Ghosts
of Kosovo

Friday,
Feb. 29, 2008 By SAMANTHA POWER

Kosovars hold flags as they
celebrate the independence of Kosovo in the capital Pristina on February 17,
2008

Dimitar Dilko / AFP / Getty

On Feb. 17,
after almost a decade of legal limbo and two years of unsuccessful
international mediation, Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia. The U.S.
moved swiftly to recognize the new country, and nearly 2 million ethnic
Albanians celebrated their long-awaited freedom, dancing in city streets,
releasing fireworks and waving flags. Having bristled under Serbian rule and
then U.N. administration, Kosovars were elated by the prospect of at last
controlling their own affairs.

The Serbs
weren't quite so thrilled. On Feb. 21, some 200,000 protested in Belgrade,
chanting "Kosovo is Serbia" and holding placards that read, RUSSIA,
HELP. Rioters set the U.S. embassy on fire; Russian President Vladimir Putin
vowed never to recognize Kosovo and threatened to support secessionist
movements in Georgia and Moldova.

Not so long
ago, the scenes of unrest would have inspired fears of the kind of ethnic
violence that devastated the Balkans in the '90s. But these are different
times. Kosovo's ethnic-Albanian leaders have belatedly tried to extend an olive
branch to the province's aggrieved 120,000 Serbs. In addition to allowing Serbs
in northern Kosovo to have their own police, schools and hospitals, Kosovo's
new Prime Minister, Hashim Thaci, did the unthinkable: he delivered part of his
inauguration speech in the hated Serbian language. Even in Serbia, whose
citizens feel genuine humiliation over losing Kosovo (which Serb nationalists
call their "Jerusalem"), the protests should abate. Prime Minister
Vojislav Kostunica has threatened to retaliate against Kosovo's becoming
independent by suspending talks with the European Union, but Kostunica can't
afford to cut ties with the West. The E.U. supplies 49% of Serbia's imports and
buys 56% of its exports--a far more valuable trade relationship than Serbia's
with Russia.

But Kosovo
matters to our future because it underscores three alarming features of the
current international system. First, it exposes the chill in relations between
the U.S. and Russia, which is making it difficult for the U.N. Security Council
to meet 21st century collective-security challenges. Putin has used the Kosovo
standoff as yet another excuse to flaunt his petro-powered invincibility,
sending his likely successor, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev, to
Belgrade to sign a gas agreement. If a firm international response is to be
mobilized toward Iran, Sudan or other trouble spots in the coming years, the
U.S. will have to find a way to persuade Russia to become a partner rather than
a rival in improving collective security.

Second, the
27-country E.U., which is bitterly divided over Kosovo, lacks an overarching
defense or security vision. After Kosovo declared independence, Britain, France
and other countries offered recognition, while Spain, Romania, Greece, Cyprus,
Bulgaria and Slovakia refused to do so. Keeping peace in Kosovo will require
European nations to put their citizens at risk. Unfortunately, the stated
desire of many European countries to reduce their commitments to the nato
effort in Afghanistan does little to bolster confidence in Europe's eagerness
to maintain international security.

Finally, the
disagreements over Kosovo expose the world's fickleness in determining which
secessionist movements deserve international recognition. If Kosovo's
supporters were more transparent about the factors that made Kosovo worthy of
recognition, they could help shape new guidelines. A claimant has a far
stronger claim if, like Kosovo, it is relatively homogeneous and not yet
self-governing, if it has been abused by the sovereign government and if its
quest for independence does not incite its kin in a neighboring country to make
comparable demands. Not all secessionists can clear that bar. Iraq's Kurds, for
instance, are clamoring for independence. But the Kurds are already exercising
self-government, and their independence could have the destabilizing effect of
causing the Kurdish population in Turkey to try to secede.

Western
countries will have to work hard in the coming months to ensure that Kosovo and
Serbia do not descend into violence. The larger problems highlighted by the
impasse aren't going away anytime soon. Unless they're resolved, a U.S. embassy
may not be all that goes up in flames during the next crisis.

TIME
columnist and Harvard professor Power also advises Senator Barack Obama on
foreign-policy issues