Kosovo: New War in the Balkans?

 

STRATFOR (USA)

Kosovo: New War in the Balkans?

November 22, 2005 17 40 GMT

Summary

The current stalemate over Kosovo's status is a perfect example of the palsied international system. One would think that a province that has been a de facto international protectorate for more than six years, by now, would have its status decided; yet the concerned parties in Kosovo ostensibly cannot perform the necessary tasks. The responsibility for this impasse rests first on the shoulders of the Kosovar Serbs and Albanians, who cannot agree, and second on the shoulders of the Contact Group members -- including the United States -- who dare not impose a solution.

Analysis

U.N. status envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his deputy Albert Rohan on Nov. 21 began their Balkan trip in the Kosovar capital of Pristina, with the clear intent of ensuring that status negotiations scheduled for December in Vienna, Austria, do not fail. However, their visit probably will have the opposite effect. At this stage it appears Ahtisaari merely wants to take notice of the contradictory positions at play in the negotiations rather than come up with a clear plan. A further sign of the chaos reigning in and around Kosovo is that disagreement exists both between and among the Albanians and the Serbs.

Two major views have emerged in the Serbian ranks. Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica and Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic maintain that "Kosovo-Metohija" must remain part of Serbia. It can receive more than autonomy but less than independence, and the inhabitants' minority and property rights must be respected to the utmost. Hence, the Serbian government prepared a resolution Nov. 15 that was adopted by the Serbian Parliament on Nov. 21.

Also on Nov. 15, Serbian head of state Boris Tadic expounded his own views during talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Tadic said Kosovo should be decentralized to create separate Serbian and Albanian entities within the region and allow Serbs to have a relationship with Serbia that would be close but regulated by Kosovar institutions. Earlier, Serbian Vice President Miroslav Labus came forth with a similar proposal, maintaining that a Serbian enclave should be created in northern Kosovo and along the Kosovar part of the River Morava.

What the Serb positions have in common is a simple fact: Kosovo must not, under any circumstances, be allowed to achieve independence.

Here, it must be noted that the international community -- the majority of U.S. and European politicians involved in this process -- are striving to extinguish the independent Serbian enclave in Bosnia-Herzegovina and create a unified state. Hence, it is possible that Tadic and Labus' proposals are designed to safeguard the existence of Serbian entities not only in Kosovo but also in Bosnia.

Events during the last few months testify to the uncertainties among Albanians, too. Though all the Albanians agree that Kosovo must be independent, in October some radical groups attempted to pressure the Kosovar Parliament to declare independence immediately. However, as a result of international pressure -- primarily from Jesen Petersen, leader of the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo -- on Nov. 17 a public proclamation was issued stating that Kosovar Albanians want an independent and sovereign Kosovo, and that this position will be represented during negotiations with Belgrade.

The international community could resolve this predicament -- especially if the major powers represented in the Contact Group (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) legally sanctioned the de facto protectorate. That would translate into at least five years of conditional independence for Kosovo, supervised by the Contact Group and protected by international forces, which would give the Serbs in Northern Kosovo not only minority rights (a term they consider an affront in itself) but also the ability to organize themselves -- inside Kosovo -- as a separate entity.

If the Contact Group members are not ready to impose the solution of conditional independence as soon as possible, a new war in the Balkans is almost a certainty. Historical patterns simply are not working: Neither the Ottoman Empire nor Tito's Yugoslavia can be resurrected. But a sort of Bismarckian realpolitik -- a protectorate imposed and supervised by a concert of major powers -- might be worth trying.

Regardless of what path is approached, any removal of international forces will lead to Albanian-Serb bloodshed. Consequently, the international community only has two options. First, the Contact Group could adopt a position of de facto support of Albanian independence. Such a stance would anger Belgrade, but Belgrade currently lacks the tools to retaliate effectively (although the Bosnian Serbs would certainly feel forced to act to protect their own interests). Second, the Contact Group could simply attempt to extend the existing legal limbo.

Unfortunately, another bit of Serbia and Montenegro -- namely, Montenegro -- is champing at the bit to vote on independence itself. And should Montenegro go, the Kosovar Albanians are certain to not wait around for the international community to make up its mind. This leaves just one question in Stratfor's mind: Do the Kosovar Albanians possess the military fortitude to seize their independence should they not receive a blank check from the Contact Group?