How to move Bosnia forward
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2006
SARAJEVO, Bosnia-HerzegovinaBosnia and Herzegovina has traveled a long way in the past decade as the country has sought to rebuild itself with international support in the wake of Europe's most devastating conflict since World War II. But progress will only be irreversible when Bosnians take responsibility for the peace process. It is my task as Bosnia's last high representative to oversee the transition from today's quasi-protectorate to local ownership.
The office I have just inherited was created by the Dayton Peace Agreement to oversee implementation of the accord ending the Bosnian War in 1995. In response to massive obstructionism in the first two years of Dayton implementation, the powers of the high representative were augmented at a meeting in December 1997 in Bonn, enabling him to dismiss officials and to impose laws if this was deemed necessary.
In the intervening years, my three immediate predecessors - Carlos Westendorp of Spain, Wolfgang Petritsch of Austria, and Paddy Ashdown of Britain - all made use of these so-called "Bonn powers" to establish the institutions necessary for a viable, modern democracy. In this way, they succeeded in taking the peace process forward.
There are, however, limits to what can be achieved by imposition and these limits have almost certainly been reached.
It is not possible to decree reconciliation, opportunity and prosperity. Institutions that have been created by imposition will never function effectively unless Bosnians of all ethnicities buy in to them and until Bosnian citizens expect them, and not in to international organizations, to deliver reform.
This requires a shift in mind-set both among Bosnians, who have grown accustomed to an intrusive international presence in their country, and within the international community, which has grown accustomed to intervening in all levels of decision making.
One consequence of seeking to avoid using the Bonn powers could be a slowdown in the perceived pace of progress in the coming year. But neither stagnation nor a return to the zero-sum attitudes that once characterized Bosnian politics are inevitable. Indeed, I believe it is possible that Bosnians surprise us and prove to the world that the caricature of their country as a "failed state in Europe" is no longer accurate.
I have traveled through Bosnia for more than a decade, brokering more than 60 mediation agreements on highly sensitive issues, and I have seen impressive changes as a result of the efforts of local people and institutions.
There are huge incentives for success. This year, Bosnia could both sign a stabilization and association agreement with the European Union and join NATO's Partnership-for-Peace program. These are key milestones on the road to European and Euro-Atlantic integration. My office will do what we can to help Bosnia reach these objectives. But to take these processes forward, Bosnia must be a fully sovereign country. That means that I must step back.
Elections in October should provide Bosnians with an opportunity to debate the way forward and to choose leaders who are best equipped to secure their country's European future. For they - not I - will be responsible for negotiating the terms and speed of their country's entry into Europe.
Termination of the office of the high representative - and with it, the Bonn powers - does not signal the end of international engagement in Bosnia. Rather it will herald the beginning of a new chapter in the country's relationship with the wider world and in particular with the rest of Europe. Moreover, I will not leave the country when I cease to be high representative. Instead, I will remain here as a special representative of the European Union to help steer these processes.
Europe has not always done the right thing for Bosnia. I have been acutely aware of this since I resigned from the German government in 1992 in protest of our collective failure in Bosnia. But today tried-and-tested mechanisms, in particular in the form of the European Union's pre-accession negotiations but also NATO's Membership Action Plan, exist to focus the minds of Bosnian leaders on required reforms.
The process of European integration has been remarkable for all countries that today make up the European Union and has helped create unparalleled peace, prosperity and opportunity. It has also helped heal the wounds of the most devastating war the world has known.
Those of us who experienced Europe's darkest days and have lived long enough to see the European Union and NATO grow to include countries that used to be part of the Eastern bloc realize how far and fast it is possible to move when countries are on the right track. While clearly Bosnia still has a long way to go, the goal of eventual membership in these institutions should be sufficiently powerful to help Bosnians overcome divisions and shape their own destiny.
(Christian Schwarz-Schilling is High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina.)
The office I have just inherited was created by the Dayton Peace Agreement to oversee implementation of the accord ending the Bosnian War in 1995. In response to massive obstructionism in the first two years of Dayton implementation, the powers of the high representative were augmented at a meeting in December 1997 in Bonn, enabling him to dismiss officials and to impose laws if this was deemed necessary.
In the intervening years, my three immediate predecessors - Carlos Westendorp of Spain, Wolfgang Petritsch of Austria, and Paddy Ashdown of Britain - all made use of these so-called "Bonn powers" to establish the institutions necessary for a viable, modern democracy. In this way, they succeeded in taking the peace process forward.
There are, however, limits to what can be achieved by imposition and these limits have almost certainly been reached.
It is not possible to decree reconciliation, opportunity and prosperity. Institutions that have been created by imposition will never function effectively unless Bosnians of all ethnicities buy in to them and until Bosnian citizens expect them, and not in to international organizations, to deliver reform.
This requires a shift in mind-set both among Bosnians, who have grown accustomed to an intrusive international presence in their country, and within the international community, which has grown accustomed to intervening in all levels of decision making.
One consequence of seeking to avoid using the Bonn powers could be a slowdown in the perceived pace of progress in the coming year. But neither stagnation nor a return to the zero-sum attitudes that once characterized Bosnian politics are inevitable. Indeed, I believe it is possible that Bosnians surprise us and prove to the world that the caricature of their country as a "failed state in Europe" is no longer accurate.
I have traveled through Bosnia for more than a decade, brokering more than 60 mediation agreements on highly sensitive issues, and I have seen impressive changes as a result of the efforts of local people and institutions.
There are huge incentives for success. This year, Bosnia could both sign a stabilization and association agreement with the European Union and join NATO's Partnership-for-Peace program. These are key milestones on the road to European and Euro-Atlantic integration. My office will do what we can to help Bosnia reach these objectives. But to take these processes forward, Bosnia must be a fully sovereign country. That means that I must step back.
Elections in October should provide Bosnians with an opportunity to debate the way forward and to choose leaders who are best equipped to secure their country's European future. For they - not I - will be responsible for negotiating the terms and speed of their country's entry into Europe.
Termination of the office of the high representative - and with it, the Bonn powers - does not signal the end of international engagement in Bosnia. Rather it will herald the beginning of a new chapter in the country's relationship with the wider world and in particular with the rest of Europe. Moreover, I will not leave the country when I cease to be high representative. Instead, I will remain here as a special representative of the European Union to help steer these processes.
Europe has not always done the right thing for Bosnia. I have been acutely aware of this since I resigned from the German government in 1992 in protest of our collective failure in Bosnia. But today tried-and-tested mechanisms, in particular in the form of the European Union's pre-accession negotiations but also NATO's Membership Action Plan, exist to focus the minds of Bosnian leaders on required reforms.
The process of European integration has been remarkable for all countries that today make up the European Union and has helped create unparalleled peace, prosperity and opportunity. It has also helped heal the wounds of the most devastating war the world has known.
Those of us who experienced Europe's darkest days and have lived long enough to see the European Union and NATO grow to include countries that used to be part of the Eastern bloc realize how far and fast it is possible to move when countries are on the right track. While clearly Bosnia still has a long way to go, the goal of eventual membership in these institutions should be sufficiently powerful to help Bosnians overcome divisions and shape their own destiny.
(Christian Schwarz-Schilling is High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina.)
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The goal of eventual membership in the EU and NATO should be sufficiently powerful to help Bosnians overcome divisions and shape their own destiny.
