Unfreezing Kosovo

Reconsidering Boundaries in the Balkans

Nikolas K. Gvosdev

April 26, 2010

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Summary: 

Two years after it declared independence, Kosovo has not progressed as many of its backers -- most especially the United States -- once hoped. To make Kosovo politically and economically viable, Washington should encourage negotiations open to the idea of territorial adjustment.

NIKOLAS K. GVOSDEV is Professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed here are entirely his own.

When Kosovo unilaterally declared its independence in February 2008, proponents of the move assumed that Serbia's acquiescence to Kosovo's final status was not absolutely necessary. The United States and many countries in Europe hoped Kosovo would gain quick recognition. These supportive governments thought that Kosovo would then have access to capital and investment, and that the northern, ethnically Serbian parts of the province would want to take part in the post-independence economic boom. Sadly, things have not gone according to plan.

Although the United States and many European countries did recognize the new state, some EU members -- such as Spain -- did not, due to fears of setting a harmful precedent that could weaken the doctrine of territorial integrity. Most other world powers have also declined to recognize an independent Kosovo, including Brazil, China, and India. Although some U.S. policymakers predicted that the Islamic world would embrace a new Muslim state -- and express gratitude to the United States for bringing about its birth -- almost no members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference have extended recognition. Even states that enjoy the patronage of the United States, such as Georgia and Iraq, have declined to support Washington by recognizing Kosovo (both countries face separatist problems of their own).

Being considered nonexistent has led Kosovo to struggle economically -- a situation made even worse by the lack of a formal agreement with Serbia on property claims. As U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Philip Gordon said recently, Kosovo is hampered by "high unemployment, low investment rates, and a relatively small economic base." The government in Pristina requires Western aid to meet its expenses. Meanwhile, Kosovo remains a regional hub for narcotics, weapons, and human trafficking, with corruption a major deterrent to foreign investment.

To move forward, Washington must delink the question of independence from the question of frontiers.

Initially, many hoped that growing prosperity in Kosovo would entice those living in the Serb-majority region north of the Ibar River, as well as the residents of the ethnically Serb enclaves in the south, to reconcile themselves to the reality of Kosovan independence. But the weak economy has left this promise unfulfilled. Serbian participation in the electoral process has been minimal. Even many ethnic Albanians seem to be questioning the merits of independence: whereas 93 percent of Kosovo's Albanians believed that independence had been a good thing two years ago, that number is 75 percent today.

Making matters more perilous is that, contrary to the assumptions of many proponents of independence, Belgrade has not reconciled itself to this fait accompli. Rather, it is challenging the legality of the unilateral declaration of indepedence, arguing that the rules-based international system was compromised when Kosovo's status changed without agreement by both parties.

Serbia has asked the International Court of Justice to rule that Kosovo's declaration of independence was illegal according to international law. If the ICJ rules along these lines, then Kosovo would enter a permanent state of limbo (the court's decision is expected later this year). In such a scenario, Kosovo would not be able to join international bodies such as the UN, and its relationship with the EU would remain unsettled. Some countries may withdraw their recognition, as well.

But the ICJ process also creates a pretext for renewed negotiations that might break the existing deadlock. In pushing for talks, the United States and Europe must contend with two realities. First, the government in Pristina is not going to withdraw its declaration of independence, nor are states that have already recognized Kosovo -- beginning with the United States -- prepared to rescind their recognitions. Second, no government in Belgrade will recognize the current boundaries of Kosovo as legitimate. And in the aftermath of the 2004 riots, in which mobs attacked Serbian communities and churches, no Serbian administration can trust that ethnic Serbs and Serbian heritage sites will be safe in an independent Kosovo. To convince Belgrade otherwise would require outside security guarantees, but NATO is not prepared to make an open-ended commitment to deploying forces in Kosovo.

Whatever the outcome, Belgrade would benefit from resolving Kosovo's status. Serbia's relations with all of its neighbors -- and its position as the linchpin state of the western Balkans -- are complicated by the lingering Kosovo question. Its domestic politics are also negatively affected, as nationalists are able to attack pro-reform and pro-Western parties by championing the "fate of Kosovo." Moreover, the U.S. strategy of compartmentalization -- whereby Kosovo is treated as an issue separate from the rest of the U.S.-Serbian relationship -- is not viable. The Obama administration cannot deepen cooperation with Serbia in order to stabilize the western Balkans yet "agree to disagree" on Kosovo

To move forward, Washington must delink the question of independence from the question of frontiers. In other words, the debate over whether there should be an independent, Albanian-majority state of Kosovo must be handled separately from territorial issues. There are precedents for this approach: after World War I, the international community recognized that there would be an independent Armenia and Poland before the boundaries were definitely created; today, the Israel-Palestinian peace process works from a starting point of a two-state solution, although no final territorial settlement has been made. And yet, ever since the failed Rambouillet peace talks in 1999, diplomats have made the mistake of insisting that an independent Kosovo cover the entirety of the province as defined by the communist strongman Josip Broz Tito.

Belgrade and Pristina may come to an eventual agreement if the question of boundaries is split from the theoretical question of independence. Such talks should proceed without preconditions. This means that Serbia should not be required to change its constitution to cede legal and territorial claims to Kosovo (just as Ireland held on to its constitutional claims to the north of the island until 1998 without precluding talks with the United Kingdom). Nor should the government in Pristina be forced to abandon its earlier declarations.

Territorial adjustment, however, should certainly be on the table. The broad outline of a settlement is already clear: the Serb-majority regions north of the Ibar should remain part of Serbia, with some sort of arrangement made for important Serbian heritage sites and enclaves in the south.

One possible model for the latter is the agreement reached between Italy and the Vatican in 1929. For decades, the Catholic Church had not recognized the takeover of Rome by Italy in 1870; the Italian state was similarly uninclined to cede its claim over its capital city. The Lateran Treaty resolved this issue by establishing Vatican City as a neutral but independent state. Additionally, the Vatican received extraterritorial rights over sacred sites in and around Rome and in other parts of Italy. Of course, the Kosovo case is not identical, but the Lateran model could provide guidelines for a sustainable settlement.

An agreement between Belgrade and Pristina would resolve Kosovo's state of limbo in the international community. It would simultaneously settle the critical issue that has slowed Serbia's integration with Europe: Belgrade's ability to show that it controls all the territory under its jurisdiction, a requirement if it is to ensure enforcement of the acquis communautaire, the EU's body of common law. An agreement would also lift the current barriers to Kosovo's membership in the UN, signaling a final resolution to the issue.

Critics of such a plan would suggest that the very idea of redrawing boundaries is dangerous because it could call into question other disputed borders in the Balkans. But the reality on the ground is that Pristina has never controlled the territories north of the Ibar. And as shown by the continued need for NATO troops to protect Serb enclaves and monasteries in the south, Pristina does not really control those areas either. Would NATO member states launch a military campaign to conquer Mitrovica and the north in order to forcibly bring them under Pristina's governance?

Some critics might also argue that adjusting Kosovo's boundaries would compromise its status as a viable state. Yet Kosovo is far less viable in its current condition. Moreover, if outstanding property disputes and border issues are resolved, international investors would feel more secure investing in Kosovo. Economic development, in turn, would have a positive effect on security and long-term stability.

And adjusting territorial boundaries would not necessarly spark new instability, because any agreement would respect the principles of the 1975 Helsinki accords by being voluntary and negotiated, not a forcible change imposed by one party on another.
Recent statements by senior officials in Belgrade suggest that Serbia wants to resolve the lingering sources of instability in the western Balkans. It has repeatedly said that it is flexibile on the question of Kosovo. Meanwhile, Pristina cannot consolidate its position and begin true governance under the status quo. Restarting serious negotiations between the two sides -- with both parties prepared to offer concessions -- could finally move Kosovo toward a durable, lasting peace.

Copyright © 2002-2010 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

EU states to put Serbia's membership bid on temporary hold

ZELJKO PANTELIC

Today @ 08:27 CET

Serbia's bid to become official candidate for accession to the European Union is likely to be delayed until autumn due to the Balkan country's intransigent position on Kosovo's status, WAZ.EUobserver has learned from well-informed diplomatic sources in Brussels.

Member states have indicated they may again postpone processing Serbia's membership application, which Belgrade hopes to see happening in June. The reason is Serbia's intention to raise the question of Kosovo's status at the United Nations. Belgrade is waiting for the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the former Serbian province's declaration of independence, and has threatened to take it to the UN General Assembly.

EU member states are unhappy with Serbia's refusal to swallow the loss of Kosovo and have hinted this may be another roadblock in Belgrade's EU membership negotiations.

Serbia's progress towards candidate status has been blocked in the past due to its fluctuating cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and most notably due to the failure to arrest Ratko Mladic, a former Yugoslav general who is wanted by the ICTY for war crimes.

Paradoxically, now Mladic appears to be the only joker in Belgrade's hand - arresting the elusive fugitive would soften some EU capitals' opposition to moving ahead with Belgrade's membership bid.

"If Serbia arrests Ratko Mladic, it would be impossible even for the most enlargement-sceptic states in the EU to block Serbia's next step towards candidate status - even if the country brings the Kosovo issue back to the UN," a senior diplomat from an EU state told WAZ.EUobserver.

Belgrade hopes that EU foreign ministers at their meeting in June will start the procedure of granting Serbia candidate status, following the country's application for EU membership last December. The gathering, formally known as the "General Affairs Council", can ask the European Commission to prepare an opinion ('avis') on the issue, which would be the first formal step to Serbia obtaining candidate status.

Member states are unlikely officially ask demand Belgrade to drop its claims on Kosovo. But diplomatic sources are unanimous that EU countries have sufficient instruments to delay the start of negotiations until Belgrade bends to their demands.

"Nobody should be surprised if the Serbian application for EU membership remains in the box until the last months of the year, especially if Ratko Mladic is still at large," an EU insider told WAZ.EUobserver.

The EU appears increasingly likely to put Serbia's application on hold until it sees Belgrade's reaction to the ICJ opinion on Kosovo's independence. Two EU member states, which are also members of the influential six-nation Balkans "Contact Group" (US, Russia, Britain, Italy, France, Germany), have indicated silent support for the hard-line position of the Netherlands: that membership application should not be discussed by the Council until the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between Serbia and the EU is ratified.

"If Mladic remains at large, it would be impossible for the Council of Ministers to decide before October and to ask the Commission to start accession talks," an EU diplomat said. "October would be good timing for the most important EU countries, because by then it will be clear how Serbia has tackled the Kosovo question at the UN General Assembly in New York," he added.

The General Affairs 'Council has to decide unanimously whether to ask the European Commission to prepare its official opinion on Serbia's application, and this provides another conundrum. The Netherlands will hold parliamentary elections in June, and considering the protracted inter-party negotiations, it may be September before the new Dutch executive gets the mandate to decide on EU enlargement issues.

An additional setback for Belgrade's hopes is Belgium taking over the EU's rotating presidency for the second half of the year, which also means chairing the foreign ministers' discussions on enlargement. Belgium has been among the proponents of a stricter approach toward Serbia, whose membership application may be delayed on Belgian watch - certainly longer than Iceland's bid, but maybe also longer than the pending applications of Montenegro and Albania.

EU capitals seem to have little patience for Serbia's contradictory ambitions of not appearing weak on Kosovo while pressing for a fast-lane trip to EU membership. "Sometimes it is confusing to read reports in which Serbia plays hard against the most important EU countries on the Kosovo issue, and at the same time listen to Belgrade officials imploring us to help their country move faster towards the EU," an EU official commented.

http://waz.euobserver.com/887/29921

Translating the Gorilla

Translating the Gorilla

Posted by The New Yorker

Marija Stajic worked with David Samuels in translating a book called “Gorilla” for his piece in the magazine this week about an international Balkan crime gang called The Pink Panthers. Here, she describes her experience reading what Samuels called a “sordid, semi-incoherent novel.”

When David Samuels asked me to read “Gorilla,” a Serbian novel written by Dusan Savkovic, and narrate the story in English for his piece, I was thrilled—I’m a bookworm and former literature professor. “Gorilla” is a thinly veiled novel based loosely on the life of a Serbian thug named Stevan Markovic. I expected drama, noir, and intrigue! But as I started to read “Gorilla,” I realized: this book is going to take more time and less pleasure than I anticipated.

From page one, I was transported into the toxic world of Stefan Ratarac. He’s a former Yugoslav stunt man and a car thief, but he’s described by Savkovic as an Adonis. He immigrated to Paris in his twenties, where he lived in poverty until Alain Dupre, a famous French actor (based on Alain Delon), learns of Ratarac’s reputation. Ratarac is a fearless man, prone to violence, with a short fuse, and so physically endowed that he is very, very popular among women. Dupre hires him as his bodyguard—his Gorilla—but used him more as a weapon against his enemies, and a private rent-a-stud for his high-profile female friends.

“Gorilla” is filled with crooks, corrupt French officials, murderers, prostitutes and profanities. In fact, all the female characters in the book are portrayed as prostitutes. They will sleep with any man in a matter of seconds, out of lust if they are old, ugly and rich; for self-preservation if they are young and beautiful; or for money, regardless. There are several graphic and disgusting depictions of orgies that involve not only Dupre, but Anna Maria De Roche, a French politician’s wife; Philip Morseau, a film producer; Joseph Lagrange, an award-winning writer; and a French singer named Lilly Morgan. “The next photograph showed Lilly Morgan and Philip Morseau, the producer of most of Alain’s movies. Lilly was obviously drugged, or under the influence of the orgy, that gave a stamp of animal lust to the woman’s beautiful, angel-like face.”

The crux of the novel centers around the “blackmail of the century,” when Gorilla—along with another Balkan immigrant, a Romanian named Vasil Negresku—decides to blackmail the orgy participants. Dupre and his friends are the cream of the French society, and Gorilla demands one million dollars for his silence: “Is that any kind of money…for you?!” he asks Dupre.

“No one is going to give you a single franc,” retorts Dupre. “Rich people love the money. If they didn’t they wouldn’t be rich. And they don’t want anyone to make them feel like fools, anyone to put his hands into their pockets.” Furious, Dupre hires a Corsican Mafioso named Antonio Pierangeli, and punishes Gorilla’s betrayals with a painful, suffering death with a “lady gun,” a gun that releases a small bullet that “probably still floats through Gorilla’s brain.”

In Savkovic’s Parisian underworld, the characters are not black and white. They are all black. There are no redeeming characters nor actions. Some descriptions are cliché, story lines and sentences are repetitive. The author loves calling Dupre a “superstar” and Gorilla’s penis a “bludgeon.” But if you have a strong stomach, “Gorilla” tellingly reveals the connection between the Parisian underground and the top layers of French society in the late sixties. As Samuels concludes about the novel in his piece:

“Gorilla” channels the rage that many young Serbian men must feel for the European Union, which tantalizes them with its wealth yet forbids them legal entry. The E.U. failed to stop the carnage in the Balkans, and then it applied sanctions to the recalcitrant Serbs and curtailed immigration. The invisible wall erected by the West kept the criminal élites of Serbia rich and the rest of the defeated country poor.

Photograph by Walter Watzpatzkowski/CC-BY)

Keywords

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Where is This Story? 4.7 Million at Risk of Starvation

Where is This Story? 4.7 Million at Risk of Starvation

10.04.2010 | 02:36

Four point seven million people are at risk of starvation in Northern Africa due to a harvest failure caused by scarce rainfall in 2009, yet the story, as well as the funds, are nowhere to be seen in an international media worried about Tiger Woods' personal life.

The United Nations Organization's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has launched an urgent appeal for more funds (133 million USD) from aid agencies and partners to finance the distribution of food aid in Niger, where 5.7 million people are affected by malnutrition and food shortages after last year's harvest failed in vast areas of the country due to insufficient rainfall.
 
The situation is sufficiently bad to merit the use of the term "emergency humanitarian action plan" to describe the calamitous position faced by these people, who are in urgent need of food security, food aid, safe water, sanitation and hygiene networks and infrastructures, according to OCHA.

The UNO office has issued the following statement on the crisis in Niger: "Inadequate or poor distribution of rainfall has caused large deficits in Niger's agricultural and fodder production. Poor harvests have created a cereals deficit of more than 410,000 metric tons, while fodder shortfalls have been estimated at more than 16 million metric tons or 67 per cent of the national livestock needs. Many water sources have also dried up, adding to the hardship pastoralists are facing".

For Josette Sheeran, Executive Director of the UN World Food Programme (WFP), the situation in Mali has become "a major humanitarian challenge" despite the fact that her Programme has doubled food aid to Niger in recent months.

The ruling authorities in Niger, the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD), which came to power after a coup d'etat on February 18, have appealed for international assistance.

This is not the first time that the people of Mali have been let down by the international community following a disastrous crop, due to lack of rainfall or to the scourge of swarms of locusts. Yet the same international community turns a blind eye, because Mali is in Africa and because Africa has been stamped as a disaster area. Period.

"Where is Mali and anyway, who the Hell cares?" is the unspoken soundbite from the first decade of the new millennium, in which trillions of dollars are spent on wars to kill people and a paltry 133 million USD cannot be raised to feed hungry kids.

As you read these lines, spare a thought for NATO and question yourself exactly what has this Organization done to develop the world? Why does this Organization control its member states' foreign policy? And why does it siphon off cash which the majority of informed and thinking citizens of its member states would rather donate to a cause such as Mali than to bombing Serbia or wedding parties in the Hindu Kush?

Is this really the world we are happy to live in? And what role does the international press play, mis and disinforming people, shaping public opinion away from the truth and focussing on banalities and trivia such as the private life of Tiger Woods?

Timothy BANCROFT-HINCHEY

PRAVDA.Ru

http://www.moscowtopnews.com/

No to NATO! Enters the Political Agenda

 

No to NATO! Enters the Political Agenda

 

07.04.2010

Source: Pravda.Ru

URL: http://english.pravda.ru/world/europe/112918-no_nato-0

 

The murmurs against NATO have been growing into a crescendo in recent years, especially after the lies to Russia, the murderous campaign against Serbia and the free hand given to the drugs growers in Afghanistan where under NATO’s guidance heroin production has increased not by four, but by forty times. Now a worldwide anti-NATO wave has entered the political agenda. Thirty-three political parties from twenty-seven countries representing all the continents of the world have signed a declaration against NATO, denouncing it as an imperialist and intrusive, meddlesome organism which panders to the interests of those who control the arms lobby and does nothing to solve real issues, while at the same time it is a supra-national unelected body which controls the foreign policy of its member states (is this constitutional?) and siphons off funds which are much needed for social issues. In a document entitled “For Peace! Against NATO!” the movement was launched on April 1, undersigned by workers’ and communist parties, declaring that military expenditure in the USA and EU have reached record levels, while the EU hides behind the Treaty of Lisbon as it implants itself as the military block of NATO in Europe. Moreover, what exactly does NATO do? “The Palestinian question is still unsolved, as is the question of Western Sahara while imperialist crimes go unpunished,” declares the declaration while attempts have been made to draw lines on maps (Kosovo being a prime example of the violation of international law and one of the power of NATO over national legislative procedures). In the name of fighting terrorism, NATO has launched a wave of intolerance which has committed crimes against humanity, economic crimes, crimes against democracy as its real objective is reached: using the alliance as a means for the USA to grab the reins of power contained in the world’s energy resources, to control new technologies and to complete military and geo-strategic domination of the globe while markets and peoples are controlled, moulded and used. NATO has managed to perpetuate itself under the falsity “new global challenges” after the “reds under the beds” myth disappeared with the voluntary institutional dissolution of the Soviet Union (against the wills of its peoples). And it is this new strategy that NATO will take to Lisbon, Portugal for its Summit in November. NATO intends to reaffirm itself as a nuclear military block, while it talks about nuclear disarmament. NATO intends to continue its expansion while it talks about peace. As NATO spends trillions of dollars in developing new weapons systems while it looks for new wars to test them out (the Pentagon gives contracts for weaponry tested in battle), a new political wave has taken shape and is visible today on the political agenda. Against NATO stands a determined new political order which fights for social justice, which fights for a future international community living side by side in peace, with the community of nations respecting each others’ cultures. Against NATO stands a demand for true nuclear disarmament and the complete destruction of chemical and biological arsenals. Against NATO stands an appeal for the end of all military bases on foreign soil. Against NATO stands a demand for the total dissolution of this organization, for the end to provocation and interference in Latin America and the Caribbean. In short, NATO is at the basis of all the evils we see today in the international community. NATO lied to Russia, proclaiming it would not expand eastwards. It promptly did. If there is one universal lesson that the history book taught us, it is never trust a liar. Timothy BANCROFT-HINCHEY PRAVDA.Ru

 

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Richard Holbrooke: Bulldozer Stuck in the Mud

Date: Tuesday, April 6, 2010, 10:09 PM   Antiwar.com Original - http://original.antiwar.com - Richard Holbrooke: Bulldozer Stuck in the Mud Posted By Kelley B. Vlahos On April 5, 2010 @ 11:00 pm Strobe Talbott once called Richard Holbrooke the "diplomatic equivalent of a hydrogen bomb." Oh, the many ways we could interpret that today. When Talbott, Bill Clinton's deputy secretary of state and a friend of Holbrooke, made that comment to the New York Times in February 2009, Holbrooke was riding a wave of fairly breathless publicity in the wake of his appointment as special envoy to the Afghanistan-Pakistan ("Af-Pak") region. A former Clinton administration diplomat who cultivated near-hero status as chief architect of the war-ending Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia in 1995, Holbrooke basked in the hopeful tenor of the new Obama administration and a wave of sycophantic media coverage that suggested that regional leaders – both friend and foe – were no match for his diplomatic prowess and tenacity. Though not entirely falling into this trap, NYT writer Jodi Kantor nonetheless made Holbrooke's appointment an event, not quite calling it a potential game-changer, but close. The media loves to tie personalities to policy, whether they ultimately fit or not. After 9/11, it was Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. During the so-called "Surge" in Iraq, it was Gen. David Petraeus. And for "Obama's War" in Afghanistan, Holbrooke reeked of the good ol' days – the Clinton Camelot and winning wars and all that – so it was easy to plug him in as a white knight of sorts. Kantor, however, at least paused to suggest Holbrooke's "pyrotechnical style" might not work with the humorless technocrats in Foggy Bottom or in the wilds of Central Asia: "Mr. Obama and Mrs. Clinton chose Mr. Holbrooke because of his ability to twist arms as well as hold hands, work closely with the military, and improvise inventive solutions to what others write off as insoluble problems. But no one yet knows how his often pyrotechnical style – he whispers, but also pesters, bluffs, threatens, stages fits, and publicizes – will work in an administration that prizes low-key competence or in a region that is dangerously unstable." The writer had the sense to temper her enthusiasm, and indeed she was right: one year later we find that Holbrooke has sadly failed to live up to the hype of his diplomatic wizardry. Instead, the Afghanistan-Pakistan policy remains mired in constant uncertainty and seems incoherent to most Americans. The U.S. military appears in charge of everything, and Holbrooke, as a result, often looks ineffectual and marginalized. Not only that, he's become too much like Vice President Joe Biden, making head-scratching public statements that end up rankling temperamental allies, who are always waiting for secret signals that the Americans are being disingenuous and slippery. Maybe it isn't really the State Department's careful ethos or even regional "instability" that prevents Holbrooke from living up to his famous "bulldozer" moniker. It could be that this war is bigger than even the mighty Richard Holbrooke, who might turn out not to be that mighty after all. Where's Dick? Beginning in the fall of 2009, Holbrooke's bright star was starting to dim. It had been 10 months since he was appointed by Obama, and five months since insiders like Washington Post columnist David Ignatius (inadvertently?) described Holbrooke's first trip to the region as a sort of cheesy listening tour, "an unusual exercise in strategic listening," and a "bravura diplomatic show" that "seemed to have the desired effect." But soon, headlines began blaring, "Where Is Richard Holbrooke on Afghanistan?," "Holbrooke Missing From Afghan Talks," and on the McClatchy "Nukes & Spooks" blog, "Where's Dick?": "We're in the midst of the biggest political crisis in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban government in 2001. Pakistan has launched a major offensive into the South Waziristan tribal area, a move that was preceded by a string of murderous terrorist attacks against Pakistani security forces. U.S.-Pakistani relations almost went thermonuclear over a U.S. aid bill that Pakistani military saw as a hammer against it. "Where then is Richard C. Holbrooke, the president's Special Representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan? … "[H]is public profile has gone from hero to zero in recent weeks. "A quick check of the State Department Web site shows that Holbrooke's last public appearance before the media was nearly a month ago, during the UN General Assembly in New York. "Coincidence? We thought not." The unnamed administration sources who helped McClatchy figure it out spun it as White House "orders" that all officials engaged with "Af-Pak" policy "keep a lid on it" until the election mess (fraud) involving soon-to-be-declared President Hamid Karzai was over. But that didn't explain why Holbrooke had been nearly MIA on the Pakistan offensive or why, as chief envoy, he wasn't directly involved in the talks that opened the doors to the Nov. 7 election runoff (which never happened). Jon Ward, writing for the Washington Times, said he was told by a State Department spokeswoman that Holbrooke was "in Washington helping to preside over the president's month-long Afghanistan strategy review … his job is in Washington right now." Ward and McClatchy and others speculate that it was Holbrooke's heated exchange with Karzai after the initial election, followed by a Karzai freeze-out, that led to his diminished role in Kabul. Whatever the impetus, it's clear even today that Holbrooke doesn't seem to enjoy the alpha-dog treatment he used to command just by sweeping into a room. "It's a fair point to make that if we are going to negotiate eventually, we need to be able to deal with Karzai," points out Inter Press News Service correspondent Gareth Porter. That Holbrooke presently appears on the outs with the Afghan president doesn't say much "of Holbrooke's vaunted diplomatic capabilities." Only insiders know what the true dynamics of the situation are. We can only guess about the kind of icy response Holbrooke got from within Foggy Bottom itself when he started gobbling up staff and walling off like a private fiefdom back in 2009. One former Pentagon official suggested to me that Holbrooke had attempted early on to bypass the department's regional bureau system, and what we're seeing now is "the system regaining control." Others say you cannot dismiss the role of the military. Remember, last fall when all of the election shenanigans were coming to a head, Gen. Stanley McChrystal and his own inner circle of senior officers and advisers were forcing the president's hand in favor of their branded counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy that, despite all of the talk to the contrary, would involve a military-led, comprehensive Long War roadmap that kept the State Department and all other U.S. government agencies in supporting roles. Billions in resources for public diplomacy, plus control over reconstruction and other things not traditionally under the Pentagon's purview, have been funneling into military coffers over the last several years, leaving little question as to who is in charge. Even the White House emerged looking whiplashed from last fall's war policy fights. This is where things might have spelled doom for Holbrooke's heroic self-image. "The Army four-stars, led by Gen. David Petraeus, seized strategic control of political events from President Obama in 2009 when he capitulated to the four stars' demands for a slow, ponderous withdrawal from Iraq and a buildup in Afghanistan," said retired Army Col. Doug Macgregor, author of Warrior's Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting and a familiar critic of the current war policy. "Holbrooke and his boss [Secretary of State Hillary Clinton] are now left to struggle in a large, black hole for American resources with little hope of achieving anything of value." Others pinpoint Holbrooke's "jump the shark" moment to Aug. 12, 2009, when he told a "live-tweeting audience" sponsored by the Center for American Progress that we'll know what victory in Afghanistan looks like "when we see it." One can just imagine the response. "For those of you who worry that the Obama administration doesn't have a clear strategy in Afghanistan or Pakistan, or even a clear sense of what our overall objectives are: relax. You needn't fret, because Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke knows how to define success," Stephen M. Walt wrote on his Foreign Policy blog that day. Others see Holbrooke as constantly reacting to events like a firefighter – quite unlike the legacy he was reaching for in his own 2003 autobiography, To End a War. There, he describes with great aplomb – and without a trace of irony – his omnipotent role in bringing the Serbs to heel in 1994 (by steering then-President Clinton into a massive NATO bombing campaign), and then to the negotiating table, leading to the Dayton peace talks and consequent accords, which transformed Bosnia into a three-headed (some would say) monster representing the Muslims, the Croats, and the Serbs. As Antiwar.com's own Nebojsa Malic described back in 2003, Holbrooke is the "founding stepfather" of modern Bosnia, and he took great pains to let everyone know it in his book. "There is no hint of modesty – false or otherwise – in Holbrooke, and for that one must be grateful. For in chronicling his efforts to badger, bully and beat the Bosnian's into ending their war – on American terms, of course – he offers surprisingly clear insights into the U.S. Balkans policy at the time, and his own role therein." While Holbrooke may have been the "avatar of the entire American government in the eyes of the warring factions," with enviable "carte blanche" from his superiors throughout the Balkan crises, he now comes off as less confident, smaller, and seemingly prone to missteps and confusing, overly calibrated statements, such as when he suggested that Indians were not the target of extremists in the Feb. 26 bomb attack on a popular Indian guesthouse in Kabul. He may have been trying to pander to the Pakistanis then, but he managed to get frozen out of India –for a second time. In another potential foot-in-mouth scene in March, Holbrooke told an audience at Harvard that "almost every Pashtun family in the south has family or friends who are involved in the Taliban – it's a fabric of society." His words went viral immediately and were seen as a slight to Karzai, who is Pashtun, and to the Pashtun people at-large. "Karzai just really doesn't like him. I hear the Pakistanis don't like him, either," an unnamed senior former diplomat told Reuters in a report titled "Is Holbrooke's 'Bulldozer' Style Working?" "They have acute sensitivities about being bullied by Americans." There are the times when he appears in charge, but then he is overtaken by some external event that seems designed to pull him off his game. In an excellent analysis published by the Asia Times on March 6, M.K. Bhadrakumar wrote that the "nosedive" of U.S. "Af-Pak diplomacy" began after Holbrooke's "spectacular success" at the London conference on Afghanistan on Jan. 28, which brought together NATO leaders to solidify support for the surge, but more importantly, for a "reintegration" plan for so-called moderate Taliban. "No sooner had the crowd dispersed from London, than Af-Pak diplomacy began unraveling," Bhadrakumar wrote. He pointed to a series of unfortunate developments for the Americans: first the Pakistani government captured Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who had been "shaping up as a key interlocutor" for the U.S. in this reintegration plan. The Pakistanis had been reportedly left out of the loop, and they seemed to be registering a complaint by capturing Baradar themselves. Second, Karzai announced in February that his government, which had been blamed for some of the worst corruption in the world, was taking over the independent election complaints commission. Since there are parliamentary elections coming up in August that could change the face of the parliament, the primary representative body in Afghanistan, the implications of this move are pretty dramatic. "Washington," wrote Bhadrakumar, "has been left with no option for the present but to take Karzai's blow and pretend nothing happened." Don't Believe the Hype Some say Holbrooke cannot be blamed entirely for the glacial pace of progress. "The problems in Afghanistan are huge, and the United States needs Afghan political will and strong leadership to reform, which are lacking," says Caroline Wadhams of the Center for American Progress. "The challenge of managing the [Afghan and Pakistani] problems dwarfs Holbrooke and the American military," adds Macgregor. The problem from the beginning has been that Holbrooke and everyone around him in the Democratic establishment has believed the hype to the contrary. The Afghan war was already in swing when he wrote his book and said things like "there will be other Bosnias in our lives – areas where early outside involvement can be decisive, and American leadership will be required," suggesting that "muscular" American authority "after Dayton" could and should be wielded on the international stage, as long as it's done by the right leaders and for the right causes. His steely embrace of the liberal view of humanitarian interventionism (which guided his support for Bush's Iraq invasion), or "bombs for peace," didn't hold up even through a decade. Today, Bosnia is a mess, but no one seems to notice. Take a look: it's Iraq in 15 years – but by then no one will care about Iraq, either. Holbrooke's experience in Bosnia gave him a false sense of what such interventions could accomplish, and a false sense of himself, just like what happened in Iraq in 2007-2008 during the Surge, which gave Petraeus & Company a false sense of what COIN could accomplish. That Holbrooke is failing to live up to the image of "one of the most talented diplomats of his generation" shouldn't matter much, but it should serve as yet another warning about the disappointments still ahead. Article printed from Antiwar.com Original: http://original.antiwar.com URL to article: http://original.antiwar.com/vlahos/2010/04/05/richard-holbrooke-bulldozer-stuck-in-the-mud/

 

Islamic jihad in Russia

 

Islamic jihad in Russia
 

Mar 31, 2010        http://serbianna.com/analysis/?p=455

 

By Lee Jay Walker | Latest terrorist attack which killed at least 38 people is a stark reminder that terrorism, radical Islam, and ethnic nationalism, is still a potent force within the Russian Federation.
 
The Russian Federation is multi-ethnic and multi-religious but several areas of the Russian Federation are blighted by international terrorism, internal ethnic fault-lines, local terrorism, and regional political issues which are hindering real progress. 
 
This most notably applies to the Caucasus region and areas like Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia which are overwhelmingly Muslim.  However, other regions have become engulfed by the threat of terrorism and in North Ossetia, which is mainly Christian; you had the Beslan hostage crisis in 2004 when Chechen insurgents and others seized control of a school. This led to the deaths of 335 civilians, the majority of victims being young children who were used by radical Sunni Islamists without any compassion or care for the loss of their blood.
 
Attacks have also happened within the heartland of the Russian Federation and the latest terrorist attack is a reminder that terrorism is a threat in not only the Caucasus and surrounding region; but it can strike at any time throughout the Russian Federation.
 
Past terrorist attacks have happened in Kabardino-Balkaria in 2005 when Islamists attacked government buildings in Nalchik and this led to the deaths of around 80 people.  In 2004 you had Beslan and the sight of radical Sunni Islamists abusing and terrifying innocent children after taking over a school. 
 
Also, in 2004 a terrorist attack outside a Moscow subway station led to the deaths of ten people after a female suicide bomber killed innocents in the name of Islam.  The year 2004 was particularly bloody because terrorists were also responsible for the downing of two Russian passenger planes (female Chechen suicide bombers were blamed); Islamic insurgents also attacked Nazran in Ingushetia and roughly 100 Ingushetian Interior Ministry troops were killed; and many other acts of terrorism took place including the assassination of Chechen President Akhmed-hadj Kadyrov and a suicide attack against a subway train in Moscow which killed at least 40 people.
 
Other more prominent attacks apply to a suicide bomber killing 5 people within the easy reach of the Kremlin in Moscow in 2003.  In the same year a passenger train was blown up between Kislovodsk and Mineralnve which led to the deaths of at least 40 people in southern Russia; a military hospital in Mozdok, North Ossetia, was also blown up by a suicide bomber which resulted in the deaths of at least 50 people; and two female Chechen suicide bombers killed 15 people during a rock festival at Moscow's Tushino airfield.
 
Countless other terrorist attacks have happened and around 129 hostages in Moscow's Dubrovka Theatre were killed in 2002.  These terrorist attacks, and so many others which I have not mentioned throughout the Russian Federation, highlight that no region is out-of-reach because Chechens and Islamists have taken their deadly carnage to many places.
 
In recent times it appeared that the situation had been contained to limited areas within the Caucasus region and that the worse was over.  This does not imply that the threat of terrorism had completely gone away because this was never the case.  However, compared with the situation in the 1990s and up until 2005 when you had countless terrorist attacks; then it did appear that the security forces alongside regional interior troops were gaining the upper hand.
 
However, the latest terrorist attack which killed at least 38 people is a stark reminder that terrorism, radical Islam, and ethnic nationalism, is still a potent force within the Russian Federation.
 
It is noticeable, however, that Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Foreign Minister, hinted (March 29, 2010) that the subway explosions may have their roots and links to the Islamic insurgency along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
 
Lavrov stated that "We all know that the Afghan-Pakistani border, in the so-called no-man's land, the terrorist underground is very well entrenched." He continued by stating that "We know that many people there actively plot attacks, not just in Afghanistan, but also in other countries. Sometimes the trails lead to the Caucasus. "
 
Interestingly, B.Raman (Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi) also links the current crisis to a broader area and B. Raman is an expert in this field.
 
B. Raman states that "Western skepticism about the Russian evidence regarding the links of the Chechen terrorists with Al Qaeda has been coming in the way of strong action against the Chechen terrorists operating from Pakistani sanctuaries with Saudi money. This skepticism can be compared to the US skepticism over Indian evidence regarding the international dimensions of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and its links with Al Qaeda. Only after the LET killed six US nationals in Mumbai during its sea-borne terrorist strikes in the last week of November, 2008, did the Americans start admitting that the LET had become as dangerous as Al Qaeda. The Chechen terrorists have till now not targeted US nationals and interests. Hence, the US skepticism continues. This is a short-sighted approach and will weaken the war against global jihadi terrorism. The LET did not target Americans till November, 2008. That did not make it any the less dangerous as a terrorist organization. The Chechen terrorists are as ruthless and dangerous as the LET or any other associate of Al Qaeda. The world has to be concerned over their activities before it becomes too late."  ( 31-3-2010)
 
Vojin Joksimovich, the author of The Revenge of the Prophet, states that "In order for the Western world to counter, and conceivably eradicate, the onslaught of Islamic terrorism, the root causes must be addressed." 
 
However, according to Vojin Joksimovich, "this has not been the case" and he continues by stating that "The most pressing underlying root cause is the Saudi Wahhabi-led petrodollar hegemony over the Islamic world."
 
Vojin Joksimovich is clearly highlighting the funding channels which are enabling radical Islam to obtain a major foothold in many conflicts throughout the world and to create radical Islamic cells in any given nation because of ample funding.
 
He continues by stating that "The Wahhabis, or Wahhabists, make use of these windfall profits primarily for proselytism purposes.  However, a modest percentage goes to the terrorist arm of the Wahhabi movement, i.e. Al Qaeda and other similar terrorist organizations in the Islamic world.  It is imperative to starve these terrorist organizations of financial resources and recruits."
 
The latest terrorist attack in the Russian Federation may lead straight back to the Chechen conflict and hatred which developed during this bloody conflict. 
 
However, it is also clear that international jihadists, finance via the Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia, Islamic cells in various parts of the world, training grounds along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the spread of radical Islam to the Caucasus and other parts of the world is also the root cause.
 
Therefore, the Russian Federation must once more do a lot of soul searching but clearly Islamic financial funding for terrorism, the international jihadist brigade, and other factors; fused with genuine internal ethnic issues in many host nations, means that this issue is very complex .
 
The very nature of Islam itself must be studied because this religion does appear to nurture and sanction the holy war throughout the Koran and the Hadiths.
 
After all, Mohammed did state in the Koran (9:29) "Fight those who do not believe in Allah and the last day……and fight People of the Book, who do not accept the religion of truth (Islam) until they pay tribute by hand, being inferior."
 
Lee Jay Walker
is the Tokyo correspondent for Seoul Times
 

http://serbianna.com

http://themoderntokyotimes.wordpress.com

 

 

Srebrenitsa Massacre: Genocide of Muslims of Serbs?

Front page / World / Europe

01.04.2010 Source: Pravda.Ru

 

 

 

Serbian Skupshtina criticized massacre of Muslims by Bosnian Serbs in Srebrenitsa in 1995. 127 out of 173 members voted for the document. The events that took place in this Bosnian town are considered one of the most horrifying episodes of Bosnia and Herzegovina war. In the beginning of July, soldiers of the army of Bosnian Serbs broke into the city populated by Muslims and protected by the UN peacemaking forces. Nearly the entire male population of the town was eliminated. The Hague tribunal blames the ex-leader of Bosnian Serbs Radovan Karadzic for the crimes against the humanity and believes the massacre in Srebrenitsa to be one of the most significant episodes. Yet, the supporters of this position often ignore the affairs that preceded those tragic events. In 1992, by the beginning of the war, Serbs accounted for more than a quarter of the town population. Yet, Muslim troops occupied the town killing Serbs and forcing the rest of them flee. In 1993, military initiative changed hands. Bosnian Serbs won back the villages next to Srebrenitsa and surrounded the town. The town, populated by then primarily by Muslims, was taken under the UN shelter. Muslim troops took advantage of it and kept attacking Serbian positions. This made Serbian leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic make a decision to attack the town. In the West, the events in Srebrenitsa have been called the genocide of the Muslims for a long time. However, Serbia, remembering the event before the tragedy of 1995, did not think so. The local community demanded that the world aknowledges the crimes committed by Muslims against the Serbs. Pro-western President Boris Tadic who took office in 2004 came to Bosnia five years ago and criticized the actions of his compatriots. Muslim leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina took advantage of the situation and demanded that Serbia compensates them for the genocide in Srebrenitsa. In 2007 the Hague tribunal accepted the fact but denied compensation. At the same time, Serbia did not accept any official document assessing those events. President Tadic spent several years trying to talk Skupshtina members into accepting a resolution criticizing genocide of Muslims in Srebrenitsa. A few days ago, the resolution was drafted. Yet, there was no unanimous vote, and the parliament was turmoiled. The draft resolution was introduced by Tadic's supporters from the coalition "For a European Serbia" who represented the majority. The document did mention genocide. The authors indicated that the EU has been trying to get this condemnation for a long time. It is one of the stipulations if Serbia wants to join the EU and make peace with its Balkan neighbors The partners of pro-presidential forces from the Socialist party once chaired by Slobodan Milosevic, who died in the Hague prison, were ready to support the document. The only significant condition was that the document could not contain the word "genocide."They justified it with the fact that the biggest losses in the wars accompanying the collapse of Yugoslavia were incurred by the Serbs. The leaders of pro-western Liberal-Democratic party, on the contrary, called for even sterner wording to brand the crimes, end with the shameful past and satisfy the demands of the EU. Nationalistic forces refused to vote for the resolution. Serbian radical party believes that all facts concerning Srebrenitsa were still not revealed. The party representatives believe that the international community has to recognize genocide of Serbs, Jews and gypsies committed during World War II by the Nazi accomplices, Croats and Muslims. As a result, there was a compromise. Parliamentarians acknowledged the crimes committed by their compatriots against Muslims. Yet, there was no mentioning of "genocide" in the document. Additionally, Skupshtina called the world community to acknowledge the crimes committed by Muslims and others against Serbs. Now it is up to the world community. As of now, the Hague Tribunal has not criticized any high ranking Muslim, Croat or Kosovo Albanian who gave orders to wipe out the Serbs. Before, the judges could say that Serbia does not officially recognize its crimes. Now this excuse is absolutely ungrounded. Vadim Trukhachev Pravda.Ru

http://english.pravda.ru/world/europe/01-04-2010/112805-srebrenitsa-0

ABOUT SAHAKASHVILI , THE GEORGIAN OPPOSITION AND FEMALE LOYALTY

ABOUT SAHAKASHVILI, THE GEORGIAN OPPOSITION AND FEMALE LOYALTY

 

The transmission of Imedi Georgian TV, showing a staged Russian attack against Georgia, allegedly launched on 13 March, is still one of the top stories discussed in mass media.
I suppose there is no need considering the reasons for broadcasting this programme that took away the lives of several old people from the Georgian nation, enriching the lamentably impressive list of the victims of the "policy" conducted by Mikhail Sahakashvili. There is another point calling for special attention. On 16 March, the press published the telephone conversation of Georgi Arveladze, Director General of Imedi TV, with Eko Tsamalashvili, the host of the Special Report Programme, that had taken place the day before the aforementioned TV broadcast. During their emotional talk, G. Arveladze refers to the direct instructions given by "Misha" (i.e. Sahakashvili), forcing his employee into airing the programme without notification of its being staged.
In his comments on this material, the Director General of Imedi declared that his conversation had been simulated and made public by the Special Services of Russia. This version, however, is highly doubtful. Firstly, it implies that prior to its publication, the CIA, FIS or FSB organised the airing of the report on a TV channel controlled by the Georgian authorities, which is impossible. Secondly, it is incredible that the broadcast was shown on the initiative of the journalists themselves. Were they dreaming of reaching the glory of Orson  Welles, who frightened half of America in 1938 with his radio version of the War of Worlds? Even Kshishtof Dombrovski, Head of the Polish portal kaukaz.pl who is known for his loyalty to the Georgian powers, stated the following in his interview to Talk FM Radio Station: "This channel used to represent the Opposition, but today... it is controlled by a person from the ruling camp. It is hard to think that such a powerful video could have been released without permission from the supreme powers." Thirdly, the broadcast of the staged chronicle of events following the alleged Russian invasion inflicted such heavy damage on the image of Sahakashvili and his camp outside Georgia that Russia no longer needs to do anything to that end (the statements by the French and British ambassadors, Eric Fournier and Denis Keefe, who severely condemned the broadcast of Imedi, speak for themselves).
The source of the "leakout" of information on the conversation between G. Arveladze and the programme host  should rather be searched for inside Georgia, or among its former citizens who abandoned it for fear of sharing the fate of many Georgian political figures and businessmen who once got in Sahakashvili's way. So let us enumerate the versions that seem more verisimilar:
First ("conflict due to business"): the printed conversation "leaked out" into the press with the efforts of the relatives of the former head of Imedi, Badra Patarkatsishvili, who is trying, by applying to international courts, to restitute the TV company Sahakashvili took from him.
Second ("vendetta in a Georgian way"): in its publication might be involved the former companions-in-arms of the Georgian President, who remain deadly insulted by him—ex-Minister of Defence Irakli Okruashvili, or the ex-representative of Georgia in the UN, Irakli Alasaniya. It might also be of benefit to certain forces in the USA and the West which counted on these political figures.
Third ("oppositional"): the "leakout" of the conversation of G. Arveladze is the response of the Opposition leaders—first of all, ex-Speaker Nino Burjanadze and ex-Premier Zurab Nogaideli—accused by Sahakashvili of treason and ties with Moscow. It might also be viewed as part of the ongoing struggle towards the mayoral elections of Tbilisi, scheduled for the end of May.
Fourth ("clannish"): this story might involve people from the camps of ex-President Edward Shevardnadze, or former "master"of Ajaria Aslan Abashidze (the latter was banished by Sahakashvili), who have lost money and power, but not influence. This is further substantiated by the recent press publications about the February meeting in Batumi between Sahakashvili and Berezovsky. At that time, the runaway oligarch allegedly gave the Georgian President the idea of a TV broadcast on a staged attack. It is beyond doubt that these (and many other) people find it advantageous for themselves to harm Sahakashvili, doing for this everything within their power. However, it remains uncertain how they were technically able to intercept the conversation by satellite. It is at this very point that the fifth ("treachery") version arises. According to it, the transmission showing the Russians' attack against Georgia and the subsequent press expose of G. Arveladze were the consequences of an inner conflict in Sahakashvili's team. As reported by Regnum Agency, Georgian Minister of Interior Affairs Vano Merabishvili violently objected to the broadcast of the staged transmission. For this reason, it was aired when the Head of the Ministry of Interior Affairs had gone abroad. This has given rise to the presumption that the intercepted telephone conversation of the Director General of Imedi was made public by the very Ministry headed by V. Merabishvili.
By the way, until very lately the Minister of Interior Affairs was considered one of Sahakashvili's best companions-in-arms. To him is ascribed the organisation of the majority of the "dark" episodes of the recent history of Georgia connected with the disappearance, or mysterious deaths of many of the opponents of the President, the activity of the so-called "squadrons of death" in the regions of the country inhabited by ethnic minorities, and the establishment of "blocking detachments" (or anti-retreat forces) during the war of August 2008.
Apparently, even this companion-in-arms of Sahakashvili's realises that the collapse of his regime is near and is attempting to dissociate himself from his half-sane boss as soon as possible.

It is evident that not only V. Merabishvili, but also others from the presidential team avoid commenting on the scandal connected with Imedi TV. It is only the female members of Sahakashvili's camp that manifest unswerving faithfulness to him. His Press Secretary Manana Manjgaladze held a pompous meeting with journalists during which she did her utmost to defend "the leader of all Georgians." In her turn, in her attempts to save her boss's image, Secretary of the Security Council of Georgia Eka Tkeshelashvili hysterically called on the Western PR companies to help them (in this field, the authorities of Georgia work in close partnership with David Cracknell's British Firm Project Associates, Public Strategies American Company, as well as prominent PR specialists Daniel Kunin, Gregory Maniatis and others).
However, after the scandal connected with Imedi, even their efforts will hardly be enough for anybody in the West to take Sahakashvili for a political figure of at least partly sound mind.

 

 

Alexei MUKHIN

                                                     Director General of the Centre of Political Information

 

http://www.standard.rs/

Maj.-Gen. Lewis MacKenzie : I'm news in Sarajevo again'

I'm news in Sarajevo again'

OTTAWA — It's the war that won't end. Maj.-Gen. Lewis MacKenzie is once again making headlines in Sarajevo, where, 18 years ago, he led a United Nations peacekeeping operation that attempted to keep Bosnian Muslims and Serbs from killing each other.

"I'm news in Sarajevo again," the now retired officer said Wednesday. "I'm very sensitive to the fact that in Sarajevo today they're reading that MacKenzie said 'Muslims were killing Muslims.' "

MacKenzie is news because Sarajevo papers published remarks attributed to him by Peter Robinson, the American lawyer leading the legal team defending Radovan Karadzic, the former Bosnian Serb leader being tried on war crimes charges before a tribunal in The Hague. The lawyer was in Ottawa this week to interview MacKenzie and others in preparation for Karadzic's defence. In an interview Tuesday, Robinson praised MacKenzie for being "courageous enough to say that, in fact, the Muslims were involved in killing their own people."

However, in an interview with the Citizen Wednesday, MacKenzie said the statements attributed to him were "incomplete" in that they did not reflect his equal denunciation of the Serb forces under Karadzic's command for their indiscriminate shelling of Sarajevo in the spring and summer of 1992.

"There's more than enough blame to go around for all sides," he said, adding that if he was called to testify in the Karadzic case, he would not hesitate to lay blame at the former Bosnian leader's feet. "Of the most serious accusations against Karadzic, I do consider the use of heavy artillery against civilian targets in Sarajevo ... to strike fear into the heart of the population to be a war crime."

MacKenzie and his small UN command arrived in Sarajevo in April 1992. By the time he left on July 31 — and despite his best efforts and those of his under-armed command — much of Sarajevo had been shelled into rubble, hundreds had died, and he was persona non grata with the Bosnian Muslims for not blaming only the Serbs.

But MacKenzie suggested that if fault lies anywhere for sparking Bosnia's descent into civil war, it lies with the United States.

In 1992, under the auspices of the European Community, the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats signed a peace agreement, the Lisbon Agreement, in which Bosnia would be carved into ethnic cantons. But according to some accounts, former U.S. ambassador Warren Zimmermann met the Bosnian Muslim president Alija Izetbegovic and told him that if he withdrew from the agreement and unilaterally declared independence, the United States would support him. In effect, Izetbegovic was encouraged to think he would be establishing the first Muslim nation in the heart of Europe.

However, as far as the Bosnian Serbs were concerned, they weren't going to be ruled by Muslims, who, the Serbs believed, were intent on creating an Islamic fundamentalist state. War was the only alternative once the Bosnian Muslims withdrew from the Lisbon Agreement.

The problem for the Muslims was that the Serbs had the stronger military, and unless they could win international support and intervention, they would likely be defeated.

MacKenzie recalled a meeting with Izetbegovic in which the president said, " 'Look, Gen. MacKenzie, I've been told that when I have 10,000 dead, I'll get intervention. How am I doing?' he was asking me every day, sarcastically." Izetbegovic would never reveal who promised the intervention, MacKenzie said, except that it was a "senior diplomat."

MacKenzie also recalled meeting U.S. congressmen, who told him then president George Bush Sr., "didn't want to touch Bosnia with a 10-foot pole."

Only after Bill Clinton, the Democrat's presidential candidate in 1992, promised to intervene if he was elected, did the Bush administration involve itself in the conflict.

Does MacKenzie hold the Americans responsible for the civil war?

"Let's put it this way, if the EC's plan had been agreed to, and agreed to by Izetbegovic, my personal opinion is there wouldn't have been a conflict Bosnia."

But that didn't happen, of course.

The Bosnian Serbs soon started shelling Sarajevo and, as it seems, the Muslims tried to gain the world's sympathy and U.S. intervention by supposedly staging atrocities against their own people.

"It wasn't a black or white situation," MacKenzie said. "The Serbs were 60 per cent to blame and the Bosnian Muslims 40 per cent.

"To achieve international sympathy there was circumstantial evidence that mortar rounds landing amongst Bosnian Muslim civilians were fired from Bosnian Muslim territory and not from the Bosnian Serb side," MacKenzie said, adding, however, that it was possible at least some of those attacks were perpetuated by "criminal elements" who wanted to keep the fighting going so they could make profits on the black market.

As for the Serbs, while they had "legitimate concerns" regarding the Muslims' political motives and intentions, their means of opposition were, as MacKenzie put it, "disproportionate" to those concerns. "They had a first-world army at their disposal, but you don't just sit back and use heavy weapons" on civilians.

The Serbs, in effect, lost the public relations war. When a few dozen members of the international media were watching every move the Serbs made, reporting every shell that hit a marketplace, it was "stupid" to use heavy artillery on civilian populations.

MacKenzie said he would like to put the issues and recriminations behind him, but that luxury has not been granted. Indeed, over the last decade he's been asked half-a-dozen times in one war crimes case or another. He expects he will be again.

"It seems I'm in it for life."

Robert Sibley is a senior writer for the Citizen.

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