blogs.lse.ac.uk

EU enlargement in the Western Balkans: The missing issue in the 2019 European election campaign

8-10 minutes

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The campaign for the European Parliament elections on 23-26 May offers an opportunity for key EU policy areas to be debated. Yet as Anna Nadibaidze writes, the issue of EU enlargement in the Western Balkans has so far remained far from the agenda. She explains that with public opinion focused on other topics and both mainstream and Eurosceptic parties lacking enthusiasm for rapid enlargement, the process is likely to slow in both the shorter and longer term.

The campaign for the European Parliament elections has already begun, and unsurprisingly, the issue of EU enlargement, specifically in the Western Balkans, has barely been mentioned. With the Brexit impasse and a number of other pressing issues to solve, enlargement is not a priority and will remain on the sidelines, at least in the short term until a new European Parliament and Commission are formed.

It is not a particularly popular topic among the European public. According to a YouGov poll looking at attitudes towards enlargement in six EU member states (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Sweden and the UK) as well as Norway, in most of these countries, there are more people who believe that Romania's EU membership was a mistake than people who do not. The prospects of the six Western Balkans candidates are also viewed with a degree of scepticism by the public in the countries surveyed.

Chart: Attitudes toward Western Balkans enlargement (selected European countries)

 

Note: Average calculated from results of YouGov/Eurotrack survey conducted in seven European countries (Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the UK) in December 2018.

Building upon these tendencies in public opinion, it has become easier for Eurosceptic and populist parties to use the 'threat' of enlargement in their anti-EU and anti-immigration rhetoric. The topic is therefore likely to be sidelined for the duration of the campaign, both by the main centre-right and centre-left parties, but also by the EU's institutions.

Romania, currently holding the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, stated it plans to focus on the topic of accession only after the European elections. Even the publication of the Commission's annual reports on the progress of the candidate countries has been delayed from the usual date in April to the end of May. This is probably to avoid contributing to the populist cause at such a sensitive moment, when polls suggest an increasing number of seats could be won by Eurosceptic parties.

After the elections, when Finland takes over the presidency in July, the Union will be too preoccupied with the formation of new institutions, the (possible) finalisation of the Brexit process and the next stages of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) discussions. The accession process in the Western Balkans is expected to be revived only when Croatia, itself the newest EU member state and formerly part of Yugoslavia, takes over in 2020.

How can a new European Parliament influence the accession process?

While the European Commission conducts accession negotiations and monitors candidates' fulfilment of criteria, the European Parliament also plays a key role as in the end it has to give the green light to the final terms of accession. Its approval is needed for the financial resources allocated to the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) in the MFF. The Parliament also publishes positions and resolutions which have considerable influence on EU policy.

According to current polls, the new Parliament is predicted to be more fragmented, with the mainstream centre-right European People's Party (EPP) and centre-left Socialists and Democrats (S&D) groups facing significant losses. This would mean more complex decision-making and an increasing need to forge coalitions.

Despite this fragmentation, there is a general lack of enthusiasm towards enlargement across the political groupings. The EPP – which is likely to win the largest amount of seats – states that it supports "the concrete European perspective of the Western Balkans" and helping "countries in the region improve their prosperity, as long as they adhere to European standards and achieve progress in the rule of law and the fight against corruption." The largest party in the EPP, Germany's ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU), advocates "deepening" EU reforms before "widening" the Union, and stands against any enlargement until 2024.

The S&D group and the Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) support the Western Balkans' accession path, but are strict on pushing for reforms in the region and are clear that the process must be based on merit. The European Greens also support increasing EU engagement with the region, but avoid giving details such as concrete dates of accession. French President Emmanuel Macron's La République En Marche party has been constantly pushing for further reform of the EU before accepting new members, explicitly ruling out the possibility of any accession before 2025.

Most Eurosceptic and populist parties are opposed to EU enlargement, although they do not hold a unified position, as is the case with other foreign policy matters including the recognition of Kosovo and relations with Russia. Anti-immigration parties such as the Brothers of Italy have a strict stance against the accession of countries where the population is primarily Muslim, including Albania. The French National Rally argues that the EU must put a stop to enlargement.

There is cross-party expectation that enlargement is unlikely to happen anytime soon. This was demonstrated at the televised debates of French parties' candidates for the European elections, where ten out of thirteen party candidates said they were against Serbia – who is currently at the most advanced stage of negotiations – joining before 2025, citing the need for reforms on both sides before such a step can take place.

Next steps

At the next European Council summit in June, EU leaders are due to decide unanimously upon opening accession negotiations with candidate countries Albania and the recently renamed North Macedonia. Following the Prespa Agreement with Greece, there is now a more positive attitude towards North Macedonia's accession. However, as mentioned above, the governing parties in France and Germany do not support enlargement in the short-term, and there are suggestions that France is still hesitating about giving the green light. Serbia also expects the opening of two new accession chapters in June.

Declining either one or both of these decisions would be risky both for the region and for the EU. It would mean the EU failing to maintain its soft power rhetoric and its policy of 'giving carrots' to acceding countries. This is especially important with North Macedonia, where a lot of effort was put into implementing the Prespa Agreement with the specific goal of beginning the accession process.

The EU would risk losing leverage over other situations in the region, for instance the Serbia-Kosovo normalisation dialogue. Bilateral relations remain tense as Kosovo maintains its 100% tariffs on Serbian goods, despite Brussels saying the tariffs must be suspended in order for the dialogue to continue.

Progress on the enlargement front will take time, depending on the composition and leadership of the next European Commission, and who becomes the next Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy. Overall, it is unlikely that the newly composed EU institutions will radically change their approach towards the Western Balkans. Public opinion remains focused on other issues, and both mainstream and Eurosceptic parties lack enthusiasm for rapid enlargement. The EU will maintain a certain level of commitment, but the process is likely to slow down in both the short and longer term.

Please read our comments policy before commenting.

Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image: High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission Federica Mogherini attending a session of the Serbian parliament in Belgrade in 2017, Credit: EEAS (CC BY-NC 2.0)

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About the author

Anna Nadibaidze – Open Europe
Anna Nadibaidze is a research and communications associate at the think tank Open Europe. She holds an MSc in International Relations from the London School of Economics.

 

sputniknews.com

What's in a Name? For Some Yugoslavia Bombing Was Operation, For Others a War

Sputnik

5-7 minutes

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Serbia marked the 20th anniversary of the NATO bombings in March, but even such a long period of “endurance” was not enough for the country to end the disputes about what it really was: an intervention, an aggression, an operation or a war.

As well as put an end to the controversy whether it was possible to do anything to prevent this “operation” and whether it is possible to do something now to restore justice.

Boris Krivokapic, Professor at the Department of Law at Union Nikola Tesla University in Belgrade and a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in an interview with Sputnik tried to answer all these questions.

The professor explained that when influential members of the international community attack someone from among less influential representatives, they avoid calling their actions a war, and that's no surprise.

READ MORE: Twenty Years on: The "Peace Conference" That Resulted in Bombing of Yugoslavia

© AP Photo / U.S. Air Force, Msgt. Keith Reed

According to Mr Krivokapic, the sources behind the naming of armed invasions of foreign territories can be found in the history of the perception of war and its legitimacy, experienced by mankind. He recalled that in the past, countries had an unconditional right to wage war.

This right was one of the attributes of their sovereignty, but after World War I this right was limited, while after World War II, not only the use of force was prohibited, but also the threat of its use. The possible instances for the use of force were narrowed down to self-defence and collective measures against an aggressor state, as provided for by the UN Charter.

"This is why 'major players' don't like to call a spade a spade. For them, this is a campaign, an operation… Because if they declare that they have launched a war against anyone they would become the aggressors. Many have already forgotten about it, but the UN is actually a collective security system, an organisation designed to come to the aid of a victim of a aggression. But in the Security Council, which was supposed to deem what was happening as an aggression, the aggressors themselves occupied key seats — three of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: the United States, France, and the United Kingdom participated in the intervention", Mr Krivokapic reminded.

Back in 1999, he published a book called "NATO aggression against Yugoslavia — power beyond the law" (NATO agresija na Jugoslaviju — sila iznad prava). In it he recalled that in November 1999 he had taken part in a conference on international law in Spain and his colleagues from Western countries, including Americans from Harvard, had acknowledged that the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an act of aggression.

READ MORE: 20 Years On: Timeline of NATO's War Against Yugoslavia

The expert noted that Yugoslavia 20 years ago could have sought solutions, referring to UN Security Council Resolution 82, adopted in 1950 in relation to the Korean War. It provides for the possibility of transferring Security Council's authority to the General Assembly. The General Assembly could, according to Krivokapic, have taken some measures, but there was no political will.

The professor noted that over the past 20 years a lot has changed for the better for Serbia and the situation continues to evolve:

"We no longer live in a unipolar world with a single centre of power in charge, now the great powers control each other, and this state of affairs is in the interest of the whole world".

 

© AP Photo / str

As for the stream of comments that Serbia should actively collect evidence in order to lodge a claim against NATO, Krivokapic, noted that no evidence is needed here: just the fact that NATO began this operation is sufficient evidence of aggression.

"Our people are for the most part skeptical of international law, they wonder, ‘how could this happen to us?' But life in general is unfair. Many things in international relations 'work' well, but there are also instances when the norms of international law are grossly violated, this is exactly what happened to us", the expert said.

A lawsuit against the alliance, according to the professor, is an unrealistic scenario, although in theory Serbia could have filed one with the International Court of Justice.

READ MORE: Depleted Uranium, Chlorine and Hydrochloric Acid: Yugoslav Witnesses’ 'Toxic' Memories of NATO Bombings

"The special nature of this court is in the fact that it deals with only claims made by one state against another state, and in order for both parties to start the proceedings, the consent of the party against which the lawsuit is filed is required. That is, we, of course, can file a lawsuit against the United States, but they can say that they do not want to ‘play this game with us'. Another option is to file lawsuits against the states that participated in the bombings in our own courts, but this way we will not achieve any justice and only ruin relations with them. The third possibility is that people can lodge individual complaints with the European Court for Human Rights, but even in this case we most likely will not achieve much success. Only one last option, obviously destined to fail, remains — to file lawsuits against NATO member countries in their courts", Krivokapic concluded.

By Natasa Milosavljevic

 

chroniclesmagazine.org

L'Affaire Assange

7-9 minutes

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By:Srdja Trifkovic | April 12, 2019

Julian Assange's arrest inside the embassy of Ecuador in London would not have been possible had that country's government not authorized the British police to enter its theoretically sovereign territory. The lesson is clear: if you plan to seek asylum in a foreign embassy, you should be careful to choose the diplomatic premises of a country (a) not likely to be pressurized into betraying you; and (b) comfortable enough to make a long sojourn tolerable.

The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations reaffirmed the long-established principle of inviolability of diplomatic premises. The host-country's police and security forces are not allowed access without a specific authorization of the chief of mission, which was granted in this case. Assange had spent almost seven years in the Ecuadorian embassy, after being welcomed there by the country's former president Rafael Correa. The hosts' political calculus has changed to his detriment over the past two years, however.

The British police arrested Assange supposedly for skipping UK bail seven years ago, but also—and far more importantly—under a previously secret U.S. indictment. The exact charge is for conspiracy, with Chelsea Manning, to hack into a "classified U.S. government computer." Assange lawyer Barry Pollock said the allegations "boil down to encouraging a source to provide him information and taking efforts to protect the identity of that source." Assange had predicted that this would happen years ago, and stated it as his reason for seeking asylum in the first place.

Sen. Joe Manchin (D, W.V.) gloated "He is our property!" when told of Assange's arrest, and he accurately reflected the sentiment shared by the entire Beltway swamp, Democrats in particular:

Assange committed the unpardonable sins of embarrassing the establishment—from members of Congress to intelligence officials to the media. And he will now be punished for our sins. Despite having significant constitutional arguments to be made, it is likely that he will be stripped of those defenses and even barred from raising the overall context of his actions in federal court. What could be the most important free speech and free press case in our history could well be reduced to the scope and substance of an unauthorized computer access case.

Before becoming a fugitive Assange had unveiled a massive, likely unconstitutional NSA surveillance program potentially affecting all Americans. He later published emails that showed that the DNC and the Clinton campaign lied in various statements to the public, including the rigging of the primary for her nomination. As USA Today columnist Jonathan Turley says, "No one has argued that any of these emails were false. They were embarrassing. Of course, there is not crime of embarrassing the establishment but that is merely a technicality." The American media machine nevertheless views the WikiLeaks founder primarily through the lens of the 2016 election, after which he was denounced as a Russian cutout who threw that election for Trump. That is not true, but it is certain to slant much of the U.S. mainstream media coverage to Assange's disadvantage.

The problem Assange ultimately faced was related to Ecuadorian domestic politics and the country's external vulnerabilities. Its current president Lenin [sic!] Moreno, elected in 2017, is a Leftist who has made peace with the Empire, a la Greece's disgusting bo-bo PM Alexis Tsipras. One of the fruits of Moreno's volte-face has been a massive World Bank loan, which would not have been granted without Washington's political blessing. Moreno's decision was not legal under Ecuadorian and international law: Assange is a political refugee and the country's government cannot rescind asylum once it is granted. In addition he was given Ecuadorian citizenship in December 2017, which theoretically should have given him an additional layer of protection. Evidently Assange should not have sought refuge in the embassy of country susceptible to American pressure.

In this context it is useful to recall the destinies of two Hungarian notables after the collapse of the 1956 anti-Soviet uprising. Cardinal József Mindszenty, the Roman Catholic primate of Hungary, spent 15 years in the U.S. embassy in Budapest (1956-1971). He was eventually allowed to leave, after Pope Paul VI offered a compromise declaring Mindszenty a "victim of history"—instead of communism—and annulling the excommunication imposed on his political opponents. For the rest of his life he resided in Vienna, because he took grave offense at the Vatican's suggestion that he should give up the primacy of the Catholic Church in Hungary in exchange for uncensored publication of his memoirs . . . but all that is a minor footnote now.

As hundreds of Soviet tanks rolled from the east in the first week of November 1956 and the uprising collapsed, Hungary's reformist Prime Minister Imre Nagy and some of his associates made the fatal mistake of seeking sanctuary in the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. The ensuing impasse in Soviet–Yugoslav relations was ended when Nagy was forced to leave the premises, after the new government of Janos Kadar and its Soviet masters gave Tito the guarantees of safe conduct for the fugitives. They were duly arrested (as Tito knew they would be), removed to jail in Romania, and finally deported to Hungary for trial in 1957. Nagy was shot on June 17, 1958, and buried, face down, in an unmarked grave. It was only after the fall of Communism that Nagy's grave was located and he was given a proper burial attended by 100,000 people.

Assange will not be executed, but his fate will be unpleasant. A hint of what awaits him came when he was taken to Westminster Magistrates' Court and found guilty of breaching bail only hours after his arrest. He denied the offense, with his lawyers arguing that he had a reasonable excuse and he could not expect a fair trial in Britain as its purpose was to "secure his delivery" to the United States. District Judge Michael Snow described the defense as laughable, adding: "Mr Assange's behaviour is that of a narcissist who cannot get beyond his own selfish interests. He hasn't come close to establishing reasonable excuse." He remanded Assange in custody ahead of a future sentencing hearing at Southwark Crown Court. 

Assange will not be executed but his fate will be unpleasant in the extreme. It is an even bet that Britain will extradite him to the U.S. In an unpleasant federal facility he will have many years, decades even (he is 47), to ponder the mistake of not seeking protection of a real country. He will be treated brutally, pour encourager les autres.

Julian Assange is not a particularly likeable man. Some of his actions may have been legally shady and morally ambivalent. In the end he deserves our sympathy because he will be pilloried by the sworn enemies of decency and civilized life.

[Image via Snapperjack from London, UK. [CC BY-SA 2.0]]

 

counterpunch.org

The Tragedy and Fallacy of NATO’s Balkan Experiment: 20 Years On

by

11-14 minutes

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Photograph Source Darko Dozet – CC BY-SA 3.0

March 24,1999 was an ordinary school day in Belgrademid-week (Wednesday). Suddenly, half of my high-school class quietly left for home early, citing relatives calling in from overseas saying that the NATO bombing campaign has startedin the South, including an authorisation to hit Belgrade. My friends and I (for whom the satellite TV was an unimaginable luxury!) reluctantly left our interrupted class, each one of usburied deeply in our thoughts as to what the conflictmight actually mean. We rememberedwellthe convoys of refugees pouring across Serbia’s westernborder during the Croatian and Bosnian wars, with many refugee children attending our school too and eventually blending in withthe locals. The state broadcaster RTS television was playing its usual program, heavily controlled by Milosevic’s cronies, with no sign of impaling events. Around 8.12pm, which was the time for widely popular Latin telenovelas, there was a loud bang in the neighbourhood and all of our apartment block’s windows shook. Is it firecrackers? A little while afterwards the air raid sirens began;thenow famous commentator fromtheindependent Studio B television channel Avram Izrael was about to start with his daily commentary about air raids. This was the first bomb that was dropped on Belgrade, a European capital during an offensive military operation, hitting very close to home. In our proximity there were several military facilities underneath Strazevica and Avala mountains, which became a daily target for NATO’s yet another failed Balkan experiment. The symbol of Belgrade and former Yugoslavia, the Avala Tower and a television transmitter, was destroyed during one of those raids, only six days after RTS headquarters were bombed killing a dozen journalists and which the Amnesty International declared a ‘war crime’.

We had no atomic bomb shelter in our building(throughout the old Yugoslavia, some of these can still be found), and one family built a home in our basement whose doors they generously opened to the children at night, including myself and my best friend who was often visiting us. Newer buildings had proper shelters from the days of the old Yugoslavia, but we could not go there as they were already full. Our neighbours were stocking petrol in the basement cages;if a bomb was to fall on our building, we would have become a giant firecracker ourselves.I remember stuffing all our major possessions (family jewellery and some money in the foreign currency) in a brown bear (a souvenir from Australia) with a large zip across its belly and holding our passports close by. Mine was different – it had a clear stamp from the Australian embassy and a 3 month tourist visa on it, unused. The embassies were shutting down along with the borders. Only the Hungarian one remained open, but NATO by then already targeted an Albanian refugee convoy citing collateral damage. One question was doing the rounds: Werewe going to end up facing one ofthose ‘mistaken missiles’, adding to a rising civilian toll of this conflict? Bridges in Novi Sad were already destroyed as people were crossing them. The Chinese Embassy in Belgrade had been hit, killing three and wounding twenty embassy staff members. The bus had to go around and around to get to the northern border, while there were soldiers hiding in the bushes near the highway as I could see through a foggy window, with my mother accompanying me to our farewell in Budapestand short-stay there organised by a relative.There is a sizeable Serbian community in Hungary (once a large ethnic group within the Austro-Hungarian empire) and a Romaniorchestra played a famous song for us at the dinner table withominouswords “Adio for now, and who knows when and where we will meet again”.

This was a fortnight after the raids began. My memory of that era is still vivid, stark and unspoiled. The feeling of weird, dangerousexcitement when listening to the anti-aircraft fire and observing the capital city covered in spring darkness as the electricity was cut. People were unsure whether the light would attract any attention from theinvisiblekilling machines which we could ominously hear above our heads; as a resulteverybody was reluctant to even put candles on. There was the lingeringsound of dogs howling on the streets. There were numerous scenes of people in the city centre protesting with music and song against the bombing while defiantly stationed on the main bridges in Belgrade, defending them from NATO bombs. Thousands of people each daygathered. It was an inspiration to live each day as it came. People were greeting bombs with humour and song.

For public servants it was compulsory to attend work, putting citizens in harm’s way. My mother’s company, the famous Sava Centar Convention Centre (it was originally built to host by Yugoslavia the first Non-Alignment Movement conferencetherein 1961)was on the NATO’starget hit list as it hosted one of three major television channels. It was a stroke of luck that it was not hitduring the NATO bombing spree in the heart of Southeast Europe.

Surreal times for surreal people, with neighbours greeting each other with real smiles for the first time in years, or even decades. Some sending their children to the countryside, only for some areas there also to be hit with even more collateral damage. What was reallyhappening in Kosovo went underreportedlocally, just like what was happening in the rest of Serbia and Montenegro internationally. For me then came a one-way ticket to Australia and a wonderful Australian family with whom I lived while attending a prestigious Anglican college in Perth. I didn’t look back but part of my heart was forever left behind. Custody was transferred to my father from Australia so that my status could be made permanent. Less than a decade later I worked, ironically, as aparliamentary servant in Canberra advising the Australian parliamentarians on NATO!

It all came back to me with a jolting reminderlast month; the 20^thanniversary since the brutal, unprovoked and extraordinary attack by 19 NATO Alliance members against a sovereign nation in Europe, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, composed of Serbia and Montenegro. As a living teenage witness of that pan-European tragedy, the 24^thMarch will be remembered as a black day for many peoples living in the heart of the Balkans and their children who now reside in the West as a result of that conflict. For 78 days they had to re-live some of the experiences of their ancestors who were carpet bombed during the Second World War first, in a case of bitter historical irony, the Nazis in Operation Retribution in 1941, then by the Allied forces which was, by many accounts, even worse and in which some of my family members lost their young lives.  The Kosovo War was a dramatic turning point for international politics, suggesting the limits, and hypocrisy, of humanitarian intervention.  Even long-standing defenders of such rights, including Vaclav Havel, felt it necessary to attack the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without explicitUNSCapproval, despite having a mere 35 percent of the population supportingit.With unjustified optimism, he argued that this had been the first war not waged “in the name of ‘national interests’.”

The NATO bombing attack on Serbian and Montenegrin territory, initiated withevangelical zeal by President Bill Clinton of the United States (who was on the mend from his Monica Lewinsky scandal) and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, brought the world close to another dangerous crisis with Western and Russian forces. A deeper conflict was probablyavertedthanks to the swift thinking by a British Lieutenant-General Sir Mike Jackson,who resisted themilitary confrontation with Moscow that was ardently advocated by his boss, NATO chief Wesley Clark with now famous words: “No, I’m not going to do that. It’s not worth starting World War III”. NATO, however, bombed hospitals, schools, children’s playgrounds, petrol stations, trains, factories, all in the name of ‘peace’ and ‘conflict prevention’. Hundreds of thousands were reallocated because of this conflict.

Carving out the Kosovo territory from a sovereign nation in Europe ran against all international law principles the world has known, causing a turning point in the West’s relations with Russia and ushering a new, politicised principle of the so-called ‘humanitarian intervention’. NATO’s military operation was, ironically, named ‘Merciful Angel’, giving precedent to regime-change scenarios from Iraq in 2003 to Libyain 2011. It also caused another mass migration in the Balkans, with hundreds of thousands of people being firstly internally displaced across the region, then over the next couple of years emigrating from the Balkans into Western Europe and further across the seas all the way to Australia and New Zealand. The intervention perpetrated the very thing it was meant to halt: mass displacement and disruption.

The Balkans is now living with the legacy of that humanitarian impulse initiated by NATO countries, oneheavily contaminated with depleted uranium from the NATO bombs, with dire consequences for human, animal and environmental health still being heavily debated. There is currently a move by Serbs to initiate a lawsuit against NATO for the contamination and damage done. The bombings destroyed much of Serbian industry as the targets were not only military: schools, hospitals, factories, petrol stations, TV stations and other civilian infrastructure suffered terribly from the NATO bombing. Serbia and its break-away Kosovo province turned semi-independent state (with international assistance) are now among the poorest areas of Europe, with massive brain-drain, youth unemployment and widening social inequality as well as reliance on foreign remittances. Yet it remains highly popular as the sought-after travel destination, famous for its nightlife and defiance through music and humour which at display daily during NATO bombing and media campaign against Serbs and rump Yugoslavia in 1999.

I went on to do extraordinary things in Australia, finishing four degrees and working as both public and parliamentary servant. All of my studies also dealt with the issue of Kosovo war in different ways, all invariably finding it debilitating to the European landscape: myHonours thesis saw the Kosovo war as the catalyst for change in German and Italian foreign policies after the Cold War; in my Master’s thesisconsidered itan obstacle to democratisation in the Balkans, and in my PhD found it to bea lingering legacy which has delayed Serbia’s EU accession prospects to this day. I provided tailored and independent advice to the Federal Parliament’s Presiding Officers, who often took me along to their meetings with international dignitaries. I took a parliamentary delegation overseas and facilitated the visits of many international visitors to the Parliament, including from NATO and a prominent lobbyist for the Kosovo war whom I found quite pleasant on a personal level. As I raisea young family in Sydney, the conflict still exists in my dreams and the feeling of displacement that they occasionally bring, along with the feeling that crimes were committed during those 78 daysby 19 members of NATO Alliance which went on to build the largest military base in Kosovo for Southeast Europe.

Dr Nina Markovic Khaze is a sessional lecturer at the Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie University, Visiting Fellow at the ANU Centre for European Studies, andpolitical commentator for SBS Radio and has been writing for different news outlets over the years.

 

Playing with Fire: Talk of Shifting Kosovo's Borders Sparks Concern

spiegel.de

Playing with Fire: Talk of Shifting Kosovo's Borders Sparks Concern - SPIEGEL ONLINE - International

SPIEGEL ONLINE, Hamburg, Germany

10-13 minutes

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April 05, 2019  04:15 PM

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These days, his statesman's uniform fits the former rebel commander perfectly: bespoke shoes, dark suit, golden cuff links. Flanked by reverent-looking toadies, Ramush Haradinaj recently sat down for an interview in Pristina, at the seat of the Kosovo government.

If it weren't for Haradinaj and his comrades, Europe's youngest republic might not exist. In the nineties, at the fiercest phase of the ethnic Albanian revolt against the Serbian occupiers in Kosovo, he commanded part of the Kosovo Liberation Army, a paramilitary organization known by its Albanian initials UCK. Haradinaj's nom de guerre was "Smajl." Today he is the head of government in a country searching for its place in Europe.

Twenty years after the NATO bombings that, starting on March 24, 1999, forced the withdrawal of the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army, Kosovo remains the problem child of the Balkans. This tiny country, with barely 2 million inhabitants, 90 percent of whom are Albanian, is currently not recognized by more than 80 countries around the world, including five EU members. That insecurity is impeding the country's progress. Its citizens are the only Europeans west of Belarus who still require a visa to travel to the Schengen area. Every third employable resident is jobless.

Potentially even more alarming, discussions about the country's borders have recently cropped up -- the kind of talk that many people thought had faded into the past. Leading ethnic-Albanian politicians in Kosovo argue about whether the Serb-dominated north of the republic should be left to Belgrade as part of an exchange of territory. The presidents of Serbia and Kosovo discussed this question under the oversight of Federica Mogherini, the EU's chief diplomat, but Prime Minister Haradinaj rejects any such proposals, claiming they are dangerous nonsense. "The tragedies in the Balkans always had to do with borders," he says. "Whoever raises these questions again now invokes new tragedies."

Over 13,000 people died between February 1998 and June 1999. Haradinaj knows the horrors of the Kosovo War. The former commander has stood before the International Criminal Court in The Hague twice for crimes against humanity, including murder and rape. He was ultimately acquitted both times. "I did what was necessary," he says, looking back. Though he makes it sound like he didn't even participate. He claims that during the war, and afterward, it was about "surviving in a lawless society." Even today, in his statesman's uniform, Haradinaj is a fighter. With customs duties of 100 percent on imports from Serbia, he is trying to force the government in Belgrade to recognize Kosovo -- and, in the process, is riling up the United States, the country's protector.

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Ever since the autonomous province of Kosovo was allowed to cut itself free from Serbia in 2008 with the explicit permission of Madeleine Albright, Washington's ambassadors have been the secret rulers of this country. But these days, U.S. President Donald Trump's man in Pristina is facing resistance. Haradinaj coolly explains that the custom duties were a "sovereign decision of the Kosovar government." In other words, it means Pristina is no colony of Washington's and reserves the right to take revenge for things like Serbia's most recent veto against Kosovo joining Interpol.

Geopolitical Turning Point?

Was this a first step out of the shadow of the American superpower? Haradinaj says Kosovo needs to learn to defend itself: "We had no choice. Serbia has been acting more and more aggressively lately. Our openness and generosity have been misread as weakness."

Although Trump expressed in letters to the heads of state in Belgrade and Pristina that he hoped to be able to sign a "historical agreement" at the White House as soon as possible, a long-term peaceful solution is not in sight. For a long time, a partition of Kosovo was out of the question for Washington. Now it sounds like things have changed. "We no longer have any red lines; if the two countries suggest a deal that involves a change in the borders and that is accepted by the citizens, then that is fine with us," said one high-ranking U.S. official in Pristina, who added that when it comes to the "struggle between the superpowers," Washington is mostly concerned about "maneuvering Kosovo to the West."

That means, into the EU and NATO, which is to say, away from the Russian sphere of influence. The latter begins in the city of Mitrovica, the primarily Serbian part of Kosovo north of the Ibar River, and stretches anywhere in the Balkan region where questions of alliance are still unresolved. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, Moscow is using logistical and military support to keep the threat of the country's division alive.

Pierre Crom/ Getty Images

A mural glorifying Serbian fighters on the Serbian side of Mitrovica bridge

In a region in which ethnic Albanians live in several countries and the smallest border movement threatens to upset the balance, Kosovo's unresolved future is dynamite. And then there are the mass protests against the governments in the neighboring countries of Albania, Montenegro and, especially, Serbia, showing the impatience of inhabitants who have been spent years waiting to join the EU.

Anyone who plays with fire in Kosovo -- on the historic fields dotted with medieval monasteries that, according to Serbian myth, are the cradle of the nation -- risks setting off a firestorm. And yet, Mogherini, John Bolton, Trump's national security adviser, and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic are all considering giving the north of Kosovo to Serbia, and offering the mostly ethnic-Albanian Presevo Valley to Kosovo. Kosovar President Hashim Thaci is also in favor of this, but is largely alone in his own country in having that stance.

The unwritten, but internationally respected agreement not to change any of the old internal Yugoslav borders is now being questioned. It is a dangerous precedent. Who then could deny the Bosnian Serbs an alliance with Serbia, or the ethnic-Albanian North Macedonians one with Albania?

Potential New Trials

Anyone who visits Mitrovica in northern Kosovo sees posters behind the Ibar Bridge depicting the presidents of Russia and Serbia, Vladimir Putin and Aleksandar Vucic, peacefully assembled under the Cyrillic headline "We are brothers -- god stands with us." Oaths of loyalty between Russians and Serbians are not only a part of folklore here. They are also a geopolitical calculation.

The tone in Kosovo has gotten sharper. Its own protection force could gradually be turned into a regular 5,000-strong army. To date, NATO has guaranteed security in the country. Its secretary general, Jens Stoltenberg, has warned against serious repercussions in the relationship with the alliance.

And because Albania's head of government, Prime Minister Edi Rama, is angry about what he sees as a stalling tactic by the EU, he is now threatening to bring the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo back to the motherland. He considers a joint head of state and foreign policy a serious alternative to EU membership.

The border between the two states is already fluid and those traveling from Kosovo to Albania encounter only superficial inspections. In Pristina government circles, the creation of a "mini Schengen" in the western Balkans is already under discussion -- an option that would unite Albanians who live on either side of the border. A shared experience of injustice and the blood splattered through the mountain landscape have brought together the people on both sides of the border.

As of recently, potential Albanian war crimes are once again being addressed in The Hague. Under examination is the degree to which the Kosovar guerrilla army, UCK, may have incriminated itself. Many of the country's leading politicians were once members of the group. Since January, an international court subject to Kosovar law has been taking part in negotiations. Old wartime comrades of Prime Minister Haradinaj have already been invited, and it has intentionally been left unclear whether they are to appear as accused or as witnesses.

In the godforsaken Tropoja, on the Albanian side, two men in a cemetery are pointing, without hesitation, at the grave of a UCK fighter who died on this side of the border -- and where one of his brothers later placed the severed heads of two Serbian soldiers. There are photos proving the gruesome ritual murder occurred.

The government in Pristina is arguing that possible war crimes carried out by the Albanian side can of course be investigated. But patience among the ethnic-Albanian population is running thin. Investigations took place under UN supervision until 2008, then came the International Criminal Court in The Hague, and the EU's EULEX mission. If a special court were to investigate the UCK once again, it would likely not be well-received.

The West's grotesquely inconsistent approach is exemplified by the fact that ex-commander Hashim Thaci, now president of Kosovo, and Fatmir Limaj, the deputy prime minister, may currently negotiate with head EU diplomat Mogherini through different channels despite the fact that both of them were heavily involved in wartime activities of the UCK.

"There are, of course, some people on both the Albanian and Serbian sides who say, 'I won't negotiate with that bastard over there,'" admits a leading U.S. official in Pristina. But the Trump administration, he says, wants to achieve a historical solution similar to a Korea deal: "We need to make progress. The status quo in Kosovo is critical -- either the relationship between the two countries will improve, or it will go completely down the drain."

As long as the EU doesn't manage to show Kosovo the path forward, and do so as a unified body, the country's course will be set in Washington. Kosovo's prime minister complains that the goals of the Europeans are hard to determine, unlike those of the U.S.: "When our people recently flew to Brussels for discussions with Mogherini, they had a 30-page proposal in their luggage." And what did they get from the EU negotiators? "Nothing," says Haradinaj, "except coffee and water, though free of charge."