U.S. blunders by recognizing Kosovo independence

http://www.freep.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080331/OPINION02/803310308/1070

DETROIT FREE PRESS (USA)

COMMENT

U.S. blunders by recognizing Kosovo independence
BY JAMES A. PALMER

March 31, 2008

The United States' decision to recognize the independence of Kosovo is the
most recent in a series of mistakes regarding the breakaway Serbian
province. America has been making ill-fated decisions in the Balkans for at
least a decade and a half. What separates this bungling of Kosovo from its
prior decisions is that the recognition of Kosovo's independence will have
deleterious effects on international law and cause consequences in the
region and beyond.

The main problem is that Kosovo's independence undermines a system of
international law that America helped create and from which it benefits
greatly. The United Nations Charter enshrines the inviolability of state
sovereignty. In recognizing Kosovo without a UN Security Council resolution,
the United States and its European allies have weakened two of the
fundamental principles of international law: that states are free to
determine their internal composition and that their territorial integrity
must be respected.
To make matters worse, the United States and the European Union have adopted
a wildly expansive interpretation of Security Council Resolution 1244, which
placed Kosovo under UN administration and provided for Kosovo's autonomy
within Serbia. Under this interpretation, administrative authority is being
transferred from the UN-sanctioned mission in Kosovo to an EU mission that
has no legal mandate in the province and whose prospects for success rely on
Serb participation, which is far from guaranteed. Already, ethnic divisions
are hardening into a de facto partition of the territory between Albanian
and Serb-controlled areas.

Another problem caused by Kosovo's independence is the precedent it sets for
ethnic enclaves within other sovereign states. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice's claim that "Kosovo cannot be seen as a precedent for any
other situation in the world today" misses the point. It is doubtful that
separatists from Xingjian to Catalonia will accept the niceties of Rice's
argument that Kosovo is exceptional due to its political and legal history.
It is much more likely that these separatists will view the conflict for the
precedent that it is: the carving off of a sovereign state's territory in
favor of an ethnic and religious minority threatening violence -- a model to
be replicated elsewhere.

Russia has been particularly outspoken against Kosovo's independence because
of its concern that its restive Caucasian provinces will follow the Kosovo
precedent. The United States currently requires Russian cooperation on two
issues of great strategic importance to America: counterproliferation
efforts against Iran and the implementation of new missile defense systems
in Central Europe. Irritating Russia and spending useful political capital
on a tiny, economically stagnant, breakaway region will only make Russian
cooperation less likely -- even on issues that concern its security.

Finally, Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence has only reinflamed
the divisions and enmities of the 1990s -- not a time that any of us should
want to revisit in the Balkans. The declaration of Kosovo's independence has
emboldened Albanians in Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia in their calls for
the creation of "greater Albania."

There is also the possibility that the largely Serbian north of Kosovo will
decide to secede and ask its Serbian kinsmen to protect it. Will America
defend Kosovo's sovereignty after having destroyed Serbia's?

The decision to recognize Kosovo's independence was foolish. In doing so,
the United States and its European allies have undermined international law
and opened the door to separatist movements worldwide to follow suit.
Relations with Russia are being strained at a time when America needs
Russia's cooperation. Most disturbing of all, the Balkan tinderbox could be
reignited at any point. No amount of wishful thinking by our foreign policy
leadership will fix the damage that's been done.

JAMES PALMER, 26, grew up in Royal Oak, attended Dondero High School, has a
degree in political science from Denison University in Ohio, and is a
student in the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University in
Medford, Mass. He can be reached by e-mail at james.palmer@tufts.edu.

Is Kosovo the End of Europe?

http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article606.html

MAINSTREAM (INDIA)

Vol XLVI, No 15

Is Kosovo the End of Europe?
Saturday 29 March 2008, by Ash Narain Roy

Rene Magritte, the celebrated Belgian surrealist painter, once painted an
apple and wrote on it, "This is not an apple." He did the same on a pipe.
Today, he could as well paint his country, Belgium, and certainly Kosovo,
the youngest nation in the world, and write, "This is not a country."
Belgium is collapsing under the weight of its own contradictions, with its
majority Dutch-speaking, many French-speaking and few German-speaking
citizens unable to decide what and for whom the state stands for. Kosovo is
a self-inflicted pain and the world will not be able to withstand it given
the can of worms its creation has opened. Mitrovica, witnessing intense
violence, may emerge as a flashpoint of new conflict. Serbia is thinking of
inviting Russian troops into Serb-dominated northern Kosovo as peacekeepers
that may undermine the authority of the NATO-led KFOR peacekeeping mission,
creating the potential for conflict leading to the partition of Kosovo.

Kosovo's independence has dealt a blow to the nation-state. Many wonder if
the nation-state in the 21st century is going out of fashion and whether a
model of multi-cultural living, the hallmark of the nation-state, is on way
to redundancy. In any case, China and Russia seem moving towards 19th
century-style nationalism, militarism and assertive-ness. Many states would
follow them.

Kosovo's declaration of independence has won enthusiastic to grudging
approval from some and vociferous to mild disapproval from others depending
on which side of the fence one is sitting. But it has placed India on the
horns of a dilemma. New Delhi is only studying the evolving situation as
there are "several issues" involved in the declaration. There was a time
when India took pride in being right than in being diplomatic. Today hard
realities of "national interests" and pragmatism have become the main
yardstick of its foreign policy. Silence and discretion are in, moralising
is out. That perhaps explains what Shashi Tharoor says, why India feels
comfortable with the "Burmese junta, than its janata". India's flirtations
with the US and the desire to occupy the UN high table with the help of
Washington are also coming in the way of taking a principled stand on global
issues.

But New Delhi's virtual silence on Kosovo is fraught with far-reaching
consequences. It is unfortunate that even on an issue that concerns its own
minorities and sub-national movements, India has chosen to look the other
way. As the CPI-M mouthpiece People's Democracy says, "at least on such a
vital issue as the sovereignty of countries with minority populations and
the challenges to a basic principle of international law, India should speak
up." Kosovo has created a new precedent and twisted international law that
separatists all over the world would use to further their interests.
Kashmiri separatists like Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Shabbir Shah and Yasin
Malik have already said that they see Kosovo as a ray of hope. North-East
militants and the Naxalites would not be far behind in extracting some
mileage out of Kosovo. Spain's Basque and Catalan separatists have also
welcomed Kosovo's independence with a banner like, "Today Kosovo. Tomorrow
Catalonia". Ethnic Albanians in Macedonia have also intensified their
autonomy demands, an obvious road to independence. Many believe the upsurge
of violence in Tibet is not unrelated to Kosovo.

WHAT is the American gameplan in Kosovo? Russia certainly sees a red signal.
Kosovo is a dress-rehearsal for redrawing boundaries in Eurasia and the
Middle East. It is a new balkanisation, part of American and German
geo-strategic plan, to tame Russia. The goal is to drive a wedge in the
Balkans to advance a spurious form of European integration. A clear pattern
is discernible. Since the former Yugoslavia was a thorn in the
American-German flesh, it has been systematically targeted. The NATO bombing
of Yugoslavia in 1999 was a well-devised plan. It was no coincidence that
Bosnia-Herzegovina was divided along ethnic and religious lines-Serb, Croat,
Bosniak, Christians and Muslims. To these ethnic-religious divides have been
added further sectarian divisions within Christianity-Eastern Orthodoxy
versus Roman Catholicism.

Facts speak for themselves. Bosnia's Constitution was written at a US Air
Force base in Dayton, Ohio by American and European experts. Efforts are now
on to establish a Greater Albania which will bring together what are now
Albania and Kosovo as well as adjacent parts of Serbia and Montenegro,
Western Macedonia and the north-western regions of Greece.

Kosovo has created a new divide even in the ranks of European states. While,
Germany, Britain, Italy and France have recognised Kosovo, countries like
Spain, Greece, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus have opposed Kosovo's
independence. There is a perception among multinational, multi-ethnic and
multicultural states that Kosovo's independence will give a new lease of
life to separatists in their own midst-Basques in Spain, Tiroleans in Italy,
Hungarians in Romania and the like.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has reacted most vehemently calling
Kosovo's independence as the "beginning of the end of Europe". Moscow is
right in maintaining that Kosovo's independence will rekindle fire in the
frozen conflict zones-Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria etc. Way back
in 1992, South Ossetia had declared independence from Georgia. Only thanks
to the presence of Russian peacekeepers a bigger conflict was avoided.
Russia has not recognised South Ossetia as yet, but it could exercise that
option. Moscow has also hinted that the Kosovo precedent could be invoked in
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh. In fact, Moscow has decided to
withdraw from a CIS treaty imposing sanctions against Georgia's breakaway
region of Abkhazia. It is not hard to imagine what happens if Russia decides
to use the Kosovo approach to resolving conflicts in its own backyard. Even
supposing Russian troops are sent to Serb-dominated northern Kosovo, it
could create a flashpoint of conflict.

Is the US trying to appease the Muslim world by its support for Kosovo and
thus seeking to make up for the folly of the Iraq war? It is possible that
some Muslim regimes may see the American gameplan in that light. But what
kind of message is Washington conveying to the Iraqi Kurds? The US says it
is backing a federal Iraq where Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans, Assyrians as also
Shias and Sunnis could live together. Can Iraqis be blamed for thinking that
the federal formula is a cover to break the country?

The West's stance is inconsistent and self-contradictory. If it supports
Kosovo's independence, why does it oppose the independence of Flanders in
Belgium? Few believe Kosovo will actually be free; it will become a
protectorate of the EU. What is worse, Kosovo is likely to see the
Serb-dominated parts walking away. In pursuing their geo-strategic
interests, the US and Germany may end up reviving old chauvinist passions
and creating a monster that may turn their dream into a nightmare. It is too
dangerous to fiddle with the Balkans' fault lines. The US smiles at Kosovo
only to frown at Russia. Come on America! Your bare teeth are showing.

The author is the Associate Director, Institute of Social Sciences, New
Delhi.

Bold steps to Europe

Bold steps to Europe

Vuk Jeremic

March 28, 2008 11:30 AM

http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/vuk_jeremic/2008/03/vuk_jeremic_serbia_kosovo.html

Five weeks ago, the provincial authorities in the Serbian province of Kosovo unilaterally and illegally declared their independence. Around 30 countries have recognised this illegitimate and destabilising act, setting back the region's European membership perspective.



The vast majority of UN member states are not following suit,
uncomfortable with a precedent that is making the international system
unstable. International law has been grossly violated, and a revival of
the global debate about the legitimacy of internationally recognised
borders has been triggered. This needs to be addressed, not wished
away. For there are clearly dozens of Kosovos throughout the world,
happy that an attempt has been made to legitimise unilateral secession
in the international system - and pleased to have been provided with a
detailed plan on how to achieve success. Accordingly, many existing
conflicts may escalate and new ones could be instigated. Already the
recognition of Kosovo has increased the danger that the doctrine of
imposing solutions to ethnic conflicts will be legitimised, that the
right to self-determination will be transformed into an avowed right to
independence.



Recent events
in Kosovo, triggered by Pristina's unilateral declaration of
independence, suggest that the situation is dangerously close to
escalating beyond control. It is important to realise that we are all
in this together, and that we must find a way forward together.

The first step requires talking to one another honestly and
respectfully. We have to address the real life concerns of the
province's most vulnerable, and we have to pay attention to the human
cost of our actions. The alternative is a frozen conflict solidified by
entrenched, maximalist positions that only perpetuate the continuation
of defensive, self-preservationist moves that drive us further apart.
We must therefore work to instil the confidence necessary for all the
western Balkans to once again take bold, historic steps to full EU
membership.



This brings me to the second step. Serbia's president, Boris Tadic,
spoke recently of his willingness to sign the stabilisation and
association agreement
with the EU immediately. Were that to happen, Serbia and the rest of
the region would be put back on the EU membership fast-track, justly
gaining entry into one of the world's greatest political projects.

The third step involves the tricky question of the future status of
Kosovo. Sooner or later, responsible stakeholders will realise that it
cannot achieve sustainable prosperity without Belgrade. Once this sinks
in, an opportunity will be created in which, perhaps for the first
time, a true negotiation can take place between the parties - one that
leads to a mutually acceptable compromise.



This will not be easy. But the alternative is for Kosovo to remain in
limbo, unattractive to foreign investment, unresponsive to the rule of
law and unable to control its freefall into failure.



The formula for success revolves around finding a way to satisfy the
right of Kosovo's Albanian community to substantial self-governance
while remaining under a common sovereign roof with Serbia. Anything
less than that constitutes a fundamental threat to our democratic
development, the European future of southeast Europe and the legitimacy
of the international system that has brought unprecedented prosperity
to the world since 1945.



Serbia is ready to take all three of these steps, because we believe
that Serbs and Albanians must find the courage to act in wisdom and in
conscience, propelled by a hope that beckons us on in this time of
trial. To build on this hope is a bold and solemn purpose. It requires
men and women confident in their strength, compassionate in their
hearts, clear in their minds and steady in their vision. The time is
ripe for daring.

NATO's Balkan Destiny

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120658092416867333.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

WALL STREET JOURNAL (USA)

OPINION

NATO's Balkan Destiny

By ANTONIO MILOSOSKI

March 27, 2008

SKOPJE, Macedonia

The NATO summit in Bucharest is less than a week away. Yet Macedonia's bid
to join the trans-Atlantic alliance hangs in the balance. Strangely, the
problem is the name of my country, which Greece doesn't recognize, and not
our record on civil and military reforms, which Macedonia has been
diligently pursuing.

Seven years ago, Macedonia was a net security consumer. We're now a net
provider with 3.5% of our troops engaged in security missions abroad --
mainly in Afghanistan. Ninety percent of our citizens support NATO
membership, a rarity in this region. Support for the alliance unites the
multiethnic Macedonian society and cuts across ethnic, party and social
lines.

Our close cooperation with NATO goes back to its 1999 intervention against
the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia. Macedonia was the key country in
the region in assisting the alliance, providing infrastructure and logistics
for NATO combat operations. We also opened our doors to 380,000 Kosovo
refugees who found a shelter in Macedonia. Some stayed on to make their
lives in Macedonia.

Kosovo remains a pressing security issue today, and Macedonia is honoring
its end of the bargain. We are the host country of the logistics
headquarters for KFOR, the Kosovo stabilization force. It is operated by the
Macedonian army and financed through our budget.

Kosovo's independence last month changed the security and political outlook
for the Balkans. We still don't know what the end game will look like. Much
progress was made in the recent years in the Western Balkans in terms of
keeping stability and expanding our economies. This has been achieved in no
small part thanks to the positive roles played by the EU and the U.S. in our
region in the last decade.

But there are numerous potential sources of instability. Political
structures in Kosovo are underdeveloped. Political cohesion in the region is
weak. From a security perspective, NATO is still needed, particularly in and
around Kosovo to help administer borders and keep a close watch on
trafficking and organized crime.

Positive messages from the EU and the U.S. on integration into NATO and the
EU are vitally important. NATO membership is a staple of progress in our
region. To this extent, progress, stability and prosperity will be enhanced
in the Balkans if Albania, Croatia and Macedonia are invited to join NATO
next week in Bucharest.

The more states from the Balkans we have joining NATO, the less NATO we will
need in the Balkans. The alliance would then be freed up to cope with
challenges further a field

Considering what's at stake, Macedonia's NATO membership shouldn't be held
hostage to a bilateral dispute with Greece over my country's name. But
that's just what has happened in recent months.

Our soldiers are fighting in Afghanistan shoulder to shoulder with the
Greek, Americans, the Dutch, and others. No one minds the label "Macedonia"
on their uniforms. Macedonia was asked to fulfill the Membership Action Plan
(or MAP) criteria to be considered for NATO membership. This we did.

Our issue with Greece is a bilateral one. We are prepared to settle it
together with our Greek friends. We are ready to compromise. But we won't be
pushed into accepting a solution concerning our name as a condition of
getting into NATO.

My country remains committed to the 1995 Interim Accord where we agreed --
with the UN serving as the guarantor -- that neither Macedonia nor Greece
will block the other's membership in international organizations.

NATO membership and the start of the accession talks with the EU are the two
bottom-line priorities for Macedonia -- no matter who's in power. But
Macedonia will not yield to pressure.

NATO isn't where the name issue should be decided. Let's keep the alliance
focused on security. With that in mind, it should be clear that excluding
Macedonia from the club will do nothing to boost security in the Balkan
region. It may even bring about the opposite result.

Mr. Milososki is foreign minister of Macedonia.

wsj.ltrs@wsj.com

Will Kosovo be turned over to the Pentagon?

Will Kosovo be turned over to the Pentagon?
19:59 | 25/ 03/ 2008


MOSCOW. (RIA Novosti international commentator Tamara Zamyatina) - Predictions made by experts before Kosovo's illegal declaration of independence are coming true - the territory seized from Serbia is turning into a big military base of the United States and NATO.
Thus, George W. Bush ordered arms shipments to Kosovo. Because of this, Moscow insisted on an emergency session of the NATO-Russia Council - it will be held in Brussels on March 28.
Incidentally, Bush issued this order two days after the Moscow visit of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who urged Moscow to promote cooperation, expand consultations, and display more openness in general.
The haste with which the Pentagon is trying to take the fledgling Kosovo under its wing demonstrates the West's lack of confidence that peace will come to the Balkans after Kosovo's cessation. But the West was actively using this rhetoric - the need to put an end to the Yugoslav crisis - in order to justify its support for the Kosovo separatists. There can be no peace when one side is being equipped with weapons against the other. This means pouring more fuel on the fire...
The Serbs have already got the message. In the city of Kosovska Mitrovica (in northern Kosovo), they desperately rushed to defend their last shelter - a courthouse. Previously, it was the venue of Serbian justice, but now it is occupied by international lawyers who will turn it over to their Albanian colleagues. Blood was spilled there during clashes with peacekeepers. There are numerous rallies in Belgrade supporting the Serbian minority in Kosovo.
The city divided into Albanian and Serbian parts by the Ibar River will be a bone of contention for a long time to come. Belgrade has already sent an appeal to the UN, demanding that Kosovo's northern region adjacent to Kosovska Mitrovica with a compact Serb population be returned to Serbia. These people primarily need physical protection, but the advocates of Kosovo's independence are not likely to be worried about that. In the first half of the 1990s, Western countries shut their eyes to the expulsion of 300,000 Serbs from Croatia. They won't bother about a mere hundred thousand. People in Belgrade say that if 300,000 birds suddenly left a region, the world would be alarmed, but it did not even notice the Serbian tragedy.
One of the reasons behind Washington's decision to supply Kosovo with arms is its intention to keep Kosovska Mitrovica in Kosovo, because it is a turbulent and strategically important Serbian city. But the main goal is to give Kosovars carte-blanche to suppress the protests in Serbian enclaves on Kosovo's entire territory. This opinion is held by Yelena Guskova, head of the Balkans Crisis Center at the Institute of Slavic Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences.
Arms shipments to Kosovars are designed to legalize future Albanian efforts to oust the Serbian minority from the province. In other words, the Kosovars are given a chance to complete what they have started - drive non-Albanians out of the province, but with their own hands so as not to cast a shadow on the NATO-led KFOR peace keepers, not to mention the United States.
It seems that Kosovo will be the first state under NATO's complete protection. The KFOR peacekeepers have been a guarantor of order in the province for nine years now. Considering the intentions of Albania, Macedonia, and Croatia to join the North Atlantic alliance at its summit in Bucharest on April 2-4, Kosovo may become NATO's most powerful support in the Balkans. The Pentagon has already built the world's biggest military base on its territory - Camp Bondsteel. Now it has started the construction of a second military base, Guskova said.
Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, is convinced that Washington, at least under the current administration, does not need stability in the Balkans or the rest of Europe: "The United States cannot influence events in a stable situation. If it is calm in Europe, the United States has nothing to do there. U.S. political strategy is based on control through chaos." He mentioned that as far as he knows, initially Washington will supply Kosovo with small arms and armored vehicles without heavy equipment. Subsequently the Albanians will be trained for air force and tank units.
Under the circumstances, there is little Russia can do. Guskova and Ivashov believe that in addition to humanitarian aid to the Serbian enclaves in Kosovo, the Kremlin could suggest bringing Russian peacekeepers into the district of Kosovska Mitrovica. Russian experts are actively discussing the introduction of Russian peacekeepers into Serbia's southern regions bordering on Kosovo. But pro-Western President Boris Tadic is not likely to turn to Russia with such a request. Hence, Russia will have to use only diplomatic levers. As for economic levers - Kosovo's participation in the South Stream gas project - Russia either did not want to use them, or failed to do so.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080325/102208039.html

Serb PM accuses NATO bombers of cynical land grab

Serb PM accuses NATO bombers of cynical land grab

By Douglas Hamilton
Reuters
Monday, March 24, 2008; 9:21 AM

BELGRADE
(Reuters) - Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica marked the anniversary of
NATO's bombing of Serbia on Monday with an attack accusing the West of
cynically grabbing territory in the name of humanitarian intervention.

"Now
it is more than obvious that the cruel destruction of Serbia during the
NATO bombardment had only one aim: to turn the province of Kosovo into
the world's first NATO state," he told the state news agency Tanjug.

NATO
began bombing strategic targets in Serbia on March 24, 1999, and kept
it up for 78 days until the late strongman Slobodan Milosevic agreed to
pull his forces from Kosovo and end the killing of Albanian civilians
in a counter-insurgency war.

Launching the first war in its
history, and freighted with a failure to act in Bosnia, the alliance
said it would not stand by and watch another bloodbath in the Balkans
by Serb forces.

Kosovo has been run by the United Nations and
patrolled by NATO troops since June 11, 1999. Its 90 percent Albanian
majority declared independence on February 17 with Western support.

The
European Union, which Serbia wants to join, plans to deploy a
supervisory mission in the country, following a blueprint set out by
United Nations envoy Martti Ahtisaari.

"The illegal construction
of the huge American military base Bondsteel and Annex 11 of the
Ahtisaari plan -- which enshrines NATO as the ultimate authority in
Kosovo -- reveal the true reason why Serbia was mindlessly devastated
and why on February 17 a NATO state was illegally declared," Kostunica
said.

When Serb voters toppled Milosevic in 2000 and elected
Kostunica, the West greeted him as a reformist. But Kostunica is now
the loudest voice of Serb nationalism, leaning to Russia for support and strongly anti-Western in his daily rhetoric.

"UNPATRIOTIC" LABELLING

Kostunica's
10-month-old coalition government collapsed this month under the strain
of deep divisions over Kosovo. President Boris Tadic would not agree to
freeze Serbia's EU aspirations as Kostunica wants, until it revokes its
recognition of Kosovo.

Serbia faces a May 11 election with this as the key issue.

"The
next two months are going to be potentially very difficult, if not
dangerous," said former U.S. ambassador to Serbia, William Montgomery,
in a weekly commentary.

He predicted Kostunica and fellow
"isolationists" would try to keep Kosovo centre stage by means of
provocations and confrontations with NATO and the United Nations.

"The
Prime Minister will continue his tactic of taking hard, nationalistic
positions and forcing his political opponents to choose between meekly
swallowing their objections and following his lead like sheep or
appearing 'unpatriotic'," he wrote.

Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci, a guerrilla in the 1998-99 conflict, said NATO fought for the right reasons.

"The
people of Kosovo express their life-long gratitude to NATO and all
countries that supported this just war...in support of the highest
values of western civilization -- freedom, peace and democracy," he
said in a statement. "Today Kosovo is free."

Kostunica on Sunday
accused NATO troops and U.N. police of using "snipers and banned
ammunition" to quell a riot in the Kosovo Serb stronghold of Mitrovica
last week.

A Ukrainian U.N. policeman was killed by a Serb
grenade and a Serb rioter badly wounded. The United Nations and NATO
say the violence was instigated by Belgrade.

Defense Minister
Dragan Sutanovac, of Tadic's pro-EU party, said the start of NATO
bombing was "the saddest day in the recent history of our nation, when
we showed that we didn't understand the world, and the world understood
us even less."

"I hope we've learned the lesson from those
events, that we think much more in political not military terms, and
that it's better to negotiate for 100 years than to have a day of war."

(Edited by Ibon Villelabeitia)

© 2008 Reuters

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/24/AR2008032400902_pf.html

Kosovo a Month After: Quo Vadis?

http://www.mw.ua/1000/1600/62441/

ZERKALO NEDELI (UKRAINE)

28 March 2008

Kosovo a Month After: Quo Vadis?

Author: Nazar BOBITSKI

It has been a month since unilateral proclamation of Kosovo independence.
During that time the eyes of the international media have been fixed on the
dramatic protests of the Serbs of Northern Kosovo, a seemingly unstoppable
but geographically limited stream of international recognitions and frantic,
mostly diplomatic efforts by Belgrade to stem it. Ukraine and other
countries anxiously reacted to attempts by other separatist regions to use
Kosovo events as a 'road-map' to advance their own cause. So far these
attempts in breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia have amounted to nothing
more than mere copycats of public appeals by Kosovar leaders to third
countries and international organizations. A far-reaching step was taken by
Moscow to withdraw from the CIS sanctions against Abkhazia and legalize its
long-standing trade ties with the region.

The media fixation on the situation in Mitrovica and Belgrade has pushed to
the background some other events which yet may play a decisive role in the
fate of Kosovo. On February 28 in Vienna representatives of 15 countries
which recognized Kosovo held the first session of what was called the
founding meeting of the "International Steering Group for Kosovo". Along
with the US delegates, the session was attended by representatives of 12 EU
Member States as well as Turkey and Switzerland. The group derives its
mandate from the provisions of Ahtisaari Plan. According to the Plan, were
it approved by the UN Security Council, the governance of the province would
have been discharged by the international steering group of countries which
would appoint an 'international civil representative' for this purpose. The
international civil representative would at the same time hold the post of
the EU special representative for Kosovo.

However, the next day after the group's session the UN Secretary General
received the letter from the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs pointing
out at the lack of legality in the status of the 'international steering
group' and its 'international civil representative'. In the opinion of
Serbia, it renders illegal the activities of the group and its
representative in Kosovo as they constitute the breach of sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Serbia. Belgrade also considers as illegal attempts
to transfer the governing powers from the UN Mission in Kosovo, which it
considers legitimate under the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, to the
'international steering group'. On the same day, February 29, the Serbian
position was officially supported by Russia in the UN Security Council. As a
result the UN Secretary General was obliged to officially notify the
government of Slovenia as a current EU Presidency about objections of
certain UN Security Council Members against the transfer of powers of the UN
Mission in Kosovo to the EU Special Representative.

These developments may help shed light on the profound problem of governing
Kosovo which currently stays in the shadow of other events. With the absence
of the decision of the UN Security Council on Kosovo status, in particular,
on the fate of Ahtisaari Plan, the status of the EU special representative -
'the international civil representative' has murky legal grounds. Therefore,
it casts doubt on the status of the EU special mission to Kosovo sent there
to assist the EU special representative. This doubtful position raises the
question of the ability of the mission to fulfill its primary task -
implementation of Ahtisaari Plan which in essence is about bridging the
unbridgeable - granting independence to Kosovo while securing the greatest
possible autonomy and safeguarding the interests of the province's Kosovo
Serb community. The attempts by the EU mission to implement the Plan will
inevitably meet resistance from the newly-made sovereign Kosovo authorities.
Their resistance will only grow with realization of the fact that Kosovo
independence came about not as a result of the will of the international
community through the UN Security Council decision but as a result of their
sovereign choice as a people in accordance with the principle of
self-determination.

We can only ask ourselves whether the Albanian leaders of Kosovo will be
responsible and wise enough to accept the EU way even if it leads to
considerable devolution of their power in favour of their old adversaries,
the Serb minority. The entire history of interethnic relations in the
region speaks against it. In the pessimistic scenario the EU special
representative and the mission will be forced to regularly adapt the
Ahtisaari Plan to the realities on the ground. However, with each and every
compromise and derogation the relevance and hence legitimacy of the Plan
will be undermined and along with it - the mandate of the EU
representatives. Once again the European Union will find itself in a
situation of a hostage of those for whose fate it has assumed
responsibility. The gravity of the situation is further compounded by the
fact that the EU primary political weapon to deal with instabilities in the
region - the promise of membership, is currently out of reach for Kosovo as
the EU still lacks internal consensus to recognize a new state, let alone to
negotiate new contractual links for trade, political association and so on.

In these circumstances the best course of action for Serbia and the Serb
inhabitants of Kosovo seems to be cessation of acts of violent dissent which
only divert the international opinion and turn them into the villains of the
situation. Instead, Belgrade should pressure the EU as a de-facto authority
in the province to take all necessary measures to protect human rights and
rights of Serbian minority in Kosovo. It should emphasize that any further
progress in bilateral dialogue as well as peace in Northern Kosovo will
obviously depend on it. This approach does not in any way entail Serbia's
approval of Ahtisaari Plan or the surrender of its sovereignty over Kosovo.
The time will show to what extent the Serbian government will be able to
adopt a more rational posture and not build its position mostly on the basis
of emotions.

On top of that, in the absence of the 'blessing' by the UN Security
Council, the continued activities of the 'international steering group for
Kosovo' may lead to certain controversial outcomes elsewhere. The group has
a clearly regional (West European) mould which limits her moral authority to
speak on behalf of 'the international community'. At the same time, it shows
the way for similar 'regionalized' settlements of other 'frozen' conflicts.
For instance, another 'steering group' can be easily propped up by the
countries of another region or a regional grouping of Europe to assume
interim governance of breakaway provinces without much need for
international legitimacy. However, the probability of the second group is
quite low as its potential sponsors will soon painfully discover their true
position in the international pecking order of power of influence as
measured in the number of international recognitions. This is why one should
not expect any time soon any new steps by Russia towards recognition of
Abkhazia or South Ossetia. It is much more profitable politically for Moscow
to play a role of the defener of primacy of international law and the
exclusive role of the UN Security Council to settle regional conflicts
rather than pursue a dubious course of wrecking the Georgian state.

For Ukraine this situation, riddled with controversies, dictates to refrain
from any actions leading to recognition of Kosovo's independence. At this
stage it seems more beneficial, as well as right from the point of view of
international law, to call the parties in question to respect the UN Charter
and the exclusive powers of the UN Security Council. Ukraine should also
protest vigorously against any attempts to use Kosovo as a precedent for the
settlement of the other 'frozen conflicts' around the world.

Kosovo's independence and how the West presided over ethnic cleansing

George Jonas on Kosovo's independence and how the West presided over ethnic cleansing
Posted: March 19, 2008, 1:40 PM by Marni Soupcoff
George Jonas

Last month, the Serbian province of Kosovo declared its independence. This week, Canada became the 31st country to recognize it. Foreign affairs critic Bob Rae wondered what took our government so long. Well — perhaps we hesitated recognizing what we went to war for because we recognized that we should have hesitated going to war for it.

Wait a minute, someone might say. Canada didn’t go to war in 1999 as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to help Kosovo secede from Serbia. That would have been like Germany dismantling Czechoslovakia in 1938 to liberate the Sudetenland. We only participated to prevent what we believed was an attempt at ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.

Yes, well, so much for the best-laid plans of mice and men. The forces of Western liberalism that went into Kosovo to prevent ethnic cleansing ended up presiding over it.

It was exactly four years ago, during the last week of March, that nearly 1,000 Serbs fled their homes after Albanian Muslims attacked Serb Christians in their churches and villages. News agencies quoted Admiral Gregory Johnson, U.S. Commander of NATO forces for Southern Europe at the time, saying: “This kind of activity almost amounts to ethnic cleansing.” Almost? By the spring of 2004, an estimated 200,000 Serbs had been driven from the province.

To prevent the expulsion of Kosovar Albanians by Serbs, NATO engaged in a war that ended up facilitating the expulsion of Serbs by Albanians. Had this been an unforeseeable result, it might be excused — but it was predictable. Had it been the West’s aim to wrest Kosovo from Serbia, NATO’s entry into the conflict would have made sense. As it wasn’t, it didn’t.

Our bias for multicultural models of nationhood made us reluctant to support Croatian, Slovenian and Bosnian ambitions for independence in 1990-91. Though a prompt and unequivocal Western endorsement of self-determination might have averted bloodshed altogether, we didn’t want to see the multicultural federation of Yugoslavia, a model we liked, break up into its ethnic/religious components. Then, when war became inevitable, we needlessly prolonged the conflict through a vapid UN arms embargo imposed on all factions in September, 1991 — which naturally gave an edge to the better-equipped Serbs. The savage war had an extended run, especially on the Croatian front, due to our humanitarian-pacifist folly.

Slow to protest against the illegitimate ambition of multicultural Yugoslavia to forcibly keep in its fold three nations that wanted to separate, we came down like a ton of bricks on ethnic Serbia for its far more legitimate ambition to preserve the country’s territorial integrity against the secessionist guerrillas of Kosovo. Washington, which resisted recognizing genuine, if splinter, nations such as Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia until April, 1992, was quick to launch Stealth bombers to ensure the autonomy of ethnic Albanians in a Serb province. As a multiculturalist thug, the late Slobodan Milosevic was a protected species. As a nationalist thug, NATO declared an open season on him.

Why did the West go to war in Kosovo? Probably for three reasons. One, to make the world safe for multiculturalism; two, to appease the Muslim world; and three, to avert another humanitarian tragedy in Europe. Though hardly evil motives, in the circumstances all three amounted to a profound misreading of the time and place to which they were being applied.

The Kosovo conflict was the flower children’s war, waged by politicians who emerged from a ‘60s generation of confused peaceniks, eco-freaks, and draft resisters. After a life-long opposition to everything NATO stood for, Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, Gerhard Schroeder, Javier Solana, and their friends hijacked the alliance to act out their mushy liberal fantasies of fitting every region into the Procrustean bed of a multicultural dream. They failed to notice that Albanians had even less interest in multiculturalism than Serbs; that the Muslim world wasn’t being appeased; and that for every Albanian saved from being ethnically cleansed in the region, a Serb was being condemned to it.

The law assumes that people intend the natural consequences of their acts. I wonder what we thought the natural consequences of putting NATO’s air force at the disposal of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) would be – other than eventual secession. Canadians are lucky Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, Gerhard Schroeder and Javier Solana weren’t in charge of the alliance in 1970 when Pierre Elliott Trudeau brought in the War Measures Act. They might have put NATO’s air force at the disposal of the FLQ.

Serbs lash out at Ottawa

http://www.thestar.com/News/Canada/article/347701

TORONTO STAR (CANADA)

Serbs lash out at Ottawa

TheStar.com - Canada - Serbs lash out at Ottawa

TARA WALTON/TORONTO STAR

Thousands of ethnic Albanians rally in Queen's Park in Toronto yesterday
afternoon after Kosovo's parliament proclaimed independence, a decade after
a bloody separatist war with Serbia.

Envoy sees trouble looming with Quebec as Canada recognizes Kosovo's
independence

March 19, 2008

Allan Woods
Ottawa Bureau

OTTAWA-Canada's decision to recognize Kosovo's independence will set a
dangerous precedent should Quebec sovereignists ever win a referendum,
Serbia's ambassador to Canada warns.

Dusan Batakovic, expressing his anger over Ottawa's controversial decision,
said Canada has shown disrespect for Serbia's constitution, for United
Nations resolutions and international law with its decision to back the
breakaway republic, which unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia
a month ago.

By the end of the week, Batakovic will return to Belgrade as a sign of
Serbia's displeasure with Ottawa.

Batakovic said yesterday the Kosovo decision could come back to haunt
Canada.

"Imagine that Quebec, for instance, proclaims independence in the same way
that Kosovo did, unilaterally. Would Ottawa then recognize Quebec as an
independent country?" he asked. "How would it react if other countries,
without notifying Ottawa, recognize an independent Quebec?"

Foreign Affairs Minister Maxime Bernier, announcing Canada's position
yesterday, said the strife that preceded Kosovo's separation from Serbia
makes it a "unique case" with which Quebec sovereignists can draw no
parallels.

"The unique circumstances which have led to Kosovo's independence mean it
does not constitute any kind of precedent," Bernier said.

He noted that many of Canada's allies have recognized Kosovo, bringing
Ottawa's decision into line with a "new international reality."

Serbia will today deliver a diplomatic note of protest to the Canadian
government charging that Ottawa is violating United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1244, a legally binding document that, according to Batakovic,
defines Kosovo as part of Serbia. The 1999 UN resolution sets out the terms
for the international intervention in Kosovo to end fighting.

Canada was part of a NATO force that intervened militarily in Kosovo in 1999
to stop Serbian attacks on the civilian population. Kosovo, which is 90 per
cent ethnic Albanian, has not been under Serbian control since the NATO
force moved in after massive air strikes.

A UN mission has governed Kosovo since, but Serbia, backed by Kosovo's
Serbs - who make up less than 10 per cent of the population - refuses to
give up the territory.

Opposition parties agreed with the government that there was a significant
difference between the situation in Kosovo, prompted by a civil war and the
campaign of ethnic cleansing almost a decade ago, and that of Quebec, where
grievances are primarily cultural.

Liberal foreign affairs critic Bob Rae said it is irresponsible to suggest
the situation in the Balkans sets a precedent for Canada. "It would be wrong
for anyone to suggest any such thing," he said.

But sovereignists are taking heart at the international support for Kosovo's
independence, and some observers say Canada's recognition could form an
important part of the dossier for Quebec separation should a referendum
succeed.

Because Kosovo declared independence without first consulting the Serbian
government, Quebecers would similarly have no obligation to consult Ottawa
before separating, the argument goes.

"Certainly this can be used as an instrument in a range of arguments that
can be presented by the sovereignists, that the federal government has
recognized the legitimacy of this kind of process ...," said University of
Montreal professor Pierre Martin.

Quebec has held two referendums on separation, in 1980 and 1995. Both have
failed to come up with the majority support of Quebecers.

In the aftermath of the near defeat of the federalists in the 1995
referendum, Liberal unity minister Stéphane Dion, now the party leader,
drafted the Clarity Act setting out the terms and conditions that would
govern secession from Canada. It was passed into law in 2000, but has never
been tested.

In 1999, the Supreme Court said Quebec has no right under the Constitution
or under international law to unilaterally secede.

While Dion is reviled by separatists in his home province, he backs Kosovo's
independence because of its bloody history and because NATO has been
enforcing a buffer zone between Serbia and Kosovo.

Included in the 30 countries that have now recognized Kosovo are the United
States, the United Kingdom, France and Australia.

- With files from The Canadian Press

A Second Look at Kosovo

http://www.nysun.com/article/73213

NEW YORK SUN (USA)

OPINION

A Second Look at Kosovo

BY EUGENE KONTOROVICH

March 19, 2008

Kosovo's succession from Serbia, while winning applause in Washington and
Europe, is a grave defeat for international law and international order.

Kosovo's independence did not come about unassisted. This summer, America
and Europe went to the United Nations Security Council seeking authorization
and legitimacy for partitioning Serbia between the Serbs and secessionist
Albanians. The Security Council refused to authorize the carve-up of an
existing country along ethnic lines - consistent with the international
rejection of dividing Iraq into three ethnic states.

Having failed to win Security Council approval, America and Europe simply
indicated to the Kosovars that they could announce independence anyway.
Serbia of course, cannot resist the succession militarily, as Kosovo has
been held by NATO troops since 1999. Thus the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization is providing the vital military cover for Kosovo's
independence. Kosovo did not simply tear itself away from Serbia. It was
conquered from the Serbs by NATO and the West, and handed over.

So America makes a pitch to the Security Council, gets rejected, and then
does what it was going to do anyway. Sound familiar?

The defiance of international law dates back to NATO's original intervention
in Kosovo in 1999. Responding to Serb abuses against the ethnic Albanians in
the region, NATO launched a campaign of aerial bombardment against Serbia.
The Security Council also refused to authorize this action, and
international lawyers widely agree that despite its humanitarian motives,
NATO's war was completely illegal. Further, since even small military
casualties could spoil public support of a poorly-understood war, the
bombing was carried out from high altitudes to minimize military causalities
at the expense of greater collateral damage.

The Serbian military was finally kicked out of Kosovo, and an incipient
ethnic cleansing halted. NATO forces secured the province. On NATO's watch,
the Albanians turned the tables, perpetrating ethnic cleansing on the Serbs,
a large proportion of whom were chased out of the province through murders,
church burnings, and pogroms. With their security forces barred from the
province by NATO, the Serbs, who are a majority in Serbia but a minority in
the Kosovo province, were powerless to defend themselves. NATO deserves the
credit for stopping the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo's Albanians, but must
bear at least some responsibility for the ethnic cleansing of the Serbs.

The Kosovars invoke the international law principle of self-determination.
They constitute 90% of the population in the region, having bolstered the
ratio by evicting most of the Serbs, gypsies, and any other minority who
lived there.

Yet self-determination is no guarantee of independence. The Tamils in Sri
Lanka, the Russians in Transdniester/Moldova, the Kurds in Turkey, Syria,
Iraq, and Iran; Uighurs in China, Chechens in Russia, and similar groups in
dozens of other countries also predominate in a particular region, and have
made massive and violent efforts to win self-determination.

Yet in all these cases, the policy of the West is either indifference or
outright opposition to succession. It seems self-determination is a
principle of very selective application. Indeed, the Serbs in Kosovo are
actually a majority in one well-defined enclave; they themselves wish to
succeed, but the new Kosovar government will hear nothing of Serb
self-determination within Kosovo.

An important ingredient of Kosovo's success in achieving self-determination
seems to be their constant threats of violence. The Kosovar prime minister,
a former leader of an armed rebel movement, often warned of "dangers" and
"unforeseeable consequences" if the province were not allowed to succeed.
With 16,000 NATO troops in the area, the last thing Europe wanted was an
insurgency that could become a jihad-magnet.

As a result, NATO and America have become parties to the carve-up a
sovereign state that they subdued by force. To say that this goes against
the core principles of the U.N. Charter is an understatement. For
international law, the entire process is a string of humiliations. The
Security Council comes out looking like a joke; the right of
self-determination looks like it depends on the product of a group's
ruthlessness and proximity to Europe; peacekeepers are hostages; and
sovereignty is trumped by the threat of terror.

Mr. Kontorovich is a professor at Northwestern University Law School,
specializing in international and constitutional law.

Serbia, Kosovo, the US and the UN

http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles/55684

AMERICAN CHRONICLE (USA)

Serbia, Kosovo, the US and the UN
Dr. George Voskopoulos

March 18, 2008

The recent crisis in Kosovo has taken by surprise only those who are not
aware of the problems south-eastern Europe has faced in the post-Cold War
era. It should be ana-lyzed on different levels with a view to providing
answers to specific questions refer-ring to statehood, stability and the
United Nations system.

First, the unilateral declaration of independence on the part of a Serbian
province, whose vast majority is populated by ethnic Albanians, sets the
dilemma originally set in the early post-Cold War era of setting priorities
between stability and human rights. It is obvious here that priority was
given to human rights although recent history has shown that any solution
that does not support territorial stability is destined either to fail or
produce undesired side-effects such as the revolt of ethnic Serbs in
northern Kosovo.

Once again it is obvious that out-of-system interference by powerful actors
has trig-gered reactions and threatens stability and peace in the region.
Kosovo has been an historic symbol for Serbs ever since the Ottoman era
consequently territorial changes could not be accepted by ethnic Serbs. The
violation of human rights in the region during the Milosevic era provided
the desired by separatists, nationalists and former warlords ground for
establishing an independent statelet that lacks basic sustainability
criteria such as a democratic system of governance, lack of the rule of law
and a par-liamentary system that will allow Serbs to express themselves.

The issue here refers to what this new state can add to the Balkan conundrum
and what our expectations are from its leadership. First current Albanian
leaders in Kos-ovo were part of the belligerents that caused turmoil in the
region. It was the Ameri-can government that had labeled them terrorists in
the recent past. A drastic change of mood led to a second evaluation and
offered them support in becoming the acknowl-edged leaders of a state,
epicenter of a number of illegal activities in the region namely drugs,
weapons and human trafficking. Second, the solutions could not be ac-cepted
by Belgrade because Serbs were not offered substantial carrots.

On the contrary, the country was territorially mutilated without receiving
an alterna-tive. To those who have studied the region and lived there it is
obvious that a weak Serbia, a wish materialized in sequences by foreign
interference, is not a step towards stability and intra-Balkan cooperation.
It leads Serbia to total isolation, assists nation-alism, deprives it of
incentives to cooperate with the world community and drives it to political
instability. Belgrade holds the key to regional stability and peace in
south-eastern Europe and this was evident in the 1990s crises. It triggers
once again dreams of greatness and territorial expansionism on the part of
nationalists. These could be used by any powerful intruding actor who would
decide to reactive south-east Euro-pean tectonic plates.

Finally, the decision to support a unilateral declaration of independence
overlays the normative, regulatory role of the UN, a policy supported by
those who envisage a post-UN world order based on power. Eventually it was
the very same policy many condemned when they reacted to S. Milosevic regime
and its tactics. In the future the decision may activate pockets of
instability, although naïveté suggests that it is a sui generis case.

The Balkans once again has become the battleground of great power
competition. Russia is moving in using its energy policy and its traditional
ties with the Slavs, while the US is reacting by turning it into a NATO
fortress.

The only sustainable solution is to advance a human right regime delinking
human rights from territorial issues and border changes. The long
inaugurated effort to weaken Serbia and turn it into a minor player in the
region has jeopardized efforts to stabilize the Balkans and incorporate
Belgrade into the euro-Atlantic core.
__,_._,___

Kosovo: Worst still to come

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=18772

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY NETWORK (SWITZERLAND)

Kosovo: Worst still to come

As Serbia tries to prove that Kosovo Albanians and Serbs cannot live
together, the Kosovo Serbs embark on a peaceful boycott, but an incident in
Mitrovica leaves one UN policeman dead and hundreds injured, Anes Alic and
Igor Jovanovic report for ISN Security Watch.

By Anes Alic and Igor Jovanovic for ISN Security Watch (18/03/08)

Rioting in the divided town of Kosovo Mitrovica has left one Ukrainian UN
policeman dead after suffering fatal injuries in clashes with Serb
protesters following a Kosovo Serb attempt to take over a court house in the
city.

In Kosovo, it is not at all difficult to foment unrest and create
atmospheric incidents to prove that the two groups cannot live in harmony.
It is in the interest of Serbian authorities to show to the world that
Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs cannot coexist peacefully; while it is now
in the interest of Kosovo Albanian authorities to prove the opposite.

The most recent incident in the northern city of Kosovska Mitrovica, divided
by Serbs and Albanians, illustrates these points well.

More than 100 Serb employees of the local court, including judges, entered
the court building last Friday after three weeks of peaceful protests,
demanding to be returned to their offices.

They had been driven out of their offices in August 1999 and replaced by
international staff and ethnic Albanians who had quit their jobs during the
rule of Slobodan Milosevic. The Serbs have continued to work within the
Serbian Justice Ministry system, but from their private homes and premises.
The international community in Kosovo had earlier announced that this
parallel judicial system was soon to be suspended.

The government of Kosovo demanded that the United Nations Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK) evict the "hooligans" from the court. UNMIK turned to the Serbian
government to restore order, calling on Belgrade not to "interfere in Serb
areas of the new state." Serbian authorities in Belgrade have denied any
involvement in the incident.

The siege of the court reached its climax on Monday when some 100 UN police
troops stormed the court and retook control from the Kosovo Serbs.

The action triggered mass protests by the Serbs, during which at least two
UN vehicles were set on fire and police used tear gas to disperse the crowd.

According to media in Belgrade, at least 70 Kosovo Serbs were injured in the
process. International sources say at least 30 UN and NATO troops sustained
injuries.

The UN police backed by NATO troops were forced to withdraw from Serb areas
of Mitrovica after being attacked by demonstrators while a UN convoy was
transporting some 50 detained protesters from the court.

International troops were also injured in an explosion, thought to have been
caused by a hand grenade. Machine gun fire was later heard.

Action plan
In December 2007, two months prior to Kosovo's declaration of independence,
the Serbian government adopted an action plan that was to be put in place
after Kosovo authorities announced the province's secession. One of key
notes from the plan was the strengthening of links with Serbs living in the
northern Kosovo enclaves by taking back the authority they lost there in
1999.

The action plan was labeled a state secret, hence its details were never
revealed in public. Now, however, it is certain that a portion of the plan
referred to the strengthening of Serbia's institutions in Kosovo, especially
in the north where the most compact Serb enclaves are located. This area is
physically close to Serbia and is home to some 40,000 of the remaining
120,000 Serbs in Kosovo.

But Serbia is seeking only the de facto partitioning of Kosovo: After all,
should it win an official partition of northern Kosovo, it would lose
approximately 80,000 Serbs who live south of the Ibar River, practically
surrounded by Albanians.

If Serbia agreed to the partitioning of Kosovo, it would mean abandoning
those people, along with numerous important churches and monasteries south
of the Ibar. As such, Belgrade will fortify its position in northern Kosovo
and as much as possible in the enclaves south of the Ibar.

In the meantime, and perhaps with this in mind, reports say that hundreds of
Kosovo Serb families from those south Ibar enclaves have begun selling their
homes and settling in northern Kosovo and in Serbia proper.

Unconfirmed reports from ethnic Albanian sources claim that Kosovo Serb
paramilitary groups have been using scare tactics to force Kosovo Serbs in
the south to relocate to the north to make partitioning feasible.

Tricky transfer
Since Kosovo declared unilateral independence on 18 February, Serbia has
advocated taking control of the Serb enclaves in the province, which have
been under UNMIK protection since 1999 and are not set to be transferred to
the new independent Kosovo institutions.

Serbia is calling for the implementation of UN Resolution 1244, which it
believes guarantees the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. The
Kosovo Serbs still hold authority in health care, local self-government and
energy in these enclaves.

Milan Ivanovic, head of the Serb National Council of northern Kosovo, the
most powerful Kosovo Serb organization, told ISN Security Watch that the
Serbian government should have started taking over authority in the north
much sooner.

"That is the only option, because the Serbs from northern Kosovo and south
of the Ibar River do not want to accept the institutions run by the
Albanians on behalf of the phantom and false state of Kosovo," Ivanovic
said.

Commenting on the potentially negative reaction from the Kosovo Albanians to
the Serbs' initiative, Ivanovic said that at the moment one should not worry
too much about potentially causing violence, but should insist on firmly
advocating the necessity of the Serbian state's presence in Kosovo.

"The Albanians have been very convincing before the international community
with the policy of threats and violence, unlike the servile official Serbian
policy, which had even before the unilateral declaration of independence
made it clear that our response would be peaceful, and that we would defend
our integrity and sovereignty only with diplomatic means," Ivanovic said.

However, Momcilo Trajkovic, leader of the Serb Resistance Movement, which
comprises the Serbs living south of the Ibar River and in the enclaves, is
dissatisfied with the Serbian government's moves regarding the takeover of
institutions.

"It is difficult to assess the government's tactics, as few people are
familiar with the details of the action plan. Such activities might lead to
the partitioning of Kosovo, but they might also be linked to positioning in
the north, aimed at better control of the situation in the territory south
of the Ibar," Trajkovic says.

He also said that a policy favoring the division of the province would be
ill-advised because 65 percent of the remaining Serbs are located south of
the Ibar River and partitioning would expose them to Albanian attacks.

"Partitioning would be disastrous for Serbs living in enclaves. The essence
of our battle is not in northern Kosovo, but south of the Ibar. That is
where our historical monuments are, the symbols of our statehood and
culture, but I fear that the government wants Serbia to stretch from
Subotica [in the north] to Kosovska Mitrovica [also in the north] in the
future," he said.

Trajkovic also criticized Belgrade's decision to give 80 percent of the
financial aid meant for all of Kosovo's Serbs to representatives in the
north, without consulting enclave leaders.

The internal boycott
So far, Kosovo Serbs have taken several major steps that indicate what their
future tactics will be.

It seems they are nearly unanimous in boycotting Kosovo institutions, saying
that life under ethnic Albanian rule is impossible.

Some 300 Serb policemen in the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) refused to take
orders from their superiors and are demanding that they remain part of the
UNMIK police chain of command, as they did before Kosovo's declaration of
independence. They were then suspended and handed in their weapons and
uniforms peacefully.

There are about 800 Serbs in the KPS, some 10 percent of the overall
service, which is in proportion with the population of Kosovo; around 400
Serb policemen in the north have remained under UNMIK command, and therefore
are not rebelling; some 50 people have taken sick leave or vacations, hence
they are still officially members of the KPS; and some 100 workers at the
Lipljan prison are demanding that Serbia resolve their status because or
they will quit their jobs.

In another case, the Serbian railway company, Zeleznice Srbije, tried to
take over the railroad in northern Kosovo in early March. That part of the
railroad, on the Lesak-Zvecan route, is very important because it links
northern Kosovo with the Serb enclaves in the central part of the province.

Despite attacks on trains in the past, this is believed to be the safest
means of transport for the Kosovo Serbs inside Kosovo and to Serbia proper.
Since UNMIK has dismissed Belgrade's attempt, the railroad has been
inoperative.

"If no agreement is reached with UNMIK, an impasse will occur, which will
neither allow UNMIK to start organizing traffic by force, because it lacks
the manpower, nor the Serbian railway company to operate," Zeleznice Srbije
General Manager Milanko Sarancic recently told Belgrade media.

Even Serb members of Kosovo parliament and government are boycotting those
institutions. Prior to the declaration of independence, there were 10 Serb
members of parliament and two in the government, the constitutionally
guaranteed seats for them, even though Kosovo Serbs boycotted the elections.
All of them froze their mandates after the 18 February declaration of
independence.

However, all Kosovo Serbs employed in Kosovo's public services, such as
municipalities, schools and the health-care system, are being delegated and
paid by Serbian government, and their salaries are double those of their
colleagues in Serbia proper.

Rough ride for EU
Belgrade is fighting its battle on another front by refusing to acknowledge
the European mission (EULEX), and pledging its cooperation only to UNMIK,
which arrived in Kosovo in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1244.

Following the official example, Kosovo Serb civilians are also cooperating
only with UNMIK and KFOR, and not with the EU mission (which has not been
positioned in northern Kosovo) or the Pristina institutions.

The EU is putting tremendous pressure on UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon to
mark the end of UNMIK's mission and invite EULEX to take over. However, the
secretary-general is also facing an intense drive from Russia and other
countries that have sided with Belgrade, which leaves UNMIK on the field.

Last week, the EU admitted that the takeover of authority would require more
than the initially planned 120 days. Some members of the EU even think it
would be wise for UNMIK to remain in the Serb enclaves.

"The situation is still volatile, particularly north of the river Ibar, in
northern Kosovo," the chairman of the EU Council of Ministers Dimitrij Rupel
told a press conference at the end of the meetings of the Council of
Ministers in Brussels last week.

Rupel said UNMIK should take control of a border between Serbia and Kosovo.
The Slovenian foreign minister admitted that the planned transition between
UNMIK and EULEX would take longer and will require more effort.

Peter Feith, the international civilian representative in Kosovo, says that
his mission is not coming to Kosovo to establish a NATO state, adding that
it is politically impossible to admit a mistake and go back to the previous
state of affairs.

In a 12 March interview for the Serbian Vecernje Novosti daily, Feith said
his first impression after coming to Kosovo was "it could have been worse,"
adding that the worst was perhaps still to come.

The EU envoy went on to say that the EU mission would attempt to be as
"invisible" as possible, adding that it was necessary for the Kosovo cabinet
to assume power. In addition, he stressed that if Pristina tried to endanger
the Serb community in Kosovo, he would not hesitate to use his powers, even
if that meant dismissing and banning the violators of the rules.

Anes Alic, based in Sarajevo, is ISN Security Watch's senior correspondent
in Southeastern Europe and the Executive Director of ISA Consulting.

Igor Jovanovic is ISN Security Watch's senior correspondent in Serbia and
Kosovo. He is based in Belgrade.

Kosovo spurs more Greater Albania dreams

Encouraged by Kosovo’s independence, Albanians in
Macedonia are now discussing ambitious plans for a new country made up of
Albania, Kosovo, large parts of Macedonia and part of Ipiros in Greece.

If you walk down the streets of Skopje, the capital city of Macedonia, the
signs and the language is Slavic.



But if you drive just 25 kilometres on, it appears to be a completely different
country where the language and tradition is Albanian and the religion is Muslim
- that’s Tetovo. In 2001, civil war broke out there between Albanian and Slav
populations. Nowadays it’s more peaceful.



Small restaurant owner Agim Berzati says Albanians are treated as second-class
citizens in a country where they make up at least 30% of the population. He’s
Albanian and the food he serves up is traditional kebab and shishlik alongside
Turkish coffee.



”We are born here and deserve equal rights. Macedonians don’t give us equality.
I don’t feel they treat us with respect. There were lots of things we fought
for and were promised in 2001, but nothing has been implemented,” he
complained.



But what has changed though is Kosovo’s declaration of independence. For
Mustafe Hasani it was the dream of a lifetime. He spent a month in prison for
his political activities and for years he’s donated part of his salary to
developing an independent Kosovo.



”We only want an ethnic Albania, for all the Albanians in all the countries
to get together. Now is the end of protest and war. Now we Albanians have to
get educated and then we’ll get what we want. Albania is like our mother,
Kosovo is our father,” Hasani thinks.



What many Albanians want is a greater Albania that incorporates the country Albania,
Kosovo, big parts of Macedonia and part of Ipiros, which is in Greece.



Tailor Shahin Osmani, Albanian who has lived all his life in Tetovo believes a
greater Albania is inevitable and will happen once the country becomes part of
the European Union:



”There will be a time of great Albania in the future, maybe after thirty
years. History repeats itself, and if we get into the European Union, borders
will be eliminated. We’ll be free and it’ll be like having a greater Albania”.



But it’s not a certainty that Macedonia will join the European Union, largely
because Greece objects to it using the name Macedonia.







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http://www.russiatoday.ru/news/news/21950

Kosovo: once again a political pawn

http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/michael_boyle/2008/03/kosovo_once_again_a_political_pawn.html

GUARDIAN (UK)

COMMENT IS FREE

Kosovo: once again a political pawn
Michael Boyle

March 11, 2008 1:30 PM

In the last few weeks, it has become increasingly clear that Kosovo's
declaration of independence on February 17 did not settle the matter once
and for all. The newly independent Kosovo is a tense place, roiling with
ethnic incitement in its predominantly Serbian north and struggling to
survive amid rumours of a potential partition. Worse still, it is a pawn in
two overlapping political games: first, between the US, EU and Russia and
second, between its ethnic Albanian Kosovo leadership and the Serbian
government.

The first thing that should be clear is that nobody walks out of this mess
with clean hands. That Kosovo would have to be independent was probably
inevitable. The campaigns of ethnic cleansing led by Slobodan Milosevic
expelled nearly 800,000 people from Kosovo (nearly 90% of the population),
and killed - according to an American bar association estimate - nearly
10,000 people. It's hard to imagine that the Kosovo Albanians who returned
to the province after this assault in 1999 could ever imagine themselves
again being part of Serbia, no matter how democratic it became or how much
minority protection it offered.

But that does not mean that all of the players can absolve themselves of
responsibility for this crisis. Both the US and the EU deserve a fair amount
of blame for tabling UN resolution 1244 in 1999, which promised to resolve
Kosovo's status at some unspecified future point. This "kick the can down
the road" approach might have worked if it was tied to a clear strategy to
get Serbia to accept Kosovo's independence. But it was rather an attempt to
gloss over a nearly intractable issue, while minimising the political
consequences for the political leadership at the time. This left the
successors of Clinton and Blair with a ticking time bomb and no particularly
compelling options for how to defuse it.

What has emerged now - a declaration of independence which makes even
European states that fought to protect Kosovo uneasy - is evidence of this
lack of strategic forethought. Recognising the independent Kosovo may have
been the least bad option, but it certainly did not need to happen with the
level of political cost that it incurred.

The European Union should also not congratulate itself on its behaviour in
Kosovo. While it has played an important role in state-building and in
deploying peacekeepers and police to prevent the outbreak of violence, it
nevertheless held on to the hopes of a negotiated settlement with Belgrade
for too long and proved reluctant to play hardball with Serbia.

For example, the EU could have made Serbia's admission into the European
Union conditional on its peaceful acceptance of a negotiated independence
for Kosovo. But this was a bridge too far for the EU, due to internal
opposition by its members, and thus it spent years experimenting with
unworkable proposals for things like "conditional independence".

Its preference for a negotiated settlement may have increased the political
shocks after independence happened. The EU-backed Athissari plan, which
promised a quasi-independent status for Kosovo, was a compromise, but one
which was fundamentally unacceptable to both Pristina and Belgrade. It was,
essentially, another "kick the can down the road approach" and in avoiding
the issue it may have magnified the severity of the political reaction from
Albanians and Serbs alike.

Moreover, when independence happened, the EU appeared to be caught almost by
surprise and, astonishingly, insisted on no common policy for the legal
recognition of Kosovo among its members. This has meant we have a new state
recognised by only some of the states in the regional organisation it wants
to join.

At the time of UNSCR 1244, Russia was happy to accept this sleight-of-hand,
to end the war and to rein in Milosevic's Serbia before the situation got
out of hand. But today we are dealing with a very different Russia: a surly
but resurgent power that resents the American and European posturing about
the democratic future of Kosovo. The Russia that Putin built is more than
happy to keep the Kosovo issue in play just to dish some humiliation back to
the US and the EU.

Keeping Kosovo as an issue in play has also paid off financially and
politically for Russia. Russia capitalised on its backing of Serbia and by
cutting several deals over gas and oil with Belgrade and then by suddenly
repositioning itself as the champion of international law against rogue
secessionist states. This is either ironic or cynical, because Russia is
simultaneously using the Kosovo precedent to openly flirt with the idea of
recognising Georgia's breakaway republic, Abkhazia, just to settle some old
scores. No matter how much it protests that Kosovo's independent was a
dangerous precedent, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Russia has
benefited most from this bungled affair.

Both Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanian government in Pristina have also been
playing games with the Kosovo problem. On top of allowing rioters to attack
the US embassy, Belgrade has formally rejected the independence of Kosovo,
and instructed its 120,000 citizens to cut off all ties with the government
in Pristina. It has also fomented the dreams of a "soft partition" where the
Serbian community lives apart from its Albanian neighbours, without
specifying how this would happen or how exactly how this impoverished and
vulnerable community should sustain itself once it happens. Beyond denial,
what positive future is Belgrade offering the Kosovo Serbs once independence
is an established fact?

In a sign of how messy things are getting, the Kostunica government
collapsed yesterday, as the prime minister dissolved the government due to
concerns that his coalition partners are insufficiently committed to "the
battle to preserve Kosovo". This is a clever move: first to reconstitute the
government in May with hardliners who will make the Kosovo issue their top
priority, and secondly to exploit the divisions in the EU by forcing it to
clarify how it can admit both Serbia and Kosovo, given that some EU member
states do not recognise the partition and some do. It promises only a bigger
headache for the EU in the years to come.

Finally, the Kosovo Albanian government in Pristina cannot be absolved of
its responsibility for this mess. During the period after the war, the
interim Albanian government often turned a blind eye to reprisal attacks
against Kosovo Serb civilians (often allegedly by KLA splinter groups) and
watched with indifference as Serbs, Roma and other minorities were expelled,
trapped and harassed in enclaves. Now Pristina claims the moral high ground,
with Agim Ceku calling on the international community to stand up to Serbian
extremists to protect Kosovo's freedom.

While Pristina has every right to protect itself, it will need to recognise
the legitimate security concerns of the Kosovo Serbs and starts taking
serious measures toward providing them with jobs and a future in the new
Kosovo. Pristina will get nowhere by insisting on the purity of its moral
position while remaining blind to the sins of the KLA or to the needs of its
most vulnerable.

What we see in Kosovo at the moment is not an example of careful statecraft
at the level of great power politics, nor of considered and reasoned attempt
at reconciliation between Albanians and Serbs. The Kosovo situation is a
mess because its independence has become a bargaining chip in a series of
overlapping games for political power. All of these games are conducted at
the expense of the Albanian and Serbian citizens of Kosovo, who would
certainly trade them for some kind of hope for their future.

letters@guardian.co.uk

Government Falls in Belgrade

http://www.chroniclesmagazine.org/?p=529

Government Falls in Belgrade

by Srdja Trifkovic

Far from indicating Serbia's readiness to cower into the vivisection
kennel, Tadic's victory on February 3 was the last chance for the U.S. and the
EU to stop the Kosovo trainwreck. Both Washington and Brussels decided to play
va banque instead. Serbia's resulting anger against the West will translate
into the well-deserved demise for the DS and other "pro-Western
democrats" at the parliamentary election on May 11.

*************************

The collapse of Serbia's government on Saturday was unsurprising and
necessary. Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica finally stated what we've known
for months: that his coalition government "has no united policy any more
on an important issue related to the future of the country, on Kosovo as a part
of Serbia." The immediate cause of the split was the refusal of two
pro-Western parties in the coalition to support Kostunica's position that
Serbia would only seek to be integrated into the EU if it can be so in its
entirety, including Kosovo.

The underlying causes of the rift are complex. Their explanation requires
semantic clarity that is absent among Western analysts of Balkan affairs and
their Serbian colleagues alike. Thirteen years of Slobodan Milosevic's rule in
Serbia have left many ugly marks on the political and cultural scene of the
country. One of them, of a secondary order yet illustrative of the
country's mood, is the reluctance of participants in Serbia's public discourse
to use certain eminently useful words, such as "conspiracy," and
"treason." [ ... ]

In reality there had been many full-bloodied conspirators, enemies,
and traitors among the Serbs' foes throughout the 1990s. In 1993, for
instance, Bill Clinton actively conspired with the mullahs in Tehran to smuggle
arms to Bosnia's Muslim mujaheddin, in blatant violation of the very UN
resolution which the United States had proposed a year earlier. Albright's
brutal ruse at Rambouillet in February 1999, executed with all the subtlety of
Reinhardt Heydrich or Zia ul Haq, was a conspiracy against peace par
excellence. Its perpetrators were Serbia's enemies in the
technical, rather than ideological, sense of that term.

A semantically precise description of political events is the prerequisite
for their proper understanding and analysis. We need those words to explain
accurately and adequately what has been going on in connection with Kosovo over
the past few months.

THE CONSPIRACY

In the final quarter of 2007 we've witnessed a coldly premeditated
conspiracy by the United States administration to prevent any possibility of
compromise in Kosovo. Earlier statements by various U.S. officials, from Mr.
Bush and Ms. Rice down, that Kosovo's independence was "inevitable"
and that it would be achieved "one way or another" (June-July 2007)
were a classic case of policy makers actively torpedoing a diplomatic outcome
they dislike - and then claiming that the failure of "diplomacy" had
been preordained, and therefore an imposed solution was necessary.

This same trick was played by then-U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade, Warren
Zimmermann, when he actively sabotaged the Bosnian peace accord brokered by the
Portuguese Presidency on behalf of the EU in early 1992. Zimmermann flew
post-haste to Sarajevo to tell Alija Izetbegovic that the U.S. would support
him if he were to renege on this agreement. The rest is history: Izetbegovic
followed American advice, thereby igniting the Bosnian civil war. Zimmermann,
his masters at Foggy Bottom, and the White House all share the responsibility
for the bloody results.

The present American conspiracy over Kosovo went far beyond engineering the
failure of diplomatic efforts. It was focused on getting the EU to follow the
Diktat from the Potomac. The doubters were to be cajoled, threatened, maligned
as Russian stooges, or otherwise press-ganged into submission. As
Slovenian analyst Tomaz Mastnak noted in the latest issue of Foreign Policy in Focus, this behind-the-scenes collusion
revealed two violations with regard to Kosovo:

The United States, with Slovenian assistance, sought to circumvent the
European political process - not to speak of the UN. And Kosovo itself, by
unilaterally declaring independence, violated international law. These two
violations - of a political process and of the rule of law - will come back to
haunt Europe and the United States in the coming months and years.

Slovenia plays a disproportionately important role in this story, Mastnak
explains, because it assumed the European Union presidency on January 1, 2008.
A week before, on Christmas Eve 2007, a top official of the Slovenian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, its Political Director Mitja Drobnic, had a meeting in
Washington with Daniel Fried, assistant secretary of state for European
affairs, his deputy Rosemary DiCarlo, and Judy Ansley, NSA senior director for
European affairs. An internal Slovenian report of this meeting was leaked to
the Slovenian daily Dnevnik and the Belgrade daily Politika and
published on January 25. Their authenticity was beyond doubt, causing the
immediate resignation of Mr. Drobnic.

According to Drobnic's minutes, the Americans presented a list of demands,
including "a mention of Iraq and rogue states, such as Iran, Burma, and
Syria" in the US-EU declaration at the forthcoming summit in Ljubljana.
Regarding Kosovo, the conversation was a careful orchestration of the timetable
for independence. Drobnic asked for help with obtaining the UN Secretary
General's statement in support of sending the European Security and Defense
Policy mission to Kosovo, "since some EU member states have difficulties
with making the decision to send the ESDP without the UN agreement." Fried
responded that "the UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon is under the pressure
of the Russian Federation and thus in a difficult position," but the U.S.
had assurances that the UN was not going to put restrictions on the sending the
mission. Washington, he explained, "will help the UN Secretary General in
the case of difficulties with the Russian Federation, while [Slovenia] has to
achieve within the EU the sending of the ESDP in the shortest time."

As Mastnak points out, the decision to send the ESDP mission to Kosovo was
of key importance for the United States, since it was effectively replacing the
UN mandate over the province with the EU mandate. In pushing that decision
through, Fried was clear: "one can ignore the critical positions and
statements of the Russian Federation and Serbia." His deputy Rosemary
DiCarlo noted that it would make sense if "the session of the Kosovo
Parliament, in which they pass the declaration of independence, were to be on
Sunday, since this way the Russian Federation would not have the time to call
for the UN Security Council. In the meantime, the first recognitions would
already have happened."

Fried further told the Slovenes that "the US is drafting the
constitution with the Kosovars" and that the situation on the ground was
"promising." Fried added, "The US hoped that the Kosovars would
not lose confidence in themselves, because that would mean that the US will
lose its influence."

Both by the formal and substantive criteria, the U.S. Kosovo policy in
general and Daniel Fried's behavior in particular is a classic case of
CONSPIRACY: the pursuit of illegal and illegitimate objectives through secret
association with other plotters. Mr. Fried's manner of a mastermind telling his
Euro-underlings how to stage a heist offers far more incontrovertible evidence
of conspiratorial culpability than, say, the Hague "Tribunal's"
accusation against Milosevic or Seselj that they had forged a conspiracy for
the creation of a "Greater Serbia."

The US-EU plot is not aimed only at Serbia, Russia, and those EU members
that oppose Kosovo's independence. Let us recall that Swedish foreign minister
and former premier Carl Bildt declared last December that the EU should seek to
maintain a "mere appearance" of respect for international legality.
In reality the trans-Atlantic Kosovo conspiracy is directed against the very
foundations of the global legal and political order, and therefore against
peace as such. This is a capital crime par excellence under the
Nuremberg Rules.

THE TRAITORS' SWAN SONG

There is no more overtly inimical act in international relations than taking
territory away from one nation for the benefit of another. Throughout history
it has been a perfectly legitimate casus belli. Accordingly, the proponents of
Kosovo's independence are stricto sensu Serbia's enemies, just as the
proponents of the Munich Diktat in September 1938 were the enemies of the
Czechs. Accordingly, Under-Secretary of State Nicholas Burns - Daniel Fried's
boss - "explained" why UNSC Resolution 1244 did NOT prevent
Kosovo's secession in terms worthy of a Ribbentrop or Molotov:

The language referring to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the
Former Republic of Yugoslavia is mentioned in the resolution's preamble, not in
any of its legally operative language. In other words, while UNSCR 1244 aimed
for a negotiated agreement, it did not prejudge the ultimate outcome and did
not legally require a negotiated agreement.

By this standard of "legality" this world is a Hobbesian jungle in
which the life of small nations that do not obey the will of Messrs Burns,
Fried, and their ilk, is nasty, brutish, and short. By allowing its Kosovo
policy to be shaped by these dysfunctional bureaucrats and recognizing the
monster of its own creation, the United States government - the
Conspirator-in-Chief - has declared itself as an enemy of Serbia in the purely
value-neutral sense, just as the proponents of a "free" Chechnya are objectively
Russia's enemies. This is the context needed to understand the motives of
demonstrators who damaged an auxilliary wing of the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade
just over two weeks ago.

Within Serbia there are prominent "pro-Western" political leaders
and top-level state officials belonging to the "reformist" and
"pro-European" parties who have coordinated their domestic political
strategies with the likes of Messrs. Burns and Fried, and their Euro-ilk. By
any normal, i.e. non-ideological yardstick they are guilty of treason:
of criminal disloyalty manifest in actions that undermine or jeopardize the
interests of their nation and state. There is ample prima facie evidence of
such culpability among Tadic's coterie. The recent presidential elections, for
example, were called on December 12, 2008, by the Democratic Party without
prior agreement among coalition partners - but in agreement with, and the
approval of, Washington and Brussels.

Contrary to Mr. Burns' stated expectation of "a period of
stability" after Kosovo's declaration of independence, the U.S. policy has
destabilized the Balkans and divided the world. The good news is that the
polarization will finally debunk the myth of the "International
Community." If about a half of all sovereign states, accounting for more
than two-thirds of the world's population, are not on board with the United
States on this issue - intense pressure, threats and promises notwithstanding -
the result will be a long-overdue and welcome loss of face and credibility by
the global-hegemonist "foreign policy community" inside the Beltway.

Mr. Burns' confident expectation that, after some passing anger, Serbia
would "take its place in the European Union in the future and in a better
relationship with NATO and as a friend of the U.S." is as absurd as his
"legal opinion" on UNSC Resolution 1244. The flames in the U.S.
embassy in Belgrade were easy to put out, but the country's anger is deep and
the people's resentment of America abiding.

President Boris Tadic's narrow victory (51 percent) in the second round of
the presidential election on February 3 was entirely due to his claim that, as
a pro-Western reformist, he could obtain less brutal treatment for Serbia from
Brussels and Washington than his "nationalist" opponent. But Mr.
Burns et al misinterpreted his victory as a sign that the Serbs were throwing
in the towel. (Oh yes, had Tomislav Nikolic of the Serbian Radical Party won,
they would have said that their scenario should be applied because Serbia
proved herself to be irredeemably nationalist . . . )

Far from indicating Serbia's readiness to sling into the vivisection kennel,
however, Tadic's victory was the last chance for the U.S. and the EU to stop
the train wreck. The anger against the West will translate into the
well-deserved electoral demise for Tadic's Democratic Party at the
parliamentary election on May 11.Kosovo will linger on for a few years, as an
expensive albatross costing American and European taxpayers a few billion a
year. It will continue developing, not as a functional economy but as a black
hole of criminality and terrorism. The ever-rising and constantly unfulfilled
expectations of its unemployable multitudes will eventually turn -
Frankenstein's monster-like - against the entity's creator.