NEWS VIEWS by Srdja Trifkovic
Friday, December 15, 2006
The Untold Story of Kosovo Negotiations
Vojislav Kostunica, Serbia’s prime minister for the past three
years, has one of the most challenging jobs in the world. He
nevertheless seems at ease with that burden, and appears more
confident than while he was Yugoslavia’s last president
(2000-2003). When we met in Belgrade last week, he was as
matter-of-fact about the problems he is facing as ever; but
whereas in the past he had occasionally agonized about the
magnitude and complexity of those problems, today he treats
them as facts of life that neither intimidate nor depress him.
It may be telling that in appearance he has hardly aged over
the past decade, while in substance he has become the key
figure on Serbia’s political scene for many years to come.
The most pressing of those problems is of course Kosovo. The
United States, NATO and several leading European Union
countries have occupied one-seventh of his country’s territory
for over seven years, and the officials who run the
“international community” appear keen—for now—to detach the
southern province permanently from Serbia. Kostunica’s best
defense against the pressure to sign Kosovo away—and that
pressure keeps coming from Washington, Brussels, London and
other power centers—has been to insist on the need for any
solution to be legal, to conform to the letter and spirit of
the international law.
The law is clear: Kosovo belongs to Serbia, and its status was
reiterated in the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 that
stopped NATO bombing in June 1999. Detaching it from Serbia
against Belgrade’s will would be an unprecedented violation of
the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Ahtisaari
and his political masters know that, of course, but like to
pretend that it is but a minor irritant. As Kostunica says,
“When we mention the need for legality, some of these
officials become exasperated, even agitated. They respond with
various comments to the effect that we should not be bound by
‘mere’ legality.”
This, Kostunica adds, reminds him of the attitude of
Yugoslavia’s late communist dictator, Marshal Tito. When
commenting on how the country’s judges should try political
cases, Tito famously advised them “not to stick to the law
like a drunk sticks to a fence.” Such attitude irritates
Kostunica—a constitutional lawyer, whose nickname in Serbia is
“the Legalist”—but it does not surprise him. “The whole
negotiating process had been designed from the outset to lead
to only one outcome: Kosovo’s independence,” says he; and the
role of the U.N. mediator, Finland’s former president Marti
Ahtisaari, was simply to choreograph that outcome.
Kostunica’s account of Ahtisaari’s bungled attempt to
“deliver” the Serbs indicates that the promoters of the
Albanian cause had selected the wrong person for the job. The
Finn came to it as a self-declared proponent of detaching
Kosovo from Serbia and an associate of the Soros-funded
International Crisis Group, a leading pro-Albanian lobby
group. Ahtisaari’s opening gambit nevertheless was to try and
assure Kostunica of his good intentions: he really wanted to
assist Serbia, he said, in ridding herself of a problem—of
Kosovo, that is; and “we” should work together on finding the
formula to make it happen smoothly and painlessly, since “we”
(men of the world, big-time players in the “international
community”) surely realize that Kosovo is lost to Serbia
anyway.
Ahtisaari’s approach may have been based on six years’ worth
of flawed advice that he and others in the “international
community” had received from Western diplomats in Belgrade and
from a small but influential clique of “pro-Western” Serbian
officials and analysts. All along their assumption had been
that Serbia would cave in yet again and agree to Kosovo’s
detachment, albeit with some meaningless fig leaf
(“conditional independence,” “international guarantees for
minority rights,” etc, etc); that Russia and China would
endorse the deal at the Security Council; and that the problem
would be taken off the agenda by the end of this year with the
admission of yet another part of ex-Yugoslavia into the
“international community.”
Observers agree that the nature of the new entity would be
clear not so much for what Kosovo would be (an international
protectorate, an EU-NATO condominium, a future province of
Greater Albania) but for what it would no longer be: part of
Serbia. As a Washingtonian insider has noted, “The UN, the EU,
the Contact Group countries, would issue the appropriate
guarantees, mainly protection for the remaining Serbs—and
everyone would know the guarantees were just new lies on top
of the old. When all the Serbs were cleared out and their holy
places destroyed, there would be expressions of regret from
Washington, Brussels, London, etc: ‘Indeed, how sad. How
unfortunate that these Serbs should have made themselves so
hated’.”
The belief that this scenario might work was reinforced by
none other than President Boris Tadic’s chief foreign policy
advisor Vuk Jeremic, one of very few Serbian enthusiasts for
John Kerry’s victory in November 2004. Mr. Jeremic (who
happens to be a Muslim on his mother’s side) came to
Washington on 18 May 2005 to testify in Congress on why Kosovo
should stay within Serbia; but in some of his off-the-record
conversations he assured his hosts that the task is really to
sugar-coat the bitter pill that Serbia will have to swallow
anyway—and to ensure that the nationalist Radical Party does
not score excessive gains in the process.
When confronted with Kostunica’s polite but firm refusal to
operate on those assumptions, Ahtisaari tried subterfuge,
suggesting tête-à-tête off-the-record conversations with
individual Serbian leaders. Aware of the potential for
intrigue and double-dealing contingent upon such arrangements,
Kostunica refused. All his meetings with Ahtisaari were
strictly official, on-the-record, minuted, and attended by
advisors. In the meantime the negotiations between Serbs and
Albanians in Vienna, supposedly mediated by Ahtisaari, failed
because they were doomed to fail. As Kostunica says, the
Albanians were led to believe that they would get independence
anyway, and therefore had no incentive to negotiate.
The biggest internal challenge for the prime minister was to
ensure coherence of the official Serbian position, between
himself, President Tadic, and foreign minister Draskovic. That
has not been easy, and may have become impossible were it not
for the remarkable unity of the country’s public opinion on
this issue, manifested in the referendum on Serbia’s
constitution last October that reiterated Kosovo’s status as
integral part of Serbia. Confronted with the strength of
popular sentiment, Kostunica’s coalition partners and
Tadic—whose Democratic Party is not in government—realized
that breaking ranks would be tantamount to political suicide.
Some of the lingering ambiguities in Belgrade’s leadership
remain, however, and became apparent only days after our
meeting when President Tadic announced that he would fight to
save Kosovo—but added that he does not believe that the fight
would be ultimately successful.
Kostunica disagrees with that assessment, and believes that
the chances of success—of a compromise that would give
self-rule to the Albanians but keep Kosovo within Serbia’s
boundaries—are better now than at any time since 1999. The
fact that Ahtisaari felt compelled to move the deadline, long
set for the end of this year, has tremendous psychological and
political significance: the surest means of denial is delay.
Many proponents of Kosovo’s independence now realize that
setting a firm deadline was a grave mistake. We are witnessing
a shift in momentum that does not work to their advantage.
The shift would not have been possible without Russia’s firm
and unambiguous commitment not to support any Security Council
resolution that is not acceptable to Serbia. We can only
speculate whether Moscow’s stand would be so solid had the
United States promised to treat Kosovo as a valid precedent
for Transdnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Nagorno-Karabakh; but having rejected any such possibility out
of hand, Washington has ensured that Putin has no incentive to
play ball. As for China, the danger works in the opposite
direction: had Peking supported Kosovo’s independence, it
could have facilitated the creation of a precedent that could
be and therefore would be used against it vis-à-vis Taiwan (or
even Tibet) at some future date.
Option B for the proponents of Kosovo’s independence was
stated by the province’s “prime minister,” war criminal Agim
Ceku, earlier this week: Albanians proclaim independence
regardless of the UN and invite bilateral recognition by
individual countries, most crucially the United States. The
trouble is that the Europeans hate that option, even those
(notably in London and Berlin) who are supportive of
independence. Option B cannot work unless the European Union
supports it as a whole, and within the EU so many countries
have announced their opposition—Spain, Greece, Rumania, and
Slovakia unequivocally—that it is not practicable. No
individual EU country will recognize a self-proclaimed “state”
in Kosovo unless it is an agreed policy consensually approved
in Brussels. Ceku et al may try it nevertheless, but
Washington is certain not to extend recognition that bypasses
the Security Council if that risks a rift with the Europeans:
the U.S. needs them on board to manage the mess in
Afghanistan, and for the forthcoming disengagement from Iraq.
In conclusion, the untold news is that Kosovo will not become
independent. The New York Times, the Washington Post and the
rest of the Western “mainstream” will go on huffing and
puffing and pretending otherwise, but there is not much they
can do: Kostunica will not be duped, Serbia will not cave in,
Russia will not relent, and the Albanians will not give up on
what they had been promised by those who had never had the
right to make the promise in the first place. They threaten
renewed violence, but the threat only serves to reinforce the
argument that they should not be allowed to get away with it.
As Russia’s ambassador to the U.N. told his Western colleagues
last Wednesday, “you may be willing to give in to Albanian
blackmail, but we are not.”
As Kostunica says, once the reality sinks in we’ll finally
have some real negotiations. We do not know what the end
result will be, but that is in the nature of all genuine
negotiations: their outcome is unknown. Ahtisaari has failed,
and his supporters are getting very nervous. As Misha Glenny
confided to the former U.S. ambassador in Belgrade William
Montgomery on December 7, “I am seriously worried about the
Kosovo situation . . . entre nous, I am very disappointed with
Martti’s performance.”
Good. Very, very good.
/The Balkans/Kosovo | print | permanent link | writebacks (0)
Srdja Trifkovic is the
foreign-affairs editor of
Chronicles: A Magazine
of American Culture and
director of The Rockford
Institute's Center for
International Affairs.
Click here to find out when
Dr. Trifkovic is scheduled
to appear on radio or television.
Advanced Search
GO TO COLUMNS
Columns Autodidact Booklog Pat Buchanan
Chronicles Chronicles Extra! Cultural
Revolutions FilmLog Thomas Fleming International
David Hartman William Murchison Scott P. Richert
Paul Craig Roberts Srdja Trifkovic Chilton
Williamson Clyde Wilson
More Articles
The Untold Story of Kosovo Negotiations
Fri, 15 Dec 2006 10:14:00 GMT
Pope in Turkey: A Reluctant State Guest
Fri, 01 Dec 2006 19:54:00 GMT
The Price of Modernity: A Letter From Dublin
Wed, 22 Nov 2006 15:45:00 GMT
Rumsfeld’s Long Overdue Departure
Thu, 09 Nov 2006 15:23:00 GMT
A Troubling Verdict
Tue, 07 Nov 2006 22:10:00 GMT
Fighting Jihad at Home
Thu, 19 Oct 2006 16:16:00 GMT
A New Architecture in the Pacific North East
Fri, 13 Oct 2006 20:45:00 GMT
Comrade Kim’s Nukes, Uncle Sam’s Opportunity
Tue, 10 Oct 2006 02:18:00 GMT
Kosovo and the “Global War on Terrorism”
Wed, 04 Oct 2006 15:55:00 GMT
Pope Benedict and the Meaning of Words
Tue, 26 Sep 2006 17:52:00 GMT
An End-Timer on the East River: The Hidden Message of
Ahmadinejad’s U.N. Speech
Fri, 22 Sep 2006 15:26:00 GMT
Farewell to a Good European: Oriana Fallaci (1929
2006)
Fri, 15 Sep 2006 22:49:00 GMT
A Grim Anniversary
Mon, 11 Sep 2006 18:21:00 GMT
CAIR at ORD: Vampires Inside the Bloodbank
Tue, 05 Sep 2006 13:51:00 GMT
Sir Alfred Sherman: Witness to a Century
Wed, 30 Aug 2006 16:37:00 GMT
Iran Rejects Nuclear Terms
Wed, 23 Aug 2006 22:46:00 GMT
Syria: The Weak Link in the Iran-Hezbollah Axis
Mon, 21 Aug 2006 20:42:00 GMT
A Flawed Resolution That Resolves Nothing
Wed, 16 Aug 2006 01:30:00 GMT
Britain’s Jihadist Fifth Column
Fri, 11 Aug 2006 20:42:00 GMT
Lebanon: Déjà Vu All Over Again
Wed, 26 Jul 2006 19:52:00 GMT
North Korea: The Problem, The Solution
Fri, 07 Jul 2006 18:47:00 GMT
We Can’t Solve the Problem, But We Can Maintain It
Thu, 29 Jun 2006 23:10:00 GMT
The “Peace Process” Is Dead
Thu, 22 Jun 2006 00:57:00 GMT
Nick Griffin’s Long March
Mon, 12 Jun 2006 13:44:00 GMT
Olmert, Abbas, and Prospects for Peace
Tue, 30 May 2006 18:42:00 GMT
New Martyrs of the East and Coming Trials in the West
Fri, 19 May 2006 14:13:00 GMT
Kosovo: The Plot Thickens
Fri, 12 May 2006 21:04:00 GMT
Al-Maliki’s Unenviable Task
Fri, 05 May 2006 21:48:00 GMT
Bin Laden Puts All Americans On Notice
Thu, 27 Apr 2006 13:45:00 GMT
Rumsfeld, the Wounded Survivor
Fri, 21 Apr 2006 13:55:00 GMT
Get the Score on Islam!
Purchase Dr. Trifkovic's Books
Defeating Jihad: How the War on Terror May Yet Be Won,
In Spite of Ourselves
The Sword of the Prophet:
Islam—History, Theology,
Impact on the World
Peace in the Promised Land:
A Realist Scenario
(edited by Srdja Trifkovic)
Support This Website
Make a tax-deductible donation
Copyright 2006, www.ChroniclesMagazine.org
Friday, December 15, 2006
The Untold Story of Kosovo Negotiations
Vojislav Kostunica, Serbia’s prime minister for the past three
years, has one of the most challenging jobs in the world. He
nevertheless seems at ease with that burden, and appears more
confident than while he was Yugoslavia’s last president
(2000-2003). When we met in Belgrade last week, he was as
matter-of-fact about the problems he is facing as ever; but
whereas in the past he had occasionally agonized about the
magnitude and complexity of those problems, today he treats
them as facts of life that neither intimidate nor depress him.
It may be telling that in appearance he has hardly aged over
the past decade, while in substance he has become the key
figure on Serbia’s political scene for many years to come.
The most pressing of those problems is of course Kosovo. The
United States, NATO and several leading European Union
countries have occupied one-seventh of his country’s territory
for over seven years, and the officials who run the
“international community” appear keen—for now—to detach the
southern province permanently from Serbia. Kostunica’s best
defense against the pressure to sign Kosovo away—and that
pressure keeps coming from Washington, Brussels, London and
other power centers—has been to insist on the need for any
solution to be legal, to conform to the letter and spirit of
the international law.
The law is clear: Kosovo belongs to Serbia, and its status was
reiterated in the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 that
stopped NATO bombing in June 1999. Detaching it from Serbia
against Belgrade’s will would be an unprecedented violation of
the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Ahtisaari
and his political masters know that, of course, but like to
pretend that it is but a minor irritant. As Kostunica says,
“When we mention the need for legality, some of these
officials become exasperated, even agitated. They respond with
various comments to the effect that we should not be bound by
‘mere’ legality.”
This, Kostunica adds, reminds him of the attitude of
Yugoslavia’s late communist dictator, Marshal Tito. When
commenting on how the country’s judges should try political
cases, Tito famously advised them “not to stick to the law
like a drunk sticks to a fence.” Such attitude irritates
Kostunica—a constitutional lawyer, whose nickname in Serbia is
“the Legalist”—but it does not surprise him. “The whole
negotiating process had been designed from the outset to lead
to only one outcome: Kosovo’s independence,” says he; and the
role of the U.N. mediator, Finland’s former president Marti
Ahtisaari, was simply to choreograph that outcome.
Kostunica’s account of Ahtisaari’s bungled attempt to
“deliver” the Serbs indicates that the promoters of the
Albanian cause had selected the wrong person for the job. The
Finn came to it as a self-declared proponent of detaching
Kosovo from Serbia and an associate of the Soros-funded
International Crisis Group, a leading pro-Albanian lobby
group. Ahtisaari’s opening gambit nevertheless was to try and
assure Kostunica of his good intentions: he really wanted to
assist Serbia, he said, in ridding herself of a problem—of
Kosovo, that is; and “we” should work together on finding the
formula to make it happen smoothly and painlessly, since “we”
(men of the world, big-time players in the “international
community”) surely realize that Kosovo is lost to Serbia
anyway.
Ahtisaari’s approach may have been based on six years’ worth
of flawed advice that he and others in the “international
community” had received from Western diplomats in Belgrade and
from a small but influential clique of “pro-Western” Serbian
officials and analysts. All along their assumption had been
that Serbia would cave in yet again and agree to Kosovo’s
detachment, albeit with some meaningless fig leaf
(“conditional independence,” “international guarantees for
minority rights,” etc, etc); that Russia and China would
endorse the deal at the Security Council; and that the problem
would be taken off the agenda by the end of this year with the
admission of yet another part of ex-Yugoslavia into the
“international community.”
Observers agree that the nature of the new entity would be
clear not so much for what Kosovo would be (an international
protectorate, an EU-NATO condominium, a future province of
Greater Albania) but for what it would no longer be: part of
Serbia. As a Washingtonian insider has noted, “The UN, the EU,
the Contact Group countries, would issue the appropriate
guarantees, mainly protection for the remaining Serbs—and
everyone would know the guarantees were just new lies on top
of the old. When all the Serbs were cleared out and their holy
places destroyed, there would be expressions of regret from
Washington, Brussels, London, etc: ‘Indeed, how sad. How
unfortunate that these Serbs should have made themselves so
hated’.”
The belief that this scenario might work was reinforced by
none other than President Boris Tadic’s chief foreign policy
advisor Vuk Jeremic, one of very few Serbian enthusiasts for
John Kerry’s victory in November 2004. Mr. Jeremic (who
happens to be a Muslim on his mother’s side) came to
Washington on 18 May 2005 to testify in Congress on why Kosovo
should stay within Serbia; but in some of his off-the-record
conversations he assured his hosts that the task is really to
sugar-coat the bitter pill that Serbia will have to swallow
anyway—and to ensure that the nationalist Radical Party does
not score excessive gains in the process.
When confronted with Kostunica’s polite but firm refusal to
operate on those assumptions, Ahtisaari tried subterfuge,
suggesting tête-à-tête off-the-record conversations with
individual Serbian leaders. Aware of the potential for
intrigue and double-dealing contingent upon such arrangements,
Kostunica refused. All his meetings with Ahtisaari were
strictly official, on-the-record, minuted, and attended by
advisors. In the meantime the negotiations between Serbs and
Albanians in Vienna, supposedly mediated by Ahtisaari, failed
because they were doomed to fail. As Kostunica says, the
Albanians were led to believe that they would get independence
anyway, and therefore had no incentive to negotiate.
The biggest internal challenge for the prime minister was to
ensure coherence of the official Serbian position, between
himself, President Tadic, and foreign minister Draskovic. That
has not been easy, and may have become impossible were it not
for the remarkable unity of the country’s public opinion on
this issue, manifested in the referendum on Serbia’s
constitution last October that reiterated Kosovo’s status as
integral part of Serbia. Confronted with the strength of
popular sentiment, Kostunica’s coalition partners and
Tadic—whose Democratic Party is not in government—realized
that breaking ranks would be tantamount to political suicide.
Some of the lingering ambiguities in Belgrade’s leadership
remain, however, and became apparent only days after our
meeting when President Tadic announced that he would fight to
save Kosovo—but added that he does not believe that the fight
would be ultimately successful.
Kostunica disagrees with that assessment, and believes that
the chances of success—of a compromise that would give
self-rule to the Albanians but keep Kosovo within Serbia’s
boundaries—are better now than at any time since 1999. The
fact that Ahtisaari felt compelled to move the deadline, long
set for the end of this year, has tremendous psychological and
political significance: the surest means of denial is delay.
Many proponents of Kosovo’s independence now realize that
setting a firm deadline was a grave mistake. We are witnessing
a shift in momentum that does not work to their advantage.
The shift would not have been possible without Russia’s firm
and unambiguous commitment not to support any Security Council
resolution that is not acceptable to Serbia. We can only
speculate whether Moscow’s stand would be so solid had the
United States promised to treat Kosovo as a valid precedent
for Transdnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Nagorno-Karabakh; but having rejected any such possibility out
of hand, Washington has ensured that Putin has no incentive to
play ball. As for China, the danger works in the opposite
direction: had Peking supported Kosovo’s independence, it
could have facilitated the creation of a precedent that could
be and therefore would be used against it vis-à-vis Taiwan (or
even Tibet) at some future date.
Option B for the proponents of Kosovo’s independence was
stated by the province’s “prime minister,” war criminal Agim
Ceku, earlier this week: Albanians proclaim independence
regardless of the UN and invite bilateral recognition by
individual countries, most crucially the United States. The
trouble is that the Europeans hate that option, even those
(notably in London and Berlin) who are supportive of
independence. Option B cannot work unless the European Union
supports it as a whole, and within the EU so many countries
have announced their opposition—Spain, Greece, Rumania, and
Slovakia unequivocally—that it is not practicable. No
individual EU country will recognize a self-proclaimed “state”
in Kosovo unless it is an agreed policy consensually approved
in Brussels. Ceku et al may try it nevertheless, but
Washington is certain not to extend recognition that bypasses
the Security Council if that risks a rift with the Europeans:
the U.S. needs them on board to manage the mess in
Afghanistan, and for the forthcoming disengagement from Iraq.
In conclusion, the untold news is that Kosovo will not become
independent. The New York Times, the Washington Post and the
rest of the Western “mainstream” will go on huffing and
puffing and pretending otherwise, but there is not much they
can do: Kostunica will not be duped, Serbia will not cave in,
Russia will not relent, and the Albanians will not give up on
what they had been promised by those who had never had the
right to make the promise in the first place. They threaten
renewed violence, but the threat only serves to reinforce the
argument that they should not be allowed to get away with it.
As Russia’s ambassador to the U.N. told his Western colleagues
last Wednesday, “you may be willing to give in to Albanian
blackmail, but we are not.”
As Kostunica says, once the reality sinks in we’ll finally
have some real negotiations. We do not know what the end
result will be, but that is in the nature of all genuine
negotiations: their outcome is unknown. Ahtisaari has failed,
and his supporters are getting very nervous. As Misha Glenny
confided to the former U.S. ambassador in Belgrade William
Montgomery on December 7, “I am seriously worried about the
Kosovo situation . . . entre nous, I am very disappointed with
Martti’s performance.”
Good. Very, very good.
/The Balkans/Kosovo | print | permanent link | writebacks (0)
Srdja Trifkovic is the
foreign-affairs editor of
Chronicles: A Magazine
of American Culture and
director of The Rockford
Institute's Center for
International Affairs.
Click here to find out when
Dr. Trifkovic is scheduled
to appear on radio or television.
Advanced Search
GO TO COLUMNS
Columns Autodidact Booklog Pat Buchanan
Chronicles Chronicles Extra! Cultural
Revolutions FilmLog Thomas Fleming International
David Hartman William Murchison Scott P. Richert
Paul Craig Roberts Srdja Trifkovic Chilton
Williamson Clyde Wilson
More Articles
The Untold Story of Kosovo Negotiations
Fri, 15 Dec 2006 10:14:00 GMT
Pope in Turkey: A Reluctant State Guest
Fri, 01 Dec 2006 19:54:00 GMT
The Price of Modernity: A Letter From Dublin
Wed, 22 Nov 2006 15:45:00 GMT
Rumsfeld’s Long Overdue Departure
Thu, 09 Nov 2006 15:23:00 GMT
A Troubling Verdict
Tue, 07 Nov 2006 22:10:00 GMT
Fighting Jihad at Home
Thu, 19 Oct 2006 16:16:00 GMT
A New Architecture in the Pacific North East
Fri, 13 Oct 2006 20:45:00 GMT
Comrade Kim’s Nukes, Uncle Sam’s Opportunity
Tue, 10 Oct 2006 02:18:00 GMT
Kosovo and the “Global War on Terrorism”
Wed, 04 Oct 2006 15:55:00 GMT
Pope Benedict and the Meaning of Words
Tue, 26 Sep 2006 17:52:00 GMT
An End-Timer on the East River: The Hidden Message of
Ahmadinejad’s U.N. Speech
Fri, 22 Sep 2006 15:26:00 GMT
Farewell to a Good European: Oriana Fallaci (1929
2006)
Fri, 15 Sep 2006 22:49:00 GMT
A Grim Anniversary
Mon, 11 Sep 2006 18:21:00 GMT
CAIR at ORD: Vampires Inside the Bloodbank
Tue, 05 Sep 2006 13:51:00 GMT
Sir Alfred Sherman: Witness to a Century
Wed, 30 Aug 2006 16:37:00 GMT
Iran Rejects Nuclear Terms
Wed, 23 Aug 2006 22:46:00 GMT
Syria: The Weak Link in the Iran-Hezbollah Axis
Mon, 21 Aug 2006 20:42:00 GMT
A Flawed Resolution That Resolves Nothing
Wed, 16 Aug 2006 01:30:00 GMT
Britain’s Jihadist Fifth Column
Fri, 11 Aug 2006 20:42:00 GMT
Lebanon: Déjà Vu All Over Again
Wed, 26 Jul 2006 19:52:00 GMT
North Korea: The Problem, The Solution
Fri, 07 Jul 2006 18:47:00 GMT
We Can’t Solve the Problem, But We Can Maintain It
Thu, 29 Jun 2006 23:10:00 GMT
The “Peace Process” Is Dead
Thu, 22 Jun 2006 00:57:00 GMT
Nick Griffin’s Long March
Mon, 12 Jun 2006 13:44:00 GMT
Olmert, Abbas, and Prospects for Peace
Tue, 30 May 2006 18:42:00 GMT
New Martyrs of the East and Coming Trials in the West
Fri, 19 May 2006 14:13:00 GMT
Kosovo: The Plot Thickens
Fri, 12 May 2006 21:04:00 GMT
Al-Maliki’s Unenviable Task
Fri, 05 May 2006 21:48:00 GMT
Bin Laden Puts All Americans On Notice
Thu, 27 Apr 2006 13:45:00 GMT
Rumsfeld, the Wounded Survivor
Fri, 21 Apr 2006 13:55:00 GMT
Get the Score on Islam!
Purchase Dr. Trifkovic's Books
Defeating Jihad: How the War on Terror May Yet Be Won,
In Spite of Ourselves
The Sword of the Prophet:
Islam—History, Theology,
Impact on the World
Peace in the Promised Land:
A Realist Scenario
(edited by Srdja Trifkovic)
Support This Website
Make a tax-deductible donation
Copyright 2006, www.ChroniclesMagazine.org
powered by performancing firefox
No comments:
Post a Comment