Globe and Mail, Toronto
John Manley's Afghan report focuses rightly on the willingness of our NATO
allies to send additional combat troops to Kandahar
as a condition of our remaining in Afghanistan, but there is a broader issue
for Canadians: the poor track record of NATO
and the United Nations in bringing peace, order
and good governance to the countries they have occupied after a military
intervention.
The most obvious example
is Kosovo. It has been almost nine years since
UN Resolution 1244 brought an end to the NATO
bombing of Slobodan Milosevic's Serbia. That resolution, which laid down the
parameters for the future of Kosovo by
providing for a functioning civil society with democratic institutions,
called for the return of all refugees and the disarming of the Kosovo Liberation Army, provided for a limited number
of Serbian security forces to patrol Kosovo's borders and to guard Christian
holy places, and reaffirmed Serbia's sovereignty over Kosovo
while guaranteeing the Albanian community a high degree of local autonomy. It
was a blueprint for success.
Sadly, none of
the provisions of 1244 were fulfilled by NATO and the UN. Under the watchful
eyes of 40,000 NATO troops and UN officials, the Albanians were allowed to
expel almost all of the non-Albanian population from Kosovo and to destroy 150 Christian
churches and monasteries.
Notwithstanding billions
of dollars in development aid, Kosovo remains the poorest area of Europe. There is massive unemployment, the per capita
income is $1,600 a year and infant mortality is the highest in Europe. It has become a "black hole" where
crime, corruption and violence flourish.
Kosovo
is a small territory in southern Serbia, less than twice the size of Prince Edward Island; it has a population of about
two million. Yet, after eight years of occupation, NATO
and the UN have proved incapable of bringing law and order. In other words,
they have made a mess of it.
Afghanistan is a vast and
mountainous country about the size of Alberta.
It has a population of 32 million with a long history of resisting foreign
invaders. NATO forces, now numbering 15,000, are facing a fanatical enemy
determined to force them to withdraw, and even though these forces are
supplemented by 28,000 U.S. soldiers, it is doubtful that any military force
is large enough to bring peace and stability to the country.
The Kosovo failure should
serve as a warning that NATO and the UN are
institutions ill-equipped to carry out the multifaceted task they have taken
on in Afghanistan. The Manley report has pointed out that UN personnel in
Kabul suffer from a "lack of leadership, direction and effective
co-ordination from UN headquarters in New York."
That is nothing new: Mismanagement has been a chronic problem characterizing
UN operations everywhere.
An added problem is that NATO itself is an organization that has not yet found
its role in a post-Soviet world. When it was founded in 1949, it was designed
as a purely defensive group with two goals: Defend the West from any possible
Soviet attack; and uphold the principles of the UN Charter while never using,
or threatening to use, force in the resolution of international disputes.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO
lost one of its primary reasons for existence. The second reason - to act in
accordance with the UN Charter's principles - was seen by some NATO members
as an inhibiting factor in dealing with issues involving human-rights abuses
or rogue states.
The turning point for NATO came with its military intervention in Kosovo allegedly for humanitarian reasons. The
bombing of Serbia was done in violation of the
UN Charter and NATO's Article 1. During the
bombing campaign, in April of 1999, on the occasion of NATO's 50th birthday, Bill
Clinton announced a new "strategic concept" for NATO. The new role essentially meant the alliance
could and would intervene wherever and whenever it felt necessary to preserve
peace and security. Its days as a purely defensive organization had ended.
As with any multinational
organization, NATO has become difficult to
manage. Its new role is not clearly defined, and decision-making is slow and
cumbersome. Not all of its members are enthusiastic about the Afghan mission,
where the chances of success are slim and the cost in blood and gold may
become prohibitive. Others see it as a multinational facade to mask the
unilateral aims of the Bush administration. This is not a formula for
success.
Like it or not, Canada must fulfill its NATO
obligations. But let us be clear about what those obligations are and the
price we pay to fulfill them.
James Bissett
is a former Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia
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