https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_serbias_5g_deal_with_washington_the_art_of_muddling_through

 

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ecfr.eu

Serbia's 5G deal with Washington: The art of muddling through

Majda Ruge, Stefan Vladisavljev

8-10 minutes

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There is no obvious reason why Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic would turn his back on a relationship with China from which he draws a great deal of political capital.

The long list of commitments signed by the leaders of Serbia and Kosovo at the White House on 4 September includes several pledges that are related not to the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina but to the wider geopolitical interests of the Trump administration. One is a commitment by both parties to prohibit the use of 5G equipment from "untrusted vendors", or to remove such equipment if it is already in place. While there is no direct reference to China or Huawei in this clause, they were clearly Washington's target, as it used the Serbia-Kosovo negotiations to continue its long-running campaign against the company in Europe.

The 5G clause immediately created speculation about the impact of the agreement on Serbia's relationship with China. (This is not an issue with Kosovo, as China's non-recognition of the country means that they barely have a relationship.) While it would be premature to talk about a Serbian pivot away from Huawei (let alone China), the 5G story allows for an interesting thought exercise in mapping out what would happen if Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic was serious about keeping his promises to Washington.

If this was the case, Serbia's policy on 5G would provide him with an easy way to demonstrate his commitment. This is because Vucic's political party, Srpska napredna stranka (SNS), fully controls the parliament – and will fully control the government, once it forms. There are two ways for Serbia to meet its 5G pledge to the US. One is to follow the path taken by Estonia, Poland, and Romania, which – alongside the Czech Republic and Slovenia – signed individual Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) with the United States committing to exclude high-risk vendors from the construction of its 5G networks. Estonia, Poland, and Romania have already started translating these agreements into domestic legislation, placing legal restrictions on these vendors in 5G infrastructure. Given SNS's absolute control over Serbia's parliament, he could quickly pass legislation that prevented high-risk vendors from supplying the country's two private telecoms operators.

It would require even less effort to stop Huawei from supplying state-owned company Telecom Serbia. By virtue of state ownership, the government can rewrite Telecom Serbia's list of suppliers through direct preferential procurement and thereby exclude Huawei. This approach is at the core of Vietnam's future strategy for rolling out 5G. Unofficially, the Serbian government had taken the opposite approach: there is an informal understanding between Belgrade and Beijing that Huawei will be the main partner of Telecom Serbia for the installation of 5G infrastructure. And, just as importantly, Telecom Serbia and Huawei signed in 2017 a strategic agreement for the ongoing installation of fixed broadband infrastructure.

While it would be premature to talk about a Serbian pivot away from Huawei (let alone China), the 5G story allows for an interesting thought exercise in mapping out what would happen if Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic was serious about keeping his promises to Washington.

Finally, given that its relationship with Serbia covers a dense set of mutually beneficial relations, one could even imagine China tolerating Serbia's decision to allow, say, Ericsson (rather than Huawei) to build Serbian 5G infrastructure. As Huawei's facial recognition cameras are not part of the agreement signed in Washington, the relevant contract between the Serbian Ministry of Interior and Huawei will likely remain in place – and these devices may proliferate in Serbia as the country sinks deeper into a one-party system.

There are plenty of reasons to believe that Serbian government will not act soon to replace existing Huawei equipment or exclude the company from future 5G bids, particularly given that it has sufficient leeway to ignore the provision. Even wealthier countries in the EU have chosen not to rip out and replace this infrastructure, due to the cost of doing so. Instead, they have committed to phasing it out. Key components in radio access networks have an average lifespan of around five years, meaning they need to be regularly replaced in any case. The United Kingdom, for instance, has committed to phasing Huawei equipment out by 2027.

Vucic's intentions are reflected in a change in the agreement between its first draft and the signed document: the deletion of a clause that set a five-year deadline for removing 5G equipment from untrusted vendors. This suggests that the Serbian side does not want to be bound by specific deadlines and is instead buying time to see what will happen with the deal.

Furthermore, while the lack of a direct reference to Huawei as an untrusted vendor leaves room for interpretation, so do the MoUs signed between the US and five EU member states, none of which refer to the firm by name. In the end, domestic interests and external incentives will determine whether governments translate such agreements into concrete steps.

Unsurprisingly, the three countries that are most advanced in implementing their MoUs – Estonia, Poland, and Romania – perceive Russia as a threat, are members of NATO, and feel dependent on US security guarantees. This is not the case for Serbia, which has traditionally nurtured friendly relations with Russia and a public discourse of criticising NATO due to its bombing of Serbia in 1999. Therefore, it is unsurprising that, just a few days after returning to Belgrade, members of the Serbian delegation stated that the 5G provision had nothing to do with Huawei per se.

Finally, the Serbian president will not willingly turn his back on a relationship from which he draws a great deal of political capital, and which he has skilfully used to build the image of a leader who turns both westwards and eastwards: negotiating with the United States and the European Union while courting China and Russia as powerful allies. Chinese investments allow the president to portray himself as the mover and shaker behind employment and infrastructure projects in Serbia. And China is one of the rare subjects on which the Serbian political opposition sides with the president.

Therefore, the key question is: what is the incentive structure that will make Serbia take the 5G commitment seriously? At the moment, it is non-existent. For all the talk about the importance of getting the US involved to push the negotiations forward, the current US administration does not have a great deal of leverage in Serbia, in contrast to Kosovo. Exercising effective leverage in Serbia requires a carefully thought-out strategy based on familiarity with key actors and their preferences –and implemented in coordination with the Europeans. Furthermore, in the absence of a consensus among key EU member states on a common 5G policy, the incentive structure to persuade Serbia to move away from its commitments to Huawei will remain weak. Until there is a transatlantic consensus and a joint strategy are in place, the Serbian side will delay decisions and muddle through. 

Judging by the sloppiness with which the Washington agreements were put together in the first place, it is safe to assume that there will not be substantial follow-up from Washington prior to the election. And, should Joe Biden become president, Vucic may be caught out. One can expect a Biden administration to be more thorough and strategic in pushing Huawei out of the EU, and in coordinating more effectively with America's European allies to make this happen.

Stefan Vladisavljev is a Programme Coordinator at the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence.

Read more on: Wider Europe, Western Balkans

The European Council on Foreign Relations does not take collective positions. This commentary, like all publications of the European Council on Foreign Relations, represents only the views of its authors.

 

nationalinterest.org

How Donald Trump Used the Kosovo Conflict to His Advantage

by Ivana Stradner Allison Schwartz

5-6 minutes

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President Donald Trump marked another diplomatic victory after announcing that Kosovo and Serbia would normalize economic relations. As part of the agreement, Kosovo will recognize Israel, and Serbia will move its embassy to Jerusalem. Similar to last month's historic Israel-UAE agreement, Kosovo and Serbia's deal is just another one of Trump's tactics to advance his foreign policy agenda and boost his electorate before November. Whether an average American voter cares about the Kosovo-Serbia dispute is questionable. However, one thing is certain: After more than a decade of unsuccessful European mediation, the Trump administration is assisting Belgrade and Pristina to overcome their differences and advance not only their economic interests but also their pivot to the West.

Serbia and Kosovo's economic accord is anything but novel as both countries have already been taking steps toward economic normalization since 2017. This time around, both countries agreed to join the mini-Schengen zone, operationalize the Merdare Common Crossing Point facility, promote freedom of religion, locate and identify the remains of missing persons from the Kosovo conflict, and work to decriminalize homosexuality.

Yet, the most pressing issue in the agreement is Trump's motive to distance the Balkans from China and Russia, who have filled the power vacuum due to the United States and the European Union ignoring the region for two decades.

Serbia's "strategy of neutrality," balancing between Russia and China, is unacceptable to America. Hence, this agreement is a litmus test for President Aleksandar Vucic to decide how he wants to lead Serbia, as this is a unique opportunity to return to its democratic and liberalizing path. This deal forces Belgrade and Pristina to forego using China's 5G network. Given China's push to install 5G networks via Huawei, turning away from 5G might challenge Serbia's ties with China. The agreement also asks for energy diversification. Given Serbia's close ties with Moscow, this may jeopardize relations between Belgrade and Moscow. Both of these further the Trump administration's foreign policy goals. 

 

 

Donald Trump Nominated for Nobel Peace Prize

But the biggest coup for Trump occurs with the agreement's focus on the Middle East.

The agreement requires both parties to designate Lebanon's Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Kosovo and Serbia agreeing to this designation advances Trump's ongoing maximum pressure campaign on Iran, which appeared significantly weaker on the global stage after the United Nations Security Council rejected the U.S. proposal to extend the arms embargo on Tehran. This agreement stands in the face of previously strong bilateral relations between Serbia and Iran. In this vein, in June, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani called Vucic to expand economic ties between the two countries, stressing the importance of not allowing the US maximum pressure campaign to erode their economic relations.

Consequently, the Serbian-Palestinian relationship will falter. Palestinian official Saeb Erakat's rash response to the agreement underscores how the Palestinians will respond to any nation who eventually becomes a "victim" of Trump's electoral ambitions.

The United States moved its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in 2018 after recognizing Jerusalem as its capital in December 2017. Trump's historic decision was met with strong condemnation at a United Nations emergency resolution session, declaring Trump's Jerusalem status as "null" and "void." Although Belgrade was one of 128 countries to vote in favor of the UN resolution, President Vucic addressed AIPAC's Policy Conference in March to announce Serbia's intentions of opening an "official state office" in Jerusalem. This accord requires Serbia to move its embassy by July 2021.

Serbia and Kosovo's willingness to develop relations with Israel will not go unpunished. As both countries seek EU membership, the decision to move their embassies to Jerusalem would be a direct blow to Brussels. EU policy views any embassy move to Jerusalem as hindering the Israeli-Palestinian peace process's advancement and unilaterally risks inflaming violence in the region. Despite the EU's grumbling, the agreement is an opportunity for Belgrade and Pristina to point out European mismanagement of the Kosovo dialogue. 

Ensuring a peaceful and prosperous Balkan peninsula is indeed in America's best interests.

As the Balkans are destabilized by Russia and China, the EU is again turning a blind eye to their security. Their previous unwillingness to stop the Kosovo conflict only ended when America decided to intervene. Love it or hate it, the Trump administration's advancing security in the Balkans is a step in the right direction.

Ivana Stradner is a Jeane Kirkpatrick fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Allison Schwartz is the communications assistant for AEI's Foreign and Defense Policy department.

Image: Reuters

 

politico.eu

Trump's Kosovo show: No big deal

Majda Ruge

6-8 minutes

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Press play to listen to this article

Majda Ruge is a senior policy fellow with the Wider Europe Program at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

BERLIN — Despite the unpredictability that surrounded the negotiations, one thing was clear from the start about the much-hyped U.S. effort to normalize relations between Serbia and Kosovo: It would be light on substance and heavy on publicity.

So it came as no big surprise that the result — two separate documents signed by each party individually — reflected the superficiality and lack of planning involved. Essentially a restatement of things already agreed between Kosovo and Serbia, the primary purpose of Friday's "deal" was not to advance dialogue but to advance Donald Trump's reelection campaign.

Kosovo and Serbia have jointly signed multiple agreements and proclamations in the past. And yet, for all the supposed high-level political attention brought to this agreement, U.S. Ambassador Richard Grenell couldn't get the parties to issue a unified statement — raising questions about the legal status of the signed documents and reflecting a degree of sloppiness that comes with prioritizing speed and showiness over content.

Unsurprisingly, each side left the meeting armed with their own narrative for domestic consumption. The White House claimed victory in advancing the peace process in a long-standing conflict. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić interpreted the event as a bilateral meeting with Washington aimed at improving bilateral relations. Kosovo, meanwhile, chalked it up to a win because it gained recognition from Israel.

The commitment to use U.S. screening and information systems could undermine the accession process for Serbia and Kosovo.

None of these supposed victories move the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue forward in any respect.

Contrary to Grenell's claim that the U.S. had landed on something "new" and "creative," most of the pledges already exist within the framework of the EU negotiations and Berlin process, or as independent initiatives — including infrastructure projects, regional cooperation, border crossing points, the recognition of diplomas and missing persons and IDPs.

Some of the infrastructure projects are already underway and funded by the EU, such as the so-called peace highway for which loans from the European Investment Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, matched by EU grants, amount to €235 million.

The railway infrastructure agreement brokered by Grenell connecting Belgrade and Pristina is competing with an existing EU-funded initiative by suggesting alternative routes on partly non-operational railway tracks through an impassable tunnel that was bombed in 1999.

To be sure, there are some new developments. Israel's recognition of Kosovo, for one thing — which is in itself good news, but is less related to the dialogue with Serbia and has more to do with Trump's desire to appeal to his evangelical base.

The downside of this so-called Israel package is that both parties risk drifting further away from the EU, as it requires opening an embassy in Jerusalem. Whether Serbia and Kosovo will actually do so is a different issue altogether, but it creates additional problems for both countries when it comes to aligning their foreign policy with the EU.

Commenting on the package, an EU spokesman said Monday that "any diplomatic steps that could call into question the EU's common position on Jerusalem are a matter of serious concern and regret."

Similarly, the commitment to use U.S. screening and information systems could undermine the accession process for Serbia and Kosovo. Of course, it's an open question to what extent they still believe in joining the bloc. But as long as they are playing the game, these deviations from EU requirements matter.

The other new element is that the U.S. promises to play a greater role, including through investment. But how much interest there is from the relevant authorities in investing in the region — and how to compel them to invest — is far from clear.

The U.S. Development Finance Cooperation, for example, has a track record of being stringent in selecting projects to invest in, as their modus operandi requires their loans to be sold on the private markets. Its investments are therefore based on assessments of business viability, political stability, predictable regulatory framework and safe investment environment — none of which are words that necessarily come to mind for border projects between Serbia and Kosovo.

Whether this modest '"deal" will even endure after the U.S. presidential election must also be open to question. It seems unlikely to survive if Trump loses in November and the White House may have little interest in pursuing implementation even if he wins.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić visited the White House last week | Pool photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images

From an optimistic perspective, it is a positive development that the leaders of Kosovo and Serbia reiterated their previous commitments, that high-level political attention is forthcoming, and that Israel has recognized Kosovo.

But at what cost? Was it worth it? For this agreement to come about, Grenell helped bring down the reformist Kosovo government of former Prime Minister Albin Kurti, got Donald Trump Jr. to threaten the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Kosovo, and deepened a transatlantic rift that will certainly be exploited by regional politicians. This is amateur-hour diplomacy, and the damage done dwarfs any gains.

The real challenge in the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, as elsewhere in the region, lays in the implementation of pledges, not in getting the leaders to sign off on them. Countless regional agreements, better prepared than the one signed on Friday, remain unimplemented.

If the White House is genuinely interested in the agreed provisions making a difference on the ground, it needs to work closely with the State Department and the EU on substance, planning, funding and incentives.

This is not to suggest that the EU has all the answers. Over the past years, the EU has been too passive and without a strategy on how to incentivize compliance. And European policy objectives in the region have frequently been achieved only due to massive U.S. pressure to get parties to comply. But Washington's notion that it will move things in the right direction just by getting involved — without a plan, focus, strategy, and without coordination with the EU — is deeply misguided.

 

rtklive.com

Serwer: "Trepca" and Ujman could be part of talks in Washington

RTKLive

2 minutes

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Media report that agreement on the railway, airline, and highway connecting Kosovo and Serbia are topics that will start the meetings at the White House while the mutual recognition which has been continuously proclaimed by Kosovo Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti although not on the agenda, it could be added to the discussion if the two parties agree.

Balkans analyst, Daniel Serwer, said that a special economic settlement around the border strip could be up for discussion and this, he said, includes "Trepca" and Ujman.

"However, it is difficult to see this being achieved as they implicate sovereignty issues," he added.

Serwer further said that Serbia is not ready to discuss Kosovo status therefore mutual recognition is unlikely to be tackled in the formal settings but could perhaps be raised during lunch or dinner meetings. "The only possibility is economic arrangement or agreement with Vucic to accept the exchange of ambassadors with Kosovo. However, Vucic has given signals he is not ready for this."

With regards to the idea of parties moving into territory talks, Serwer said this 'bad idea' always risks coming back but that "I would be very surprised if this idea reappears in Washington as Hoti has made it clear there will be no such discussions. What remains to be seen is if he will be ready to achieve an agreement on 'Trepca' or Ujman, or both, because Serbs want a part of 'Trepca' while Kosovo controls Ujman. There could be movement in this respect."