June 16, 2006

The Coming of the Micro-States


The Coming of the Micro-States

By Fred Weir

Christian Science Monitor

June 5, 2006

As goes Montenegro, so goes Kosovo, Transdniestria, and South Ossetia?

As Montenegro officially declared independence this weekend, accepting the world's welcome into the community of nations, a handful of obscure "statelets" are demanding the same opportunity to choose their own destinies. In the latest example, Transdniestria, a Russian-speaking enclave that won de facto independence in the early 1990s, declared last week that it will hold a Montenegro-style referendum in September as part of its campaign for statehood.

Experts fear that many "frozen conflicts" around the world - in which a territory has gained de facto independence through war but failed to win international recognition - could reignite as ethnic minorities demand the same right to self-determination that many former Yugoslav territories have been offered by the international community.

Even more significant than Montenegro's rise to statehood would be the international community's acceptance of Kosovo's bid for independence. The province of Serbia was seized by NATO in 1999. Ongoing talks discussing that possibility are being watched with intense interest by rebel statelets. But as tiny, newly independent states such as East Timor find themselves mired in ethnic violence, international observers are wary of the implications of such a move.

"If Kosovo becomes independent, this precedent will cause further fragmentation of the global order and lead to the creation of more unviable little states," predicts Dmitri Suslov, an analyst with the independent Council on Foreign and Defense Policy in Moscow.

Russia has backed the emergence of several pro-Moscow separatist enclaves in the post-Soviet region, as a means of keeping pressure on defiant neighbors, but has so far been deterred from granting them official recognition by international strictures against changing the borders of existing states. Montenegro's successful May 21 vote of independence from Yugoslavia - recognized by the world community - has encouraged others' thoughts of following the same path.

The United Nations Charter mentions both the right of "self-determination" of peoples and the "territorial integrity" of states as bedrock principles of the world order. But these principles come into conflict when a separatist minority threatens to rupture an existing country. Russia, which has a score of ethnic "republics," including an active rebellion in Chechnya, has long championed the "territorial integrity" side of the equation. But the Kremlin's emphasis, at least regarding some of its neighbors, appears to be shifting.

"If such precedents are possible [in the former Yugoslavia], they will also be precedents in the post-Soviet space," President Vladimir Putin told journalists Friday. "Why can Albanians in Kosovo have independence, but [Georgian breakaway republics] South Ossetia and Abkhazia can't? What's the difference?"

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, all of its 15 major republics gained their freedom and basked in the glow of global acceptance. But within some of those new states, smaller ethnic groups raised their own banners of rebellion. In the early 1990s, two "autonomous republics" in Georgia - Abkhazia and South Ossetia - defeated government forces with Russian assistance and established regimes that are effectively independent but stuck in legal limbo because they remain officially unrecognized, even by Moscow. The Russian-speaking province of Transdniestria, aided by the Russian 14th army, similarly broke away from the ethnically Romanian republic of Moldova. The Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan fell under Armenian control after a savage war; and rebels in Russia's southern republic of Chechnya briefly won de facto independence in the late '90s after crushing Russian forces on the battlefield.

In all of these cases, the international principle respecting the "territorial integrity" of existing states has so far trumped the yearning of small nationalities for their own statehood. Citing that rule, Moscow launched a brutal military campaign in 1999 that has since largely succeeded in reintegrating Chechnya as a province of Russia.

But Russia's relations with Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan have soured in recent years, as those countries have broken from Moscow's orbit and charted a more pro-West course. That, plus the precedents being set in the former Yugoslavia, has led some nationalist politicians in Moscow to demand the Kremlin salvage what influence it can in the region by granting recognition - or even membership in the Russian Federation - to some of those breakaway entities.

Transdniestria has already signed an economic pact with Moscow that will allow the tiny but heavily-industrialized territory to sell its goods in Russia and eventually join the Russian ruble's currency zone. Also in the focus of Russia's changing policies are the breakaway Georgian republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

"Russia needs to be more active in solving the problems of Abkhazia and South Ossetia," says Igor Panarin, a professor at the official Diplomatic Academy in Moscow, which trains Russian diplomats. "Both the people and governments of [these statelets] want to join Russia, and there's every legal reason for them to do so. Polls show the majority of Russians support this, too."

Eduard Kokoity, president of the Georgian breakaway republic of South Ossetia, said last week he will ask Russia to annex his statelet, which has existed in legal limbo since driving out Georgian forces in a bitter civil war in the early '90s. "In the nearest future, we will submit documents to the Russian Constitutional Court proving the fact that South Ossetia joined the Russian Empire together with North Ossetia as an indivisible entity and never left Russia," Mr. Kokoity said.

South Ossetia, with a population of about 70,000, is ethnically and geographically linked with the Russian Caucasus republic of North Ossetia. Experts say there is a local campaign, supported by Russian nationalists, to join the two territories into a new Moscow-ruled republic that would be named "Alania" - the ancient name of the Ossetian nation. "South Ossetia really wants to join Russia, and I wouldn't rule this out as a long-term prospect," says Suslov.

Abkhazia, a sub-tropical Black Sea enclave, expelled its Georgian residents during the 1992-93 civil war, and now is home to about 200,000 ethnic Abkhaz who eke out a living exporting fruit to Russia and welcoming the few Russian tourists that visit each year.

Georgians cry foul, and complain the entire issue is a made-in-Moscow land grab. "South Ossetia and Abkhazia were created as a Bolshevik divide-and-rule device to control Georgia, and they are still being used that way," says Alexander Rondeli, president of the Strategic and International Studies Foundation, an independent think tank based in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi. "What is actually going on is the de facto annexation of these territories by Russia. Since Russia is strong, the Western powers let it do whatever it wants."

Many Western experts argue that the process of dismantling the former Yugoslavia is a unique event, directly supervised by the UN and carried out with a maximum of democratic safeguards. If Russia acts alone in its region, it risks alienating the world and multiplying regional conflicts. "This is a double-edged sword," says Ariel Cohen, a senior researcher at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. "By recognizing Moscow-supported statelets, Russia would perpetuate frictions for decades to come. Post-Soviet borders should remain inviolate. This would save a lot of headaches, first of all for Russia itself."

But for now, the mood in Moscow appears to be hardening. "We disagree with the concept that Kosovo is a unique case, because that runs counter to the norms of international law," Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov warned in an interview with Vremya Novostei, a Russian newspaper, last week. "The resolution on Kosovo will create a precedent in international law that will later be applied to other frozen conflicts."


Shortcut to: http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/micro/2006/0605weir.htm



RACAK... There you go again!

 


 

Mr Kamm,
You know for a fact that Racak was a massacre. Please show your evidence and show it now. It's no good parroting Walker and Holebrooke. They're going to be honorary ambassadors to Kosovo before you get a look in, that is, while they are useful and then the Albanian mafia will see them off. Only a total ignoramous would have made such a statement about Racak. The Finnish phorensic team, headed by Helena Ranta put together a report which is "secret" even today. Now, I would ask myself why this report is being repressed. By the way. The bodies in Racak were of ONE woman, ONE boy and the rest were men of fighting age. Thirty seven of these had powder burns on their hands which would have indicated everywhere else, except in Kosovo, that these men held weapons and fired them. Ranta said of the powder burns:

"Ranta rejected the findings, pointing out that they were based on a paraffin test which had been used already in the 1930s, and which she did not consider reliable. Ranta's group did not conduct any powder burn tests, because they were not able to study the bodies until a week after the victims had died. She said that such tests should be conducted within three to six hours after the shots had been fired."http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20030313IE2

So the question is Mr. Kamm, why were these bodies not examined immediately? Walker "found" them. Why didn't he demand an autopsy there and then?

I am not a fan of Chomsky, I saw through him a long time ago. Anyone who supports the bombing of innocent civilians and does not speak up deserves nothing but contempt. You, on the other hand embrace it totally, so much so that you will go to any lengths to explain your weird views. The world is, indeed, a dangerous place with people such as yourself, in it.

Sincerely,
B. Perry



What Kosovo Can Do for the Former Soviet States

Not a Precedent, but an Opportunity

By Oksana Antonenko

Special to Russia Profile


What Kosovo Can Do for the Former Soviet States

Over the course of this year, the international community aims to complete negotiations over the final status of Kosovo, which has remained in flux since NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign. Since that time, Kosovo has remained territorially a part of Serbia and Montenegro, but has been governed by the United Nations Interim Administration for Kosovo. As a result, Kosovo remains a politically dysfunctional and economically devastated region, where unemployment runs at over 40 percent and relations between ethnic Albanians and Serbs are still defined by hostility. This situation provides the most powerful argument for granting Kosovo new internationally recognized status. In its current form, Kosovo has no prospects for progressing towards greater stability, democracy and prosperity. A new, internationally recognized status will allow the people of Kosovo to take responsibility for their own future, while introducing clear and strict conditions that will guide future international engagement and assistance. These conditions include the development of democratic institutions, including respect for minority rights.

While the United States and the EU have pushed for international recognition of Kosovo’s independence, Russia has traditionally supported Serbia’s territorial integrity, with Kosovo as an integral part. Recently, however, Moscow has indicated a change in its policy, opening a path towards conditional recognition of Kosovo’s independence. These conditions were advanced by President Vladimir Putin in January, when he said that any future recognition of Kosovo’s independence will create a precedent which could be universally applied to other unrecognized de facto states, particularly those that have emerged from the former Soviet Union.

Frozen conflicts

The dissolution of the Soviet Union ignited a number of violent ethnic clashes across its territory, and in the South Caucasus in particular. As a result of these conflicts, four self-declared states emerged in the early 1990s – the republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdnestr. Abkhazia and South Ossetia seek independence from Georgia, Transdnestr from Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh is torn between Armenia and Azerbaijan. All of these have now existed under such conditions for more than a decade, defying international isolation and economic, political and humanitarian constraints emanating from their unrecognized status. All of them have developed some form of functioning economy and security systems and have conducted referenda on independence and held several rounds of elections, none of which were recognized or properly observed by the international community. This situation has created a generation of “citizens” who are committed to preserving and defending their independence.

These republics see the Kosovo precedent as possible means to advance their aims of gaining recognition. The president of Abkhazia, Sergei Bagapsh, has said that the recognition of an independent Kosovo could accelerate the recognition of an independent Abkhazia. Eduard Kokoity, the president of South Ossetia, has described the change in Russia’s position as a symbol of the end of a “double standard” approach towards the plight of all unrecognized states.

However, Russia’s plea for universality, backed by heightened expectations from the unrecognized states themselves, is unlikely to be endorsed by the international community. The EU and the United States have already responded with statements that any decision on Kosovo’s status should be treated on its own merits, and not as a precedent for other conflicts, which must be resolved based on their unique characteristics and on existing international legal strictures. This response takes into account a number of pragmatic, strategic and geopolitical factors.

The pragmatists contend that there are major differences between the Kosovo case and those of the unrecognized post-Soviet entities. Indeed, while there are some clear similarities between Balkan conflicts and those of the former Soviet states, there are also major differences, mainly deriving from how the entities were formed. Post-1999 Kosovo was shaped by a broad international consensus, with major powers playing an active role in the development of its political institutions, as well as in guaranteeing security and order on the ground.

In contrast, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr developed in isolation from the wider international community, with Russia playing the role of key mediator and sole guarantor of security and economic survival. Moreover, each of the entities differs in terms of demographic characteristics, political aspirations, degree of “real” independence, viability of government institutions and attitudes towards refugees and ethnic minorities. Finally, unlike Kosovo, where the international community seeks Serbia’s acquiescence to its independence and offers the prospect of European integration as an incentive, Europe and the United States both support the territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova.

Strategic arguments focus on the fact that any recognition of Kosovo as a “precedent” could have strategic implications not only for Eurasia, but also for other parts of the world where ethnic, separatist conflicts have occurred and might be reignited. The integration of a new state into the international community requires significant political and financial resources – the case of East Timor proves the point – and, in the cases of a number of such states, the entire post-Cold war political landscape of a wider Europe has to be revisited.

Geopolitically, Russia and the West are increasingly engaged in a new rivalry in Eurasia that is particularly evident in the case of the “frozen” conflicts. Both Russia and the West include the resolution of these conflicts among their important foreign and security policy priorities. The Western stance is based not only on the principle of supporting the territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova, but also on the assumption that the restoration of territorial integrity by peaceful means is possible.

Many Russian policy makers and experts neither support the practical reintegration of unrecognized entities into states nor believe that such an reintegration can be achieved at all, even by military force. Europe and the United States have provided military assistance and political backing to the governments of Georgia and Moldova. Both seek to distance themselves from Russia and aspire to integrate themselves into Euro-Atlantic structures. Russia, in turn, provides significant economic assistance to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr and maintains a military presence in these areas. Additionally, Russia has granted citizenship to the majority of the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The more tension between Russia and the West, the less likely it is that a Kosovo resolution could offer even a slim opportunity to devise a more realistic and co-operative approach towards the “frozen conflicts.” Any new approach should address a few core issues.

First, it is no longer possible to ignore the fact that these unrecognized entities exist. Kosovo helped to put them on the international agenda, and a review is now required to develop a new international policy towards each. This policy should combine new efforts at conflict resolution with a renewed dialogue that could be pursued until the issue of status is resolved through negotiations. Another challenge could be finding a way to grant these entities some voice within international organizations without legitimizing their unilateral political aspirations.

Secondly, it is important to lower expectations and to develop assurances that the “Kosovo precedent” does not rekindle prior tensions, particularly in South Ossetia.

Thirdly, it is important to develop a set of principles that can determine the degree of international engagement. These should be derived from the Kosovo standards and relate to democratic institutions, civil and minority rights and security.

Genuine international recognition cannot come without international consensus. While the United States and the EU are likely to secure such consensus with regard to Kosovo, Russia has little or no chance of doing the same for Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Transdnestr. Any attempt by Russia to declare unilateral recognition for some or all of these entities is bound to postpone their integration into the international community further. However, it is precisely this integration, rather than recognition, that the unrecognized entities should hope to achieve.

Oksana Antonenko is a Senior Fellow at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, and has set up meetings between high-level Georgian and South Ossetian officials with the aim of promoting conflict resolution in South Ossetia.
http://www.russiaprofile.org/international/2006/6/15/3874.wbp

USA uses Bulgarian intelligence service in the Balkans

 

USA uses Bulgarian intelligence service in the Balkans - Montenegrin daily
BBC Monitoring Europe (Political) - June 14, 2006

Excerpt from report by M.V.R. and D.Z: "Bulgarian spies followed Pedja" published by Montenegrin newspaper Dan on 13 June

The chairman of the Socialist People's Party [SNP - Predrag Bulatovic] who is also the leader of the pro-union bloc was being followed by foreign intelligence services. This fact was confirmed by Georgi Koritarov, member of the Bulgarian State Security Service, in his confession published by the Belgrade-based Blic newspaper. He admitted that this service was very interested in Montenegrin opposition leader Predrag Bulatovic.

[Passage omitted: Parts of the Blic article]

Military-political analyst Milovan Drecun believes that the fact that foreign intelligence services were following Montenegrin opposition leader Predrag Bulatovic is not an unexpected development, considering the fact that he has so many supporters that it was always a possibility that he might take over as the leader of Montenegro. He believes that there was a time when such an event definitely did not suit the American interests in the Balkans.

"Lately the Bulgarian intelligence service has become a faithful long arm serving the American interests in the Balkans. Three American bases are to be opened in that country, but it is particularly interesting to note that the Bulgarian intelligence service now has a new role to play in the Balkans. Whenever the American intelligence services cannot or do not want to do something efficiently, they do it through Bulgarian services. My sources tell me that Koritarov's statement is absolutely true," Drecun says.

He adds that everything the Bulgarian intelligence service has been doing in Montenegro and Kosovo-Metohija has been done on behalf of the USA and in the course of executing orders issued by its intelligence services.

"One former Bulgarian general from the Macedonian area is intensely busy among members of the Albanian National Army [ANA] and the [Kosovo] protection corps. His task is to control actions of the Albanian mafia and [Kosovo politician] Hasim Taci, because America is starting to lose control over that mafia.

[Passage omitted: Drecun comments on other alleged Bulgarian intelligence services' activities

He points out that, beside the CIA, Al-Qa'idah has its headquarters in Sofia, too. Its head was the ideologist of this terrorist organization, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and then his brother Muhammad.

"Daut Haradinaj, brother of [former Kosovo Prime Minister] Ramus Haradinaj, visited Sofia in order to contact him after Kfor arrived in Kosovo. Daut Haradinaj is the main connection between the former KLA [Kosovo Liberation Army], which has now become the Kosovo Protection Corps, and Al-Qa'idah.

[Passage omitted: Drecun says that Bulgarian intelligence services helped dissolve Serbia-Montenegro]


Source: Dan, Podgorica, in Serbian 13 Jun 06, p7

Copyright 2006 British Broadcasting Corporation
Posted for Fair Use only.


Quiet Bulgarian
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/dan061406.htm




Apostle of Electrification

 

http://news.serbianunity.net/bydate/2006/June_15/23.html

Serbian Unity Congress

Letter to President of Serbia regarding

International Nikola Tesla Day and the Year of Electrification

June 15, 2006

Boris Tadic, President
Republic of Serbia

Dear President Tadic,

The Serbian Unity Congress is joining the other organizations around the World that are proposing to the United Nations to declare the year 2006 as «The Year of Electrification» in honor of the 150th anniversary of Tesla's birth and proclame July 10 as «International Nikola Tesla Day». Nikola Tesla was born in 1856 in Smiljane, Lika. His father Milutin was a Serbian Orthodox priest, and mother Djuka a self-taught inventor of many household items. Tesla came to the USA in 1884 and became one of the greatest inventors in the World. Tesla was a visionary genius whose inventions established the basis for the widespread electrification and wireless communications across the Globe. In writings about Tesla, one often finds statements such as that he "invented the twentieth century" or "the twenty first century", or even that he "invented the future".

Tesla created the polyphase alternating current based system of motors and generators that remains at the heart of electric power generation to this day. Among the more than 700 of Tesla's other inventions/patents are the rotating magnetic field principle, polyphase alternating-current system, Tesla Coil, induction motor, wireless communication, fluorescent lights, use of high-frequency (h.f.) currents in medicine and remote control.

However, he is still not recognized for many of his fundamental inventions. Such is the case of radio for which even the U.S. Supreme Court in 1943 determined Tesla as inventor. Tesla is one of only two Americans to have a unit of electrical measurement named in his honor. In 1956, Tesla's peers at the Electrotechnical Conference in Munich acknowledged his monumental contributions to science by designating his name to represent a unit of magnetic measurement: the "tesla" (T) became the Unit of Magnetic Flux Density in the MKS system. Throughout the entire history of electrical science only fifteen men worldwide have received this honor. The IEEE, which considers Tesla one of the 12 "apostles" of electrical science, continues to offer an annual prize in the field of power engineering in his name.

We ask the Government of Serbia and Montenegro to submits an official requests to the UN to declare the year 2006 as «The Year of Electrification» and to proclame July 10 as «International Nikola Tesla Day».

Sincerely yours,
Prof. Dr. Jasmina Vujic
Executive Vice President

Beware Kosovo independence

 

Letters to the editor

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
June 16, 2006


Beware Kosovo independence
    In the well-written Commentary column regarding the global metastasis of al Qaeda ("Reconnecting al Qaeda dots," Wednesday), Arnaud de Borchgrave omits one important regional milestone: the Balkans. Today, while America's and the world's attention is focused on Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, the establishment of a rogue Islamic terrorist state in the belly of Europe is nearing enactment by misguided moves to create an independent Kosovo controlled by terrorist and organized-crime elements.
    A Wall Street Journal (European edition) article of Nov. 1, 2001, headlined "Al Qaeda's Balkan Links," states: "For the past 10 years, the most senior leaders of al Qaeda have visited the Balkans, including [Osama] bin Laden himself on three occasions between 1994 and 1996. The Egyptian surgeon turned terrorist leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri has operated terrorist training camps, weapons of mass destruction factories and money-laundering and drug-training networks throughout Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia (FYROM), Bulgaria, Turkey and Bosnia. This has gone on for a decade."
    The Washington Times' own Jerry Seper wrote as far back as 1999: "Some members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which has financed its war effort through the sale of heroin, were trained in terrorist camps run by international fugitive Osama bin Laden." Since then, Kosovo has become Europe's center for drug trafficking, sex slavery and terrorism.
    According to Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily (Oct. 25, 2005): "Deeply placed sources within the Islamist community in Kosovo have identified the source and type of the explosives used in the jihadist terrorist bombings in London on July 7, 2005, and the Madrid commuter railway bombings of March 11, 2004.
    "The man at the center of the provision of the explosives in both instances was an Albanian, operating mostly out of Kosovo (with links into Bosnia) who is a second-ranking leader in the Kosovo Liberation Army."
    Only firm action by the United States can stop another U.N. fiasco: Kosovo independence.
    
    COL. GEORGE JATRAS
    Air Force (retired)
    Camp Hill, Pa.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20060615-084010-9571r.htm