June 04, 2007

The Real Solution For Kosovo



The Real Solution For
Kosovo



by Aleksandar Jokic



Current Discourse on Kosovo



(Swans - June 4, 2007)  
Suddenly, the urgency to settle Kosovo's political status in the form of
"supervised independence" is on the US imperial agenda. If one is to
believe US officials who have been closely associated for a long time with US
policy regarding Kosovo (the real name of this Serbian province is Kosovo and
Metohija), such as Nicholas Burns, the US is taking a "regional
approach" to this problem. Says Burns: "The
Balkans region will not be stable, however, as long as Kosovo remains in a
state of political suspended animation."
Alas, words are cheap, and
actions by the sole superpower clearly demonstrate that it is its interest and
not "regional stability" that is the sole guiding principle. In fact,
all principles, including the letter and spirit of international law, will be
sacrificed in the name of those interests. Kosovo is still the best example of
this, which by now should be an uncontroversial statement.



After years of neglect following the US-led NATO aggression
against Yugoslavia in 1999 (the operation was called "Merciful
Angel") and merely a year of "negotiations" between
representatives of the Serbian government and an Albanian delegation from
Kosovo, it was announced that the time had come for an imposed
"solution" and that "no
more negotiations"
on the status of Kosovo could take place between
those directly involved. One may wonder why such a sudden rush to grant
independence to Kosovo, despite Serbia's opposition to giving up 15% of its
territory and Russia's consistent position that any solution must be acceptable
to both sides, thus virtually guaranteeing a Russian veto of any UN resolution
granting Kosovo independence? And why continue to insist, in this context, as
US officials do that "supervised independence" (whatever that might
be) "is now the only
way forward"
? It is hard to see how this stubborn insistence on Kosovo
independence could be reconciled with any concern for "regional
stability."



No wonder then that we have witnessed an intense campaign to
"explain" why independence for Kosovo is good, indeed the "only
way forward," or attempts to induce Serbia to agree to this "solution"
preferred in the West. These efforts range from tedious to grotesque.



Thus, disturbed by the prospect of Russia exercising its veto
right at the UN against any imposed "resolution" between Serbia and
its province of Kosovo and Metohia, Olli Rehn, EU Enlargement Commissioner,
asks "While
Russia generally condemns unilateralism, why does it yet threaten to use the
veto in the UN Security Council -- the ultimate unilateral act?"
Contrary
to this gratuitous definition, the exercise of veto power is not the
ultimate unilateral act, but it might more accurately be defined as the
unilateral threat or use of force (also known as aggression) in international
relations. It is hardly a contradiction (worth mentioning, much less a valid
"argument") that Russia would condemn unilateralism whilst exercising
its veto rights. Just as an individual can condemn unilateralism while
exercising voting rights without fear of specious and misguided suggestions
that one is ipso facto hypocritical.



Others, in the best tradition of car salesmen, are intent to
opening the eyes of Serbian officials to a good deal they are being offered.
For example, Carl Bilt, Swedish Foreign Minister, while on state visit to
Japan, stated that "the EU would take a more positive attitude to
accepting Serbia as a prospective [EU] member state if the country warmed
toward an independent Kosovo." But who would buy this? No other state had
to give up territory for dubious membership in EU that is, unlike Serbia,
incapable of even agreeing on its own constitution. Furthermore, a Euro-skeptic
could try to clarify things for Bilt in this way:



As the smart French General Charles de Gaulle clearly
recognized, EU remains an incoherent idea as long as the UK is part of it, as a
Trojan horse for US imperialism, hence Sweden should abolish all its European
ties and join the energy rich regional Eurasian alliance of Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO). However, Sweden can do this -- "and simply
as a prospect" -- if the country warmed toward an independent
Vasternorrlands to be administered by SCO right away as of now. Do you get the
picture?



Similarly, in his op-ed on the status of Kosovo Joschka Fischer
tries to sell the Serbs the idea that essentially Serbia should swap
Kosovo for potential membership in EU because "Serbia
has a bright future with the EU, but getting there requires that it break with
its own past -- on [...] Kosovo [...]."
Certainly, the invitation to
"break with a past" (coming from Germany) could appear to have merit,
but again the Bilt point could be made in its German variation: "Germany
should abolish all its European ties and join the energy rich regional Eurasian
alliance of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). However, Germany can do
this -- in prospect only -- if the country warmed toward an independent Bavaria
which is to be administered by SCO right away as of now. Additionally, this
might help Deutschland break further with its own past and obtain a bright
SCO-future, full of affordable energy."



To show that pronouncements by academics can be more dismal than
those by politicians we can look at an example of a Fulbright Scholar's wisdom
on Kosovo acquired by merely spending a few months there. Timothy Kenny offers
the ultimate argument in favor of Kosovo independence by crying: "If
anyone deserves independence, it's long-suffering Kosovo."
The merit
of a call such as this one can easily be demonstrated by juxtaposing it to for
example this one: "If anyone deserves reparations, it's long suffering
African Americans." Yet, Kenny continues his appeal: "after being
victimized in the past of four Balkan wars...action on the issue appears at
hand." And again, one may wonder isn't the following a more noble concern
for him: After being victimized for centuries and actual genocide
being committed against them the surviving Native Americans require action to
secure independent and sovereign states for the First Nations in North America?
Then comes the knockout argument that "Serbia has started one regional war
too many to be rewarded with keeping Kosovo." How sound this thinking is
can be realized by considering whether it isn't the case that the US had
started one major war too many in Iraq so that it cannot be rewarded by keeping
the federation intact? Should not the 50 states go their merry way away from
this shameful, aggressive federation?



Armed with dismal reasoning of this sort in support of the
independence "solution" it is small wonder that its proponents resort
to statements of inevitability, repeating them ad nauseam. Kenny is no
exception: "An independent Kosovo working with the European Union and NATO
is inevitable." But, we are back to mere words, and perhaps something much
more serious: If it were true that independence of Kosovo is inevitable --
"the only way forward" -- why the need to say this so often? Is it in
the hope that saying it makes it so? If so, that is a sign of serious
personality disorder or worse: the DSM V contains several references to
disorders and diseases which have as a characteristic the patient's delusional
belief that mere words create reality à la biblical: "in the beginning
there was logos."



The Solution



Instead of dwelling on the "inevitable" let us consider
what would be the result of an approach honestly concerned with regional
stability. The obvious and inexpensive solution is to partition Kosovo between
Serbs and Albanians by the process in which Serbia would exercise expulsive
secession. The Serbian part of Kosovo would then become a part of Serbia proper
while the Albanian part would become independent. Albanians have made it
abundantly clear that they want nothing short of full independence. If
possible, this genuine desire ought to be satisfied at least to a degree. Some
give and take would be necessary, however, but partition is the only natural
way to go. What would it take to accomplish this?



First, the myth that Serbs would not find this option palatable
must be rejected. In fact many Serbs, including members of the Serbian Academy
of Sciences and Arts (SANU), and in particular the former President of
Yugoslavia, the novelist Dobrica Cosic, have long advocated this sort of
solution. Back in 1996 SANU President Despic in a newspaper interview
recommended partition. What exactly it should amount to is another matter, but
it is a feasible step for both Serbs and Albanians.



In fact, convincing Serbs that a specific partition is good will
seem less of a problem than divorcing the Kosovo issue from the Republika
Srpska issue. And this is where the key policy may lead to a happy return of
foreign servicemen and women (including Americans) from both Kosovo and Bosnia.
A carefully crafted package of financial incentives and policy of compensating
the Serbs' loss of territory in Kosovo with empowering Republika Srpska to join
Serbia would provide a long term security and stability solution for the puzzle
that the Balkans have presented until recently. If it were objected that the
borders of a new country would be meandering unreasonably given the size of
Republika Srpska the obvious answer is: Croatia is already that way! (In order
to get to Molunat from Ilok a full circle must be traveled.) This proposal
would have to be further fine tuned, such as offering a provision that the UN
guarantees that the Orthodox sites that remain in Albanian dominated Kosovo
would enjoy protection from destruction and access secured to all Serbian
pilgrims, etc.



The policy of partitioning Kosovo along with the unification of
Republika Srpska with Serbia offers long term security and stability for the
region. Also, it is no less natural an outcome than the unification of Germany,
for example. Once NATO and EU troops pull out of Bosnia, Serbs in Republika
Srpska will be safe from possible attack coming from the Muslim and Croatian
Federation as the strength of the Serbian Army will function as a decisive
deterrent. On the other hand the Muslim and Croatian side would have nothing to
fear from a democratic government in Belgrade. Similarly, after partition of
Kosovo, KFOR can pull out without worry of a renewed full-scale war between
Serbs and Albanians there. A small contingent of NATO troops (preferably
Americans, because of their credibility) would have to maintain a long-term
presence in Macedonia to prevent a conflict erupting in the western part of the
country where Albanians have a majority similar to the Kosovo situation.
Albanians there might be tempted to repeat a Kosovo style uprising. American
troops in Macedonia would guard against this, further contributing to the
long-term security of the Balkans. The cost would, however, be an insignificant
fraction of the current costs of maintaining both the Bosnia and Kosovo
missions (currently surpassing $3.5 billion annually).



This entire enterprise is likely to provoke fierce resistance only
from one side: the ethnic Muslims in Bosnia. However, American diplomats should
have no serious problem convincing them to go along, as Muslims have enjoyed
American protection and favors from the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis. While
Croats were supported by Germany and Serbs supposedly by Russia, Muslims in
Bosnia were the side the US chose to favor. Perhaps the honor of carrying out
the implementation of this comprehensive and long-term security solution could
fall on the son of the president who got the US involved in the Yugoslav mess
in the first place.



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