What’s Behind the Arms Buildup in the Balkans

warontherocks.com

What's Behind the Arms Buildup in the Balkans - War on the Rocks

Vuk Vuksanovic and Marija Ignjatijevic

15-19 minutes

---

No one wants a Balkans arms race, even if it's a "mini" one. Last May, when Croatia bought a dozen used Rafale fighter jets for $1.2 billion, the Associated Press described it as part of a "mini arms race" with Serbia. In October, the Economist reported on Serbia's "weapons shopping spree" and $1.4 billion-a-year military budget under the headline "A Balkans arms race."

In this case, the analysis might be off, but the concern is warranted. While Serbia and Croatia are indeed rapidly building up their respective arsenals, describing this as a simple arms race misunderstands the dynamic at play. In modernizing outdated military hardware left over from the Yugoslav era, Belgrade and Zagreb are not driven by strategic competition or fears of conflict with one another. Rather, elites in both countries are using the process of buying new weapons to advance broader foreign policy goals and, most importantly, improve their domestic political standing. The prospect of war is not realistic, but using arms procurement as an opportunity for saber-rattling can nonetheless destabilize the region.

Toys for the Serbian and Croatian Militaries

Over the past six years, Serbian and Croatian leaders have happily fed the narrative of an arms race as they engaged in a series of high-profile weapons purchases. The good news is that actual procurement has sometimes lagged behind the rhetoric, and, to date, neither side has exceeded the arms control provisions of the Dayton agreement.

Discussion of a regional arms race began in 2015 when Croatia asked the United States to donate 16 Lockheed Martin-produced M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System armed with ballistic missiles. Incumbent Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, then prime minister, responded by announcing: "Either they will have to change their mind, or we will have to find an answer to that." Serbia quickly started looking to Russia for an answer. During a January 2016 visit to Belgrade, Russia's Deputy Prime Minister raised expectations by giving a model of the Russian S-300 missile defense system as a gift to Vučić. Over the course of the following year, tensions rose when the Croatian government cited Serbia's military buildup as possible grounds for reinstituting conscription.

In the end, however, Croatia did not receive U.S. rocket launchers and Serbia did not receive Russian S-300s. Despite the heated rhetoric, both countries faced financial constraints, and the great powers they were courting did not prove as forthcoming as they'd hoped.

Belgrade and Zagreb nevertheless persevered in their pursuit of new weapons, spending billions on defense deals over the last several years. In 2017 Serbia's largest defense contractor, Yugoimport-SDPR, developed a Šumadija tactical missile with a range of over 280 kilometers. To increase its air policing capabilities, Serbia received MIG-29 fighter jets from Russia and Belarus in 2021. Through a mix of sales and donations Russia also provided Belgrade Mi-35 and Mi-17 military transport helicopters, T-72MS tanks, BRDM-2MS armored reconnaissance vehicles, and a rapid-fire Pantsir S1 anti-aircraft missile system.

Serbia has not been picky whether it was getting hardware from Western or non-Western powers. It plans to buy about 30 military helicopters in the next two years, some from the European multinational Airbus and some from Mil Moscow Helicopter Plant, a subsidiary of Russian Helicopters company. After agreeing to buy the French surface-to-air missile system Mistral, Belgrade is now eyeing the purchase of the Chinese FK-3 anti-aircraft rocket and Israel's SPIKE LR2 anti-armor missiles. Further, Serbia's acquisition of six Chinese CH-92A drones, along with the accompanying technology transfers, has allowed it to become the largest drone operator in the Balkans.

Croatia, of course, has kept pace. In 2015 and 2016, Zagreb acquired 12 Panzerhaubitze 2000 howitzers from Germany and 16 Kiowa Warrior helicopters from the United States. It subsequently received AGM-114 Hellfire missiles from Lockheed Martin and, in late 2020, signed a deal for the modernization of 76 Bradley Fighting vehicles alongside associated machine guns and missiles.

Still, as arms control experts have noted, these purchases have yet to exceed internationally agreed restrictions. Article IV of Annex 1B of the Dayton Peace Agreement has been the bedrock of arms control in the Western Balkans since 1995, first under the auspice of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, then, since 2015, by agreement between the signatory states  of Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. In the five categories of weaponry covered by Article IV — battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters — both Serbia and Croatia are still within the mandated limits.

Not Quite an Arms Race

In theory, Croatia and Serbia could use their new weaponry in a future Balkan conflict. Some U.S. analysts noted that Serbia could deploy Šumadija missiles against its neighbors if they took part in another NATO campaign against Belgrade. The drones acquired by Serbia would also be powerful instruments in a hypothetical battle in Kosovo or Bosnia. If the status quo were to break down in Bosnia, the resulting fighting would inevitably suck in both Serbia and Croatia, who might then have occasion to employ their new arsenals. Croatian howitzers and attack helicopters would be effective in the low-land Serbo-Croatian border, while Israeli SPIKE missiles would be a potential equalizer for Serbia. But despite this, Bosnia has been largely absent from the rhetoric surrounding re-armament in both Belgrade and Zagreb.

More importantly, launching a new conflict in the Balkans makes no political or military sense. Indeed, there is no realistic goal that Croatia or Serbia could hope to achieve by attacking one other. It has become almost impossible to control territories inhabited by a hostile population, even for the most powerful militaries. Since 1995, neither the Croatian minority in Serbia nor the Serbian minority in Croatia is large enough to serve as the foundation for separatist ambitions.

What's more, Croatia has been a member of NATO since 2009. A Serbian attack on Croatia would activate the collective defense clause within Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, prompting NATO's response against Belgrade. Similarly, NATO still has 3,600 troops in Kosovo as part of the Kosovo Force, ensuring that the Serbo-Albanian dispute over Kosovo will not be resolved militarily.

It would also be folly for Croatia to launch an offensive. The fear of being bogged down in the face of a partisan insurgency played a role in NATO's 1999 decision not to send ground troops against Serbia. If that threat was enough to deter NATO, it is enough to deter Croatia. Equally important is the fact that NATO-Serbian relations are much different now than in 1999. While Serbia does not seek NATO membership, it is a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace program, and its Individual Partnership Action Plan represents the highest level of cooperation a non-member state has with the alliance.

Moreover, waging war has become expensive for local capitals. That is why Croatia replaced its conscription military service with a professional army in 2008, and Serbia did the same in 2011. The budget deficit has been a growing concern in Croatia in recent years, impeding defense planning. The Serbian military is experiencing a constant loss of its professional cadre. The region as a whole is lagging behind in socio-economic terms and experiencing a demographic decline. That not only deprives the local leaders of the money and manpower to fight a prolonged war, but it also limits the spoils that any country could hope to achieve through victory.

Arms Procurement in Service of Foreign Policy

So, if they are not preparing for a war, why are Belgrade and Zagreb buying so many weapons? Both countries are conducting overdue military modernization while using the process to achieve other goals. In the realm of foreign policy, Serbia and Croatia are both trying to position themselves amidst growing security anxieties in Eastern Europe and worsening tensions between Russia and the West.

So long as the West perceives Russia as a threat, Serbia has an opportunity to play Russia and the West against each other. In this balancing act, its arms buildup is both an end and a means. Serbia wants to be able to buy weapons from all sides. It also hopes that having a formidable military will enhance its leverage on all sides as well. Military cooperation with Russia is a way for Serbia to increase its bargaining power with the West on outstanding issues like the Kosovo dispute. Serbia knows that the unprovoked use of military force in theaters like Bosnia or Kosovo would attract Western hostility and intervention. However, Belgrade still believes that with more weaponry at its disposal it can do better at the negotiating table.

Croatia, in turn, has used the same regional dynamics to raise its standing in the West. As one of newest members of both NATO and the European Union, Zagreb has tried to portray itself as a Western bulwark in a dangerous region, facing down Russian meddling and an unpredictable Serbia. Croatia's National Security Strategy of 2017 does not mention Serbia, but it refers to the country's "Southeastern neighbourhood" as "a source of potential challenges." Defense modernization serves to promote Croatia as the anchor of regional stability. It also helps Croatia uphold NATO's target of 2 percent defense spending. Indeed, Croatian Prime Minister Andrej Plenković has stated that purchasing Rafale jets from France takes Croatia's defense spending beyond NATO's threshold.

A Lack of Transparency

The arms race narrative also feeds, and feeds off of, a lack of defense sector transparency. Over the past five years there has been a noticeable decline in the transparency of Serbia's defense sector, particularly in finances and procurement. During this period a number of bad practices have been legalized. For instance, legal amendments have allowed the government to declare whole categories of data confidential under the guise of protecting national security. One of the categories marked confidential in 2016 was human resources management. Hence, the Serbian public cannot find official records about personnel in the defense system, and least of all, personnel drain.  Sensationalist reporting on weapons and military modernization goes hand in with preventing the public from learning about military personnel leaving the service on account of unsatisfactory conditions. Were this information more readily available, it would shatter the image of a competent government taking good care of the army, one of the most respected national institutions.

The lack of transparency in defense procurement also drives perceptions of an arms race. Military  spending is exempt from Serbia's Law on Public Procurement. This means that the Serbian Ministry of Defense does not report on confidential procurement, or even provide a lump sum of the total money spent. Nor does it publish whether, when, or with whom confidential procurement contracts are signed. Even in 2019, when legislation on public procurement was amended to align with European standards, the range of national security exemptions was broadened. Unlike in Croatia, long-term planning documents are not disclosed to the public. Hence, there is no way to determine whether the government's spending is keeping up with its own strategic planning. Instead government officials announce sales when it suits them. In 2018, the president even said he would "surprise'' citizens and soldiers with a new arms purchase.

Croatian non-transparency also benefits from the rhetoric of an arms race. As a NATO member, Croatia's finance and procurement transparency level is higher than Serbia's. Up to a point. To reach NATO's spending threshold, for example, Croatia pulled a bookkeeping trick by including war veteran pensions in its military expenditure. For the government in Zagreb, anti-Serbian rhetoric also helped suppress debate over its latest fighter jet purchase on supposed national security grounds. Throughout 2020, the Croatian public was kept out of loop as the government negotiated with potential bidders, raising suspicions about the competence of the Croatian negotiators. When the deal to purchase Rafale jets from France was announced, local media raised questions about the sudden jump in price and asked whether Croatia has the logistical capabilities to make effective use of these jets. The government hopes that tough talk toward Serbia can ensure these awkward questions will be overlooked.

The Dangers of Domestic Politics

To date, the arms race narrative has worked well for leaders in both Zagreb and Belgrade. When sensationalist reporting about arms sales is combined with military exercises and moves like reintroducing conscription, it triggers escalating rhetoric on all sides. Political leaders and the media are all too proficient in stirring the tensions and scoring populist points in order to avoid accountability for their own records. Inflammatory nationalist rhetoric is a tried and tested recipe in the region for mobilizing voters and divertubg attention from corruption and economic problems.

Not suprisingly, the "arms race" narrative has typically peaked during pre-election periods. Both Serbia and Croatia had parliamentary elections in 2016, the year the narrative first took hold. Ahead of the 2017 presidential elections in Serbia, front pages were full of reports about the arrival of MIG-29 jets from Russia. Headlines announced that "Putin will defend Serbia with weaponry" and "The Serbian Army will roar when the new MIGs arrive."

A return to the armed hostilities of the 1990s is highly unlikely, but the current process is still alarming. It is dangerous because it further poisons the already distrustful relationships between regional states. Moreover, it perpetuates the poor state of local governance. So long as spitting in the direction of your neighbors is a more appealing option than discussing policy, the region will be plagued by economic problems and poor public services. War is unlikely, but bullets do not have to be fired for the damage to be inflicted.

Serbia and Croatia have every right to modernize their outdated arsenals, particularly in light of technological transformation that is changing the global security landscape. However, they should do it in less toxic fashion. Perhaps in time politicians in both countries will come to perceive how hawkish rhetoric has actually undermined their international prestige. Or perhaps a new generation of more mature leaders will eventually emerge.

When this happens, both capitals should begin reducing tensions through consultations and confidence-building measures. In doing so, they can rely on the extant regional arms control regime, emboided by Article IV of Annex 1B of the Dayton Peace Agreement. They can also develop a billateral system of consultations between their military staffs to reduce security anxieties. More importantly, they can abandon the rhetoric of an arms race. Defense and national security should be left out of domestic politics in the Balkans where historical wounds have been slow to heal.

Vuk Vuksanovic is a senior researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy and an associate of LSE IDEAS, a foreign policy think tank at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He received his Ph.D. in international relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science. He has published widely on modern foreign and security policy issues.

Marija Ignjatijevic is a researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy. Her field of expertise covers defense policy, international military cooperation, parliamentary oversight of the armed forces, and the violent extremism in the Western Balkans. This piece is derived from the analysis they co-authored for the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy.

Image: U.S. Army (Photo by 1st Lt. Caroline Pirchner)

 

spiked-online.com

Russia does not want a war in Ukraine

Mary Dejevsky

13-17 minutes

---

Over the past month the drum beat of a new war in the east of Europe has grown ever louder. So loud, in fact, that US president Joe Biden and Russia's president, Vladimir Putin, felt the need to hold a virtual summit on Tuesday this week. The stated aim from the Russian side was to try to clear the air and, from the US side, to stall what it had presented as Russian preparations to invade Ukraine.

The outcome, as spun by the US, included loud threats of new Western sanctions and embargoes should Russia take a step across the Ukraine border. As spun by Russia, the summit allowed for new discussions, which was in turn spun by some advocates for Ukraine as potentially jeopardising its independence.

What seems not to have been resolved in those two hours of talks, however, is the original question: is Russia mobilising to invade Ukraine? (For the New Cold Warriors, this would be the second invasion, the first being Moscow's 2014 annexation of Crimea and its ill-defined support for anti-Kiev rebels in eastern Ukraine.) And if Russia is not planning to invade, then what is going on?

The problem, as so often, is that the very same elements that can be cited as evidence of Russia's aggressive intent, in terms of troop deployment and rhetoric, can also be viewed as reactive – that is, defensive. Yet the idea that Putin might be trying to reinforce Russia's national security against what he might see as a Western threat – taking the form, say, of the NATO-backed land-grab for Ukraine – is almost never entertained. Yet consider which side has made the running here.

This latest West-Russia stand-off would appear to date from a hawkish Pentagon briefing on 10 November, which coincided with a visit to Washington by the Ukrainian foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba, and the signing of a US-Ukraine strategic partnership agreement. Both the Pentagon and the US secretary of state referred to 'unusual troop movements' near Russia's border with Ukraine, a figure of 100,000 troops was mentioned, and the supposed threat received blanket coverage in the US media.

The UK picked up the war cry. In a series of valedictory speeches and interviews in mid November, the outgoing UK chief of defence staff, General Sir Nick Carter, commanded headlines, warning of a Russian threat that had been a leitmotif of his three-year tenure at the top of the UK's military establishment. Then came a veritable festival of Cold Warriordom in the shape of the NATO foreign ministers' meeting on 30 November, held in the Latvian capital, Riga.

Here, NATO secretary general Jens Stoltenberg was on unusually eloquent form in defence of Ukraine's independence and sovereign states' right to choose their allies. Stoltenberg also harked back to a decade-old NATO-Russia quarrel about spheres of influence. In a rare nod to his native country, he noted that Norway had never called for any sphere of influence despite its border with Russia, therefore Russia didn't need any buffer against NATO either. (A glimpse at the map might show the short length of Norway's Arctic border with Russia and the huge buffer afforded by neutral Sweden and Finland, but that's another matter.)

At the same time as the Riga meeting, an inimitable contribution to the general climate of peace and friendship was made by the UK's new foreign secretary, Liz Truss, who posed, helmeted, in a tank while visiting a British troop unit in Estonia. It was not her fault that the pictures were seen less as a warning to Russia than a Thatcher tribute act – and, as such, as an unsubtle hint about Truss's future ambitions.

Nor was this the end. From here the torch of invasion-alarm was passed to Germany where, following hot on the heels of Angela Merkel's military farewell after 16 years as chancellor, the popular Bild published an enormous 'exclusive' on 4 December, complete with an elaborate map, headed: 'This is how Putin could annihilate Ukraine.' It set out the supposed positions of Russian troops (inside Russia) and detailed a Russian plan for a three-phase attack sometime in the New Year. In this piece the estimated number of Russian troops deployed 'near' the border with Ukraine was upped from 100,000 to a 'potential' 175,000 – a number instantly promoted and repeated, unqualified, across the Western media.

It might now be worth considering some peculiarities about the way this whole Russian-invasion scenario has been put about and how it has been magnified into a threat not just to Ukraine, but also to the EU and to the West as a whole.

First, we have been here before. Back in mid April, it was confidently reported that 100,000 Russian troops were mustering near the border with Ukraine – except that quite soon it transpired that they weren't. Most were at their barracks at least 200 kilometres away. Russia's fervent denials that anything was afoot were dismissed, but there was no advance and, in time, the accusations melted away.

Seven months later, in November, the same number of Russian troops had supposedly been spotted, split between Ukraine's eastern border – in the Donbass – and its northern border. Why was the number suddenly upped to 175,000? Was it because US spy satellites – whose grainy pictures periodically pop up as supporting evidence – really showed this? Or was it perhaps because some Western military experts had argued that a 100,000-strong force was way too small to pacify Ukraine, so the numbers had to look more convincing?

Which leads on to Russia's supposed objective. A favourite Western theory has long been that Putin wants not just to return Ukraine to Russia's sphere of influence – he also wants to rebuild the Soviet Union, restore the Russian Empire, or at the very least to create a new Russia-led federation with Ukraine and Belarus.

Regardless of the presumed end point, however, many Russia-watchers in the West view the current military impasse affecting a small part of Ukraine as generally satisfactory to Moscow. It leaves the Donbass as a familiar 'frozen' conflict in which Russia retains enough leverage to exert influence, with minimal costs in terms of troops, weapons and risk.

So why would Russia even think of invading? And if it did, would it be a full invasion to take Kiev and bring all of Ukraine back into Russia's strategic fold, or an occupation of just the mainly Russian-speaking Donbass? Or is Russia just sabre-rattling in the hope of somehow forcing the Kiev government and / or its Western backers to the negotiating table? There has been no clarity whatsoever on this score.

Quite simply, an invasion, and a winter invasion at that, makes no sense. The last thing Russia wants or needs is more territory. It can be argued that there was a strategic imperative for Moscow to annex Crimea – to secure its warm-water base at Sevastopol and its hinterland, which it saw as possibly falling into NATO hands. There is no such imperative to take the Donbass; it would be an unstable drain on Russia's resources for the foreseeable future. Russia's prime need is for a stable border region.

And this highlights another peculiarity. From the start, this whole Russia-invasion story, from April this year onwards, has been entirely in one direction – from the US, and then moving eastward across Europe. Ukraine itself, and its leaders, no strangers to alarmism, have maintained an almost surreal calm. When President Volodymyr Zelensky mentioned Russian troop movements for the first time this November, he noted the information had been passed on by US intelligence. No changes in Russia's troop dispensations or in supplies to the rebels seem to have been registered by Ukraine's own – always active, alert and at times inventive – secret services.

 

Russia also took the accusations with more equanimity than it sometimes does – which, of course, invites the West to conclude that US intelligence has got Moscow bang to rights. But its messages in recent weeks have also been unusually clear. It has denied any aggressive intent, blaming the West for trying to incite tensions. It has stated that a sovereign country has the right to move forces within its borders (which it does). But it has also, and crucially, said in no uncertain terms that for Ukraine to join NATO would, for Russia, constitute a 'red line'. All this should leave no doubt that Moscow is in reactive, not proactive, mode.

Logic might also dictate that if anyone has a motive to launch a new military action now, it would be the Kiev government, freshly equipped with military equipment from the UK and the US. After seven years of intermittent fighting, it could finally judge – or have been persuaded – that force is the only way to reclaim the rebel regions in the east. Indeed, that it could be now or never.

Look again not just at the recent Western statements of support for Ukraine and the sabre-rattling against Russia that accompanies them, but also to Western actions over recent months. There are the defence agreements with Ukraine on the part of the US and the UK, the multiple NATO land and sea manoeuvres, including in western Ukraine and the Black Sea, and the current dispositions of NATO forces (including, officially for training purposes, at bases inside Ukraine and, officially for advisory purposes, actually inside Ukraine's defence ministry). Then there are the recent US weapons supplies, including Javelin missiles, the Turkish supplies of drones, and an agreement with the UK on building warships. If you are sitting in Moscow, Ukraine starts to look very much like a NATO Trojan horse.

Is it so unreasonable to ask who is threatening whom here? Who is on offence – and who on defence? Anyone who notes Russian troop movements, within however many kilometres from Ukraine, should also look to the west of Ukraine, where NATO forces have been stationed since the alliance was enlarged to include most of the former Warsaw Pact and Yugoslav states (with Ukraine and the flaky Belarus constituting the only buffers).

From Moscow's perspective, it is a travesty of recent history for NATO, with the US, the UK and former Eastern bloc states holding the megaphones, to denounce Russia as an expansionist power. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 aside, Russia has been contracting for the past 30 years, including the past 11 years under Putin.

From NATO troop movements Russia might also divine other reasons for the West's war-talk than an invasion threat to Ukraine. Could the alarms sounded first in Washington provide cover for a Western-backed attempt to 'change the facts on the ground'? Could Russia perhaps be tricked into a move that it would see as defensive and NATO would present as aggression? Remember that incident last summer with the British warship in the Black Sea.

In my view, and it is only my view, Russia might not be averse to a deal that would bring peace to the Donbass and leave it in Ukraine. But it would aim to secure guarantees for the Russian-speaking population (as the UK tried to do for British nationals in Hong Kong before the return to China and would doubtless try to secure for Brits in Northern Ireland in the event of Irish unification). Russia would be far less amenable to the Donbass being reincorporated into Ukraine by force, still less with Western help. It would see that – probably rightly – both as a humiliation and as presaging instability for years to come.

The bigger context is the current state of US-Russia relations. The speed with which this week's summit was arranged hints at a lot going on behind the scenes. Ukraine does not like it, but hardly for the first time its future is tied up in a bigger game. It is one of the last pieces in the chess game that has been in progress since the end of the Cold War and the Soviet collapse.

Russia would dearly like a pan-European security agreement that would enshrine a US commitment to no further NATO expansion. This combines an old idea dating back to Gorbachev with Russia's newly articulated 'red line' over Ukraine, and the West has ruled both elements out.

But could Biden and Putin, who both face re-election in 2024, be looking for a legacy agreement that would set Western-Russia relations on a new course? If so, it is no wonder that both sides are posturing to maximise their advantage. As the invasion-talk shows, however, posturing is a risky business, not least because there are real people and a real country, Ukraine, in the middle.

Mary Dejevsky is a writer and broadcaster. She was Moscow correspondent for The Times between 1988 and 1992. She has also been a correspondent from Paris, Washington and China.

 

All pictures by: Getty.

To enquire about republishing spiked's content, a right to reply or to request a correction, please contact the managing editor, Viv Regan.

 

Vuk Vuksanovic: Russia's gas gift to Serbia comes with strings attached

Russia's gas gift to Serbia comes with strings attached | View

Comments

Updated: 04/12/2021 - 18:29

By Vuk Vuksanovic

 

Opinions expressed in View articles are solely those of the authors.

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić had a very unpleasant task when he met his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin in Sochi last week to plea for a lower price for Russian gas.

Indeed, before travelling to Russia, President Vučić had told the Serbian press that he would "ask and beg."

In the end, Putin fulfilled the request of his Serbian guest, meaning the Serbian president will have one less problem to worry about ahead of the April 2022 Serbian general election.

However, the question remains as to whether there will be a price to be paid.

Serbia's gas supply on the line

Why was this an unpleasant task for Vučić? Serbia is completely dependent on Russia for its gas supplies.

In 2008, Russia acquired majority shares in NIS, Serbia's national oil and gas company. The sale was made below market price, in return for Russia's protection at the UN level on Kosovo and the promise that Moscow would construct the now-defunct South Stream pipeline over Serbian territory. The opening of the Turkstream pipeline in 2021 confirmed the reality of energy dependence.

However, in light of the ongoing energy crisis in Europe, Serbia now fears high Russian gas prices.

In 2022, Serbia is poised to undergo presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as elections in the capital, Belgrade.

Cars roll on a highway in the morning in Belgrade, Serbia, on Friday, Oct. 29Darko Vojinovic/AP

President Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) are almost certain to win. But both still face the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic and the economy, which must not experience a major downturn until after they consolidate power.

The Serbian leadership needs to show that despite the pandemic, the economy is still growing. That was the primary reason why the government enthusiastically embraced Chinese financing, despite the ensuing degradation of environmental and labour standards.

The UAE is also useful as a source of cash and an instrument of domestic promotion. However, the high gas price would complicate things.

The first reason for Vučić's concern was more immediate: the start of the cold season. High gas prices lead to higher costs for heating, electricity and groceries: all the things voters observe in the run-up to elections. In mid-November, high food and energy prices pushed the inflation rate to 6.6 per cent.

Serbian pro-government daily Večernje novosti, despite being known for uncritical and hyperbolic praise of Serbian leadership and Serbo-Russian ties, gave an accurate overview of Serbia's concern ahead of the Putin-Vučić meeting.

Serbian gas consumption has doubled compared to previous years. Serbia has been paying Russia $270 (€239) per 1,000 cubic meters because, since the Soviet days, Serbia bought Russian gas based on a system whereby 100 per cent of the pricing is derived from the oil formula.

In light of the energy crisis, Russia's state-owned energy corporation Gazprom proposed that price be determined 30 per cent by oil formula, 70 per cent by spot market prices, which would see Serbia newly charged $790 (€698) per 1,000 cubic meters.

This is too much for the Serbian leadership. So too is the alternative proposal, whereby the price would be determined 70 per cent by oil formula and 30 per cent by spot market prices: all in all, $510 (€451) per 1,000 cubic meters.

Not such an easy task

The Serbian head of state was hoping to secure a new arrangement, in which Serbia would be buying three billion cubic meters of Russian natural gas annually for ten years.

Pro-government media in Serbia flaunted the notion that Vučić could secure a fairer Russian gas price than countries like Germany, Belarus and Armenia had.

The difference was that Germany is a major customer of Russian gas, with a long-term supply contract, and Belarus and Armenia are Russia's allies in the post-Soviet space.

More importantly, while Serbia insisted the focus would be on gas supply, Russia's presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that the two leaders would be discussing bilateral ties, with energy being just one of the issues that would be addressed.

Why is this important? For the past year, Serbia did a slight re-pivot towards Russia due to the election of Joe Biden in the US. However, 2020 was a very bad year for Serbo-Russian ties. Putin did not forget that.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic speak during their meeting in SochiMikhail Klimentyev/Sputnik via AP

What happened in 2020? Putin did not like the idea that Vučić was trying to resolve the Kosovo dispute with Donald Trump's assistance, which would mean Moscow would lose one of its last assets in the Balkans, and Belgrade's shifting towards Washington.

To curry favour with the West, pro-government tabloids in Serbia blamed pro-Russian players for instigating violent anti-lockdown protests in the summer of 2020.

Trilateral military drills with Russia and Belarus were also cancelled. In the meantime, China replaced Russia as Serbia's primary non-Western partner.

Putin did not forget how Vučić tried to trick him when he thought he would get a better bargain from the West. The meeting was almost certainly used to discipline Vučić.

Nevertheless, Vučić got what he wanted. After the meeting, it was announced that the gas price for Serbia would remain at $270 and the amount of delivered gas would increase for the next six months.

No one knows what will happen after those six months end. But Vučić got a gift from Putin for the heating season -- and for the elections. Vučić can also promote himself to his constituents as a skillful leader who enjoys the friendship of brotherly Russia.

A Serbian flag is seen on a gas pipe on the first section of the Gazprom South Stream natural gas pipeline, 80km north of BelgradeDarko Vojinovic/AP

What were the concessions offered?

It should be presumed, though, that Putin's gift comes with strings attached.

On that same day, news started circulating that Russia's state nuclear construction company Rosatom could be constructing a nuclear power plant in Serbia, although Serbian experts don't believe Serbia has the necessary expertise or resources for such an enterprise.

Russian companies are also set to get the job of constructing the Belgrade urban and suburban railway system.

Most importantly, there are talks that Serbia might be getting Kornet anti-tank missile systems from Russia: a dangerous scenario since in late 2019, Serbia, in fear of US sanctions, gave up on purchasing Russian weaponry.

It remains to be seen whether these transactions will be completed, and indeed whether any other favours that Vučić promised to Putin will be uncovered later in the game. After all, there's no such thing as a free lunch.

Vuk Vuksanovic is a researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) and an associate of LSE IDEAS, a foreign policy think-tank of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). He got his PhD in international relations at the LSE. He has published widely on modern foreign and security policy issues.

https://www.euronews.com/2021/12/04/russia-s-gas-gift-to-serbia-comes-with-strings-attached-view

b92.net

When U.S. official defends Serbia in the middle of Croatia

5-7 minutes

---

US Special Envoy for the Balkans Gabriel Escobar responded to the Croatian president, who said that Serbia has no sincere desire to become a member of the EU.

Source: Tanjug Friday, November 26, 2021 | 09:07

EPA-EFE/FEHIM DEMIR

In an interview with the Croatian agency, Escobar said that Serbia "historically, culturally and economically belongs to Europe" and that most of its citizens believe that their future is in that alliance. He also reminded Milanovic that Serbia stated EU membership as its strategic goal and that it was already connected with that alliance.

"I think that process has already come a long way," Escobar said.

In his opinion, Serbia should be faster in that process, but he pointed out that less progress, partially aggravated by the pandemic, was still achieved. "In terms of foreign policy alignment with the EU, Serbia has been better this year than it has been for a long time," Escobar said, citing a European mechanism that measures overlaps in foreign policy decisions, according to which to the extent of two-thirds, Serbia has harmonized its foreign policy with the EU.

What about Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Escobar also assessed that Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have an outstanding ethnic issue, but a problem of systemic corruption. He also said that he was more worried about demographic and economic difficulties in BiH than ethnic issues.

He emphasized that the structure with three constituent peoples remains the foundation of American policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina. "Political consensus can be reached through limited reforms, not by changing the structure of Dayton," Escobar said, adding that the United States is currently working with BiH political actors to change the election law to satisfy all three peoples in the federation.

He stated that he dislikes talking about sanctions because, as he said, "he does not want the region to get the impression that the United States is engaged in it primarily through sanctions. Sanctions do exist, but they will not be targeted at the Republika Srpska and the Federation or their citizens, but at corrupt individuals", stressed Escobar. He added that the Serbian member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as he said," is not the only, but the most current problem" in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 

b92.net

Russia will support the independence of Republika Srpska under one condition

7-8 minutes

---

Russian Ambassador to BiH, Igor Kalabukhov, says he sees no problem in Milorad Dodik's idea of an independent Republika Srpska within Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Source: Beta Thursday, November 11, 2021 | 16:45

Foto: Shutterstok/smith371

Russian Ambassador to BiH, Igor Kalabukhov, said that the condition for it should be the result of dialogue between all parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Kalabukhov stated that it is a matter of politicians, democratic decisions, and that Russia will support it if "it is realized in dialogue".

Russian ambassador told the BiH Public Service (BHRT) that he advocates the principle of resolving the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina through dialogue, all decisions must be made through dialogue, in communication between the entities, which must decide how to find the best way out of the current situation.

Kalabukhov further stated that the Russian position is that there is no High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because the procedure for appointing Christian Schmidt to that position has not been followed. He reminded that the decision on the appointment of the German diplomat was made by the ambassadors of the member states of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council in BiH (PIC) without consensus and without the consent of the High Representative in the UN Security Council.

"As a guarantor of the Dayton Agreement, we are a member of the PIC, but we do not work in the OHR while Christian Schmidt is there. We do not support any official contacts with Schmidt," Kalabukhov said. He also assessed that Valentin Inzko's decision to impose a law banning genocide denial, which he passed as the High Representative at the very end of his mandate, was "subjective and unbalanced".

"It would be best if that decision was in the BiH institutions, during the debate, during the dialogue. This dialogue is being conducted. Of course, not everyone may know about this dialogue, but it is being discussed in diplomatic circles. It is a term which, due to political repercussions, must be very balanced and very sensitive", Russian ambassador said.

Kalabukhov pointed out that he "does not see a problem in the fact that the Republika Srpska repealed the decision of the High Representative, although Inzko made that decision in accordance with his powers", adding that it was a matter for the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska.

"We didn't want to blame the whole nation"

According to him, in 2015, Russia did not support the Resolution on Srebrenica in the UN Security Council, which was prepared by Great Britain, because, as he stated, the draft was unbalanced and blamed the entire nation.

Kalabukhov also said that the decisions of the Hague Tribunal are also questionable for Russia. "When we were at the beginning of this story for the establishment of this court, we said that we see its work as an instrument of reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, that did not happen. We think that what was done there did not lead to reconciliation and tolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that is why our position in relation to these decisions and all the tragic events is known", he pointed out.

According to him, Russia's diplomacy is trying to balance everything concerning Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they are trying to "balance the whole position of the international factor".

 

economist.com

A Balkans arms race

Serbia is on a shopping spree for weapons

And its neighbours don’t like it

 

---

Oct 30th 2021

BELGRADE

“COME WITH me,” says Aleksandar Vucic, Serbia’s president. “Now you are going to see a smile on my face!” From the terrace of Belgrade’s presidency building he points at skyscrapers shooting up and declares triumphantly: “Like a phoenix rising from the ashes!”

Other former Yugoslav states worry that Serbia’s army is also rising from the ashes. During a petty dispute with Kosovo about car number-plates in September, Serbia flew warplanes close to the border and deployed armoured vehicles to cow its smaller neighbour.

Between 2015 and 2021 Serbia’s defence spending jumped by some 70% to $1.4bn a year. Russia and Belarus have given it ten MiG-29 jets. Russia has given it 30 tanks and armoured personnel-carriers and sold it an air-defence system. It has bought Chinese armoured drones, Russian helicopters and a French surface-to-air missile system. This month the defence minister announced that Serbia was negotiating to buy transport planes and helicopters from Airbus. Last month came news that it was talking to Israel about anti-tank missiles. Turkish drones, which were used to devastating effect in last year’s defeat of Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh by Azerbaijan, may be on the shopping list. Serbia’s own defence industry is also producing new kit, as opposed to just churning out more Yugoslav-era stuff.

After the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s Serbia’s military capacity decayed. But in 2014 the government decided to rearm. Russia’s intervention in Ukraine showed that the era of conventional warfare in Europe was not over; and floods in Serbia that year were a “wake-up call”, says Daniel Sunter of the Balkan Security Network, a think-tank. They revealed that the country had barely any helicopters for search-and-rescue missions. In 2015 Croatia, also restoring its armed forces, asked America to supply it with rockets which, if fired at Serbia, could reach deep inside the country.

A modern state needs a modern army, says Mr Vucic. Serbia spends more in absolute terms than before, but its defence spending as a share of GDP has hovered around 2% since 2005. Compared with Bulgaria, Hungary or Romania, that is “peanuts”, says Mr Vucic. But Serbs were not at war with Bulgaria, Hungary or Romania in the 1990s. They were at war with neighbours that now have smaller military budgets. Serbia outspends Albania, Bosnia, Montenegro, Kosovo and North Macedonia combined. It also outspends Croatia, which is buying French jets to restore its almost non-existent air capacity.

If Serbia were merely modernising its armed forces no one would mind. It is the context that sets off alarms. Bosnia is in political turmoil again, and Milorad Dodik, the Bosnian Serb leader, suggested on October 14th that if his part of Bosnia seceded and violence were to follow, Russia would step in to defend it. Serbia’s government-controlled tabloids constantly proclaim that war with the Kosovo Albanians or the Croats is imminent. In October, following a clash between Kosovo Serbs and the Kosovo police, Serbia’s imaginative tabloids linked the presence of British Gurkha troops to the violence.

At the same time nationalists, including Serbia’s minister of the interior, talk about the creation of a “Serbian World”, which many in Kosovo, Montenegro and Bosnia fear is code for a Greater Serbia that might swallow them up. Mr Vucic dismisses that as “propaganda”. He says that all the neighbours know that rearmament is “not against them”.

Vuk Vuksanovic, a researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, says that the real significance of the country’s rearming is political rather than military. Showy arms deals impress Mr Vucic’s supporters, who tend to hold the armed forces in high esteem.

But Serbia is effectively surrounded by NATO (see map). With a big alliance shielding its small neighbours, Serbia is highly unlikely to send its soldiers into action in the forseeable future. Indeed, Serbia has excellent (if discreet) relations with NATO, and America trains Serbian troops. Having a strong army means that big powers treat you with respect, says Mr Vuksanovic. And if, “God forbid”, the regional status quo were to break down, then “if we can inflict damage on our hypothetical opponents, they will perhaps be more accommodating with us at the negotiating table.” ■

This article appeared in the Europe section of the print edition under the headline "A Balkans arms race"

 

Timothy Less: Let Kosovo be partitioned

transconflict.com

Let Kosovo be partitioned

TransConflict

13-16 minutes

---

It's wrong to close down the partition option. If this is what the local parties can agree on, let Kosovo be partitioned. The US has finally accepted this logic. Others should now do the same.

By Timothy Less

At long last, the United States has decided to let Belgrade and Pristina resolve the question of Kosovo's status the way they want – if necessary, it seems, by partitioning the territory.

Its embassy in Prishtina has stated that 'sides in the dialogue will have unlimited freedom to decide about the destiny of their countries'. This follows an interview last month in which the American ambassador to Pristina refused to rule out partition, to the evident surprise of the interviewer.

About time.

The unresolved question of Kosovo's status has left the country in a debilitating state of limbo for nearly two decades.

However, attempts to resolve the issue have been persistently foiled by the insistence of the West, and particularly the US, on precluding the one thing which Serbia has consistently said it might accept in return for recognising the breakaway state – namely the Serb-dominated enclave in Kosovo's north.

Is Serbia being unreasonable in demanding this? Perhaps so. But that's beside the point. If Serbia is to shift its position and recognise Kosovo, which is the only way out of the current imbroglio, then its demand must be taken seriously.

Doing the deal

The attraction of any deal based on partition, of course, is that it is simply a formalisation of the reality on the ground.

Belgrade knows it has lost the south of Kosovo because its overwhelmingly-Albanian population will never accept a return to Serbian sovereignty. And Pristina knows it doesn't control the north which is dominated by Serbs and is functionally a part of Serbia.

So, the core of any such deal is a potential win for both sides, without either having to give anything new away. That bodes well for an agreement.

However, success or failure will ultimately depend on a resolution of various second-order issues, most obviously the status of those Serbs left behind in Kosovo, south of the river Ibar.

Belgrade will probably ask Pristina for some form of self-government for this community – probably less than the pending EU-mediated deal to establish an Association of Serb Municipalities, which would give some autonomy to Kosovo Serbs, but the minimum needed for a population numbering a few tens of thousands to maintain its basic way of life.

In return, Pristina will likely demand an end to the complex arrangements that give Serbs massively disproportionate influence in Kosovo's political institutions, including ten reserved seats in parliament and veto powers over matters of vital interest. Pristina will also want Serbia to do something for the Preshevo Valley, a region bordering Kosovo in southern Serbia, where the Albanian population is agitating to be part of discussions about Kosovo.

How Serbia responds to that remains to be seen. Potentially it will sacrifice Preshevo to prevent Albanians spreading to other parts of southern Serbia. Or it might agree to grant Preshevo whatever Pristina is willing to give Serbs in southern Kosovo. Alternatively, Belgrade and Pristina might agree not to make any special arrangements and support those who decide, all things considered, to make a new life across the border.

Around the edges there are also issues of monasteries, missing persons, financial compensation and more besides that each will put on the negotiating table.

But if both sides can find some basic equilibrium in what President Vucic has called a 'comprehensive package', and sell it to their domestic constituencies, then a deal based on 'partition for recognition' which ends the Kosovo conundrum is a real possibility.

Risks and opportunities

Good news, you would think.

But so far, reaction in European capitals has been overwhelmingly hostile to the idea of partition and focused exclusively on a set of perceived attendant dangers. There is generalised talk of ethnic tensions, separatism and renewed conflict in the region.

Naturally, there are risks involved, as there are in any process of conflict resolution. But these should be kept in perspective.

One oft-raised concern is that Serbia's annexation of the north would expose those Serbs left behind in the south to the risk of ethnic cleansing.

Would it, though?

An act of recognition by Serbia would fundamentally change the calculus in Kosovo.

Serbs have been targeted in the past because their presence complicates the Albanians' goal of independence. Not only have they given Belgrade leverage over Kosovo's internal affairs, but Western diplomats have insisted on diluting Kosovo's statehood to uphold the rights of the Serb community.

If, however, Serbia recognises Kosovo, then Albanians will have achieved their core political goal and have no obvious reason to bother the small Serbian population that remains. If anything, the risk of ethnic cleansing will be lower than now.

Another concern is that Kosovo's partition will set a dangerous precedent in a region beset by unresolved ethno-nationalist border disputes.

The greatest fear is for Bosnia where Serbs and Croats have made abundantly clear they do not want to be ruled from Sarajevo – just as Kosovo's Albanians do not want to be ruled from Belgrade.

If Kosovo, is partitioned, so the thinking goes, then why not Bosnia too?

Again, however, that is a questionable assumption. If the Balkans was governed by such simple processes of cause and effect, Republika Srpska would have declared its independence after Kosovo did the same in 2008.

Instead, the fate of Bosnia depends far more on politics inside the country and the wider geopolitical environment than it does on developments inside Kosovo. So, there is no immediate need for panic.

Moreover, to the extent that a deal on partitioning Kosovo did have repercussions, by focusing minds in Sarajevo on the prospect of the Bosnian state breaking up, there might finally be a chance of ending Bosnia's excruciating political deadlock.

As in any separatist conflict, the onus is on the Bosniaks, as the largest group and the one which wants to preserve the Bosnian state to find a modus vivendi with the Serbs and Croats, both of which want more autonomy.

To date, however, Bosniaks have refused point blank to discuss these demands, secure in the knowledge that the US stands behind them and that everything to do with borders is non-negotiable.

This has fuelled the frustration of the Serbs and Croats and recently generated worrying levels of heat: Croats demand a third entity, Serbs threaten to secede, and Bosniaks threaten Serbs with violence, which only increases their determination to break away. On its current trajectory, Bosnia is heading for some kind of bust up.

Since Serbs and Croats are manifestly not going to change their minds, the only way out of this malaise is the emergence of pragmatic leaders within the Bosniak community who are prepared to take Serb and Croat demands for greater autonomy seriously and name their price for agreeing to this.

And a game-changing deal in Kosovo could be the catalyst for this by demonstrating that borders are not inviolable, the US is no longer taking sides and that long-standing foes can resolve their disputes by peaceful negotiation rather than settling them on the battlefield.

The prize is not just something of value to Bosniaks but a way out of the current deadlock and even a chance for Bosnia to develop as a state, to everyone's benefit, most of all the Bosniaks themselves.

A deal in Kosovo could also offer lessons to Macedonia where Albanians have made similarly clear they will not accept second-class status in a state run for the benefit of Macedonians, but where a majority of Macedonians does not wish the country to become bi-national in character, manifest in their opposition to the proposed language law.

This ultimately leaves Albanians with only one option, which is some kind of split in which Macedonians do what they want on their land and Albanians do what they want on theirs. Again, a negotiated solution in Kosovo can offer a way out if pragmatic politicians in Skopje are willing to state their terms for giving the Albanians the autonomy they seek.

Many will object that deals are impossible in Bosnia and Macedonia and merely opening a discussion about fundamentals will automatically lead to war, presumably because they think Balkanites are inveterate barbarians who know only one way to solve their problems – with violence.

But the reason deals have hitherto been impossible is because the West has distorted the local balance of power by backing selected local clients and blocking any meaningful debate about the political arrangements in the region. If the West adopted a position of genuine neutrality, as the US is apparently now doing in Kosovo, then suddenly the impossible would become possible.

As for the resort to violence, the current negotiations over Kosovo clearly show that local parties can talk about fundamentals in a peaceful manner – especially since there is huge popular opposition to conflict following the traumas of the 1990s.

Finally, there is the spectre of the so-called Greater Albania – or, more accurately an Albanian nation state. If Kosovo was recognised by Serbia, Pristina would no doubt seek tighter relations with its more successful southern neighbour. The signs of ever-closer union are plain to see, not least this month when the two dismantled their border controls.

But is it really such a problem if Albania and Kosovo do eventually unite? Unless there is some hidden interest in denying Albanians the kind of national state which other Europeans take for granted, they have every right to have one, if that is their wish.

The only obvious casualty would be the ideology of multiculturalism, which would suffer a major setback in a region which has long been a laboratory for Western liberals to practice their social experiments. And that, one suspects, is the real motivation for much of the hostility towards partition.

At the same time, of course, the risks of a deal based on partition must be weighed against the risks of a deal not based on partition – which, given Serbia's bottom line, means no deal at all.

Kosovo itself will remain in a state of limbo and the north a flashpoint for conflict. And the EU will steadily lose its little remaining leverage as the prospect of membership fades into nothingness.

Indeed, after the EU-Balkans summit in Sofia in May, the General Affairs Council in June and the washout in London last month, it is clear that any enlargement of the union is now on permanent hold as European leaders focus their energies on arresting the EU's slow-motion demise.

It is not hard to foresee a scenario in which Serbia one day simply seizes northern Kosovo out of sheer frustration, triggering a crisis which leads to the revenge expulsion of Serbs in southern Kosovo and the reciprocal expulsion of Albanians from Serbia.

And that sort of violent shock really could trigger the kind of domino effect around the region which angst-ridden opponents of partition are predicting.

A new opportunity

Far from being a regional Armageddon, the new focus on partition offers a solution to the Kosovo problem, and one which has a genuine chance of success following the apparent lifting of the American veto.

In doing so, the US is to be applauded for finally recognising the two most obvious points about the Kosovo debate – that the only durable solution is one which accords with the wishes of the people on the ground. And that what really matters to those people are traditional concepts such as nationhood, sovereignty and territory.

Of course, there are risks to a deal based on partition because the consequence could be to open a new phase in the unfinished process of dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. Partition will also provide no instant panacea to the problems of poor governance and poverty.

But in the longer term, by disentangling their affairs in a peaceful, negotiated manner, Serbs and Albanians can finally embark on the long-frustrated process of state-building and address vital issues like democracy, the economy and the rule of law. With the foundations secured, construction of the house can finally begin.

Indeed, there is no reason why, in a couple of decades' time, Serbia and an enlarged Albania which incorporates Kosovo cannot be reasonably prosperous, moderately well-governed and strategically-important nation states, with close links to Russia, China, Turkey and the West, and constructive relations with their neighbours.

That seems a more inspiring vision than the current pathway which leads nowhere except continued political deadlock, economic stagnation and a fruitless struggle to join a declining EU, which probably ends with some kind of security breakdown when people's patience is fully exhausted.

Partitions and border adjustments may be an ugly solution to an ethno-territorial conflict, but Kosovo is not an aesthetic or moral problem but a political one. The overwhelming priority is to get Serbia to recognise Kosovo so life can go on, and Serbia has said that its price for doing so is the return of the northern enclave.

So, it's wrong to close down the partition option. If this is what the local parties can agree on, let Kosovo be partitioned. The US has finally accepted this logic. Others should now do the same.

Timothy Less is the director of the Nova Europa political risk consultancy and the leader of The New Intermarium research project at the University of Cambridge.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of TransConflict.

http://www.transconflict.com/2018/08/let-kosovo-be-partitioned-228/

Shared via the Google app

 

Sent from my iPhone

telegraf.rs

Montgomery: I fear new conflicts in the Balkans

Dragica Ranković

3 minutes

---

1. Home /
2. English

07/10/21 |  16:41  ≫  16:01

07/10/21 |  16:41  ≫  16:01

This region cannot succeed alone, it needs the full support of the West, the US and the EU in order for changes to happen over time - concluded the American diplomat and former US ambassador to Serbia

Photo: HO / AFP / Profimedia

Former American ambassador to Serbia, William Montgomery, expressed his fear that new conflicts could occur in the Balkans, considering that, as he says, no problem in the Balkan countries has been solved.

Montgomery pointed out that an additional problem is that it no longer attracts the attention of other countries.

"I think that in the '90s, this place was the main place in the world to which our leaders focused their attention. Today, that is not the case and I don't believe that these countries can solve the issues that bother them. Feelings from all sides are so upset that I do not see a solution," Montgomery pointed out while appearing on HRT.

He also stressed that he believes the European Union does not provide assistance and support to the entire Balkan region.

"I think that people here are somehow behind in terms of their views on other European countries. It should not be forgotten that Germany and France were at war for centuries and stopped only after the Second World War. That will happen to this region as well. However, the most important thing is that the help of the European Union will be needed for that, because this region cannot succeed alone. It needs the full support of the West, the United States and the EU for these changes to happen over time," Montgomery concluded.

(Telegraf.rs)

Telegraf.rs zadržava sva prava nad sadržajem. Za preuzimanje sadržaja pogledajte uputstva na stranici Uslovi korišćenja.

 

nationalinterest.org

The Submarine Row Marks the Dawn of the Franco-British Rivalry

by Ali Demirdas

7-9 minutes

---

“It’s a stab in the back. We had established a trusting relationship with Australia, and this trust was betrayed,” French Foreign Affairs Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian said upon the abrupt cancellation of the $66 billion submarine deal with Australia. Furious, Paris reciprocated by recalling its ambassadors from Canberra and Washington—a first in the history of the long alliance between France and the United States, dating back to 1778. 

Some argue that the decision to favor the U.S.-made nuclear submarines was partially due to the perception that French-made diesel-powered submarines on long transits from Australia to potential conflict zones in the Asian region would have to spend time traveling on the surface (where they are at their most vulnerable) using diesel engines while they recharge their batteries. Some claim the cost blowouts, schedule slippages, and concerns over commitments to use local contractors led Australia’s Morrison government to finally pull the plug on the French submarine deal. While those can be contributing factors in the “submarine saga,” a very important factor is being omitted: London’s aspiration, in the aftermath of Brexit, to ascend in the Great Power Competition that is rapidly reshaping the global geopolitical order. After all, British prime minister Boris Johnson promoted Britain’s departure from the European Union as an opportunity for the country to strike more global strategic deals unrestrained by the EU. 

To this end, the UK is trying to achieve three goals: preventing a European power from rising as a challenger to London, preventing Russia from dominating the Eastern Mediterranean, and preventing China from controlling the Indo-Pacific trade routes that are vital for Britain’s economic prosperity. Not surprisingly, those three pillars are intertwined and involve London’s power struggle with Paris. 

The Franco-British rivalry is most visible in the eastern Mediterranean. London has taken every possible step to undermine Paris’ perceived national interest, particularly in Libya, thus weakening France’s prospects of becoming a dominant power in the European Union in the UK’s absence. In this regard, the British have sided with Turkey, France’s archrival in Libya and the eastern Mediterranean. Subsequently, France did not hesitate to irk the British by pursuing a policy of rapprochement with the Russians in Libya. 

London’s aide in the EU, after Brexit, is Malta. Malta, one of the two British Commonwealth and European Union members (the other being Cyprus), was an intercessor in the Brexit negotiations and has been a port of call for Royal Navy patrols in transit to and from the Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and the Indo-Pacific. In May 2020, it was Malta that vetoed the funding for Operation IRINI, the EU naval mission tasked to enforce an arms embargo in Libya, particularly those arms that Turkey intended to deliver to its proxy, the Government of the National Accord (GNA), and the archrival of the French-backed Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar. 

Malta was also among the five countries, with the others being Germany, Spain, Italy, and Hungary, who blocked a Franco-Greek sponsored EU resolution that would have imposed an arms embargo on Turkey due to Ankara’s policies on Cyprus and drilling in the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, in an effort to counter Turkey’s growing influence in the region, France has stood by the Cypriot Greeks, and in August 2020 went so far as to send naval vessels off the coast of Cyprus as well as deploy Rafale fighters jets to the Greek island of Crete. Yet, Johnson called Greek prime minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and urged him to pursue a more diplomatic solution, indirectly supporting Turkey’s “gunboat diplomacy.” Whereas France sees an ascendant Turkey in Syria as a threat and has condemned Turkey’s Syria incursions, London threw its support behind Ankara, citing Turkey’s right to self-defense. While Macron hosted the representatives of the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) at the Elysee Palace, drawing Turkey’s ire, London stated that the YPG was part of the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), which is considered to be a terrorist organization by many NATO members. 

Even though French interests were hurt in Libya, Syria, and the South Caucasus, London continued to supply Turkish drones with necessary technology at a time when American and Canadian firms imposed an arms embargo on Turkey. Most notably, in May 2020, Turkish drones and air defense systems helped the Turkish-backed GNA government retake nearly all of western Libya from Haftar’s forces.

The Franco-British rivalry also flared up in the English Channel. In May 2021, Johnson didn’t hesitate to dispatch two Royal Navy patrol boats to protect Jersey (the largest channel island) from a feared blockade by French fishing vessels in an escalation of a dispute over post-Brexit access to waters around the Channel Islands. France retaliated by blocking a post-Brexit financial services deal between the EU and the UK until Johnson’s government granted fishermen fair access to British waters. French government spokesman Gabriel Attal did not deny that Paris was holding up the deal for the financial sector as a lever in the fishing dispute.

By leaving the European Union, London has severed the “restraining yokes,” allowing its leap into the great power competition that is rapidly heating up. For the UK, this competition entails containing the rise of any continental European power, most notably France. It appears that London is sabotaging France’s moves wherever it can. Soaring Turco-British relations, for instance, not only facilitate London’s ability to project power deep into the Caucasus and Central Asia, but also helps the British undermine France’s perceived interests that greatly contradict those of the Turks.

It should be no surprise that Australia’s decision to ditch the submarine deal with France came hours after the declaration that the United States, the UK, and Australia formed a security pact (AUKUS) to counter China in the Pacific. Mark Leonard, director of the European Council on Foreign Relations, said, “the submarine snub is a symptom of a toxic turn British-French relations have taken in the last few years.” Increasingly rendered impotent in the eastern Mediterranean, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Sahel, Paris is likely going to take steps to restore its wounded pride, with severe consequences. The French have already been questioning the purpose of being a part of NATO, and the submarine issue has given them a concrete reason to revise France’s place in the Transatlantic alliance, just like Paris did in 1966. Having already cozied up with Russia in the eastern Mediterranean, Paris should be expected to increase its intimacy with Moscow, which is more than enough to damage the foundations of NATO, raising concerns among Poland, the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Georgia. Given his slumping performance against his political rival, populist Marine Le Pen, who has close ties with Vladimir Putin, Emmanuel Macron may resort to taking drastic steps in foreign policy.  

Europe is increasingly resembling what it was before 1939. Whether AUKUS is going to trigger a wider conflict in Eurasia has yet to be seen.

Ali Demirdas, Ph.D. in political science from the University of South Carolina, Fulbright scholar, professor of international affairs at the College of Charleston (2011—2018). You can follow him on Twitter @DrDemirdasEn

Image: Reuters.