Handke: Send my award to the Serbs
http://www.kosovo.net/news/archive/2006/June_24/1.html
KiM Info Newsletter24-06-06Peter Handke: Send my award to the SerbsPeter Handke has once again shocked the German public but this time in such a way that not even the most extreme do not dare criticize him for it. He has given up the alternative Heinrich Heine award that the actors and intellectuals of Berlin wished to bestow upon him in favor of the Serbs of Kosovo, who live "surrounded by barbed wire and tanks".www.novosti.co.yu
Vecernje Novosti daily, BelgradeJune 24, 2006By D. Sekulic, June 23, 2006Peter Handke has once again shocked the German public but this time in such a way that not even the most extreme do not dare criticize him for it. He has given up the alternative Heinrich Heine award that the actors and intellectuals of Berlin wished to bestow upon him in favor of the Serbs of Kosovo, who live "surrounded by barbed wire and tanks".The Berlin Ensemble, headed by the also frequently controversial Klaus Peymann, the famous former head of the Vienna Burgtheater, recently organized donations with the help of numerous actors to award Handke an alternative Heinrich Heine award in the amount of 50,000 euros. The highly prestigious German language award was awarded to Peter Handke by an expert jury in Dusseldorf but the city council refused to accept its decision, stating quite literally that the award could not go to a writer who is of pro-Serb orientation!The case provoked spirited discussion and many concluded that it represented an instance of brutal political censure of literature. Local politicians are judging one of the greatest living writers in the German language, warned eminent intellectuals, among them some, like Nobel laureate Gunther Grass who at one time advocated the bombing of Serbia.At the same time Handke informed Peymann and his friends that he is renouncing the alternative award as well because, as he had previously stated, he did not wish his work to be the subject of meddling by local politicians. The money that they collect should be sent to the Serb enclaves in Kosovo and Metohija to people who are living under impossible conditions thanks to the supporters of "freedom" imposed upon them by NATO bombs.Grass dismisses juryIn Dusseldorf it has now been openly admitted that the decision really was of a political nature and that the Heinrich Heine award allegedly has a clearly political character. In response to this, Grass, who is highly influential, has sent a request that in the future the city council be stripped of the right to approve or reject the decision of the expert jury.--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Related article:Disputed Author Handke Awarded German Literary PrizeDEUTSCE WELLE25.05.2006Gro�ansict des Bildes mit der Bildunterscrift: Austrian writer Peter Handke is controversial because of his stance on SerbiaControversial Austrian playwright and novelist Peter Handke was awarded the city of D�seldorf's Heine Prize for literature.The Heine Prize, endowed for 50,000 euros ($64,000), is one of the three highest-paying literature prizes in Germany. The jury said Handke -- like Heinric Heine, the German poet after whom the prize is named -- obstinately follows the way to an "open truth." He puts forth his own poetic world view, in contrast to broader public opinion, they said. The prize will be awared on Dec. 13.Handke wrote the groundbreaking experimental play "Offending the Audience" and the novel "The Goalie's Anxiety at the Penalty Kick", but may be best know for writing the novel "Wings of Desire", whic was turned into a film by Wim Wenders.Pro-Serbian stanceHe is controversial because of his pro-Serbian stance during the Balkan wars, and his support for the Serbian regime.Recently, Frenc national theatre Com�die-Fran�aise removed the play "Voyage to the Sonorous Land or the Art of Asking" from its 2007 season lineup, after Handke spoke at the burial of former Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic in Marc.Handke, who lives in France, said in an esay in the Frenc newspaper Lib�ration: "Let's stop laying the masacre . on the backs of the Serbian military and paramilitary. And listen -- at last -- to the survivors of the Muslim masacres in numerous Serbian villages around Srebrenica."'Glad' aceptanceLast year, Handke's publisher, Suhrkamp Verlag, said the author would categorically refuse any more literature prizes; in Paris, however, Handke said he would "gladly" acept the Heine Prize.Up to now, winners of the Heine Prize have included Walter Jens, G�nter Kunert, Max Frisc, Wolf Biermann, Hans Magnus Enzensberger, Elfriede Jelinek und Robert Gernhardt.
June 26, 2006
Balkan Gains in Peril
Balkan Gains in Peril
By Gordon N. Bardos
Sunday, June 25, 2006; B07
The Bush administration is facing a moment of truth in the Balkans. Montenegro's newly declared independence, the decision on Kosovo's future status expected later this year and ongoing efforts to promote constitutional reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina all bring sharply into focus the irreconcilability of two administration goals: disengagement from the Balkans (so full attention can be given to Afghanistan and the Middle East) and the obligation to manage the political and security changes facing southeastern Europe in the near future.Given the European Union's problems -- an economic downturn in much of the eurozone, weak leadership in Italy and Germany, lame-duck leaders in Britain and France, and enlargement fatigue -- expecting the alliance to provide serious leadership in the region over the next few years is unrealistic.The disintegration of Serbia-Montenegro is only the first of many important changes the region confronts. Montenegro's declaration of independence on June 3 from its union with Serbia was a considerable success for its top politician, Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic. But the independence referendum campaign and its outcome revealed the deep divisions within Montenegrin society. While the referendum passed by a 55 to 45 percent margin, in real terms the difference between the pro-independence and anti-independence blocs (roughly 45,000 votes) was less than the number of people in Yankee Stadium on a Sunday afternoon. Voters identifying themselves as Montenegrins, Albanians, or Muslims voted overwhelmingly in favor of independence, while Montenegrin citizens identifying themselves as Serbs -- more than 30 percent of the population -- voted just as strongly for maintaining the union. These divisions, coupled with an economy in which less than 20 percent of the population is officially employed, suggest future Montenegrin politics could be bitter and divisive.Independent Montenegro faces two important challenges. The first is healing the wounds of the independence campaign and fostering an atmosphere in which the Serb population will be able to play a constructive role in political life. The second is satisfying the demands of Montenegro's ethnic minorities now that the terms of the political game in the country are changed. For several years Djukanovic has enjoyed the support of Albanian and Muslim minorities because they supported his campaign to break the tie with Serbia. Now that this has been achieved, ethnic minorities are likely to up the ante and begin seeking increased cultural and territorial autonomy within the new state. Montenegrin politics could begin to resemble the difficult, ethnically based politics of Bosnia-Herzegovina or Macedonia, which would hamper the country's Euro-Atlantic integration efforts down the road.The spillover effects of Montenegro's independence referendum are already evident. Serb leaders in Bosnia have aired the possibility of holding their own independence referendum, while some Bosnian Muslim politicians have started calling for the Bosnian Serb republic to be eliminated altogether. Either action would mean, in effect, scrapping the Dayton Accords, which have kept the peace in Bosnia since 1995. In Serbia, support for extreme nationalist parties is rising and likely to increase still more if, as is widely expected, Kosovo is granted some form of independence later in the year. In Kosovo, recent reports by the United Nations and Human Rights Watch on corruption in political life and the absence of the rule of law show that place is a long way from becoming a stable democratic polity.All of this suggests how easy it would be, absent strong U.S. leadership, for events to spin out of control and erase 10 years of efforts to stabilize the region. In such an unstable political climate, statements by U.S. policymakers about their eagerness to pull U.S. troops out of the Balkans and turn the job over to the Europeans only embolden extremists. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia are all gearing up for elections, and moderate political forces in these countries need U.S. support now to convince their electorates that the difficult choices being made to adopt economic and political reforms will pay off in the near future, not two or three electoral cycles down the line. The assassination of former Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjic in March 2003 is a tragic reminder of the great personal risks reformers throughout southeastern Europe are taking. They need and deserve U.S. understanding and support.By visiting Baghdad this month, President Bush sent a strong personal message to Iraqis that the United States intends to support their country until its transition to democracy is completed. The administration should send a similar message to both extremists and moderates in the Balkans that the United States will actively lead the effort to integrate all the countries of southeastern Europe into both NATO and the European Union -- and that it won't pull out until the job is done.
The writer is assistant director of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs. He also serves as a Balkans analyst for Freedom House.
http://kosovareport.blogspot.com/2006/06/balkan-gains-in-peril.html
By Gordon N. Bardos
Sunday, June 25, 2006; B07
The Bush administration is facing a moment of truth in the Balkans. Montenegro's newly declared independence, the decision on Kosovo's future status expected later this year and ongoing efforts to promote constitutional reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina all bring sharply into focus the irreconcilability of two administration goals: disengagement from the Balkans (so full attention can be given to Afghanistan and the Middle East) and the obligation to manage the political and security changes facing southeastern Europe in the near future.Given the European Union's problems -- an economic downturn in much of the eurozone, weak leadership in Italy and Germany, lame-duck leaders in Britain and France, and enlargement fatigue -- expecting the alliance to provide serious leadership in the region over the next few years is unrealistic.The disintegration of Serbia-Montenegro is only the first of many important changes the region confronts. Montenegro's declaration of independence on June 3 from its union with Serbia was a considerable success for its top politician, Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic. But the independence referendum campaign and its outcome revealed the deep divisions within Montenegrin society. While the referendum passed by a 55 to 45 percent margin, in real terms the difference between the pro-independence and anti-independence blocs (roughly 45,000 votes) was less than the number of people in Yankee Stadium on a Sunday afternoon. Voters identifying themselves as Montenegrins, Albanians, or Muslims voted overwhelmingly in favor of independence, while Montenegrin citizens identifying themselves as Serbs -- more than 30 percent of the population -- voted just as strongly for maintaining the union. These divisions, coupled with an economy in which less than 20 percent of the population is officially employed, suggest future Montenegrin politics could be bitter and divisive.Independent Montenegro faces two important challenges. The first is healing the wounds of the independence campaign and fostering an atmosphere in which the Serb population will be able to play a constructive role in political life. The second is satisfying the demands of Montenegro's ethnic minorities now that the terms of the political game in the country are changed. For several years Djukanovic has enjoyed the support of Albanian and Muslim minorities because they supported his campaign to break the tie with Serbia. Now that this has been achieved, ethnic minorities are likely to up the ante and begin seeking increased cultural and territorial autonomy within the new state. Montenegrin politics could begin to resemble the difficult, ethnically based politics of Bosnia-Herzegovina or Macedonia, which would hamper the country's Euro-Atlantic integration efforts down the road.The spillover effects of Montenegro's independence referendum are already evident. Serb leaders in Bosnia have aired the possibility of holding their own independence referendum, while some Bosnian Muslim politicians have started calling for the Bosnian Serb republic to be eliminated altogether. Either action would mean, in effect, scrapping the Dayton Accords, which have kept the peace in Bosnia since 1995. In Serbia, support for extreme nationalist parties is rising and likely to increase still more if, as is widely expected, Kosovo is granted some form of independence later in the year. In Kosovo, recent reports by the United Nations and Human Rights Watch on corruption in political life and the absence of the rule of law show that place is a long way from becoming a stable democratic polity.All of this suggests how easy it would be, absent strong U.S. leadership, for events to spin out of control and erase 10 years of efforts to stabilize the region. In such an unstable political climate, statements by U.S. policymakers about their eagerness to pull U.S. troops out of the Balkans and turn the job over to the Europeans only embolden extremists. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia are all gearing up for elections, and moderate political forces in these countries need U.S. support now to convince their electorates that the difficult choices being made to adopt economic and political reforms will pay off in the near future, not two or three electoral cycles down the line. The assassination of former Serbian prime minister Zoran Djindjic in March 2003 is a tragic reminder of the great personal risks reformers throughout southeastern Europe are taking. They need and deserve U.S. understanding and support.By visiting Baghdad this month, President Bush sent a strong personal message to Iraqis that the United States intends to support their country until its transition to democracy is completed. The administration should send a similar message to both extremists and moderates in the Balkans that the United States will actively lead the effort to integrate all the countries of southeastern Europe into both NATO and the European Union -- and that it won't pull out until the job is done.
The writer is assistant director of the Harriman Institute at Columbia University's School of International and Public Affairs. He also serves as a Balkans analyst for Freedom House.
http://kosovareport.blogspot.com/2006/06/balkan-gains-in-peril.html
June 16, 2006
The Coming of the Micro-States
The Coming of the Micro-States
By Fred Weir
Christian Science Monitor
June 5, 2006
As goes Montenegro, so goes Kosovo, Transdniestria, and South Ossetia?
As Montenegro officially declared independence this weekend, accepting the world's welcome into the community of nations, a handful of obscure "statelets" are demanding the same opportunity to choose their own destinies. In the latest example, Transdniestria, a Russian-speaking enclave that won de facto independence in the early 1990s, declared last week that it will hold a Montenegro-style referendum in September as part of its campaign for statehood.
Experts fear that many "frozen conflicts" around the world - in which a territory has gained de facto independence through war but failed to win international recognition - could reignite as ethnic minorities demand the same right to self-determination that many former Yugoslav territories have been offered by the international community.
Even more significant than Montenegro's rise to statehood would be the international community's acceptance of Kosovo's bid for independence. The province of Serbia was seized by NATO in 1999. Ongoing talks discussing that possibility are being watched with intense interest by rebel statelets. But as tiny, newly independent states such as East Timor find themselves mired in ethnic violence, international observers are wary of the implications of such a move.
"If Kosovo becomes independent, this precedent will cause further fragmentation of the global order and lead to the creation of more unviable little states," predicts Dmitri Suslov, an analyst with the independent Council on Foreign and Defense Policy in Moscow.
Russia has backed the emergence of several pro-Moscow separatist enclaves in the post-Soviet region, as a means of keeping pressure on defiant neighbors, but has so far been deterred from granting them official recognition by international strictures against changing the borders of existing states. Montenegro's successful May 21 vote of independence from Yugoslavia - recognized by the world community - has encouraged others' thoughts of following the same path.
The United Nations Charter mentions both the right of "self-determination" of peoples and the "territorial integrity" of states as bedrock principles of the world order. But these principles come into conflict when a separatist minority threatens to rupture an existing country. Russia, which has a score of ethnic "republics," including an active rebellion in Chechnya, has long championed the "territorial integrity" side of the equation. But the Kremlin's emphasis, at least regarding some of its neighbors, appears to be shifting.
"If such precedents are possible [in the former Yugoslavia], they will also be precedents in the post-Soviet space," President Vladimir Putin told journalists Friday. "Why can Albanians in Kosovo have independence, but [Georgian breakaway republics] South Ossetia and Abkhazia can't? What's the difference?"
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, all of its 15 major republics gained their freedom and basked in the glow of global acceptance. But within some of those new states, smaller ethnic groups raised their own banners of rebellion. In the early 1990s, two "autonomous republics" in Georgia - Abkhazia and South Ossetia - defeated government forces with Russian assistance and established regimes that are effectively independent but stuck in legal limbo because they remain officially unrecognized, even by Moscow. The Russian-speaking province of Transdniestria, aided by the Russian 14th army, similarly broke away from the ethnically Romanian republic of Moldova. The Armenian-populated enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan fell under Armenian control after a savage war; and rebels in Russia's southern republic of Chechnya briefly won de facto independence in the late '90s after crushing Russian forces on the battlefield.
In all of these cases, the international principle respecting the "territorial integrity" of existing states has so far trumped the yearning of small nationalities for their own statehood. Citing that rule, Moscow launched a brutal military campaign in 1999 that has since largely succeeded in reintegrating Chechnya as a province of Russia.
But Russia's relations with Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan have soured in recent years, as those countries have broken from Moscow's orbit and charted a more pro-West course. That, plus the precedents being set in the former Yugoslavia, has led some nationalist politicians in Moscow to demand the Kremlin salvage what influence it can in the region by granting recognition - or even membership in the Russian Federation - to some of those breakaway entities.
Transdniestria has already signed an economic pact with Moscow that will allow the tiny but heavily-industrialized territory to sell its goods in Russia and eventually join the Russian ruble's currency zone. Also in the focus of Russia's changing policies are the breakaway Georgian republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
"Russia needs to be more active in solving the problems of Abkhazia and South Ossetia," says Igor Panarin, a professor at the official Diplomatic Academy in Moscow, which trains Russian diplomats. "Both the people and governments of [these statelets] want to join Russia, and there's every legal reason for them to do so. Polls show the majority of Russians support this, too."
Eduard Kokoity, president of the Georgian breakaway republic of South Ossetia, said last week he will ask Russia to annex his statelet, which has existed in legal limbo since driving out Georgian forces in a bitter civil war in the early '90s. "In the nearest future, we will submit documents to the Russian Constitutional Court proving the fact that South Ossetia joined the Russian Empire together with North Ossetia as an indivisible entity and never left Russia," Mr. Kokoity said.
South Ossetia, with a population of about 70,000, is ethnically and geographically linked with the Russian Caucasus republic of North Ossetia. Experts say there is a local campaign, supported by Russian nationalists, to join the two territories into a new Moscow-ruled republic that would be named "Alania" - the ancient name of the Ossetian nation. "South Ossetia really wants to join Russia, and I wouldn't rule this out as a long-term prospect," says Suslov.
Abkhazia, a sub-tropical Black Sea enclave, expelled its Georgian residents during the 1992-93 civil war, and now is home to about 200,000 ethnic Abkhaz who eke out a living exporting fruit to Russia and welcoming the few Russian tourists that visit each year.
Georgians cry foul, and complain the entire issue is a made-in-Moscow land grab. "South Ossetia and Abkhazia were created as a Bolshevik divide-and-rule device to control Georgia, and they are still being used that way," says Alexander Rondeli, president of the Strategic and International Studies Foundation, an independent think tank based in the Georgian capital, Tbilisi. "What is actually going on is the de facto annexation of these territories by Russia. Since Russia is strong, the Western powers let it do whatever it wants."
Many Western experts argue that the process of dismantling the former Yugoslavia is a unique event, directly supervised by the UN and carried out with a maximum of democratic safeguards. If Russia acts alone in its region, it risks alienating the world and multiplying regional conflicts. "This is a double-edged sword," says Ariel Cohen, a senior researcher at the Heritage Foundation in Washington. "By recognizing Moscow-supported statelets, Russia would perpetuate frictions for decades to come. Post-Soviet borders should remain inviolate. This would save a lot of headaches, first of all for Russia itself."
But for now, the mood in Moscow appears to be hardening. "We disagree with the concept that Kosovo is a unique case, because that runs counter to the norms of international law," Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov warned in an interview with Vremya Novostei, a Russian newspaper, last week. "The resolution on Kosovo will create a precedent in international law that will later be applied to other frozen conflicts."
Shortcut to: http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/micro/2006/0605weir.htm
RACAK... There you go again!
Mr Kamm,You know for a fact that Racak was a massacre. Please show your evidence and show it now. It's no good parroting Walker and Holebrooke. They're going to be honorary ambassadors to Kosovo before you get a look in, that is, while they are useful and then the Albanian mafia will see them off. Only a total ignoramous would have made such a statement about Racak. The Finnish phorensic team, headed by Helena Ranta put together a report which is "secret" even today. Now, I would ask myself why this report is being repressed. By the way. The bodies in Racak were of ONE woman, ONE boy and the rest were men of fighting age. Thirty seven of these had powder burns on their hands which would have indicated everywhere else, except in Kosovo, that these men held weapons and fired them. Ranta said of the powder burns:"Ranta rejected the findings, pointing out that they were based on a paraffin test which had been used already in the 1930s, and which she did not consider reliable. Ranta's group did not conduct any powder burn tests, because they were not able to study the bodies until a week after the victims had died. She said that such tests should be conducted within three to six hours after the shots had been fired."http://www2.hs.fi/english/archive/news.asp?id=20030313IE2So the question is Mr. Kamm, why were these bodies not examined immediately? Walker "found" them. Why didn't he demand an autopsy there and then?I am not a fan of Chomsky, I saw through him a long time ago. Anyone who supports the bombing of innocent civilians and does not speak up deserves nothing but contempt. You, on the other hand embrace it totally, so much so that you will go to any lengths to explain your weird views. The world is, indeed, a dangerous place with people such as yourself, in it.Sincerely,B. Perry
What Kosovo Can Do for the Former Soviet States
Not a Precedent, but an Opportunity
By Oksana Antonenko
Special to Russia Profile
What Kosovo Can Do for the Former Soviet States
Over the course of this year, the international community aims to complete negotiations over the final status of Kosovo, which has remained in flux since NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign. Since that time, Kosovo has remained territorially a part of Serbia and Montenegro, but has been governed by the United Nations Interim Administration for Kosovo. As a result, Kosovo remains a politically dysfunctional and economically devastated region, where unemployment runs at over 40 percent and relations between ethnic Albanians and Serbs are still defined by hostility. This situation provides the most powerful argument for granting Kosovo new internationally recognized status. In its current form, Kosovo has no prospects for progressing towards greater stability, democracy and prosperity. A new, internationally recognized status will allow the people of Kosovo to take responsibility for their own future, while introducing clear and strict conditions that will guide future international engagement and assistance. These conditions include the development of democratic institutions, including respect for minority rights.
While the United States and the EU have pushed for international recognition of Kosovo’s independence, Russia has traditionally supported Serbia’s territorial integrity, with Kosovo as an integral part. Recently, however, Moscow has indicated a change in its policy, opening a path towards conditional recognition of Kosovo’s independence. These conditions were advanced by President Vladimir Putin in January, when he said that any future recognition of Kosovo’s independence will create a precedent which could be universally applied to other unrecognized de facto states, particularly those that have emerged from the former Soviet Union.
Frozen conflicts
The dissolution of the Soviet Union ignited a number of violent ethnic clashes across its territory, and in the South Caucasus in particular. As a result of these conflicts, four self-declared states emerged in the early 1990s – the republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdnestr. Abkhazia and South Ossetia seek independence from Georgia, Transdnestr from Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh is torn between Armenia and Azerbaijan. All of these have now existed under such conditions for more than a decade, defying international isolation and economic, political and humanitarian constraints emanating from their unrecognized status. All of them have developed some form of functioning economy and security systems and have conducted referenda on independence and held several rounds of elections, none of which were recognized or properly observed by the international community. This situation has created a generation of “citizens” who are committed to preserving and defending their independence.
These republics see the Kosovo precedent as possible means to advance their aims of gaining recognition. The president of Abkhazia, Sergei Bagapsh, has said that the recognition of an independent Kosovo could accelerate the recognition of an independent Abkhazia. Eduard Kokoity, the president of South Ossetia, has described the change in Russia’s position as a symbol of the end of a “double standard” approach towards the plight of all unrecognized states.
However, Russia’s plea for universality, backed by heightened expectations from the unrecognized states themselves, is unlikely to be endorsed by the international community. The EU and the United States have already responded with statements that any decision on Kosovo’s status should be treated on its own merits, and not as a precedent for other conflicts, which must be resolved based on their unique characteristics and on existing international legal strictures. This response takes into account a number of pragmatic, strategic and geopolitical factors.
The pragmatists contend that there are major differences between the Kosovo case and those of the unrecognized post-Soviet entities. Indeed, while there are some clear similarities between Balkan conflicts and those of the former Soviet states, there are also major differences, mainly deriving from how the entities were formed. Post-1999 Kosovo was shaped by a broad international consensus, with major powers playing an active role in the development of its political institutions, as well as in guaranteeing security and order on the ground.
In contrast, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr developed in isolation from the wider international community, with Russia playing the role of key mediator and sole guarantor of security and economic survival. Moreover, each of the entities differs in terms of demographic characteristics, political aspirations, degree of “real” independence, viability of government institutions and attitudes towards refugees and ethnic minorities. Finally, unlike Kosovo, where the international community seeks Serbia’s acquiescence to its independence and offers the prospect of European integration as an incentive, Europe and the United States both support the territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova.
Strategic arguments focus on the fact that any recognition of Kosovo as a “precedent” could have strategic implications not only for Eurasia, but also for other parts of the world where ethnic, separatist conflicts have occurred and might be reignited. The integration of a new state into the international community requires significant political and financial resources – the case of East Timor proves the point – and, in the cases of a number of such states, the entire post-Cold war political landscape of a wider Europe has to be revisited.
Geopolitically, Russia and the West are increasingly engaged in a new rivalry in Eurasia that is particularly evident in the case of the “frozen” conflicts. Both Russia and the West include the resolution of these conflicts among their important foreign and security policy priorities. The Western stance is based not only on the principle of supporting the territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova, but also on the assumption that the restoration of territorial integrity by peaceful means is possible.
Many Russian policy makers and experts neither support the practical reintegration of unrecognized entities into states nor believe that such an reintegration can be achieved at all, even by military force. Europe and the United States have provided military assistance and political backing to the governments of Georgia and Moldova. Both seek to distance themselves from Russia and aspire to integrate themselves into Euro-Atlantic structures. Russia, in turn, provides significant economic assistance to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr and maintains a military presence in these areas. Additionally, Russia has granted citizenship to the majority of the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The more tension between Russia and the West, the less likely it is that a Kosovo resolution could offer even a slim opportunity to devise a more realistic and co-operative approach towards the “frozen conflicts.” Any new approach should address a few core issues.
First, it is no longer possible to ignore the fact that these unrecognized entities exist. Kosovo helped to put them on the international agenda, and a review is now required to develop a new international policy towards each. This policy should combine new efforts at conflict resolution with a renewed dialogue that could be pursued until the issue of status is resolved through negotiations. Another challenge could be finding a way to grant these entities some voice within international organizations without legitimizing their unilateral political aspirations.
Secondly, it is important to lower expectations and to develop assurances that the “Kosovo precedent” does not rekindle prior tensions, particularly in South Ossetia.
Thirdly, it is important to develop a set of principles that can determine the degree of international engagement. These should be derived from the Kosovo standards and relate to democratic institutions, civil and minority rights and security.
Genuine international recognition cannot come without international consensus. While the United States and the EU are likely to secure such consensus with regard to Kosovo, Russia has little or no chance of doing the same for Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Transdnestr. Any attempt by Russia to declare unilateral recognition for some or all of these entities is bound to postpone their integration into the international community further. However, it is precisely this integration, rather than recognition, that the unrecognized entities should hope to achieve.
Oksana Antonenko is a Senior Fellow at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, and has set up meetings between high-level Georgian and South Ossetian officials with the aim of promoting conflict resolution in South Ossetia.
http://www.russiaprofile.org/international/2006/6/15/3874.wbp
USA uses Bulgarian intelligence service in the Balkans
USA uses Bulgarian intelligence service in the Balkans - Montenegrin daily
BBC Monitoring Europe (Political) - June 14, 2006
Excerpt from report by M.V.R. and D.Z: "Bulgarian spies followed Pedja" published by Montenegrin newspaper Dan on 13 June
The chairman of the Socialist People's Party [SNP - Predrag Bulatovic] who is also the leader of the pro-union bloc was being followed by foreign intelligence services. This fact was confirmed by Georgi Koritarov, member of the Bulgarian State Security Service, in his confession published by the Belgrade-based Blic newspaper. He admitted that this service was very interested in Montenegrin opposition leader Predrag Bulatovic.
[Passage omitted: Parts of the Blic article]
Military-political analyst Milovan Drecun believes that the fact that foreign intelligence services were following Montenegrin opposition leader Predrag Bulatovic is not an unexpected development, considering the fact that he has so many supporters that it was always a possibility that he might take over as the leader of Montenegro. He believes that there was a time when such an event definitely did not suit the American interests in the Balkans.
"Lately the Bulgarian intelligence service has become a faithful long arm serving the American interests in the Balkans. Three American bases are to be opened in that country, but it is particularly interesting to note that the Bulgarian intelligence service now has a new role to play in the Balkans. Whenever the American intelligence services cannot or do not want to do something efficiently, they do it through Bulgarian services. My sources tell me that Koritarov's statement is absolutely true," Drecun says.
He adds that everything the Bulgarian intelligence service has been doing in Montenegro and Kosovo-Metohija has been done on behalf of the USA and in the course of executing orders issued by its intelligence services.
"One former Bulgarian general from the Macedonian area is intensely busy among members of the Albanian National Army [ANA] and the [Kosovo] protection corps. His task is to control actions of the Albanian mafia and [Kosovo politician] Hasim Taci, because America is starting to lose control over that mafia.
[Passage omitted: Drecun comments on other alleged Bulgarian intelligence services' activities
He points out that, beside the CIA, Al-Qa'idah has its headquarters in Sofia, too. Its head was the ideologist of this terrorist organization, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and then his brother Muhammad.
"Daut Haradinaj, brother of [former Kosovo Prime Minister] Ramus Haradinaj, visited Sofia in order to contact him after Kfor arrived in Kosovo. Daut Haradinaj is the main connection between the former KLA [Kosovo Liberation Army], which has now become the Kosovo Protection Corps, and Al-Qa'idah.
[Passage omitted: Drecun says that Bulgarian intelligence services helped dissolve Serbia-Montenegro]
Source: Dan, Podgorica, in Serbian 13 Jun 06, p7
Copyright 2006 British Broadcasting Corporation
Posted for Fair Use only.
Quiet Bulgarian
http://www.slobodan-milosevic.org/news/dan061406.htm
Apostle of Electrification
http://news.serbianunity.net/bydate/2006/June_15/23.html
Serbian Unity Congress
Letter to President of Serbia regarding
International Nikola Tesla Day and the Year of Electrification
June 15, 2006
Boris Tadic, President
Republic of Serbia
Dear President Tadic,
The Serbian Unity Congress is joining the other organizations around the World that are proposing to the United Nations to declare the year 2006 as «The Year of Electrification» in honor of the 150th anniversary of Tesla's birth and proclame July 10 as «International Nikola Tesla Day». Nikola Tesla was born in 1856 in Smiljane, Lika. His father Milutin was a Serbian Orthodox priest, and mother Djuka a self-taught inventor of many household items. Tesla came to the USA in 1884 and became one of the greatest inventors in the World. Tesla was a visionary genius whose inventions established the basis for the widespread electrification and wireless communications across the Globe. In writings about Tesla, one often finds statements such as that he "invented the twentieth century" or "the twenty first century", or even that he "invented the future".
Tesla created the polyphase alternating current based system of motors and generators that remains at the heart of electric power generation to this day. Among the more than 700 of Tesla's other inventions/patents are the rotating magnetic field principle, polyphase alternating-current system, Tesla Coil, induction motor, wireless communication, fluorescent lights, use of high-frequency (h.f.) currents in medicine and remote control.
However, he is still not recognized for many of his fundamental inventions. Such is the case of radio for which even the U.S. Supreme Court in 1943 determined Tesla as inventor. Tesla is one of only two Americans to have a unit of electrical measurement named in his honor. In 1956, Tesla's peers at the Electrotechnical Conference in Munich acknowledged his monumental contributions to science by designating his name to represent a unit of magnetic measurement: the "tesla" (T) became the Unit of Magnetic Flux Density in the MKS system. Throughout the entire history of electrical science only fifteen men worldwide have received this honor. The IEEE, which considers Tesla one of the 12 "apostles" of electrical science, continues to offer an annual prize in the field of power engineering in his name.
We ask the Government of Serbia and Montenegro to submits an official requests to the UN to declare the year 2006 as «The Year of Electrification» and to proclame July 10 as «International Nikola Tesla Day».
Sincerely yours,
Prof. Dr. Jasmina Vujic
Executive Vice President
Beware Kosovo independence
Letters to the editor
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
June 16, 2006
Beware Kosovo independence
In the well-written Commentary column regarding the global metastasis of al Qaeda ("Reconnecting al Qaeda dots," Wednesday), Arnaud de Borchgrave omits one important regional milestone: the Balkans. Today, while America's and the world's attention is focused on Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, the establishment of a rogue Islamic terrorist state in the belly of Europe is nearing enactment by misguided moves to create an independent Kosovo controlled by terrorist and organized-crime elements.
A Wall Street Journal (European edition) article of Nov. 1, 2001, headlined "Al Qaeda's Balkan Links," states: "For the past 10 years, the most senior leaders of al Qaeda have visited the Balkans, including [Osama] bin Laden himself on three occasions between 1994 and 1996. The Egyptian surgeon turned terrorist leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri has operated terrorist training camps, weapons of mass destruction factories and money-laundering and drug-training networks throughout Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia (FYROM), Bulgaria, Turkey and Bosnia. This has gone on for a decade."
The Washington Times' own Jerry Seper wrote as far back as 1999: "Some members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which has financed its war effort through the sale of heroin, were trained in terrorist camps run by international fugitive Osama bin Laden." Since then, Kosovo has become Europe's center for drug trafficking, sex slavery and terrorism.
According to Defense & Foreign Affairs Daily (Oct. 25, 2005): "Deeply placed sources within the Islamist community in Kosovo have identified the source and type of the explosives used in the jihadist terrorist bombings in London on July 7, 2005, and the Madrid commuter railway bombings of March 11, 2004.
"The man at the center of the provision of the explosives in both instances was an Albanian, operating mostly out of Kosovo (with links into Bosnia) who is a second-ranking leader in the Kosovo Liberation Army."
Only firm action by the United States can stop another U.N. fiasco: Kosovo independence.
COL. GEORGE JATRAS
Air Force (retired)
Camp Hill, Pa.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20060615-084010-9571r.htm
June 05, 2006
UN Closes Book On Milosevic Cover-up
UN Closes Book On Milosevic Cover-up
Investigators clear themselves despite overwhelming evidence of foul play
Paul Joseph Watson/Prison Planet.com May 31 2006
The Hague Tribunal's final verdict on Slobodan Milosevic's death has concluded that he was not poisoned and there was no foul play involved. Imagine my shock. The truth is that the circumstances of Milosevic's death and why it had to happen prove foul play even absent allegations of poisoning.
How can an investigation that, if evidence of murder was uncovered, would result in criminals charges for the investigators themselves be impartial?
The BBC reported on the nature of Milosevic's death,
"Guards knocked on his door for an 0900 wake-up, but assumed he was still sleeping and left him alone until 1000 when they saw "that he was still lying on his bed".
"As he approached the bed he saw that Mr Milosevic's face was greyish in colour and that his arm was hanging over the side of the bed," says the report.
The guards tried to find a pulse, but realised the prisoner was dead."
Milosevic's prison cell was under 24 hour video surveillance. At first the UN ridiculously claimed he had poisoned himself by having someone smuggle in drugs past armed guards before changing their story to a heart attack. If Milosevic had died of a sudden heart attack surely his reaction to it would be captured on the tape. All the UN had to do was show the Dutch authorities the tape and no investigation would have even been necessary.
Heart attacks are not usually considered a subtle and quiet way to die. The symptoms are chest pain, discomfort, sweating, weakness, nausea and vomiting. Are we really expected to believe Milosevic experienced all this while remaining in a peaceful sleep and without his watchers noticing?
"They kept cameras and lights on in Slobodan's cell non-stop, so that he could not sleep. That is an officially recognised form of torture," said Milosevic's wife.
The fact that Milosevic was under constant surveillance coupled with the total lack of response from medical personnel to his heart attack proves foul play in itself, absent of any allegations of poisoning.
Milosevic wrote a letter one day before his death claiming he was being poisoned to death in jail. The lawyer who advised Milosevic during his trial, Azdenko Tomanovic, showed journalists a handwritten letter in which Milosevic wrote: "They would like to poison me. I'm seriously concerned and worried."
Milosevic's trial was coming to an end and the only verifiable evidence to emerge from it was proof that the real Butcher's of Serbia were Wes Clark and Bill Clinton. The US government's financial and military support of Al-Qaeda, after the embassy bombings, was also being exposed.
The Globalists have wanted to eliminate Milosevic for a long time. Former MI6 agent Richard Tomlinson said he saw documents in 1992 that discussed assassinating Milosevic by means of a staged car accident, where the driver would be blinded by a flash of light and remote controlled brake failure enacted to cause the crash. This exact same technique was utilized for real in the murder of Princess Diana.
The illegal Clinton-NATO bombing of Serbia was fueled in part by a staged ITN news report purporting to show evidence of a Bosnian Serb death camp. Pictures of emaciated 'prisoners' behind a barbed wire fence were used to claim the Serbians were running internment camps. In reality the emaciated man was a tuberculosis victim and the film screw were the ones inside he barbed wire enclosure, filming out to refugees who had willingly entered the refugee camp.
Milosevic, just like Saddam Hussein when his testimony was shut off after he discussed the US' role in staging bombings in Iraq, had to be silenced and the trial prematurely aborted before its credibility completely collapsed.
-------------------------------------------
Related: Why Milosevic Was Murdered
Related: The Real Butchers Of Serbia: Clinton, Clark, NATO
Related: Milosevic Autopsy: The Murderers Clear ThemselvesShortcut to: http://www.prisonplanet.com/articles/may2006/310506closesbook.htm
Investigators clear themselves despite overwhelming evidence of foul play
Paul Joseph Watson/Prison Planet.com May 31 2006
The Hague Tribunal's final verdict on Slobodan Milosevic's death has concluded that he was not poisoned and there was no foul play involved. Imagine my shock. The truth is that the circumstances of Milosevic's death and why it had to happen prove foul play even absent allegations of poisoning.
How can an investigation that, if evidence of murder was uncovered, would result in criminals charges for the investigators themselves be impartial?
The BBC reported on the nature of Milosevic's death,
"Guards knocked on his door for an 0900 wake-up, but assumed he was still sleeping and left him alone until 1000 when they saw "that he was still lying on his bed".
"As he approached the bed he saw that Mr Milosevic's face was greyish in colour and that his arm was hanging over the side of the bed," says the report.
The guards tried to find a pulse, but realised the prisoner was dead."
Milosevic's prison cell was under 24 hour video surveillance. At first the UN ridiculously claimed he had poisoned himself by having someone smuggle in drugs past armed guards before changing their story to a heart attack. If Milosevic had died of a sudden heart attack surely his reaction to it would be captured on the tape. All the UN had to do was show the Dutch authorities the tape and no investigation would have even been necessary.
Heart attacks are not usually considered a subtle and quiet way to die. The symptoms are chest pain, discomfort, sweating, weakness, nausea and vomiting. Are we really expected to believe Milosevic experienced all this while remaining in a peaceful sleep and without his watchers noticing?
"They kept cameras and lights on in Slobodan's cell non-stop, so that he could not sleep. That is an officially recognised form of torture," said Milosevic's wife.
The fact that Milosevic was under constant surveillance coupled with the total lack of response from medical personnel to his heart attack proves foul play in itself, absent of any allegations of poisoning.
Milosevic wrote a letter one day before his death claiming he was being poisoned to death in jail. The lawyer who advised Milosevic during his trial, Azdenko Tomanovic, showed journalists a handwritten letter in which Milosevic wrote: "They would like to poison me. I'm seriously concerned and worried."
Milosevic's trial was coming to an end and the only verifiable evidence to emerge from it was proof that the real Butcher's of Serbia were Wes Clark and Bill Clinton. The US government's financial and military support of Al-Qaeda, after the embassy bombings, was also being exposed.
The Globalists have wanted to eliminate Milosevic for a long time. Former MI6 agent Richard Tomlinson said he saw documents in 1992 that discussed assassinating Milosevic by means of a staged car accident, where the driver would be blinded by a flash of light and remote controlled brake failure enacted to cause the crash. This exact same technique was utilized for real in the murder of Princess Diana.
The illegal Clinton-NATO bombing of Serbia was fueled in part by a staged ITN news report purporting to show evidence of a Bosnian Serb death camp. Pictures of emaciated 'prisoners' behind a barbed wire fence were used to claim the Serbians were running internment camps. In reality the emaciated man was a tuberculosis victim and the film screw were the ones inside he barbed wire enclosure, filming out to refugees who had willingly entered the refugee camp.
Milosevic, just like Saddam Hussein when his testimony was shut off after he discussed the US' role in staging bombings in Iraq, had to be silenced and the trial prematurely aborted before its credibility completely collapsed.
-------------------------------------------
Related: Why Milosevic Was Murdered
Related: The Real Butchers Of Serbia: Clinton, Clark, NATO
Related: Milosevic Autopsy: The Murderers Clear ThemselvesShortcut to: http://www.prisonplanet.com/articles/may2006/310506closesbook.htm
Could Milosevic's death have been averted?
Could Milosevic's death have been averted?
By Elisabeth Rosenthal International Herald Tribune
SUNDAY, JUNE 4, 2006
As Slobodan Milosevic's family and the United Nations war crimes tribunal in The Hague spar over whether his death in prison on March 11 was avoidable, a slew of medical information released in the past week has provided new details about the former Yugoslav leader's demise, his medical ailments and his stormy relationship with his court-appointed doctors.The Milosevic family contends that his medical treatment in detention was inadequate. The court, in an internal review released last week, concluded that its doctors had delivered "proper care," and that Milosevic was an uncooperative patient.But the new medical facts suggest that there were a number of times when either Milosevic or the court could have done things differently, possibly altering the course of his illness.Much of the court's inquiry that was released last week documents a turbulent, distrustful relationship between Milosevic and the detention center's officials, which almost certainly affected his care.He sometimes refused to take pills, or took doses dictated by doctors consulted by telephone. Visitors sometimes brought unapproved medicines and alcohol into his cell.The inquiry accuses him of secretly taking Rifampicin, a tuberculosis drug that would have blunted the effect of his blood pressure drug and made it hard to control. The drug was found in a screening blood test in January. Milosevic denied taking Rifampicin and said that someone was trying to kill him.On the last day of Milosevic's life, prison guards who unlocked his cell decided not to examine him when he failed to move or respond to their greeting. Ironically, given his medical problems, they decided he needed rest.An hour later, when he still had not moved, they noticed his gray color. Milosevic's autopsy, conducted by a Dutch coroner, estimated the time of death at between 7 a.m. and 9 a.m. Could he have been alive, or revivable during the guard's first visit?The court and Milosevic spent the months before his death wrangling over where he should get a cardiac work-up, which never happened. Milosevic refused hospitalization for important cardiac testing on at least one and possibly more occasions."If he had been in a monitored setting on March 11, he certainly wouldn't have died," said Patrick Barriott, a French doctor and longtime friend of Milosevic.Twice in the past six months, Milosevic petitioned the court to be sent for urgent treatment in Moscow - he refused to be treated in a NATO country. The last petition was on March 2.Noting that the tests could be performed in the Netherlands, the court rejected the first petition. An appeal was pending when he died.In its internal review, the International War Crimes Tribunal said: "In these circumstances it cannot be concluded that there was a failure to provide proper care."Still, the report acknowledged that some of the detention center's systems for monitoring Milosevic's health were inadequate and that some prominent doctors believed that additional tests and procedures should have been performed - measures that could have been lifesaving.Ren� Tavernier, a cardiologist from Belgium who reviewed the case at the behest of the court, concluded: "There is no test that if carried out would have helped detect or prevent the cause of death."But on April 5, a Russian cardiac surgeon, Leo Bockeria, wrote to the court that Milosevic "could have been treated easily at any place of the world" with a minimally invasive procedure in which a tube is used to open an artery.In either case, it is clear from the documents that Milosevic was a sometimes difficult patient who defied doctors orders.Zdravko Mijailovic, who treated Milosevic at the Military Hospital in Belgrade in 2001, said that important studies had never been completed, because of the patient's "lack of motivation."From studies conducted around that time, Milosevic was known to have serious high blood pressure and a thickened heart wall - the result of years of hypertension. He was on a slew of medicines.All doctors agree that Milosevic was at high risk for stroke, heart attack or fatal heart rhythm. What is less certain is whether his death on March 11, at that particular moment, was inevitable. But little is known about the progression of Milosevic's heart disease during his time in the detention center.In 2002, Milosevic refused the recommendation of a Dutch cardiologist that he be hospitalized for a cardiac work-up. In 2004, a Russian doctor who he had called to examine him made a similar recommendation, although Milosevic and his lawyer never disclosed that to the court.In November, a French cardiologist hired by Milosevic, Florence Leclercq, again recommended immediate heart testing, particularly a scan called scintigraphy. She was surprised, she said, that it had not already been performed.Shortly thereafter, Milosevic requested temporary release for a work-up in Moscow. That plea was rejected and there was no effort made to schedule it elsewhere, in part because the court- appointed cardiologist believed that new testing was not urgent."Mr. Milosevic wanted full medical treatment in Russia because they started to control his health from the start," said Milosevic's lawyer, Zdenko Tomanovic, noting that he had frequently consulted Russian doctors by phone. "He did not want medical treatment in a country that was a member of NATO. The charges against him stem from the NATO conflict."Doctors disagree about whether those tests would have changed anything.An independent autopsy by the Dutch government showed that one of Milosevic's main coronary arteries was 50 percent narrowed - not generally enough to cause a heart attack in itself. At the same time, he had a severely thickened heart, with an unusual structure called myocardial bridge, where a coronary artery plunges into the heart's muscle rather than lying on its surface.The significance and proper treatment of such bridges is controversial, according to the medical literature, since many produce no symptoms or problems. But some, especially in combination with other heart disease, can precipitate chest pain, abnormal rhythms and heart attacks.Such bridges are sometimes treated by placing a stent in the narrowed artery to hold it open. Since Milosevic did not undergo a full cardiac work-up for years before his death, it is impossible to have a good sense of whether he would have been a candidate for the procedure.Marlise Simons of The New York Times contributed reporting for this article.
Copyright � 2006 The International Herald Tribune www.iht.com
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/06/04/news/serbs.php
By Elisabeth Rosenthal International Herald Tribune
SUNDAY, JUNE 4, 2006
As Slobodan Milosevic's family and the United Nations war crimes tribunal in The Hague spar over whether his death in prison on March 11 was avoidable, a slew of medical information released in the past week has provided new details about the former Yugoslav leader's demise, his medical ailments and his stormy relationship with his court-appointed doctors.The Milosevic family contends that his medical treatment in detention was inadequate. The court, in an internal review released last week, concluded that its doctors had delivered "proper care," and that Milosevic was an uncooperative patient.But the new medical facts suggest that there were a number of times when either Milosevic or the court could have done things differently, possibly altering the course of his illness.Much of the court's inquiry that was released last week documents a turbulent, distrustful relationship between Milosevic and the detention center's officials, which almost certainly affected his care.He sometimes refused to take pills, or took doses dictated by doctors consulted by telephone. Visitors sometimes brought unapproved medicines and alcohol into his cell.The inquiry accuses him of secretly taking Rifampicin, a tuberculosis drug that would have blunted the effect of his blood pressure drug and made it hard to control. The drug was found in a screening blood test in January. Milosevic denied taking Rifampicin and said that someone was trying to kill him.On the last day of Milosevic's life, prison guards who unlocked his cell decided not to examine him when he failed to move or respond to their greeting. Ironically, given his medical problems, they decided he needed rest.An hour later, when he still had not moved, they noticed his gray color. Milosevic's autopsy, conducted by a Dutch coroner, estimated the time of death at between 7 a.m. and 9 a.m. Could he have been alive, or revivable during the guard's first visit?The court and Milosevic spent the months before his death wrangling over where he should get a cardiac work-up, which never happened. Milosevic refused hospitalization for important cardiac testing on at least one and possibly more occasions."If he had been in a monitored setting on March 11, he certainly wouldn't have died," said Patrick Barriott, a French doctor and longtime friend of Milosevic.Twice in the past six months, Milosevic petitioned the court to be sent for urgent treatment in Moscow - he refused to be treated in a NATO country. The last petition was on March 2.Noting that the tests could be performed in the Netherlands, the court rejected the first petition. An appeal was pending when he died.In its internal review, the International War Crimes Tribunal said: "In these circumstances it cannot be concluded that there was a failure to provide proper care."Still, the report acknowledged that some of the detention center's systems for monitoring Milosevic's health were inadequate and that some prominent doctors believed that additional tests and procedures should have been performed - measures that could have been lifesaving.Ren� Tavernier, a cardiologist from Belgium who reviewed the case at the behest of the court, concluded: "There is no test that if carried out would have helped detect or prevent the cause of death."But on April 5, a Russian cardiac surgeon, Leo Bockeria, wrote to the court that Milosevic "could have been treated easily at any place of the world" with a minimally invasive procedure in which a tube is used to open an artery.In either case, it is clear from the documents that Milosevic was a sometimes difficult patient who defied doctors orders.Zdravko Mijailovic, who treated Milosevic at the Military Hospital in Belgrade in 2001, said that important studies had never been completed, because of the patient's "lack of motivation."From studies conducted around that time, Milosevic was known to have serious high blood pressure and a thickened heart wall - the result of years of hypertension. He was on a slew of medicines.All doctors agree that Milosevic was at high risk for stroke, heart attack or fatal heart rhythm. What is less certain is whether his death on March 11, at that particular moment, was inevitable. But little is known about the progression of Milosevic's heart disease during his time in the detention center.In 2002, Milosevic refused the recommendation of a Dutch cardiologist that he be hospitalized for a cardiac work-up. In 2004, a Russian doctor who he had called to examine him made a similar recommendation, although Milosevic and his lawyer never disclosed that to the court.In November, a French cardiologist hired by Milosevic, Florence Leclercq, again recommended immediate heart testing, particularly a scan called scintigraphy. She was surprised, she said, that it had not already been performed.Shortly thereafter, Milosevic requested temporary release for a work-up in Moscow. That plea was rejected and there was no effort made to schedule it elsewhere, in part because the court- appointed cardiologist believed that new testing was not urgent."Mr. Milosevic wanted full medical treatment in Russia because they started to control his health from the start," said Milosevic's lawyer, Zdenko Tomanovic, noting that he had frequently consulted Russian doctors by phone. "He did not want medical treatment in a country that was a member of NATO. The charges against him stem from the NATO conflict."Doctors disagree about whether those tests would have changed anything.An independent autopsy by the Dutch government showed that one of Milosevic's main coronary arteries was 50 percent narrowed - not generally enough to cause a heart attack in itself. At the same time, he had a severely thickened heart, with an unusual structure called myocardial bridge, where a coronary artery plunges into the heart's muscle rather than lying on its surface.The significance and proper treatment of such bridges is controversial, according to the medical literature, since many produce no symptoms or problems. But some, especially in combination with other heart disease, can precipitate chest pain, abnormal rhythms and heart attacks.Such bridges are sometimes treated by placing a stent in the narrowed artery to hold it open. Since Milosevic did not undergo a full cardiac work-up for years before his death, it is impossible to have a good sense of whether he would have been a candidate for the procedure.Marlise Simons of The New York Times contributed reporting for this article.
Copyright � 2006 The International Herald Tribune www.iht.com
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/06/04/news/serbs.php
June 03, 2006
Serb tragedy needs epilogue
Serb tragedy needs epilogue
By JIRI DIENSTBIERPRAGUE -- Serbia's long tragedy looks like it is coming to an end. The death of Slobodan Milosevic has just been followed by Montenegro's referendum on independence. Independence for Kosovo, too, is inching closer.
The wars of the Yugoslav succession have not only been a trial for the peoples of that disintegrated country; they also raised huge questions about the exercise of international justice.
Do international tribunals of the sort Milosevic faced before his death promote or postpone serious self-reflection and reconciliation in damaged societies? Do they strengthen or undermine the political stability needed to rebuild wrecked communities and shattered economies?
The evidence on these questions is mixed. Indeed, the record of the International War Crimes Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), based in The Hague, may be instructive in judging the credibility of the strategy of using such trials as part of the effort to end civil and other wars. In 13 years, the ICTY, with 1,200 employees, spent roughly $ 1.25 billion to convict only a few dozen war criminals.
Moreover, whereas members of all ethnic groups committed crimes, in its first years, the ICTY indicted and prosecuted far more Serbs than others, fueling a perception, even among opponents of Milosevic's regime, that the tribunal was political and anti-Serbian.
We may regret that Milosevic's own trial ended without a conclusion. But a conviction only of Milosevic, however justified, without parallel penalties for his Croat, Bosnian and Kosovo-Albanian counterparts would hardly have contributed to serious self-reflection within the post-Yugoslav nations.
To be sure, the arrest of Gen. Ante Gotovina, adored by many Croats as a hero, but responsible for the brutal expulsion of a quarter-million Serbs from Croatia and northwest Bosnia -- the biggest ethnic cleansing in Europe since World War II -- improves the ICTY's standing. But Milosevic's Croatian and Bosnian counterparts, Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic, respectively, remained unindicted when they died.
So, too, the main commanders of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK). Ramush Haradinaj, the prime minister of Kosovo, was accused but later released from detention.
I have always been convinced that Milosevic should have been put on trial in Belgrade. After all, Milosevic's critics and political rivals such as the journalist Slavko Curuvija and Milosevic's former mentor, Ivan Stambolic, were assassinated by Serb police agents, who also tried three times to murder the opposition leader Vuk Draskovic. There was, moreover, ample evidence of corruption among Milosevic's inner circle, including members of his immediate family.
Holding the trial in Belgrade might have served better to catalyze a sober examination of the past. The atmosphere was certainly favorable. The majority of Serbs hold Milosevic responsible for the decline of their society.
Even before his fall, the opposition controlled most big Serbian cities, and in 2000 he lost the election that he called to shore up his authority. The relatively small turnout at his funeral confirmed that only a minority of Serbs considers him a national hero.
Meanwhile, with the exception of Slovenia, the democratic transformation in the post-Yugoslav region remains uneasy. Wars, ethnic cleansing, embargoes and sanctions created not only psychological traumas, but also black markets, smuggling, large-scale corruption and de facto rule by mafias. The bombing of Serbia by NATO in 1999 heavily damaged its economy, with serious consequences for neighboring countries.
The definitive end of what remains of Yugoslavia may -- at least today -- pose no danger of war, but the Muslim Sandjak region will now be divided by state boundaries, and Albanian extremists, with their dreams of a Greater Albania, believe their influence in a separate Montenegro will be reinforced with a yes vote on independence.
Most Serbs and Croats in Bosnia believe that the best solution to the problems of that sad country would be to join the territories that they inhabit with their "mother" countries.
Then there is the unresolved status of Kosovo, where the Albanian majority demands independence, and extremists threaten to fight for it. As one Kosovo Liberation Army commander warned, "If we kill one KFOR soldier a day, these cowards will leave."
With independence, the extremists would gain a territorial base from which to undermine Macedonia, southern Montenegro, and southern Serbia, jeopardizing stability in the entire region.
Serbia is offering Kosovo the formula "less than independence, more than autonomy." It demands security guarantees for the Serbian minority and cultural monuments, as well as control of the borders with Albania and Macedonia to stop traffic in arms, drugs and women, and to prevent the use of Kosovo by Albanian extremists.
Any resolution of Kosovo's status is problematic, but the international community should not repeat old mistakes. In 1991, the principle that only a politically negotiated division of Yugoslavia would be recognized was abandoned. Now, as then, a change of boundaries without the consent of all concerned parties would not only violate international law, but could also lead to violence.
The international community must not be gulled into thinking that war-crime trials marginalize, rather than mobilize, extremists and nationalists. Pressure on Croatia and Serbia to arrest and hand over suspects -- a condition of EU accession negotiations -- has yielded several extraditions and may result in more. But further trials alone are unlikely to bring about the long-term settlements that the region's fragile states need in order to ensure stability and democratic development. The people of the Balkans should feel that the EU offers them political and economic support. They deserve it.
Jiri Dienstbier was foreign minister of Czechoslovakia and special rapporteur of the UNHRC in the Balkans.
Copyright 2006 Project Syndicate (www.project-syndicate.org)
Is Europe's separatist specter a ghost of former self?
HoustonChronicle.com -- http://www.HoustonChronicle.com | Section: Viewpoints, Outlook
June 2, 2006, 10:03PM
Is Europe's separatist specter a ghost of former self?
By AUSTIN BAY
A SPECTER haunts Europe, an old and once-murderous scourge: the specter of ethnic and neo-nationalist separatism.
Modernity, in the form of two of the world's most appealing "country clubs," however, may have tempered the specter's threat. The allure of belonging to the clubs of wealth and security - the wealth of the European Union and the security of NATO - has reshaped the new separatists' demands for autonomy and independence. Many would-be "new separatist" leaders have seen wealth created and the common security well served through transnational economic and defense cooperation.
Perhaps the "specter" is now a ghost of its former self. Let's hope so. In the 21st century, EU money and NATO safety should convince all but the most fanatic of 12th century European tribalists that autonomy cannot mean closed borders, isolation and warfare. The country clubs' rules: Violence is verboten; cooperation is encouraged.
Montenegro is Europe's latest public display of "new separatism." Last week, the Montenegrin people voted, by a narrow margin, to split from neighboring Serbia. The plebiscite in the tiny Balkan nation did not quite conclude Yugoslavia's long war of devolution. The former Serb province of Kosovo might have that distinction, depending on the outcome of the United Nations' decision on Kosovo independence
As it was, the Serb-Montenegrin state was a squabbling leftover. Still, consider the progress since 1991, when Croatia and Serbia went to war. This Yugoslav divorce was resolved by an angry referendum, not another bout of ethnic cleansing. (Remember the rule: Violence is forbidden.)
Montenegro's bye-bye to Serbia was about local control, not virulent ultra-nationalism. Like its neighbors (including Serbia), Montenegro wants to eventually join the European Union.
NATO is another goal. Western Europeans and Americans puzzle over NATO's 21st century purpose, though NATO now has troops in Afghanistan and may collaborate with the United Nations when and if the United Nations sponsors a Darfur (Sudan) peacekeeping mission. Eastern Europeans, including most citizens of the former Yugoslav republics, see admission to NATO as the ultimate stamp of political approval. It is also a bulwark against Russian recidivism.
Montenegro's vote has focused attention on other demands for ethnic and cultural autonomy in Europe. Europe has a quilted history - the cultural and tribal fabrics are many. There are numerous examples of unresolved and historical rivalries in virtually all of the current European states.
Though the Balkans are no longer quite the powder keg they once were, the potential for ethnic explosion increases when Muslims and Christians are involved. This is why Macedonia and particularly Bosnia remain volatile. Bosnian Serbs, now living in a curious statelet that comprises roughly a third of federal Bosnia, want to withdraw from the federation. If Montenegro can do it, Bosnia's Serbs argue, they can, too. Odds are the Bosnian Serb separatists would secede, then attempt to rejoin Serbia, violating the Clinton administration's Dayton Accords.
Some demands for autonomy will surprise Americans used to looking at the maps of France and Spain and thinking, "Oh, yes, homes of the French and Spanish." France struggles with a weak but occasionally violent independence movement in Corsica. Spain continues to struggle with Basque nationalists, but an even bigger challenge may be the Catalans, with their would-be national capital in Barcelona. Unlike the Basques, the Catalans have controlled their terrorists and struck a working economic and cultural bargain with Spain. But no astute Spanish politician should take Catalonian stability for granted.
Last year, the people of Holland and France rejected the proposed EU constitution. The Dutch and French "no's" suggested even the most solid of Western European citizens have issues with a pan-European government. Few object, however, to the original notion of a "Common Market" (the European Economic Community).
A common market (if not a common currency), open communication and common security - these are the "greater identities" shaping Europe, through the EU and NATO.
Yes, ethnic and historical differences in Europe still create wars of words, which a handful of violent fanatics would turn into wars of bombs and bullets.
But violence and isolation produce poverty - and the people of Europe's "could-be" statelets know it.
Bay, a nationally syndicated columnist based in Texas, specializesin military and foreign affairs.
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