SNN: Inside Track: Kosovo at the Crossroads

September 08, 2007

Inside Track: Kosovo at the Crossroads

by Steven E. Meyer

09.05.2007

Arguably, the future of Kosovo is now at its most important juncture since
the crisis in 1999. For the past eight years almost nothing has been
accomplished to resolve the Kosovo issue. By and large, the fault for this can
be laid at the doors of the major Western powers. Their lack of imagination,
innovation and creativity in attempting to resolve the problem has been the
major impediment. Western efforts have been arbitrary and capricious, blind to
the realities on the ground and offering solutions that serve their own interests
rather than those of the people in Serbia and Kosovo.

At the same time, Belgrade and Pristina have mostly talked past each other
in anger, when they talked at all. But, for the most part they waited for the
major powers to provide answers and assumed no concrete, meaningful initiative
of their own. As a result, Kosovo has joined the long list of dangerous “frozen
conflicts” and if positive action—action that can be “owned” by Belgrade and
Pristina—is not taken soon the Kosovo issue will become “unfrozen” through
violence.

But, all of that is about to change. Since the Kosovo issue has been moved
out of the United Nations and to the Contact Group, there is a genuine
opportunity for Belgrade and Pristina to agree on a compromise settlement. But
the window of opportunity will not be open long before violence flares again
and the conflict “re-freezes”—as it certainly will if Pristina declares
independence unilaterally. To take advantage of the opportunity, however, it is
necessary for both Belgrade and Pristina to recognize six hard realities—some
of which are unpalatable to one side or the other.

Six Realities

First, the Ahtisaari Plan is dead and, despite calls by some UN members and
political commentators to resurrect parts of it, this is very unlikely to
happen. Events have moved well beyond Ahtisaari’s proposal to create a series
of ethnically stove-piped communities in Kosovo. At its heart, the Ahtissari
plan was an attempt primarily by the United States, the UK, France and Germany
to force a settlement on both Serbs and Albanians that avoided ground reality
and served the interests of those countries much more than the interests of
those who live in the region. The collapse of the Ahtisaari Plan means that, if
there is to be any hope of a permanent settlement, the United States and its
West European allies will have to include the Serbs and Albanians as true
partners in meaningful negotiations.

Second, U.S. influence has diminished. Although Washington may try to
restore some of its clout in the full Contact Group, the comments of the EU and
Russian representatives on the troika that visited Kosovo recently have
effectively undercut the American position. Several times during the Troika’s
“fact finding trip”, EU representative Ischinger and Russian representative
Botsan-Kharchenko said that “nothing is impossible” and that everything is “on
the table.” This is a positive development. The evolving position of the EU and
Russia easily could lead to a “negotiating period” longer than the additional
120 days allotted by the UN Security Council. If so, Washington might be
tempted to unilaterally “recognize” an independent Kosovo. But, this would be a
very risky move because it could cause serious strains with European “allies”
and put the United States at odds with the widely accepted view (especially in
the EU) that the construction and recognition of new states requires the
approval of the United Nations. In the wake of the debacle in Iraq, Washington
cannot be seen to be so dismissive of international law and procedures.

Third, officially Belgrade and Pristina remained locked in a nasty,
dangerous zero-sum game that, if it is not broken, almost certainly will hasten
violence. All levels of power in the Albanian community insist that independence
of Kosovo—within its current boundaries—is the only course acceptable and that
Pristina will not back away from this position. By the same token, Belgrade
says that the only acceptable solution is for Kosovo to remain within Serbia,
albeit with considerable autonomy. Indeed, the new Serbian Constitution
stipulates that Kosovo is a Serbian province. At the same time, there is a
glimmer of hope in Belgrade because some officials have begun to suggest that
perhaps they might be willing to back away from this hard line.

Fourth, multi-ethnicity is dead in Kosovo. By and large, survey research as
well as anecdotal information indicates that most Serbs and Albanians do not
want to live together in the same society or to be governed by a government
controlled by the other ethnic group. At times multi-ethnic states have
“worked” in Europe and at times they have not. But the general trend—despite
some notable exceptions—over the past century has been for states in Europe to
be controlled by a single ethnic or cultural group. The point was well
demonstrated after World War I with the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian,
German and Ottoman Empires, and since the end of the Cold War by the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. It would be
ideal perhaps if ethnicity were not a determining factor in the construction of
political communities in the Balkans today. But, it is a reality despite the
wishful thinking of well-meaning but naive Western policy makers.

Fifth, a surge of new violence in and around Kosovo likely will lead to
renewed outside military intervention. The major powers of Western Europe and
the U.S. almost certainly will not allow the Western Balkans to spin out of
control again. Although this will not lead to a “permanent NATO” base in Kosovo
as some in Serbia have argued, it almost certainly will lead to a stronger
Western military presence in the province that could last for several years.
Although the Europeans likely would shoulder the bulk of any new military
undertaking, it is also possible that there would be some limited number of
additional U.S. forces deployed to Camp Bondsteel. The introduction of more
troops to Kosovo would be designed primarily to separate warring Serbs and
Albanians, but it also likely would set back efforts to find a permanent
political and security solution.

Sixth, in the final analysis, the Kosovo issue is primarily about ethnic,
territorial sovereignty. It has been erroneously argued—mostly by officials and
scholars from outside the region—that territorial sovereignty is passé. As
their argument goes: The entire region someday will (hopefully) be part of the
European Union and, when it is, traditional state or territorial sovereignty
will be far less important. Moreover, they argue, focusing on such a
traditional conception of sovereignty will only delay the accession of the
countries in the Western Balkans to the EU. Sadly, this reasoning misses the
fundamental point. With the establishment of the EU and the end of a thousand
years of violent nationalism based on state sovereignty, traditional state
sovereignty has become much less of an issue in Northern and Western Europe.
But the Western Balkans is in a different place. There, issues of state
sovereignty have not been worked out and they need to be resolved before the
countries of that area can hope to move to a different understanding of
sovereignty. Moreover, most people in the Western Balkans understand that EU
membership and, especially, the full benefits of that membership still are a long
way off—if it happens at all—and they are going to have to rely on national
prerogatives and regional associations for many years to come.

A Way Forward

If these six realities are deemed accurate and accepted by the political
leadership in Serbia and Kosovo, and it is possible for them to bargain in good
faith and come to agreement on four basic points they could—in time—construct a
permanent settlement on the future of Kosovo.

First, both sides need to accept the fact that a negotiated partition, with
attendant border adjustments, can provide the basis for an equitable—not
perfect—division of territory. Although partition has been discussed throughout
Serbia by officials and scholars, it has not been sanctioned officially in
Belgrade. The Albanian side adamantly has rejected any consideration of
partition, but Pristina needs to reconsider this position or risk violence and
the unilateral declaration of independence by Serbs north of the Ibar River.

Logically, partition—and a new border—would be established along the Ibar
River, with the northern part remaining with Serbia and the southern part
becoming an independent Albanian state. This is no one’s first choice, but it
can work if Belgrade and Pristina accept the rationale of ethnic territoriality
and the right of the other side to territorial sovereignty. There is not now
and there never has been anything sacred about borders—especially in Europe (as
well as the United States). Borders have changed in Europe for 2000 years for a
variety of reasons and the spate of border changes throughout Central Europe
and the former Soviet Union since the end of the Cold War demonstrates that the
configuration of states can change peacefully—if there is the political will to
do so.

Second, partition and border changes alone will not be enough. Certainly, it
will be necessary to get past a period of painful adjustment, including some
violence by “rejectionists” on both sides. Moreover, there are many Serb holy
and historic sites and Serbs south of the Ibar and some Albanians north of the
river. As part of any negotiated settlement that accepts partition, the United
States, Russia and the EU, perhaps through the UN, need to guarantee the safety
of the sites, Serb access to them and the minority populations in both ethnic communities
that chose to remain on the “wrong side” of the border—to include sanctions
against the governments that do not protect their minorities from harm or
discrimination. For those Serbs and Albanians who cannot remain where they are
now and chose to leave, the UN needs to establish a substantial fund to
relocate them to other political communities.

Third, an innovative settlement needs to go even further to consider a
broader realignment in the Western Balkans. Specifically, the most likely
candidate is the Republika Srpska. There is little doubt that most the leaders
and citizens of the RS do not want to be part of Bosnia and, if they had their
way, they would have left Bosnia many years ago, either to become independent
or part of Serbia. There also is little doubt that Bosnia is a “forced”
state—one that was arbitrarily willed into existence by the United States and
the major powers of Western Europe and has “failed” to live up to its patrons’
hopes and expectations.

Consequently, Banja Luka and Belgrade should have the right to discuss
whether the RS and Serbia should be linked and under what circumstances, so
long as those circumstances are validated in a democratic vote by the people of
the RS. Although this same logic could be applied to the relationship of the
Presevo Valley with an independent Kosovo, it cannot be stretched to apply to
western Macedonia, where the Ohrid Agreement, has—at least for now—“settled”
the ethnic issue, or to Sandjak or Vojvodina, where there is no major
agitation for independence from Serbia.

Finally, once the political and security underpinnings of an agreement have
been reached, negotiations should begin immediately between Belgrade and
Pristina on economic cooperation. Despite some encouraging economic news in
Serbia, most important indicators in Kosovo and Serbia proper are not good,
especially with respect to unemployment, per capita income, foreign debt and
trade. Consequently, irrespective of whether a political and security
settlement can be reached, a poor regional economy almost certainly would sow
the seeds of new instability in Kosovo, Serbia and beyond.

The key to economic growth and prosperity is multilayered. First, it would
be necessary for Belgrade and Pristina to identify specific areas that need
serious attention and genuine potential and agree on a bipartisan plan of
development (for example, hydroelectric power in Kosovo, the Trepca mines along
the border between Serbia and Kosovo, and agricultural programs in southern
Serbia and Kosovo). Once Belgrade and Pristina have identified likely areas of
economic cooperation, then—and only then—it would be possible to approach the
EU for technical and financial support. Although the Stability Pact for
Southeastern Europe (established in 1999) has been a relatively weak instrument
thus far, it is possible that Working Table 2 on economic development could
provide a useful vehicle to establish productive programs between Serbia and
Kosovo.

Steven E. Meyer is professor of National Security Studies in the Industrial
College of the Armed Forces at the National Defense University in Washington,
DC. The views expressed here are those of the author alone.

http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=15444