the U.S. had predicted would bring Belgrade to its knees within 48 hours), Kosovo has unilaterally declared independence which many countries have accepted and Slavic countries (such as Russia) have rejected. (Canada is nervously "assessing" the situation, aware that Quebec has the potential of someday being a Canadian Kosovo).

A recent panel discussion on the Balkans presented by the Lord Byron Foundation at Toronto's Royal Canadian Military Institute (RCMI), brought together experts on the subject, including James Bissett, former Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia.

The panelists agreed that recent moves indicate "reinvigoration" of the former Clinton policies, whereby then-secretary of state Madeleine Albright worked assiduously to go to war on behalf of Kosovo.

That was arguably, one of the greatest errors and miscalculations of the Clinton regime. The justification was that Serbs were intent on genocide of Albanian Kosovars when, in fact, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) provoked Serbian reaction, and fabricated massacres.

Embarrassing as it should be to those who supported the Kosovo war, no evidence of mass graves has ever been found. Atrocities on both sides, yes, but no massacres. The "war" was utterly unnecessary.

In fact, since the war al-Qaida and Muslim extremists have flooded into the Balkans: Kosovo, Bosnia, Macedonia. The dreaded spectre of militant Islam in the heart of Europe has become a reality, enhanced by U.S. policy and now apparently revived by Obama.

According to the RCMI panelists, European countries are uneasy about what seems a renewed American push in the Balkans. Increasingly, Europeans realize they were hoodwinked into recognizing Kosovo's independence on the pretense it would resolve problems and bring peace.

The opposite has occurred. Russia and China are stronger and more aggressive and influential now; Europe is less inclined to accede to Washington's wishes; the U.S. is weaker, sapped by two costly wars and an untested new president beset by a recession at home.

Islamic world

Possibly, Obama is persuaded that activism in the Balkans on behalf of Bosnia and Kosovo will enhance America's reputation in the Islamic world. If so, it's another error. The Balkans are a graveyard for foreign ambitions.

The U.S. House of Representatives has already adopted a resolution advocating a centralized, unitary Bosnian state, and the RCMI panel was in agreement that previous U.S. interference has contributed to Balkan violence and unrest. Bosnia and Kosovo are potential problems that European countries will inevitably inherit.

For starters, Obama should put a leash on Clinton -- and a muzzle on Biden.