http://torontosun.com/News/World/2008/04/12/5265631-sun.html
TORONTO SUN (CANADA)
April 12, 2008
Bridging the great divide
Contested Kosovo span is a symbol of international failure
By SCOTT TAYLOR
MITROVICA, Kosovo -- All seems quiet at the north end of the bridge. A pair
of NATO patrol vehicles, a handful of French soldiers, a couple of UN
policemen and several rolls of barbed wire block access to the roadway.
I take some photographs and start walking back into the Serbian sector of
the city.
It is only then that I spot a group of young Serbs lingering in the shade of
a kiosk.
These young men are known as the "bridgewatchers," and since the Kosovo
conflict began in June 1999, they have maintained a 24-hour vigil on the
Serbian side of this contested span across the Ibar River.
In the summer of 1999, as NATO forces deployed into Kosovo and Serbian
security forces withdrew, nearly 800,000 Albanian Kosovars came flooding
back into the province after they were displaced during the 78-day NATO
bombing campaign.
This in turn generated an exodus from Kosovo of approximately 200,000 Serb
and non-Albanian minorities who fled in fear of Albanian reprisals.
It was here in Mitrovica that the flood of Serb refugees halted at the Ibar
River and defiantly laid claim to the northern portion of Kosovo, which is
an entirely ethnic Serbian enclave connected to the Republic of Serbia.
Numerous violent encounters have taken place across the Mitrovica bridge
between Albanians, Serbs and NATO troops. Located next to the Republic of
Serbia, this entirely ethnic Serbian enclave has come to symbolize the
failure of the international community to overcome the divide of ethnic
hatred in Kosovo.
Following the Albanians' unilateral declaration of independence on Feb. 17,
the Serbs of the Mitrovica pocket and other protected enclaves have refused
to accept the authority of the newly proclaimed state of "Kosava."
To demonstrate their resolve, the Serbs took control of the Mitrovica
courthouse and installed their own officials. It was this occupation of
regional offices by the Serbs that led to a bloody confrontation with NATO
troops on March 17.
When UN police and NATO vehicles rolled in to arrest the violators, the
bridgewatchers sounded an air raid siren to summon other Serbs to the scene.
The angry crowds clashed with the international security forces and vehicles
were set ablaze, shots were fired.
One Ukrainian soldier died, 63 NATO soldiers were injured, and an
undetermined number of Serbs were seriously wounded.
In a scathing internal memo to his superiors, UN regional representative
Jerry Gallucci described the debacle as an "ill-conceived operation (that)
has led to the disappearance of law and order in the north (of Kosovo)."
Gallucci was particularly incensed that the international community chose
March 17 to launch their operation, as this date coincided with the
anniversary of the 2004 pogrom in which three dozen people were killed and
Albanians torched more than 800 Serbian homes.
In Gallucci's opinion, this timing coupled with the heavy-handed tactic of
arresting and transporting the courthouse squatters "seemed almost designed
to inflame Serbian sentiments."
In the leadup to, and in the immediate aftermath of Kosovo's declared
independence, a large number of UN field officers voiced their concerns
about the international community turning a blind eye to the reality of the
situation on the ground.
Last year, a number of UN observers took the unprecedented step of compiling
an independent analysis, which they published and circulated without
filtering it through the chain of command.
The stated intention of the anonymous authors was to illustrate "the divide
that exists between (their) first-hand knowledge ... and the rosy picture of
the overall situation that is officially presented by top UN officials."
The facts presented in the report show that over the past nine years, the UN
has failed to achieve its stated objectives in virtually every category.
To illustrate the international community's failure to provide a secure
environment for non-Albanians in Kosovo, they point to the fact that there
have been more than 1,000 abductions of Serbs and other minorities since
1999.
Of that number, only 253 bodies have been discovered, and yet not a single
person has been found guilty for these crimes.
Under the terms of UN Resolution 1244, which facilitated the entry of NATO
into Kosovo, the international community was to take full responsibility for
the protection of Serbian heritage religious sites.
Despite the presence of more than 20,000 security personnel over the past
nine years, Albanian extremists have managed to destroy more than 150
Serbian churches and monasteries -- many dating back to the 11th century.
One of the most alarming assessments in the UN field officers' report is
that the criminal leadership of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) guerrilla
force, which was supposed to be disbanded, has instead assumed positions of
power at all levels of Kosovo society. According to their summary, the KLA
has simply "transformed into criminal structures, carrying out organized
crime activities of drugs and weapons trafficking and prostitution."
As one field officer stated, those guerrillas "are the real power in Kosovo
and many of their leaders are now politicians at all levels -- including
Prime Minister (Hashim Thaci)."
The Kosovo police service is described as "poorly competent" and that, in
turn, has resulted in a "culture that promotes intolerance with little or no
moral obligation to non-Albanians."
The assessment of life in Kosovo for ethnic minorities is one of limited
freedom of movement and constant fear. Also cited in the report is the fact
that the international community has failed to protect non-Albanian language
rights and that they have allowed the flag of the Republic of Albania to fly
on most public institutions since 1999.
In their report's conclusion, the UN officers point out that the Pristina
sports stadium is emblazoned with "an enormous picture of an armed, bearded,
combat-uniformed KLA leader."
Such an image, they argue, runs counter to the UN's original mission of
making Kosovo a secure environment for all residents.
Failure to remove the provocative poster demonstrates that the international
community is in fact "bowing to the dictates of extremists and warlords."
Although this blunt assessment of the Kosovo situation was presented as a
briefing note to the fact-finding delegation of the UN security council, the
recommendation that the granting of independence would be an "irresponsible
act" has now been superseded by the Albanians' Feb. 17 unilateral
declaration.
Senior officials working with the UN in Kosovo confirmed that the analysis
of this report was accurate, and they are frustrated and disappointed with
the sudden elimination of their mandate.
"The original role for the (NATO-led Kosovo troops, or KFOR) was to enforce
UN Resolution 1244 -- which clearly recognized the Serbian sovereignty over
Kosovo," explained Edward Tawii, a Canadian adviser to the UN interim
administration police, who has spent the past eight years based there.
"Now they say that KFOR will be responsible to provide a secure environment
in support of the independence declaration."
While the UN mission continues to function in this interim period, the
administrative oversight in Kosovo is slowly being assumed by the European
Union.
The EU will monitor and assist the newly proclaimed independent Kosovar
government and oversee the operation of the Kosovo police service.
KFOR troops will remain in place for the foreseeable future, and NATO will
continue to train and equip the Kosovo defence forces.
Since Serbia refuses to recognize Kosovo's independence, the government
continues to administer services such as the issuing of pension cheques to
those residing in non-Albanian enclaves.
Despite the presence of so many foreign troops and police officers -- 20,000
in a region of only two million inhabitants -- this overlapping of
responsibility has generated a lot of confusion.
In many cases, the various and diverse national interests of the
contributing NATO and non-NATO security forces have been exploited by the
criminal elements of the Albanian population.
In the village of Orcusa, in the southern Kosovo mountainous region known as
Gora, Norbert, a German master warrant officer, pointed out that the border
to Albania here is wide open.
"Between us and the Albanian towns across the valley there is not even a
checkpoint, let alone any barriers." According to the German officer, NATO
soldiers in this sector refer to the Kosovo border police as the traffic
police, since their purpose seems to be in assisting the flow of contraband,
rather than impeding it.
In addition to the drugs and weapons smuggled across this border, there are
vast tracts of deforested hillside where the Albanians crossed into Kosovo
to cut down trees.
According to the German, this uncontested exploitation of Kosovo's resources
and the open conduit for illegal trade could easily be curtailed.
"We have reconnaissance vehicles with incredible surveillance capability,"
he said. "Our cameras would be able to pick up the colour of the
woodcutter's eyes -- right across the valley. And one platoon of troops
would suffice to close the border."
Asked why, over the past nine years, this has never been done, Norbert
shrugged and said, "because somebody higher than my rank level wants it to
remain open."
While international observers on the ground may be highly critical of the
way events are unfolding in Kosovo and remain hard-pressed to explain the
often contradictory policies and mandates they are asked to enforce, the one
thing that is quite clear is that another confrontation is imminent and
unavoidable.
A second showdown with the Serbs in Mitrovica is likely to erupt when NATO
attempts to make good on their public promise to arrest the Serbian
ringleaders of the March 17 incident.
Such a policy would ignore the recommendations of UN regional representative
Jerry Gallucci. In his report, Gallucci urged his colleagues to offer the
Serbs some "contrition or recognition of the mistake (the international
community) made."
Instead, it seems that NATO wants to force submission on the Mitrovica Serbs
as quickly as possible.
One reason for this is that the Serbian parliament has been suspended and an
election is scheduled for May 11.
The primary battle cry in that campaign for both the Serbian Democratic
Party and the nationalist Radical Party is "Kosovo is Serbia."
A solution imposed on Mitrovica while the Serbian leadership is in limbo
would encounter far less opposition than after the next government is
formed -- especially if they're elected with a pro-Kosovo mandate.
The clock is also ticking towards the next general assembly meeting at the
UN in September.
So far, 34 countries, including Canada, have recognized Kosovo's
independence. However, it is Serbia's intention to gain a consensus at the
UN assembly that will declare Kosovo's unilateral independence illegal.
"We will be seeking a solution which will accommodate everyone and still
uphold the UN Charter," said Serbian ambassador to Canada Dusan Batakovic
from Belgrade.
Following Canada's recognition of Kosovo, Batakovic was recalled to the
Serbian capital.
"While we are firm on Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, we are willing to
discuss a power-sharing arrangement," he said, "and we want a renewal of
multilateral discussions under UN auspices."
As for Canada's position on Kosovo, Batakovic was disappointed there was no
parliamentary debate before Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced the
decision.
"What exactly is independent about Kosovo? The UN resolution covering its
status remains valid, there are thousands of international troops deployed
to provide security, and significant numbers of non-Albanian Kosovo
minorities are defying this decision."
As the international community engages in a war of words and diplomatic
manoeuvring, the bridgewatchers in Mitrovica continue to monitor NATO
activity on the far river bank.
According to a senior NATO intelligence officer, the next confrontation is
expected to occur within a matter of "days or weeks -- not months."
TORONTO SUN (CANADA)
April 12, 2008
Bridging the great divide
Contested Kosovo span is a symbol of international failure
By SCOTT TAYLOR
MITROVICA, Kosovo -- All seems quiet at the north end of the bridge. A pair
of NATO patrol vehicles, a handful of French soldiers, a couple of UN
policemen and several rolls of barbed wire block access to the roadway.
I take some photographs and start walking back into the Serbian sector of
the city.
It is only then that I spot a group of young Serbs lingering in the shade of
a kiosk.
These young men are known as the "bridgewatchers," and since the Kosovo
conflict began in June 1999, they have maintained a 24-hour vigil on the
Serbian side of this contested span across the Ibar River.
In the summer of 1999, as NATO forces deployed into Kosovo and Serbian
security forces withdrew, nearly 800,000 Albanian Kosovars came flooding
back into the province after they were displaced during the 78-day NATO
bombing campaign.
This in turn generated an exodus from Kosovo of approximately 200,000 Serb
and non-Albanian minorities who fled in fear of Albanian reprisals.
It was here in Mitrovica that the flood of Serb refugees halted at the Ibar
River and defiantly laid claim to the northern portion of Kosovo, which is
an entirely ethnic Serbian enclave connected to the Republic of Serbia.
Numerous violent encounters have taken place across the Mitrovica bridge
between Albanians, Serbs and NATO troops. Located next to the Republic of
Serbia, this entirely ethnic Serbian enclave has come to symbolize the
failure of the international community to overcome the divide of ethnic
hatred in Kosovo.
Following the Albanians' unilateral declaration of independence on Feb. 17,
the Serbs of the Mitrovica pocket and other protected enclaves have refused
to accept the authority of the newly proclaimed state of "Kosava."
To demonstrate their resolve, the Serbs took control of the Mitrovica
courthouse and installed their own officials. It was this occupation of
regional offices by the Serbs that led to a bloody confrontation with NATO
troops on March 17.
When UN police and NATO vehicles rolled in to arrest the violators, the
bridgewatchers sounded an air raid siren to summon other Serbs to the scene.
The angry crowds clashed with the international security forces and vehicles
were set ablaze, shots were fired.
One Ukrainian soldier died, 63 NATO soldiers were injured, and an
undetermined number of Serbs were seriously wounded.
In a scathing internal memo to his superiors, UN regional representative
Jerry Gallucci described the debacle as an "ill-conceived operation (that)
has led to the disappearance of law and order in the north (of Kosovo)."
Gallucci was particularly incensed that the international community chose
March 17 to launch their operation, as this date coincided with the
anniversary of the 2004 pogrom in which three dozen people were killed and
Albanians torched more than 800 Serbian homes.
In Gallucci's opinion, this timing coupled with the heavy-handed tactic of
arresting and transporting the courthouse squatters "seemed almost designed
to inflame Serbian sentiments."
In the leadup to, and in the immediate aftermath of Kosovo's declared
independence, a large number of UN field officers voiced their concerns
about the international community turning a blind eye to the reality of the
situation on the ground.
Last year, a number of UN observers took the unprecedented step of compiling
an independent analysis, which they published and circulated without
filtering it through the chain of command.
The stated intention of the anonymous authors was to illustrate "the divide
that exists between (their) first-hand knowledge ... and the rosy picture of
the overall situation that is officially presented by top UN officials."
The facts presented in the report show that over the past nine years, the UN
has failed to achieve its stated objectives in virtually every category.
To illustrate the international community's failure to provide a secure
environment for non-Albanians in Kosovo, they point to the fact that there
have been more than 1,000 abductions of Serbs and other minorities since
1999.
Of that number, only 253 bodies have been discovered, and yet not a single
person has been found guilty for these crimes.
Under the terms of UN Resolution 1244, which facilitated the entry of NATO
into Kosovo, the international community was to take full responsibility for
the protection of Serbian heritage religious sites.
Despite the presence of more than 20,000 security personnel over the past
nine years, Albanian extremists have managed to destroy more than 150
Serbian churches and monasteries -- many dating back to the 11th century.
One of the most alarming assessments in the UN field officers' report is
that the criminal leadership of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) guerrilla
force, which was supposed to be disbanded, has instead assumed positions of
power at all levels of Kosovo society. According to their summary, the KLA
has simply "transformed into criminal structures, carrying out organized
crime activities of drugs and weapons trafficking and prostitution."
As one field officer stated, those guerrillas "are the real power in Kosovo
and many of their leaders are now politicians at all levels -- including
Prime Minister (Hashim Thaci)."
The Kosovo police service is described as "poorly competent" and that, in
turn, has resulted in a "culture that promotes intolerance with little or no
moral obligation to non-Albanians."
The assessment of life in Kosovo for ethnic minorities is one of limited
freedom of movement and constant fear. Also cited in the report is the fact
that the international community has failed to protect non-Albanian language
rights and that they have allowed the flag of the Republic of Albania to fly
on most public institutions since 1999.
In their report's conclusion, the UN officers point out that the Pristina
sports stadium is emblazoned with "an enormous picture of an armed, bearded,
combat-uniformed KLA leader."
Such an image, they argue, runs counter to the UN's original mission of
making Kosovo a secure environment for all residents.
Failure to remove the provocative poster demonstrates that the international
community is in fact "bowing to the dictates of extremists and warlords."
Although this blunt assessment of the Kosovo situation was presented as a
briefing note to the fact-finding delegation of the UN security council, the
recommendation that the granting of independence would be an "irresponsible
act" has now been superseded by the Albanians' Feb. 17 unilateral
declaration.
Senior officials working with the UN in Kosovo confirmed that the analysis
of this report was accurate, and they are frustrated and disappointed with
the sudden elimination of their mandate.
"The original role for the (NATO-led Kosovo troops, or KFOR) was to enforce
UN Resolution 1244 -- which clearly recognized the Serbian sovereignty over
Kosovo," explained Edward Tawii, a Canadian adviser to the UN interim
administration police, who has spent the past eight years based there.
"Now they say that KFOR will be responsible to provide a secure environment
in support of the independence declaration."
While the UN mission continues to function in this interim period, the
administrative oversight in Kosovo is slowly being assumed by the European
Union.
The EU will monitor and assist the newly proclaimed independent Kosovar
government and oversee the operation of the Kosovo police service.
KFOR troops will remain in place for the foreseeable future, and NATO will
continue to train and equip the Kosovo defence forces.
Since Serbia refuses to recognize Kosovo's independence, the government
continues to administer services such as the issuing of pension cheques to
those residing in non-Albanian enclaves.
Despite the presence of so many foreign troops and police officers -- 20,000
in a region of only two million inhabitants -- this overlapping of
responsibility has generated a lot of confusion.
In many cases, the various and diverse national interests of the
contributing NATO and non-NATO security forces have been exploited by the
criminal elements of the Albanian population.
In the village of Orcusa, in the southern Kosovo mountainous region known as
Gora, Norbert, a German master warrant officer, pointed out that the border
to Albania here is wide open.
"Between us and the Albanian towns across the valley there is not even a
checkpoint, let alone any barriers." According to the German officer, NATO
soldiers in this sector refer to the Kosovo border police as the traffic
police, since their purpose seems to be in assisting the flow of contraband,
rather than impeding it.
In addition to the drugs and weapons smuggled across this border, there are
vast tracts of deforested hillside where the Albanians crossed into Kosovo
to cut down trees.
According to the German, this uncontested exploitation of Kosovo's resources
and the open conduit for illegal trade could easily be curtailed.
"We have reconnaissance vehicles with incredible surveillance capability,"
he said. "Our cameras would be able to pick up the colour of the
woodcutter's eyes -- right across the valley. And one platoon of troops
would suffice to close the border."
Asked why, over the past nine years, this has never been done, Norbert
shrugged and said, "because somebody higher than my rank level wants it to
remain open."
While international observers on the ground may be highly critical of the
way events are unfolding in Kosovo and remain hard-pressed to explain the
often contradictory policies and mandates they are asked to enforce, the one
thing that is quite clear is that another confrontation is imminent and
unavoidable.
A second showdown with the Serbs in Mitrovica is likely to erupt when NATO
attempts to make good on their public promise to arrest the Serbian
ringleaders of the March 17 incident.
Such a policy would ignore the recommendations of UN regional representative
Jerry Gallucci. In his report, Gallucci urged his colleagues to offer the
Serbs some "contrition or recognition of the mistake (the international
community) made."
Instead, it seems that NATO wants to force submission on the Mitrovica Serbs
as quickly as possible.
One reason for this is that the Serbian parliament has been suspended and an
election is scheduled for May 11.
The primary battle cry in that campaign for both the Serbian Democratic
Party and the nationalist Radical Party is "Kosovo is Serbia."
A solution imposed on Mitrovica while the Serbian leadership is in limbo
would encounter far less opposition than after the next government is
formed -- especially if they're elected with a pro-Kosovo mandate.
The clock is also ticking towards the next general assembly meeting at the
UN in September.
So far, 34 countries, including Canada, have recognized Kosovo's
independence. However, it is Serbia's intention to gain a consensus at the
UN assembly that will declare Kosovo's unilateral independence illegal.
"We will be seeking a solution which will accommodate everyone and still
uphold the UN Charter," said Serbian ambassador to Canada Dusan Batakovic
from Belgrade.
Following Canada's recognition of Kosovo, Batakovic was recalled to the
Serbian capital.
"While we are firm on Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, we are willing to
discuss a power-sharing arrangement," he said, "and we want a renewal of
multilateral discussions under UN auspices."
As for Canada's position on Kosovo, Batakovic was disappointed there was no
parliamentary debate before Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced the
decision.
"What exactly is independent about Kosovo? The UN resolution covering its
status remains valid, there are thousands of international troops deployed
to provide security, and significant numbers of non-Albanian Kosovo
minorities are defying this decision."
As the international community engages in a war of words and diplomatic
manoeuvring, the bridgewatchers in Mitrovica continue to monitor NATO
activity on the far river bank.
According to a senior NATO intelligence officer, the next confrontation is
expected to occur within a matter of "days or weeks -- not months."
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