Negotiating Kosovo's status

Negotiating Kosovo's status

http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20061006/news_lz1e6slomanso.html

   The San Diego Union-Tribune      October 6, 2006
   Opinion

         Negotiating Kosovo's final status

   By William Slomanson

   The international protectorate of Kosovo is perched in southern Serbia.
Kosovo
   has been under military occupation since the 1999 NATO bombing campaign
against
   Serbia's now defunct regime of Slobodan Milosevic.

   The United Nations previously announced its intent to end its unique
   governmental administration of Kosovo within the next 90 days. Kosovo has
been a
   major financial drain, at a time when U.N. members are demanding more
bang for
   the assessed dues buck. Serbia's government has just scheduled a new
   constitutional referendum for December, claiming its irrefutable right to
the
   province. Kosovo is therein proclaimed to be an "integral part" of
Serbia.

   The Vienna-based Contact Group leads the on-going process of resolving
Kosovo's
   final status. Membership includes the United Nations, European Union,
NATO,
   Russia and the United States. Tight-lipped negotiators are presumably
exploring
   the role that the European Union might play when the United Nations
departs.
   Unfortunately, European Union members have yet to commit the requisite
degree
   of resources needed to kick-start all levels of Kosovar infrastructure.

   A patient international community should eschew temporary remedies, given
the
   region's 400 wars in 300 years. Kosovo's currently unresolved status
makes it
   the black hole of Europe. Its Balkan neighbors are progressing toward
membership
   in NATO, the European Union, and other desired international linkages. As
the
   United States National Security Strategy warns, weak states can threaten
strong
   states.

   The major impediment to independence is Kosovo's historically mono-ethnic
   society. A number of former Serbian soldiers and governmental officials
have
   been prosecuted in the U.N.'s regional criminal tribunal for their war
crimes
   and genocidal acts against the Albanian population in the 1990s. Serbs
switched
   roles in post-conflict Kosovo. They became the ethnic minority.
International
   human rights organizations cannot guarantee their safety. The prime
example is
   the small-scale Krystal Nacht of March 17, 2004. Nineteen Serb churches
were
   torched. Thirty people were killed.

   The final status options include linkage with Albania. Sophisticated
Albanian
   Kosovars do not favor this compromise, because of Albania's comparatively
poor
   economic status in Europe. Another alternative is returning Kosovo to the
   autonomy it enjoyed in Tito's Yugoslavia, before Milosevic mounted his
   repressive ethnic cleansing campaign. But many Albanian Kosovars do not
want to
   risk the remote possibility that one day, after departure of the
international
   community, Belgrade would reinstitute repressive tactics.

   This ubiquitous fear lacks a solid foundation for two reasons. First, the
   Serbian government surrendered its former president, Milosevic, for trial
by the
   U.N.'s regional criminal tribunal. That concession appeased the United
States
   and its NATO allies, whose bombing was directed at his government.
Second,
   Belgrade would not want to short-circuit its incorporation into desirable
   European entities.

   The majority Kosovar Albanian population's desired option is statehood.
   A growing number of Serbs, both in an out of Kosovo, see the
international
   community's writing on the wall. They have acknowledged that Serbia's
retention
   of Kosovo is a recipe for economic and political disaster. Kosovo is in
the
   poorest part of Europe, and its rebellious population is nearly 95
percent
   Albanian.

   The Serbian government is no doubt negotiating for retention of the
northern
   15 percent to 20 percent of this province. The city of Mitrovica is
Kosovo's
   Mason-Dixon Line. This division was parented by Serb-friendly French NATO
   forces, upon cessation of the 1999 NATO bombing. Parallel Serb
institutions
   reign in this northern portion of Kosovo, where the United Nations has de
jure
   but not de facto control. This reality is most evident by the Serbian
flag at
   the northern edge of the Ibar River Bridge. It effectively divides Kosovo
into
   the Serbian north and Albanian south. The civilian-policed guard shack,
and the
   NATO installation on the river below, evince the ethnic undercurrent
forcibly
   restrained by their presence.

   Such a geographical division may be a convenient Contact Group pressure
point.
   But it would be a particularly discomforting precedent. International
practice
   abhors geographic divisions based on ethnicity. If Vienna's negotiators
were to
   force the Mitrovica division piece into this geographical puzzle, ethnic
   adversaries elsewhere would expect like treatment. For example, the
   international community possesses something Serbia wants. That is
international
   recognition of Republika Srpska, the unrecognized Serb entity in the
eastern
   half of Bosnia. Unlike the Kosovo situation, however, Bosnia's
constitution
   expressly provides that it consist of both Bosnia-Herzegovina and this
   otherwise unrecognized Serbian entity within Bosnia.

   Balkan news reports on the Vienna Contact Group negotiations are now
referring
   to "conditional independence" as a likely final status option. The term
   conditional implies that Kosovo's independence could not be complete
until
   Kosovar Serbs and other minorities enjoy a robust existence in terms of
equal
   opportunity education, employment and housing. During conditional
independence,
   NATO's barbed wire fences and its soldiers would gradually disappear from
the
   current Serb population enclaves in Kosovo.

   Regardless of what the Vienna Contact Group achieves, a functioning
multiethnic
   society will be the unavoidable price tag for full independence. This
cannot
   occur until the international community is satisfied that the majority
Albanian
   populace has convincingly demonstrated the requisite degree of tolerance.
The
   minority population's human rights cannot be passively inherited from the
   international community's occupation of Kosovo. True independence is
literally
   in the hands of Kosovo's majority population. They have to credibly
demonstrate
   that an independent Kosovo will not erupt into a fresh ethnic cleansing
crisis,
   requiring yet another humanitarian intervention in Kosovo.

___________________________________________________________________________

   Slomanson is a professor at Thomas Jefferson School of Law in San Diego
   and visiting professor at the University of Pristina in Kosovo. He is
past
   chair of the American Society of International Law United Nations
Section.
   He can be reached via e-mail at bills@tjsl.edu.

   © Copyright 2006 Union-Tribune Publishing Co. o A Copley Newspaper Site


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