The Butmir Farce - Byronica, Oct. '09

"Byronica": the quarterly newsletter of The Lord Byron Foundation for Balkan Studies

 

Vol. XII, No. 4, Fall 2009

 

YET ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO REVISE DAYTON

THE FARCE AT BUTMIR

James George Jatras

 

[ … ] The failure of the latest attempt to reduce the Republika Srpska to an empty shell devoid of self-rule was inevitable. The meetings at Butmir on October 8 and again October 20-21 were arranged hastily on the American initiative in an ad-hoc forum composed of politicians who have no constitutional power or popular mandate to commit themselves to any fundamental changes – even if they wanted to do so. The gathering at Butmir had no legality and no legitimacy. Any further talks under this formula hold no prospect of any positive result. 

 

In fact, it is hard to see why is can be called a "process" at all. A "process" implies a linear movement from some starting position to a qualitatively different outcome. Whatever "Butmir" is, a "process" it is not. It is simply another variant of the same Made-in-Washington program to weaken and then dissolve the RS in order to create a Muslim-dominated unitary state in BiH. With the return of the Clinton crowd to the State Department, that program, after years of relative inactivity (without being reversed) under Bush, is now intensifying. As far as legitimacy, Butmir can have no status at all without the participation of all the guarantors of Dayton, and that must include Russia. In fact, even the so-called "Peace Implementation Council" – a centralizing mechanism par excellence – is an ad-hoc body that has acquired a degree of legitimacy simply because the Serbs went along with it.  But they must not repeat the same mistake. 

 

Some outside observers may be tempted to find cause for scandal in a proposed set of constitutional changes from the U.S. and EU officials who, in principle, have no legitimate voice on the question. But the only "scandal" in the eyes of Butmir's foreign designers and stage-managers is that the program of getting rid of the RS so far has not worked. The danger for the RS is that by trying to placate its critics by playing along, by "cooperatively" accepting invitations to what can only be called illegal ruses conjured up by State Department bureaucrats, it runs the risk of participating in a charade that can only serve to weaken Republika Srpska's integrity under Dayton and further them in its future options.

 

If the "maximalist" positions (as Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg has defined them) between which a "compromise" must be found, are the status quo and a unitary state – then any "compromise" can only mean steps toward unitarism, which means gerrymandering Muslim dominance in a majority non-Muslim state. This is a conscious goal of the State Department's policy. "State Department," not "American" policy, since almost no one in America remembers or cares that Bosnia-Herzegovina exists, much less the Republika Srpska. There has never been any debate in the U.S. over re-evaluating our goals and interests in the Balkans. This program is the hobby horse of, literally, no more than an dozen people in Washington, notably Deputy Secretary Steinberg, who still have to prove how right they were in the 1990s. 

 

The Europeans are also culpable, but more in their usual role of cravenly deferring to their betters in the U.S. But the EU will go along only provided the American story of the Bosnian "powder keg" does not become reality. If it starts to look like Washington's program is making things worse, not better, the Europeans – who have a lot more to lose and are sick of diktats from Washington anyway – will step back. But that will not happen automatically. First, the RS has to jump off the merry-go-round and appeal for Russian support.

 

What we see here is the ever-present "latent intent" to destroy the Republika Srpska being channeled into a new format. The goals of U.S. policy are obvious to anyone who has been following it from here since 1992. My fear is that the RS leadership may be tempted to believe Washington has adopted a more "reasonable" approach and are "manageable." That is not the case. The sad part is that RS's story can and needs to be told forcefully in the U.S. and in Europe.

Especially at a time when the U.S. has its hands full of disasters elsewhere, especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan (not surprisingly, under the care of the same person who bears major blame for messing the Balkans, Richard Holbrooke), we can't afford an optional crisis of our own making. There are centers of influence in the U.S. who would be receptive to that message on RS's behalf, but it's not being made.

 

Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina would do well to maintain a healthy distrust of American policy. Indeed, anti-Serbism is worse in the Obama Administration than it was under Bush for the simple reason of so many recycled Clinton cadres are returning to power, because it's a Democratic administration. As we say here in Washington, "people are policy."

 

A reasonable observer might hope that a "failure" of Butmir (as measured in the eyes of its foreign authors) might finally convince Washington that no arrangements can be good for BiH as a whole unless it is good for all of BiH's three constituent peoples.  But the only way to teach a lesson to people of this kind is indeed a visible and tangible failure that would be registered as such in Washington and in Brussels. They have to be resisted, and the RS has to refuse to be sucked into the dishonest assumptions behind farces like Butmir. This would not be reckless but prudent: refusal on principle to entertain illegitimate premises needs to be combined with an intelligent, principled, and above all truthful advocacy of RS's case from a position of strength.

 

The kind of people we are dealing with at the State Department and a few think tanks will never "understand" anything except that the agenda laid out for the Serbs in the 1990s is to be brought to its "logical" conclusion: a Bosnia to Siladzic's taste, an independent "KosovA" recognized by Belgrade, and July 11 commemorated all over the Balkans as Srebrenica "Genocide" Day. 

 

As for American officialdom in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the real problem does not originate with the people on the ground. Not that they are not likely part of the problem, but the roots are here in Washington. Local people just do what they're told. No U.S. Ambassador in the region has ever tried to counter the line dictated from Washington while on duty. Even if they say something discordant – like William Montgomery did regarding Bosnia four months ago, or Charles Crawford last July – it happens years after they leave their official posts.

 

Nor should we suppose U.S. policy is the product of some all-powerful "Bosnian lobby," a much overrated notion. Not that there isn't a Bosnian (Muslim) lobby, but U.S. policy is not what it is because of direct influence from Sarajevo. In fact, the "Bosniak" lobbyists are often doing and demanding what the powers-that-be in Washington… shall we say, "suggest" they should do or demand, so that the architects of centralizing policy can use the illusion of "pressure" on the U.S. to "do something" about the Bosnian "crisis." Rather, the larger problem is that for important elements in both the Democratic and Republican parties, the idea of the U.S. and the global dominant power is the central concept. Related to that is the notion that the U.S. must be seen in the Islamic world as the champion of Muslim interests in Europe. That is the main reason why U.S. officials open refer to BiH as a "Muslim country" even though it has a Christian majority (combined Orthodox Serb and Catholic Croat communities). The same is even more true regarding U.S. policy in Kosovo and Metohija. Of course this is an absurdity that is easily demolished, but there's little or no push-back from Belgrade or Banja Luka.

 

To conclude, we must ask: is there a hope for the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Probably not, but there is hope for Republika Srpska. It is a viable and democratically based polity – whereas the "Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" is neither of those things. The RS can be saved and it must be saved, not for the sake of the Serbs alone but for the sake of any durable post-Yugoslav architecture in Southeast Europe. That's what all those who care about peace, stability, and justice in the former Yugoslavia need to focus on.  

 

EDITORIAL

TIME TO LEAVE BOSNIA ALONE

 

[ … ] Constitutional reform is a codeword for establishing what in effect what would be a Muslim-dominated unitary state – in a majority-Christian country! – and amounting to the end of the RS in fact if not in name. In addition to being certain to re-ignite old animosities, this scenario is incongruous with the trend towards devolution and decentralization in some of the world's most stable democracies, from Quebec to the Basque Country, or Scotland, or Catalonia.

 

Whatever the defects of Dayton, the essential fact is that for over 14 years Bosnians have not been killing each other. Nothing should be done that risks a new confrontation among Bosnia's communities and possibly reigniting the horrors of the 1990s. With all that America has on its plate today, it is ill advised to trigger an optional crisis. The Republic of Srpska is not only a legitimate selfgoverning entity under an internationally binding treaty. It is also an oasis of relative prosperity and financial stability, compared not only to the Muslim-Croat Federation, but also neighboring Croatia and Serbia.

 

What is really impeding Bosnia's progress is heavy-handed international bureaucracy and excessive foreign meddling in local affairs. Such meddling is detrimental to the spontaneous growth of democratic institutions. Going a step beyond and imposing centralization would be a gross violation of democracy, law and logic… Bosnia-Herzegovina has suffered a lot through history, almost invariably due to some distant powers' ambitions and policies. It deserves to be left well alone.